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Note on Transliteration 
Until January 1, 1979, all Chinese-English publications and 
Western studies on China used the Wade-Giles system for trans-
literating Chinese names, places, and publications. Since then, 
the People's Republic of China has converted to the Pinyin 
(transcription) system. Throughout this study, the reader will 
note the use of both systems. Since many names, places, and 
events referred to in· this study cover the period before 1979, 
they appear in the Wade-Giles system. This, I believe, is par-
ticularly important for the scholar who wishes to refer to my 
sources and would be required to reconvert Pinyin to Wade-Giles. 
But, with respect to recent sources, as well as recent laws 
translated by the author, they will appear in their original 
Pinyin transcriptions. Certain proper names, such as Mao Zedong 
(Mao Tse-tung), and places such as Beijing (Peking) may be refer-
enced in this study in both systems to facilitate understanding. 
For the convenience of readers, I have included a table on the 
Wade-Giles - Pinyin conversion. 
About the Author 
David Salem received his J.D. and M.B.A. from the University 
of Maryland in 1982 and was a Research Associate in East Asian 
Legal Studies of the University of Maryland School of Law in 
1982-1983. Between 1980 and 1983, he was Executive Editor of the 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. 
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Wade-Giles -- Pinyin 
Conversion Table 
A a 
ai ai 
an an 
ang ang 
ao ao 
CHA zha 
ch 1 a cha 
chai zhai 
ch'ai chai 
chan zhan 
ch 1 an chan 
chang zhang 
ch 1 ang chang 
chao zhao 
ch'ao chao 
che zhe 
ch'e che 
chei zhei 
chen zhen 
ch'en chen 
cheng zheng 
ch'eng cheng 
chi ji 
ch 1 i qi 
chia jia 
ch 1 ia qia 
chaing jiang 
ch • iang qiang 
ch • iao jiao 
ch 1 iao qiao 
chich jie 
ch • ieh qie 
chien jian 
ch' ien qian 
chih zhi 
ch • ih chi 
chin jin 
ch • in qin 
ching jing 
ching qing 
chiu jiu 
ch 1 iu qiu 
chiung jiong 
ch • iung qiong 
cho zhuo 
ch 1 o chuo 
chou zhou 
ch 1 ou chou 
chu zhu 
iii 
ch'u chu 
chua zhua 
ch'ua chua 
chuai zhuai 
ch'uai chuai 
chuan zhuan 
ch'uan chuan 
chuang zhuang 
ch'uang chuang 
chui zhui 
ch'ui chui 
chun zhun 
ch'un chun 
chung zhong 
ch'ung chong 
chu ju 
ch'u qu 
chuan juan 
ch'uan quan 
chuh jeu 
ch'uh que 
chun jun 
ch'un qun 
E, 0 e 
en en 
eng eng 
erh er 
FA fa 
fan fan 
fang fang 
fei fei 
fen fen 
feng. feng 
fo fo 
fou fou 
fu fu 
HA ha 
hai hai 
han han 
hang hang 
hao hao 
hei hei 
hen hen 
heng heng 
ho he 
hou hou 
hsi xi 
hsia xi a 
hsiang xiang 
hsiao xiao 
iv 
hsieh xie 
hsien xian 
hsin xin 
hsing xing 
hsiu xiu 
hsiung xiong 
hsu xu 
hsuan xu an 
hsueh xue 
hsun xun 
hu hu 
hua hua 
huai huai 
huan huan 
huang huang 
hui hui 
hun hun 
hung hong 
huo huo 
I' YI yi 
JAN ran 
jang rang 
jao rao 
je re 
jen ren 
jeng reng 
jih ri 
jo ruo 
jou rou 
ju ru 
juan ruan 
jui ru i jun run 
jung rong 
KA ga 
k'a ka 
kai gai 
k'ai kai 
kan gan 
k'an kan 
kang gang 
k'ang kang 
kao gao 
k'ao kao 
ke, ko ge 
k'e, k'o ke 
kei gei 
ken gen 
k'en ken 
keng geng 
v 
k'eng keng 
ko, ke ge 
k'o, k'e ke 
kou gou 
k 'ou kou 
ku gu 
k'u ku 
kua gua 
k'ua kua 
kuai guai 
k'uai kuai 
kuan guan 
k'uan kuan 
kuang guang 
k'uang kuang 
kuei gui 
k'uei kui 
kun gun 
k'un kun 
kung gong 
k'ung kong 
kuo guo 
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LA la 
lai lai 
lan lan 
lang lang 
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le le 
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li li 
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lo luo 
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lun lun 
lung long 
lu lu 
luan luan 
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MA ma 
mai mai 
man man 
vi 
mang mang 
mao mao 
mei mei 
men men 
meng meng 
mi mi 
miao miao 
mieh mie 
mien mian 
min min 
ming ming 
miu miu 
mo mo 
mou mou 
mu mu 
NA na 
nai nai 
nan nan 
nang nang 
nao nao 
nei nei 
nen nen 
neng neng 
ni ni 
niang niang 
niao niao 
nieh nie 
nien nian 
nin nin 
ning ning 
niu niu 
no no 
nou nou 
nu nu 
nuan nuan 
nun nun 
nung nong 
nu nu 
nueh nue 
0, E e 
ou ou 
PA ba 
p'a pa 
pai bai 
t>'ai pai 
pan ban 
p'an pan 
pang bang 
p'ang pang 
pao bao 
vii 
p'ao pao 
pei bei 
p'ei pei 
pen ben 
p'en pen 
peng beng 
p'eng peng 
pi bi 
p' i pi 
piao biao 
p' iao piao 
pieh bie 
p' ieh pie 
pi en bian 
p' ien pian 
pin bin 
p' in pin 
ping bing 
p' ing ping 
po bo 
p'o po 
pou bou 
p'ou pou 
pu bu 
p'u pu 
SA sa 
sai sai 
san san 
sang sang 
sao sao 
se se 
sen sen 
seng seng 
sha sha 
shai shai 
shan shan 
shang shang 
shao shao 
she she 
shei shei 
shen shen 
sheng sheng 
shih shi 
shou shou 
shu shu 
shu a shu a 
shuai shuai 
shu an shu an 
shuang shuang 
shui shui 
shun shun 
shuo shuo 
so suo 
suo suo 
viii 
ssu, szu si 
su su 
suan suan 
sui sui 
sun sun 
sung song 
szu, ssu si 
TA da 
t'a ta 
tai dai 
t' ai tai 
tan dan 
t'an tan 
tang dang 
t'ang tang 
tao tau 
te de 
t'e te 
te i dei 
teng deng 
t'eng teng 
ti di 
t' i ti 
diao diao 
t'iao tiao 
tieh die 
t'ieh tie 
tien dian 
t' ien tian 
ting ding 
t'ing ting 
tiu diu 
to duo 
t'o tuo 
tou dou 
t 'ou tou 
tsa za 
ts'a ca 
tsai zai 
ts'ai cai 
tsan zan 
ts'an can 
tsang zang 
ts'ang cang 
tsao zao 
ts'ao cao 
tse ze 
ts'e ce 
tsei zei 
tsen zen 
ts 'en cen 
tseng zeng 
ts'eng ceng 
tso ZUO 
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tsou zou 
ts'ou cou 
tsu zu 
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tsuan zuan 
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tsui zui 
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ts'un cun 
tsung zong 
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tu du 
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t'ung tong 
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wei wei 
wen wen 
weng weng 
wo wo 
wu wu 
YA ya 
yai yai 
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yao yao 
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yu you 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Before arms control and disarmament! can make any signifi-
cant contribution to the international legal order, it is neces-
sary for the strategic studies community to be fully apprised not 
only of provisions in disarmament agreements controlling the use, 
manufacture, stockpiling, or testing of arms, but also of the 
conceptual foundation of disarmament -- the receptiveness of each 
of the major legal systems of the world to mandatory provisions 
for verification of disarmament procedures.2 
Direct monitoring of compliance with arms control and dis-
armament (ACD) measures is an essential ingredient in defusing 
suspicion and instilling confidence in the parties to such agree-
ments. Currently, the procedures for direct monitoring take two 
major forms: human intelligence means, including covert opera-
tions and intelligence analysis of published materials, and na-
tional technical means, in which sophisticated electronic and 
seismic equipment verifies compliance from outside the nation 
being monitored.) Regardless of the means employed, the objec-
tive remains the same: insuring verification of arms control 3nd 
disarmament agreements. But verification techniques cannot be 
decisive where the means are somehow inadequate. In esse~ce, it 
is this issue which upset SALT II and which squelched START 
negotiations. 4 It also hampered recent U.S. -chinese talks on a 
nuclear cooperation agreement.S T~e refusal of the P~ople's 
Republic of China ( PRC) to join the International Atcmic Energy 
Agency or ratify the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty has 
made the United States reluctant to sell nuclear technology to 
the Chinese since there are no means to permit inspection to en-
sure non-military use of component parts.6 
The numerous verification techniques are designed with 
three purposes in mind: ( 1) insuring compliance; (2) det:ecting 
violations in time to construct a comparable weapon; and ( 3) 
detecting violations in time to permit defensive counter-
measures.7 As indicated in the recent controversies regarding an 
alleged detonation of a nuclear weapon by South Africa, 8 Soviet 
use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan,9 and the suspected chemi-
cal warfare accident in Sverdlovsk in 1979,10 national technical 
means of verification are often insufficient for detecting mili-
tary violations.ll To ferret out evidence of suspected non-
compliance or to document proof of cooperation appears to require 
a more reliable, albeit more intrusive, procedure, such as on-
site verification.l2 The technique of on-site inspection is 
designed to verify compliance through first-hand observation of 
faci::. ities and weapons processes, revealed presumably through a 
type of "military blueprint," voluntarily offered by a party to 
an ACD agreement as part of its verification obligation or ascer-
tained through sophisticated sate!lite reconnaissance. 
That on-site inspection procedures have been a thorn in the 
side of ACD negotiations comes as no surprise, particularly since 
they so dramatically clash with the international legal principle 
of sovereigntyl3 and threaten to disrupt the intricate processes 
- 1 -
of control and discipline common to totalitarian bureaucracies.l4 
Yet, mandatory provisions for on-site verification of disarmament 
procedures are crucial to the execution of an effective ACD mea-
sure. By insuring verification, the parties are establishing and 
sustaining a confidence factor, the degree of which will vary 
directly with the ability to obtain and maintain direct and accu-
rate information on compliance or non-cornpl iance as the case may 
be. Simply put, on-site inspection in most situations generates 
the highest level of confidence.lS 
The case for the efficacy of on-site inspection is best 
articulated in the context of the receptiveness of the parties' 
legal systems to verification provisions, for once within the 
borders of a country, an inspectorate is subject to its jurisdic-
tion. Issues regarding the composition of an ACD inspectorate, 
as well as its powers, safety, and physical limitations within 
the territory of a party to an ar~s control agreement, are para-
mount to effective inspection and unquestionably subject to 
sovereign juridical constraints.l6 Implementation of disarmament 
provisions will invariably require the direct acquiescence, if 
not direct participation, of each of the· domestic legal systems 
involved. 
The People's Republic of China, despite a reluctance to 
engage in direct, genuine ACD negotiations, has gradually in-
creased its influential capacity in the int<O!J:national community. 
Its induction into the United States in 1971~7 has been followed 
by n.ormalization of relations with the United States in 197918 
and increased recognition as the soleo legal representati•;e of 
China in the international community.l9 Recentl~b the PRC has 
renewed normalization talks with the Soviet Union. The PRC has 
made technological advances in its military modernization pro-
gram, including the very recent testing of a nuclear delivery 
system and the development of space technology21 (albeit for os-
tensible peaceful use), that have brought the Chinese to the 
forefront of military potency. 
However, the obvious relevance to the PRC, at least in 
theory, of ACD negotiations offers no justification for its par-
ticipation in practice. Despite its military advances, the PRC 
has enforced a self-imposed exclusion from ACD negotiations for 
three decades.22 It is only with the confirmation of recent PRC 
overtures to the United States, Soviet Union, and the interna-
tional community on ACD issues, developing Chinese military 
potency, and a growing concern for multilateral, rather than 
bilateral, ACD agreements, that the importance of studying the 
Chinese system has emerged. 
The PRC offered its first principled positions on the en-
tire concept of disarmament in 1979.23 Realizing the necessity 
of keeping abreast on ACD issues and of studying the positions of 
other nations, Chinese officials participated in the work of the 
UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva for the first time in 1980.24 
The PRC has also kept abreast of, and condemned, the militariza-
tion of outer space by the superpowers.25 In truth, though, the 
appearance of Chinese interest in ACD issues did not offer any 
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encouragement for PRC acceptance of verification arrangements to 
ensure compliance, at least not until 1981. 
It was in 1981 that the U.S. media announced that the Chi-
nese had granted permission to American intelligence agents and 
advisors to operate a joint U.S.-PRC electronic intelligence 
gathering station in western China to monitor Soviet missile 
tests.26 Additionally, not quite a year later, in June 1982, the 
PRC modified its original 1979 disarmament program to include the 
requirement of "effective verification techniques" to monitor 
compliance with an ACD agreement,27 a suggestion alluded to ear-
lier in a statement accompanying PRC ratification of the UN Con-
ventional Weapons Convention.28 
Such precedents in recent Chinese ACD pol icy suggest the 
potential for future active PRC participation in ACD negotia-
tions. If that occurs, the question of on-site verification and 
concomitant procedures will definitely become an important issue, 
and will illustrate the necessity for familiarizing other nuclear 
powers with the Chinese system. 
It is the purpose of this study to address the mainland 
Chinese legal system and the related legal problems that may 
arise as a result of the presence of an arms inspectorate on Chi-
nese territory, including the interplay of the PRC criminal sys-
tem the Chinese penchant for secrecy, and the Chinese tre.:!t::tent 
of official representatives of foreign states and international 
organizations. 
Arrangements for on-site inspection would undoubtedly re-
quire lengthy negotiations among the parties to an ACD agreement. 
Although it is not inconceivable that the first true efforts in 
effective verification would utilize more indirect surveillance 
techniques, such as sensitive and sophisticated seiSillic and 
photographic monitoring, an examination of relevant aspects of 
the PRC legal system and Chinese perceptions of international law 
will illuminate some of the issues that will arise in negotiating 
an arms inspection arrangement of any kind with the PRC. More 
importantly, this study will analyze the major legal problems 
that would confront third party negotiators in preparing a ter-
ritorial inspection arrangement in China which, to many, con-
stitutes the only effective verification method.29 By addressing 
verification issues with a firm knowledge of the PRC policy-
implementation process, negotiators can promote the kind of con-
fidence and understanding that breeds cooperation and improves 
considerably the chances for a continuing nuclear peace. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. A number of authors have noted that certain nations have 
drawn distinctions between the concepts of "disarmament" 
and "arms control." To the Soviets, for example, the lat-
ter term has a perjorative connotation, associated with 
such alleged Western purposes as .the attempt to legalize 
nuclear war. Only disarmament is said to constitute a 
genuine step towards peace. See, z. ZILE, R. SHARLET AND 
J. LOVE, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM AND ARMS INSPECTION: A 
CASE STUDY IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (1972) (hereafter cit-
ed as ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE). 
According to another author, the difference is defi-
nitional. Disarmament is said to refer to a "quantitative 
reduction or elimination of armaments and military for-
ces." Arms control denotes "measures designed to regulate 
and restrict armaments so as to maintain a measure of 
military power balance and to reduce the probability of 
accidental war." See Leng, Arms Control and Disarmament 
in Chinese Global POlley in CHINA AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 
164-96 (Hsiung and Kim ed. 1980). Leng stated that the 
PRC has called for nuclear disarmament but has treated 
arms control measures with utter contempt. 1£· 
Based on my research, recent Chinese pronouncements 
on disarmament have included references to measures for 
partial disarmament, which are conceptually close to arms 
control measures. As such, the difference has become 
somewhat blurred. Since this study in large part assumes 
Chinese participation in an arrangement requiring ver ifi-
cation procedures and examines inspection with respect to 
PRC law, it is not crucial whether the arrangement contem-
plated is designated as "arms control" or "disarmament." 
Therefore, the terms will be used interchangeably. I 
recognize, however, that nuances in meaning do exist and 
that the PRC may be more likely to participate in one form 
as opposed to the other. 
2. Some of the major arms control and disarmament agreements 
include: the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, entered into force 
Oct. 10, 1963, in 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 
U.N.T.S. 43 and the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 683, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
Neither of these agreements provides for mandatory 
on-site inspection. The absence of such provisions has 
caused U.S. reluctance to extend the substance of these 
treaties to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty or the 1976 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. See Miller, u.s. 
Decision Near on Nuclear Tests, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 191!"2"; 
at A15. 
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3. See Gelb, Keeping an Eye on Russia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 
1981, Section 6 (Magazine), at 148. See also Keeping 
Everybody Honest, Newsweek, Jan. 31, 1983, at 20. Note 
also in this regard that 5-10 kiloton tests are about the 
minimal blast force requirements for detection under cur-
rent state of the art technology, although the October 
1982 issue of Scientific American reported that new 
developments in seismic equipment now make it possible to 
detect 1 kiloton blasts. See Sykes and Evernden, The 
Verification of a ComprehensiVe Nuclear Test Ban, Scien=:-
tific American, Vol. 247, No. 4 (Oct. 1982), pp. 47-55. 
4. START is the acronym for the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks, bilateral arms control negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, which have been taking 
place in Geneva since June 29, 1982. See The Negotiating 
Scorecard, Newsweek, Jan. 31, 1983, at 18. 
5. See Miller, U.S. Is Holding Up Peking Atom Talks, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 19, 1982, at All. 
6. Id. 
7. See Gelb, supra note 3, at 148. 
8. In 1979, a U.S. Vela reconnaisance satellite picked up two 
flashes of high intensity lightning off the South African 
c cast. Subsequent efforts to verify its source 1 ed some 
U.S. officials to speculate on a South African A-bomb 
test:. See Gwertzman, U.S. Honitors Signs of Atomic Explo-
sion Near South Africa, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at Al. 
9. See, ~· "Soviet Use of Toxic Gas in Afghanistan 
Viewed," Foreign Broadcast Information Service on China 
[hereafter cited as FBIS-CHI], No. 008, 1982 [hereafter 
cited by year and number, e.g., 82-008], Jan. 13, 1982, at 
Fl. 
10. See Gelb, supra note 3. 
11. See generally Keeping Everybody Honest, supra note 3. 
National technical means appear to be particularly inade-
quate where verification measures do not place concomitant 
restrictions on encryption (coding, for example, telemetry 
information that makes verification difficult to deter-
mine), where mobile weapons systems, like the MX, are em-
ployed, and where non-detectable weaponry (laser, particle 
beam weapons and the like) is used. See generally J. PRA-
DOS, THE SOVIET ESTIMATE 269-90 (1982). 
12. Other writers have reached the same conclusion. See, 
~· Safire, Site Unseen, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1983, at 
Al9. The current u.s. administration has also indicated 
its desire to ratify two treaties with the Soviet Union, 
contingent on mutual acceptance of on-site inspection pro-
cedures. See Miller, s~pSa-note 2. 
13. Of paramount legal significance under the 
sovereignty is the absolute inviolability of 
territorial intregrity. 
concept of 
a nation's 
14. See generally ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 1; R. 
BERNSTEIN, FROM THE CENTER OF THE EARTH (1982); F. BUTTER-
FIELD, CHINA: ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA (1982). 
15. See generally Gelb, supra note 3; Safire, supra note 12. 
Moreover, such confidence is not diluted by claims that 
geographic irregularities or underground installation re-
duce the likelihood of effective on-site inspection, at 
least where technical means are also employed to verify 
the existence of facilities in remote locations or to re-
port on militarily suspicious activities that require on-
site verification. 
16. Chief among these constraints is the protection of nation-
al security interests. 
17. The PRC took its place in the General Assembly on Nov. 15, 
1971. See Chiu, The United Nations in LAW IN CHINESE FOR-
EIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 (Leng and Chi u ed. 1972). 
[hereafter cited as Leng and Chiu]. 
18. See JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS between THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the 
PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA in Department of State Bulletin 
79, no. 2022 (Jan. 1979), at 25. 
19. See generally, Chiu, Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing 
"'ti1e People's Republic of China, ll CASE W. RES. J. INT'L 
LAW 389-419 (Spring 1979). 
No state officially recognizes both the· PRC and the 
Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). Just prior to and 
after U.S. PRC normalization, numerous other countries 
extended formal diplomatic recognition to the PRC and de-
recognized the ROC. See THE TAIWAN EXPERIENCE 1950-1980, 
386-89 (Hsiung ed. 1981). 
20. See~· Wren, China and Soviet to Open New Talks, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 5, 1982, at A9. 
21. See ~· Peking Fires Its First Submarine-Launched Mis-
sile, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982 at Al5; "Submarine-
LaUnched Carrier Rocket Tested," FBIS-CHI-82-201 (Oct. 18, 
1982), at Kl; "Wen Wei Po Editorial on Upcoming ICBM 
Test," FBIS-cHI-80-093 (May 12, 1980), at Ul; "Hua Goufeng 
Meets China-Japan Friendship Delegation: Kyodo Cites Hua 
On ICBM," FBIS-cHI-80-096 (May 15, 1980), at D2; "Li Xian-
nian Discusses ICBM Test at Wellington Press Conference," 
'Successful' Rocket Launch," FBIS-cHI-80-098 (May 19, 
1980), at El; "Beijing Press Reports on Successful Missile 
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Test: Jiefangjun Bao COmmentary," FBIS-cHI-80-103 (May 
27, 1980), at LB. 
In 1975, the PRC became the third nation to launch a 
reconnaisance satellite. See New Rocket Now Being Devel-
oped- Scientists, China Daily, July 29, 1982, at 1. 
Through March 13, 1978, the PRC had conducted 20 
nuclear tests, the first of which was on Oct. 16, 1965. 
See "Satellite Launches, Nuclear Tests Listed," FBIS-CHI-
79-186 (Sept. 24, 1979), at Ll2. The PRC has also recent-
ly reported that it possesses nuclear-powered submarines. 
See Journal of Commerce, Sept. 29, 1980, at 9. 
After the 1980 ICBM test, a Wen Wei Po editorial re-
ported that the ICBM test proved the Chinese could master 
advanced technology and create a peaceful environment for 
its four modernizations. See "Wen Wei Po Editorial on 
Upcoming ICBM Test," FBIS-cHI-80-093 (May 11, 1980), at 
Ul. 
The PRC has recently announced the development of 
sophisticated remote-sensing technology. See "Achieve-
ments Reported in Remote Sensing Technology," FBIS-CHI-81-
2 0 9, (Oct. 2 9, 19 81 ) , at Kl8. 
See generally Leng, Ar:ns Control, in Leng and Chi'J, ~ 
note 17, at 243-62. 
On !1ay 15, 1979 at the first session of the UN Disar:nament 
Commission (which the PRC attended as an observer), the 
Chinese proposed their Comprehensive Programme of Disarma-
ment, which has become the core of later PRC disarmament 
proposals. See Speech by the Chairman of the Chinese Del-
egation of the First Substantive Session of the UN Disar-
mament Commission, PRC Press Release (May 15, 1979) (An-
nex), reprinted in Beijing Review, No. 22 (June 1, 1979), 
at 17-19. 
See "PRC to Participate in UN Geneva Disarmament Talks," 
FBIS-cHI-79-177 (Sept. 11, 1979), at A2: "PRC UN Official 
Addresses Disarmament Committee,• FBIS-cHI-80-095 (May 14, 
1980), at A6. 
The Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarma-
ment, first held in 1968, was revamped in 1978 as the Com-
mittee on Disarmament, with a rotating chair and 39 member 
states, including the PRC. A new Disarmament Commission, 
composed of all UN members, was also established by the 
General Assembly to replace the previous commission, first 
formed in 1952. See Leng, supra note 1, at 171. The task 
of the Committee and the Commission was to study and dis-
cuss ACD matters and report to the General Assembly. 
For the text of the final document of the Tenth Spe-
cial Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, 
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held in 1978, which revamped the Committee on Disarmament 
and established the UN Disarmament Commission, see 15 UN 
CHRONICLE 1-12 (annexed) (July 1978). --
25. "People's Daily Views US-USSR Contention in Space," FBIS-
CHI-78-111 (June 8, 1978), at Al; "Renmin Ribao on U.S., 
Soviet Military Satellites," FBIS-cHI-82-158 (Aug. 16, 
1982), at Al; "Delegate to UN Meeting Enunciates Space 
Policy," FBIS-cHI-82-156 (Aug. 12, 1982), at Al. 
26. See U.S., China jointly run spy station, Baltimore Sun, 
June 18, 1981, at Al, col. 1. The establishment of the 
station may date back as far as 1979, when the Washington 
Post reported that the PRC was willing to monitor SALT 
data. Mathew, China Offers to Monitor SALT Data, Washing-
ton Post, April 20, 1979, at Al; "PRC Refuses Comment on 
U.S. Radar Stations,"FBIS-cHI-81-118 (June 19, 1981), at 
Kl. Note that the location of the station seems to cor-
respond to areas listed as U.S. support base structures in 
the PRC in a 1979 Defense Department policy planning 
guidance document known as CG8. See Burt, Study Uraes 
U.S. Aid to Chinese Military, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1979, at 
Al. See also "Renmin Riba.o Discusses Problem with SALT 
Verification," FBIS-cHI-79-127 (July 1, 1982), at Al. 
27. ·see The UN: China's Disarmament Prooosal, Beijing Review, 
No. 28 (July 12, 1982), at 11; "Text of PRC Proposal at UN 
Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-127 (July 1, 1982), at 
Al. 
According to Provision 5 of the proposal, "Disarma-
ment agreements should provide for strict and effective 
measures of international verification." An international 
organization under UN auspices was proposed by the Chinese 
as the arm in charge of verification procedures. 
28. The PRC ratified the UN Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects in early 1982. See "Further on NPC 
Standing Committee Session: Weapons Convention Resolu-
tion," FBIS-cHI-82-046 (March 9, 1982), at K8. The Chi-
nese ratified the Convention and included a statement 
which noted, inter alia, that the "Convention fails to 
provide for. supervision or verification of any violation 
of its clauses, thus weakening its binding force." See 6 
UN DISARMAMENT Y.B. 404 (1981). 
29. The United States has recently announced conditions for 
its approval of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 
1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: the Soviet Union 
must permit on-site inspection. See Miller, U.S. Decision 
Near on Nuclear Tests, N.Y. Time~Nov. 28, 1982, p. Al5. 
See also, Gelb, U.S. Tells Soviet Any Arms Pacts Must In-
clude On-Site Verification, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1981, p. 
AI. 
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PART I: ARMS INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHINESE SYSTEM 
Chapter 1. The People's Republic of China: The Legal Framework 
for Participation in an Arms Control Agreement 
A. The PRC and the Concept of Sovereignty 
The basic principles governing international relations as 
perceived by the People's Republic of China [hereafter PRC or 
China] have served both as political instruments for states to 
utilize in adjusting their relations and implementing their poli-
cy objectives! and as legal justifications for subsequent ac-
tions. Chinese jurists have long recognized and accepted the 
existence of general principles of international law which are 
binding on all countries. 2 This, however, is not to say that 
Chinese perceptions of international law doctrines are well-
grounded in Chinese jurisprudence. In fact, Chinese responses 
have rarely been considered a model of consistency. 3 The PRC 
government recognizes no contradiction in adhering to or denounc-
ing international agreements4 to suit its own political objec-
tives, nor has it hesitated to invoke basic international law 
principles when convenient in order to condemn the policies of 
other nations or to support its own.S 
This is due, in part, to the Chinese view of the structure 
of international politics and its perceived role in international 
affairs. Until 1974, China often resorted to use of the term 
"upheaval" in describing the character of the international sys-
tem.6 The trend most evident to the PRC in the mid-1970s was the 
"relative decline of the United States and the emergence to the 
front line of the Soviet Union as among the ,imperialist 
powers•.•? Nevertheless, numerous events persuaded the PRC that 
the international balance of power was not confined merely to an 
equipoise of the two superpowers. The Paris Agreements between 
the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,S the 
abrogation by Egypt of the Egyptian-Soviet Peace and Friendship 
Treaty,9 the effectiveness of the OPEC cartel and the enlargement 
of the European Economic Community to include Denmark, Greece and 
IrelandlO convinced the Chinese that other nations -- particular-
ly lesser developed ones were exercising their sovereign 
rights and resisting foreign control. This emerging structure of 
the international system crystallized in April 1974 when Vice-
Premier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p' ing) announced the Chinese 
"Three Worlds Theory.•ll 
This theory of the present state of international relations 
was based on a division of the nations of the world into three 
camps. Based on "traditional geopolitics and a revised interna-
tional version of the old Marxist united front tactic in domestic 
politics,•l2 the First World was comprised of the international 
ruling forces of imperialism (United States) and social-
imperialism (Soviet Union). The "national bourgeois elements" of 
Canada, Western and Eastern European countries, Australia, and 
Japan comprised the Second World. The underdeveloped and ex-
ploited countries comprised the Third World: these countries 
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could preserve their interests by uniting with the Second World 
nations to oppose "superpower hegemony.•l3 By constantly decry-
ing Soviet expansionism and relegating the Soviet Union to First 
World membership, the PRC rejected the unity of the socialist 
bloc.l4 Such a negation implied the belief that China's national 
security ultimately depended on a united Third World bloc led by 
Beijing.l5 As the vanguard of the Third World, China's objective 
was to aid the underdeveloped countries in their struggle to 
throw off the yoke of superpower "enslavement or control and [to 
safeguard] their [Third World countries ,J national independence 
and the integrity of their sovereignty.•lo 
The concept of sovereignty [zhuquan] is crucial to an 
understanding of China's foreign policy and of China's interac-
tion with the international community. The PRC has always cham-
pioned the principle of sovereignty, both in theory and in prac-
tice.l7 In the name of national sovereignty, the PRC has engaged 
in limited self-defense measures,l8 resisted the concept of 
third-party judgment in the settlement of disputes between na-
tions;19 opposed the use of UN emergency forces;20 supported the 
establishment of a new international economic order and a ne•11 
regime of the law of the sea;21 opposed the use of force;22 jus-
tified economic aid to other countries;23 and objected to any 
movement toward a supranational world government.24 As Chou 
Keng-sheng argued in 1963, sovereignty had been the most basic 
principle of international law and the most valuable characteris-
tic of the state,25 and modern states were faced with the problem 
of how to maintain, and not to relinquiish or diminish, their 
sovereign rights.26 
The Chinese obsession with the concept of sovereignty is 
the residuum of China's past frustrations and grievances, most 
notably as they related to China's technological inferiority vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union and United States, to Chinese efforts to 
gain legitimacy through recognition as a member of the United 
Nations;27 and to China's pervasive antipathy toward unequal 
treaties.28 The position of the PRC is, in large measure, an 
extension of what some scholars term the "Westphalia conception 
of international legal order" which stresses "the positivist no-
tion of vesting national sovereignty with the highest authority 
in matters of international law and [holds] that the state could 
be legally bound only to the extent it had given its consent.•29 
Though national sovereignty is probably the most salient feature 
of the Chinese view of the international legal order, it is cir-
cumscribed by the practical necessities of foreign relations. 
The Chinese were compelled to reject the principles of limited 
and absolute sovereignty -- the two extremes of the principle of 
state sovereignty -- on the basis that the exercise of absolute 
sovereignty by one nation would infringe on the sovereignty of 
another. 30 As the most logical consequence of this rejection, 
the PRC instead supported the principle of mutual respect for 
national sovereignty as the only proper interpretation of the 
sovereignty doctrine in modern international law.31 Mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty formed the 
basis of China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,32 which 
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have, in turn, served as the cornerstone of Chinese relations 
with other nations.33 
These principles, particularly that of mutual respect for 
state sovereiJlnty, are devoid of any "absolute or expansionist 
imperative.") As viewed by th PRC, sovereignty is to some ex-
tent, a defensive concept used as an instrument to protect Chi-
na's own national interests.35 In this respect, China's advocacy 
of the principle of mutual respect for national sovereignty is 
"both self-serving and self-limiting, n36 but it is undoubtedly 
designed to foster sovereign equality in the international com-
munity and preserve its rights under the maxim par in parem non 
habet imperium (equals have no jurisdiction over one another). 
B. The Chinese Attitude Toward International 
Organizations 
When examining Chinese attitudes toward principles and 
sources of international law, one ought not to attach great sig-
nificance to resolutions of the United Nations or other interna-
tional organizations, which merely "formulate, refine, and embel-
lish amorphous appeals for peace, disarmament, and amicable 
cooperation. n37 The pronouncements of these international or-
ganizations, though often embraced by the Chinese and other com-
munist countries when they serve contemporary communist and 
socialist goals, are simply too broad, too generalized and too 
easily ignored to be of probative or administrative value. 
Though recent international legal writings in many 
countries have recognized international organizations as subjects 
of international law,38 the PRC has been hesitant to support the 
expanded roles, functions and recognition of such entities. Chi-
nese hesitancy is probably the result of fear that these or-
ganizations may well encroach upon certain aspects of· state 
sovereignty which have not been relinquished, either expressly or 
impliedly, by the nation-state. Chinese perceptions of interna-
tional organizations, including the United Nations,39 are colored 
somewhat by past PRC opposition to the formulation of a unified 
world government.40 The result is that the PRC has historically 
favored a restricted role for international organizations. 
Within the past three years, however, the Chinese position has 
shifted. In late 1979, for example, the PRC acceded to the UN 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized 
Agencies, [hereafter UN Convention on Privileges] a move which 
may have significant repercussions for the Chinese, who thereby 
granted recognized juridical status -- albeit limited -- to the 
representatives of international human and social services 
organizations.41 
By and large, though, the Chinese view of international 
organizations continues to be somewhat ambiguous. For instance, 
PRC accession to the UN Convention on Privileges is colored both 
by its selectiveness (Chinese accession was with respect to only 
eight specialized agencies) and the fact that it has not yet been 
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accompanied by accession to the Convention of the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations42 (and UN personnel], which 
should, arguably, logically precede access ion to a convention 
extending privileges and immunities to UN agencies and their per-
sonnel. Moreover, one might expect that, at least before 
1979,the PRC would have denied the power of international or-
ganizations to issue pronouncements creating international legal 
principles. Such principles would generally be viewed as binding 
upon states and would thereby constitute implied acceptance of 
world government principles, something the Chinese had thereto-
fore considered incompatible with their views of the internation-
al legal order. Yet, the Chinese often invoked General Assembly 
and Security Council resolutions,43 as well as resolutions passed 
by other international organizations, 44 in support of Chinese 
positions or in condemnation of the policies of other nation 
states. 
Since the PRC has recognized international custom as a 
source of international law,45 it is conceivable that UN resolu-
tions unanimously adopted by diverse nation-states may acquire 
the significance of principles of international law.46 The prob-
lem, of course, is with the precise Chinese definition of the 
term "unanimity." International conventions, multilateral trea-
ties and international adjudicatory decisions not adhered to by 
at least a significant majority of states will almost certainly 
not gain Chinese recognition as general principles of interna-
tional la~, though how close to absolute unanimity the PRC would 
require the consensus to be is uncertain. 
PRC publicists have rarely referred to judicial decisions 
as evidence of international law.47 They have, in fact, resorted 
to accusations that the decisions of international tribunals were 
products of capitalist manipulation.48 The Chinese have also 
been hy?eccr i tical of "suggestions smacking of an expansion or 
even a liberal interpretation of the functions of the 
I(nternational) C(ourt) [of] J(ustice)•49 [hereafter ICJ]. 
Chinese indifference toward international judicial pro-
cedure is evidenced by Chinese avoidance of, and non-
participation in, any organs and activities of a purely legal 
character within the United Nations system. 50 The PRC has re-
fused to advance candidates for judgeships on the ICJ, despite 
opportunities to do so in 1972 and 1975.5~ Furthermore, the PRC 
has consistently refused to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the World Court.52 
Chinese participation in affairs of the Sixth Commiteee of 
the UN General Assembly -- the main legal organ of that UN body 
-- has been limited to responses on such highly politicized legal 
issues as the definition of aggression,53 the question of Charter 
revision54 and international terrorism.55 The PRC has involved 
itself in the International Law Commission56 but has avoided ac-
tive participation in the UN Commission on International Trade 
Law, though it appears to be interested in the result of such 
proceedings.57 Chinese indifference to legal issues presented in 
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the forum of the United Nations has also manifested itself in the 
refusal of the PRC to attend five major UN conferences on inter-
national law.58 The paucity of recognition by official ~edia of 
Chinese adherence to specifically defined international law prin-
ciples, 59 the lack of any formal PRC pronouncement of Chinese 
international law doctrine and the dearth of properly qualified 
legal personnel in the ?Rc60 are the raison d 1 etre of China 1 s 
calculated posture of noncommitment on international legal issues 
in the United Nations. 
c. Individuals as Subjects of International Law 
Because an acknowledgment of the principle that interna-
tional organizations possess the totality of the rights accorded 
to states tends to diminish the sovereign quality of a nation, 
dispersal of national power to individuals should logically be 
viewed as equally attenuating. Recognition of individual respon-
sibility for personal acts under international law would also 
clash with Marxist principles regarding the class struggle in 
international relations. Moreover, the Chinese rejection of the 
concept of individuals as subject of international law is an in-
disputable repudiation of the monist conception of law which, by 
casting individuals in the role of international entities, at-
tempted to circumvent the internal sovereign rule of the state.61 
To the PRC, the only legitimate instrument to ensure the rights 
o~ i~dividuals is t~e nation state. 
Though such an assumption would seem to lead ineluctably to 
the conclusion that individuals are protected by, and obligated 
to, domestic laws only, the PRC does recognize and accept the 
concept that certain individuals, in their capacity as state rep-
resentatives, are subject to, and protected by, diplomatic and 
consular privileges and immunities. Any speculation that the 
conferment of international legal rights on diplomatic personnel 
constitutes an anomaly in Chinese jurisprudence would probably 
prove to be unwarranted on closer examination. 
In the Chinese view, such acts as genocide, slave and nar-
cotic traffic -- despite proscription under international law --
are prohibited only because of a multiplicity of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and accords.62 Thus, it is essentially the 
act of the state which is responsible for the creation of such 
proscribed categories. In addition, within the context of trea-
ties and accords, each signatory remains free to fashion a defi-
nition of what elements constitute a proscribed crime and each 
viclator remains responsible for his actions, though not as a 
subject of international law. Any effort on the part of interna-
tional organizations to bypass state-granted rights in order to 
confer or protect additional individual rights is likely to be 
viewed as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty and intervention 
in Chinese internal affairs.63 
D. Sources of International Law 
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Innumerable conceptual problems exist in researching 
Chinese law because of ( 1) gaps· and d i scon tinu i ty in both the 
coverage and sources of the theory and practice of international 
law64 in the PRC; (2) the paucity of official elaboration on 
international legal issues; and, ( 3) the difficulty in distin-
guishing the real from the rhetorical in· available written 
materials as a result of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control 
over the press.65 For the researcher, there is still no meth-
odological panacea for examining Chinese legal material. As re-
cently as 1958, the Office for Teaching and Research of Interna-
tional Law in the Institute of Diplomacy of the PRC published an 
anthology of selected reference materials. In them, the PRC 
listed three items as potential sources of international law: 
(1) Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ; (2) the UN General As-
sembly Resolution on the Progressive Development of International 
Law and its Codification of December 11, 1946; and, (3) the UN 
General Assembly Resolution on the Principles of International 
Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal of Decem-
ber 11, 1946.66 
The problem with these sources is twofold. First, they are 
almost twenty-four years old. Second, even at the time of their 
issuance, the Chinese editor who published the sources stated 
that the documents were for reference only (emphasis added). 67 
Because the success or failure of the implementation of any arms 
control inspection arrangement will depend in large measure on 
the Chinese perception of international legal principles at the 
time the arrangement is implemented, wariness surfaces over pre-
dicting Chinese behavior on the basis of pronouncements over two 
decades old. From a methodological standpoint, the researcher is 
thus presented with the problem of attempting to fill in the gap 
in time. 
In addition to the three sources of international law men-
tioned above, the PRC has occasionally advanced Chinese theories 
of "general principles of law." These principles have been 
limited to a small number of instances of actual use in legal 
treatises and arguments, however, including an occasion where the 
sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan was defended by invoking from 
municipal law the maxim ex injuria jus ~ oritur (a person can-
not acquire a right through an illegal act).68 
Hence, the Chinese perspective on international law and 
general principles of law cannot readily be gleaned from a mere 
examination of Chinese law and foreign policy. Rather, the fun-
damental consideration for the parties to an arms control agree-
ment will be the consent, implicit or explicit, to international 
legal rules by the PRC within the agreement itself. This hypoth-
esis is violated by Chinese perceptions on the system of interna-
tional law. 
Marxist-Leninist dogma postulates that the state super-
structure, including all laws, reflects the economic base of 
society and serves the interests of the ruling class.69 Interna-
tional law, therefore,. possesses class character. The literal 
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application of "international law" to an international community 
composed of states with diverse social systems is considered 
impossible, since uniformity of legal principles in diverse 
economic systems concedes the independence of law from the 
economic base,70 an untenable position to Marxist-Leninists. 
Disenchantment with the perceived inequality between the 
PRC and its ideological adversaries in the West as well as Chi-
nese understanding of its fundamental technological and economic 
inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the United States 
resulted in a dialectical analysis of the international system, 
one that views that system as composed of at least two camps, 
each of which holds diametrically opposed world views. The logi-
cal corollary of such analysis is a theoretical formulation of 
more than one system of international law. The three schools 
of thought that have been fashioned around the question of the 
universality of international law71 have contributed to the ambi-
guity of the current Chinese position. 
The PRC, though, is quite aware of contradictions between 
ideology and practical necessity. The Chinese have asserted that 
international law is a "political instrument" and, as such, may 
be reformulated in terms of contemporary foreign policies and 
public interests.72 Thus, it appears that the PRC would be will-
ing, in proper instances, to further its national goals by adapt-
ing Marxist principles to international exigencies. 
The Chinese position on custom as a source of international 
law also illustr.ates the importance of procuring PRC consent in 
an arms control inspection agreement. Though the Soviets have 
apparently acceded to the principle that custom is a basic source 
of international law,73 the Chinese have devoted little attention 
to it. Although a 1963 People's Daily article74 listed "interna-
tional treaties and international custom" as sources of interna-
tional law, the Chinese more often resort to the use of other 
euphemisms for the term "custom. •75 Moreover, where custom is 
applied, it is often used ad hoc to demonstrate the unreasonable-
ness of actions by other -nations. The PRC has, for example, 
charged other nations with having deviated from established pat-
terns of conduct which had created some degree of continuity and 
consistency in foreign relations.76 
In view of the foregoing factors and the relative brevity 
of international law as an independent academic discipline in the 
PRC, consent will constitute the clearest basis for legal obliga-
tion in the international community. Though the PRC remains in-
different to many of the legal machinations of the international 
community, it is rarely disputed that treaties are recognized by 
the Chinese as an "important source of international law and an 
important form of expressing international law.•77 The PRC tends 
to focus on the consensual quality of the arrangement as the ul-
timate source of its binding force upon the parties and tends to 
minimize differences which "accrue from the modality in which an 
agreement is contracted. •78 Treaties are thus a major [zhuyao] 
source of international law. 79 This, though, is not to imply 
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that treaty law 
corollary to its 
it would hardly 
obligations in 
considerations.BO 
is viewed by the Chinese as sacrosanct. As a 
policy-oriented approach to international law, 
be surprising for the Chinese to put treaty 
a position subordinate to political 
The PRC relies on treaties to assert its power and to pro-
mote internal economic development. The importance of treaties 
to the PRC can be gleaned from a quantitative standpoint alone: 
more than 1700 have been concluded bv the Chinese between 1968 
and 19Bo.Bl • 
The position of importance the PRC ascribes to treaties 
must be punctuated with a caveat: only treaties regarded as 
"equal" (i.e., fairly negotiated and concluded) •,o~ill be followed 
in letter and spirit and will be accorded the status of a legiti-
mate source of international law by the Chi:tese. As such, Chi-
nese international law scholars and jurists are probably destined 
to play a continuing role in appraising the substance of treaties 
concluded by the PRC. 
With the exception of those treaties regarded by the Chi-
nese as unequal, the PRC has, for the most part, been a proponent 
of the principle of pacta sunt servanda82 (a treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties and must be performed in good faith). 
Treaty dis9utes between the PRC and other nations have been the 
result, not of outright treaty violations, but rather of the 
vagaries associated with treaty inter!Jretation.83 Moreover, 
treaty inter!Jretation problems have been exacerbated by mutual 
distrust and a failure by both sides to recognize and address the 
disparities in their separate legal theories.84 
The formal medium of treaties provides the PRC with a com-
mon ground of securityBS in dealing with other nations. However, 
the practical effect of Chinese assertions of unequal treaties is 
to allow the PRC to accept and adhere to those principles of 
international law -- as enunciated in treaty provisions --which 
it considers politically expedient. Such a practice inevitably 
results in eclecticism and ambiguity. 
Both the Soviet Union and the PRC subscribe to the concept 
of unequal treaties, and both are in apparent agreement that un-
equal treaties can be unilaterally abrogated at any time without 
contravening principles of international law.86 However, the PRC 
has not followed a consistent pattern of treaty abrogation under 
the unequal treaty concept. This has resulted in a number of 
claims against the PRC for treaty violations.B7 
A Chinese determination that a treaty is unequal has been 
based on one of two characteristics: the inequality of the 
negotiating states or the creation of dissimilar and non-
reciprocal obligations.BB The Chinese have elaborated on the 
definition of inequality and have included within it the princi-
ples of coercion and exploitation.89 To this extent, the Chinese 
view is similar to recognized Western practice, which condemns 
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the threat or use of "pressure, whether military, political, or 
economic" as a coercive tactic in concluding treaties.90 
Beyond the principle of coercion, however, additional 
criteria for the determination of equality of sovereign power in 
treaty negotiation have failed to crystallize. In theory, the 
PRC has been fairly firm on the need for reciprocal consider-
ations on substantive treaty provisions. In practice, though, 
the PRC has not always applied the concept of "identical and 
reciprocal obligations" as uniformly to multilateral conven-
tions9l nor as consistently to its own bilateral treaties.92 
The PRC has also denounced as unequal a number of treaties 
to which it has not even been a party, including the 1963 Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Treaty cp the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons.93 Chinese objections to the latter treaty serve 
as the operative basis for PRC denunciation of present disarma-
ment proposals and are illustrative of China,s prevailing concern 
for reciprocal obligations: non-nuclear states were deprived of 
their rights to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense purposes 
while the United States and Soviet Union had undertaken no com-
mitment to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
countries.94 
Because treaties are considered to be an accurate measure 
of Chinese international behavior and intentions, it is important 
that the PRC, with the passage of time, has more consistently and 
more emphatically demanded the incorporation of the Five Princi-
ples of Peaceful Coexistence into its treaties. 95 Even if one 
disregards Chinese claims that these principles be considered new 
and progressive international norms or even lex ferenda, their 
implication for any arms control arrangemen~is significant. 
Despite what some may view as favor able prior treaty practice, 
the specific incorporation of at least the first three of chese 
principles to wit, mutual respect for sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and mutual non-
interference in each other's affairs-- provides the Chinese with 
a substantive framework for opposition to verification provisions 
on the grounds that an arms inspectorate interferes with Chinese 
internal affairs. It is quite conceivable that the PRC would 
posit a legal argument that inspection arrangements are outside 
the scope of that which is properly recognized as treaty subject 
matter, i.e., matters of international relations. Because of 
high regard which the Chinese hold for the principle of 
sovereignty, the protection of PRC national interests may prompt 
the Chinese to ignore any potential counterargument that 
verification and inspection arrangements further the goal of 
peaceful coexistence, which the PRC lists as its fifth principle. 
The PRC has been reluctant to become a party to many multi-
lateral agreements,96 which -- though it may not indicate direct 
Chinese opposition to the substantive content of each -- does 
"reflect an ambivalence in the contemporary Chinese image of le-
gal order,"97 and may suggest a failure on te part of the PRC to 
"[formulate] a principled stand that is applicable to every legal 
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issue ar1s1ng in the conduct of her multilateral diplomacy. n98 
Chinese involvement does, however, extend along a common concep-
tual thread: the development of new rules, new values, and new 
norms of international legal order, all of which the PRC con-
siders essential to the struggle of Third World countries for 
"redistributive justice."99 
Such conceptual extrapolation, however, must yield in cer-
tain instances to more definitive declarations. In this regard, 
the import of PRC pronouncements on specific international law 
principles regarding treaties cannot be under-estimated. In ad-
dition to the principle of pacta sunt servanda previously men-
tioned, the Chinese have also endorsed the principle of pacta 
tertiis ~ nocent nee prosuntlOO (treaties impose no burden nor 
confer any benefits on third parties) in maintaining that the PRC 
could not be bound by previous international arms control agree-
ments nor by international conventions to which it was not a par-
ty.lOl Indisputably, any working arrangement on arms inspection 
with the PRC will involve a careful analysis of Chinese adherence 
to international law principles, a sensitivity to the Chinese 
political climate and the need to spell out bilateral or multi-
lateral obligations in considerable detail. 
E. The Relationship of International Law and Municipal Law 
Chinese legal literature until very recently was ess2ntial-
ly devoid of any discussion on the relationship between interna-
tional law and municipal law. The PRC had invoked "international 
law standards and humanitarian principles" in sentencing Japanese 
war cr iminalsl02 and included a number of treaties in a rather 
dat:ed official publication, "Compilation of Laws and Regulations 
of the People,s Republic of China."l03 Beyond these factors, PRC 
legal doctrine on the relationship of international law and 
municipal law was given scant attention. Only recently, and only 
to a limited degree, has this changed. 
Certain in tern a tional law principles have been expressly 
incorporated into PRC municipal legislation. For example, Arti-
cle 32 of the 1982 PRC Constitutionl04 expressly incorporates the 
right of political "asylum" for foreign nationals. This right is 
not limited to cases of persecution "for striving for the prog-
ress of humanity, for defending a peaceful cause or for engaging 
in scientific" as was Article 59 of the 1978 PRC Constituton, 
which, undoubtedly, was patterned after the Soviet constitutional 
provision ,10 5 Furthermore, a recent report on the PRC' s Pro-
visional Civil Procedure Code directly addressed the conflict 
between Civil Procedure code provisions and international and 
bilateral treaties to which the PRC was a party.l06 
The express incorporation of the right of political asylum 
into Chinese municipal legislation as well as the references to 
international and bilateral treaties in the Civil Procedure Code 
that decrees on the rights, privileges and immunities of foreign 
nationals, diplomats, consular representatives and auxiliary per-
sonnel represents one of the more readily acceptable principles 
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of international law to the PRC. The Chinese response to the 
Iranian seizure of American diplomatic personnel in Teheran in 
1979, in fact, was terse and unequivocal: the Iranian act vio-
lated recognized principles of international law.l07 
Consistent with Chinese declarations on privileges and im-
munities of diplomatic personnel, the PRC also ratified the Vien-
na Convention on Diplomatic Relations,l08 the 1963 Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relationsl09 and the UN Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies,llO though in 
typically enigmatic fashion, the PRC has refused to ratify the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents.lll such apparent inconsistency detracts from the postu-
late that the PRC has fully incorporated fundamental internation-
al law principles into domestic legislation. 
Given these discrepancies and ambiguities and recalling the 
Chinese posture on the inviolability of the principle of 
sovereignty, it seems almost axiomatic to conclude that the PRC 
attaches little significance to the judicial decisions and 
municipal legislation of individual nation-states. It also 
diminishes the possibility that individual nations could succeed 
in influencing the PRC posture toward international law beyond a 
point the Chinese consider economically and politically expedient 
for their own purposes. 
F. The Scoee of Treaty Law in the PRC 
An assessment of PRC treaty-making practice ought to begin 
with a formal examination of Chinese agreements bearing different 
designations. 
Only a small number of agreements have been given the most 
formal designation-- tiaoyue (treaty). This category designates 
the "most important international documents, regulating politi-
cali economic or other relations between contracting states ••• 
. "1 2 More likely than not, the conclusion of an arms control 
agreement with provisions for verification will be embodied in 
tiaoyue. 
Short-term problems of contracting states are handled in 
the most frequently used form of Chinese contractual arrangement 
-- xieding (agreement).ll3 Multinational arrangements regulating 
special problems are called conventions -- gongyue or 
zhuanyue .114 
General principles of international law and international 
relations are often embodied in xuanyan, or declarations.llS 
International documents addressing more specific and individual 
problems as well as providing for the amendment and interpreta-
tion of, or supplement to a treaty are known as yidingshu, or 
protocols.ll6 An "exchange of notes (huanwen)" between two 
states is used when it is necessary_ to define certain matters 
already agreed upon by the parLies.li7 
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The PRC also used the following designation for certain 
agreements: 1) lianhe gongbao (joint communique);ll8 2) ~
tong banfa (joint measures); 3) beiwanglu (memorandum)i· 4) xinwen 
gongbao (press communique); and, 5) hetona (contract). 19 
The PRC belief that treaties and other international agree-
ments constitute a major source of international law rema1ns 
tainted somewhat by discrepancies between doctrine and practice. 
The Chinese definition of treatyl20 is devoid of fundamental dis-
tinctions between those that may be viewed as equal and those 
that may not. Moreover, the definition ignores any explanation 
of divergent patterns ir. PRC practice which negate the Chinese 
assertion that only states may be parties to treaties .121 Fur-
thermore, the PRC continues to claim its unabashedly eclectic 
right to choose which of the pre-1949 treatiesl22 ratified before 
the division of China (into Taiwan and the PRC) it will adhere 
to. 
Given such ambiguous and selective behavior, it would seem 
that any predictable increase in Chinese participation in exten-
sive, multilateral arrangements is at best speculative and may 
lead ~ passu to a decrease in third party expectation and 
acknowledgement of Chinese commitments. The effect of such a 
result on the extremely sensitive and delicate provisions for 
arms inspection would be disastrous. Though such concern may be 
neither unwarranted not unjustified, there are a number of obser-
vations which indicat<'! that the Chinese posture O:'! f'.lture-
negotiated treaties may be somewhat more consistent and less 
problematic. 
First, the exclusion of the PRC from the United Nations 
until 1971 precluded participation in the development or signing 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties .12 3 As such, 
China was unable to engage in the discussions and negotiations 
which would have permitted and necessitated the formulation of a 
more definitive and lucid PRC position. The framework of norms 
governing the machinations cf the treaty-making process were thus 
erected without PRC participation, a process which, by precluding 
adversary negotiations, prevented the Chinese from seeking the 
kinds of concessions or making the types of tactical tradeoffs 
that are so much a part of what the Chinese have perceived as a 
"struggle with the enemy." 
Second, the sheer volume of Chinese treatiesl24 indicates 
the significant role which treaties play in PRC bilateral and 
multilateral relations and enervates somewhat the concern ex-
pressed as to the lack of a concise, coherent and distinct Chi-
nese position. More revealingly, the PRC has consistently called 
for foreign assistance in its drive to realize the four modern-
izations.I25 The conclusion of agreements with multifarious, 
individual nations and the PRC desire for dispatch in achieving 
modernization mandates moderation of previously irreconciliable 
differences, non-negotiable topics and immutable positions. The 
emergence of comity and equity and the dissolution of mistrust 
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and suspicion may combine to create accommodation and compromise 
in PRC treaty negotiations. 
Third, from a methodological perspective, treaties rep-
resent the most unequivocal source of severe ign consent. The 
Chinese ascribe far more significance to principles governing 
in te rna t ional relations as they are embodied in treaties than 
they do to international law principles. 
Because of Chinese sensitivity to inequality in the treaty-
making process, present political and economic expediency, and 
the paucity of definitive statements on the meaning and ap-
plicability of international law principles and generally ap-
plicable rules governing international relations, no reliance 
should be placed on Chinese readiness to render interpretations 
of broad treaty provisions consistent with customary or general-
ly-recognized international principles. The conclusion of an 
arms control agreement containing inspection provisions would be 
regarded as a non-routine matter. As such, the procedures 
governing its conclusion, application, interpretation, revision 
and termination compare poorly with common practice in concluding 
trade agreements or other less intrusive contractual arrange-
ments. It is of paramount importance, therefore, to spell out in 
considerable detail Chinese rights and obligations relating to 
verification procedures. 
G. The Relationship of Treaty Law and Municipal Law 
For the most part, the PRC follows generally accepted norms 
and procedures for the negotiation, conclusion and ratification 
of international agreements. Treaties, for example, are con-
cluded through a series of steps, comprising the stages of 
negotiation, signature, ratification and -- where ratification is 
required -- the exchange of ratifications.l26 
The treaty-making power of the PRC is vested in the perma-
nent organ of the National People's Congress [hereafter NPC], the 
Standing Committee.l27 Article 67 of the 1982 PRC Constitution 
enumerates the specific functions of the Standing Committee, 
which include, inter alia, the power "to decide on the ratifica-
tion and abrogation ~treaties and important agreements con-
cluded with foreign states"l28 (Art. 67(14)) and the power "to 
decide on the appointment and recall of plenipotentiary represen-
tatives abroad" (Art. 67(13)). The chairman of the Standing Com-
mittee is empowered to ratify treaties with foreign states in 
accordance with the decisions of the PRC or its Standing Commit-
tee. The State Council, as the highest executive organ of the 
PRc,l29 is granted the power to submit proposals on laws and 
other matters to the NPC or its Standing Committee and to con-
clude treaties and agreements with foreign countries.l30 The 
President of the PRC is directly responsible for the signing of 
treaties and for the appointment of the proper official to act as 
plenipotentiary.l31 The PRC Constitution describes the duties of 
the President as follows: 
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The President of the People's Republic of 
China receives foreign diplomatic rep-
resentatives ..• and, in pursuance of deci-
sions of the Standing Committee .•. appoints 
and recalls plenipotentiary representa-
tives abroad, and ratifies and abrogates 
treaties and important agreements con 
eluded with foreign states. (emphasis 
added). (Art. 81). 
All appointments and removals of plenifotentiaries are sub-
ject to approval by the Standing Committee. 32 The official who 
serves in the capacity of plenipotentiary may be the Chairman 
himself, the foreign minister, the premier, or any other desig-
nated official.l33 Though the PRC has occasionally engaged in 
the practice of concluding agreements by signatures alone,l34 
although the sensitive nature and content of an inspection provi-
sion is not likely to lead to any circumvention of the most for-
mal treaty-making procedure -- ratification. 
Agreements which must be ratified are first passed by the 
State Council, then submitted for approval to the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC, and finally formally acted upon by the NPC as 
a whole,l35 although the PRC Chairman or duly appointed represen-
tative may sign the agreement before actual ratification. 
The PRC has acceded to a small number of multilateral con-
ventions, the acceptance of which was promulgated by a resolution 
of the NPC Standing Committee.l36 The foreign ministry of the 
State Council then transmits the instrument of accession to the 
depository.l37 Reservations may be attached at the time of ac-
cession,l38 though it is not clear what significance the PRC at-
taches to these reservations.l39 Both PRC practice and protec-
tion of sovereign principles seem to dictate, however, that the 
Chinese would assert, at the proper time, that a state possesses 
the sovereign right to make reservations to multilateral treaties 
without the consent of other contracting parties.l40 
The Chinese regard the settlement of disputes over treaty 
provisions to be within the sole province of the contract inc:; 
parties.l41 Though the PRC has included arbitration clauses in a 
number of recent trade agreements,l42 Chinese support for 
diplomatic negotiations as the only effective means to secure 
resolution of treaty disputes has otherwise precluded any will-
ingness to permit third party intervention and mediation.l~J 
The formal constitutional criteria delimiting the PRC 
treaty-making process seem to support the proposition that trea-
ties have the status of domestic law. Though there has been no 
specific assertion by the PRC that treaties do not become binding 
norms of Chinese municipal law, some scholars have argued that 
there is no reason why the PRC could not accept the Soviet doc-
trinel44 that the rules of treaty law and those of domestic law 
should have the same binding force on state institutions and 
citizens.l45 One might also postulate that there is no need for 
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formal incorporation of treaty law into municipal statutes be-
cause treaties are established as a result of the volition of 
state organs [the NPC and its Standing Committee] which, by vir-
tue of specific constitutional provisions, are entrusted with the 
exercise of supreme legislative power. As such, both treaties 
and domestic legislation promulgated by the same authority should 
have the same binding force. 
Nevertheless, the lack of any formal PRC commitment to the 
principle that treaties create binding norms of international law 
preempts an unqualified assertion that PRC treaties directly cre-
ate rules of Chinese municipal law. However, PRC state practice 
and an examination of the most recent principal normative enact-
ments of the NPC indicate that Chinese municipal law has incorpo-
rated treaty rules and norms. Some municipal law documents have 
referred directly to particular treaties. The 1955 Sino-
Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, for example, was included in 
an official Chinese compilation of laws, decrees and 
regulations.l46 
Some statutory provisions have paraphrased treaty rules 
without directly citing specific treaties. In 1964, legislation 
regulating the travel and residence of aliens in the PRC provided 
that cases involving violations by foreign nationals enjoying 
diplomatic immunity be handled through diplomatic channels.l47 
The 1979 P~C Crimi~al Law Code, Article 8, provides that 
"criminal responsibility of foreigners enjoying diplomatic im-
munity is dealt with according to diplomatic practice." The 
paucity of examples of incorporation of treaty provisions in to 
municipal law suggests that the Chinese are perhaps unaccustomed 
to any concept of general transformation in the absence of 
specific legislative acts. The mere publication of treaties does 
not ipso facto provide for the conversion of treaty rules into 
municipal law. 11oreover, the Chinese have not acceded to t!'le 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.l48 Arguably, the PRC 
may still invoke provisions of its municipal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty,l49 which supports an asser-
tion that treaty law is not automatically incorporated into 
domestic law and, in fact, may be subordinate to it. 
Though Chinese treaties may provide a legal basis for the 
issuance of municipal statutes, it would not be appropriate to 
conclude that treaty rules necessarily give rise to municipal 
law. The Chinese might posit the argument that the sovereign 
right of a state mandates that treaties be transformed into Chi-
nese law only through the promulgation of special legislative 
enactments. Arguably, though, such a contention may be without 
merit since the identical legislative bodies are responsible for 
the promulgation of domestic and treaty law. As such, there 
would be no infringement on the exclusive jurisdiction of these 
legislative bodies, nor would there seem to be any circumvention 
of legislative procedure in the treaty-making process which would 
provide extrinsic justification for declaring that treaties cre-
ate rules of municipal law. Chinese doctrinal developments 
regarding the relation between treaty and municipal law are 
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simply nonexistent, however, and one is inclined to believe that 
the Chinese themselves may not be clear on their own position. 
Moreover, regardless of any adherence by the Chinese government 
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the NPC is not the -sole 
decision-maker of rules of municipal law. Local people's con-
gresses and organs of self-government of national autonomous 
areas exercise some degree of autonomylSO and it is quite con-
ceivable that there may be some discrepancies between the laws 
endorsed by each of the different organs. For instance, the 
recent introduction of the 1982 PRC Constitution and the promul-
gation of local organic lawslSl invites some degree of decentral-
ized rule-making activity which leaves in doubt the extent to 
which local participation is desired or required when the inspec-
tion provisions of an arms control agreement directly involve 
a particular region or jurisdiction of the PRC. The lack of of-
ficial endorsement of the incorporation of treaty law into 
municipal law gives rise to potential conflict where fulfillment 
of treaty obligations clashes with rules laid down under munici-
pal statutes. To assert that the PRC, in seeking to maintain 
the orderly and secure environment it believes necessary for the 
development of its economy, would adhere strictly to treaty 
obligations which are inconsistent with municipal statutes is to 
casually dismiss a fundamental internal Chinese tenet -- absolute 
and inviolable sovereign power. The problem becomes somewhat 
more complex '"'hen an attempt is made to assess the extent to 
which the Chinese observe the maxim lex posterior derogat priori 
when domestic and treaty laws are in consistent. To a r sue, for 
instance, that a subsequent legislative enactment overrides pre-
vious treaty obligations is to ignore Chinese adherence to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda unless, in fact, the treaty is 
no longer viable or in force. The possibility that periodical 
PRC review of treaty provisions could result in an assertion by 
the Chinese of unequal and nonreciprocal obligations implies an 
even greater likelihood that the PRC would act in derogation of 
certain treaties through enactment of subsequent inconsistent 
municipal statutes. However, there has been no state practice of 
or adherence to the rule of lex posterior derogat priori. At the 
same time, the PRC has displayed respect for and adherence to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.l52 Despite concern and conjec-
ture as to the consequences of the application of lex posterior 
derogat priori, the most plausible response based on precedential 
information is simply that the Chinese are not likely rely on it. 
Chinese legal literature has not admitted to the possibili-
ty of self-executing treaties, nor does the plain meaning of the 
1982 PRC Constitution. The proposition that treaty law does not 
ipso facto create municipal law and the absence of any Chinese 
acknowledgement of criteria for distinguishing between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties suggest that arms con-
trol inspection provisions will become operative in the PRC only 
through specific and deliberate incorporation into Chinese 
municipal law. 
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The 1982 PRC Constitution does, however, contain a 
"supremacy clause" similar to the one in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.l53 The American stance on self-executing treaties has 
grown largely out of the ju~idical reading of the supremacy 
clause and has led to an articulation of judicial standards not 
present in the PRC: 
In determining whether a treaty is self-
executing, American courts look to the in-
tent of the signatory parties as manifested 
by the language of the instrument; and if 
the instrument is uncertain, recourse may 
be had to the circumstances surrounding its 
negotiation and execution and other extrin-
sic factors. In order for a treaty provi-
sion to be operative without the aid of 
implementing legislation and to have the 
force and effect of a statute, it must ap-
pear that the framers of a treaty intended 
to prescribe a rule that, standinq_alone, 
would be enforceable in the courts.~~4 
Because the PRC has not formally offered its own position, 
whether the NPC or designated legislative body must execute the 
terms of a treaty before it becomes operative Chinese law is un-
certain. Generally speaking, international agreements signed and 
ratified by the PRC will not have the force of law until their 
provisions are implemented by domestic legislation or by ad-
ministrative action. Under ordinary circumstances, though, the 
NPC would probably not hesitate to promulgate legislation desig-
ned to remove inconsistencies in municipal law provisions so that 
they would accord with Chinese treaty obligations.lSS 
Chapter 2: The Chinese System as a Potential Facilitator or 
Obstructor of an Arms Inspection Arrangement 
A. General Implications 
The success of the implementation and execution of an in-
spection arrangement in the PRC is contingent upon the receptive-
ness of the Chinese system to verification procedures. The ap-
parently-decentralized quality of Chinese politics and law com-
pels a closer examination of certain key variables relevant to 
the formulation of a Chinese arms inspection policy. These key 
variables are: the Chinese Communist Party [CCP], including its 
control over, and conflict with quasi-legal organizations; Chi-
nese Communist ideology; the Chinese governmental system; and, 
Chinese perceptions of arms control and disarmament arrangements. 
As the Preamble of the 1982 PRC Constitution indicates, the 
CCP is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people. The 
unity of the political system, as embodied in CCP monopoly over 
all political activities, presupposes plenary power in the hands 
of CCP leadership to ensure full compliance with inspection 
provisions. Similarly, the omnipotence of the CCP suggests the 
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possibility that CCP leadership may also possess the power to set 
unobtrusively in motion a number of obstacles designed to effec-
tively impede the execution of an inspection arrangement without 
the need to resort to official denunciation of inspection 
activities. 
Thus, the requisite element for the successful implementa-
tion of an arms inspection arrangement is the unswerving support 
of the CCP. The Party is, unquestionably, the most pervasive 
force in Chinese life. Any commentary on factors influencing the 
formulation of PRC inspection policy is reduced to an understand-
ing of the proper hierarchical arrangement -- by order of impor-
tance -- of systematic variables, the preeminent position of 
which is always occupied by the CCP. An examination of Chinese 
Communist ideology, the Chinese governmental sys tern and Chinese 
perceptions of disarmament can only be made in the context of CCP 
control over them. 
Through manipulation of Chinese Communist ideology, for 
example, the CCP can justify each and every one of its actions to 
its own people. Moreover, if Party leaders wished to implement 
an inspection arrangement, they would encounter a minimum of for-
mal legal impediments, any of which may be circumvented through 
ostensible legal process or through more subtle CCP machinations. 
The most serious legal obstacle, in fact, might be the re-
quirement of a Constitutional amendment. Yet, the approval of 
the NPC, the body vested with the authority to amend the con-
stitution, is hardly more than a rubber stamp for CCP mandates. 
The NPC, in executing CCP commands, has not shown any reluctance 
to exercise its authority: for example, the 1978 PRC Constitu-
tion was expeditiously amended to exclude the ~reviously inalien-
able right to "write big-character posters.•l5 The Constitution 
itself has hardly been an enduring document in the annals of PRC 
history. Since its official proclamation on October 1, 1949, the 
PRC has promulgated constitutions in 1954, 1975, 1978 (all no 
longer in force) and the most recent on December 4, 1982. Such 
legislative flexibility indicates that even Chinese constitution-
al law would not obstruct a system of inspection Jnder the guid-
ing hand of the CCP if CCP leadership determined that an arms 
control inspection served the interests of the PRC. 
Chinese perceptions of arms control and disarmament ar-
rangements are also dictated by Party interests and exigencies. 
These perceptions have shifted from hard-line opposition -- in 
the twenty year period from the late-1950s to the late-1970s --
to more flexible and mollified policies which are undoubtedly the 
outcome of Party leadership position changes that resulted from 
the transfer of power to Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao- ping) after 
Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung's) death in 1976. 
Despite the paramount importance of the Party, each of 
these factors is separately relevant, because a wholesale asser-
tion that the only variable meriting examination is the CCP 
underestimates the more subtle interrelationships of the four 
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factors suggested and ignores their aggregate effect on PRC par-
ticipation in and formulation of verification procedures. 
B. Systemic Variables 
1) The Chinese Communist Party 
a) The Role of the Party in the Policy-Making 
Process 
The CCP is a highly-disciplined organ which functions under 
the guiding principles of democratic centralism. It is comprised 
of over 35 million politically conscious activists who work in 
government offices, factories, mines, 9nd other enterprises, peo-
ple,s communes, schools, shops, neighborhoods and the armed for-
ces (PLA).l57 The CCP machinery, because of its pervasive con-
trol of Chinese organizations, associations and federations, is 
the prime motivational force in the faclitation or obstruction of 
arms inspection. 
The CCP requires its members, inter alia, to serve the oeo-
ple, uphold Party unity, observe Party discipline and guard P~rty 
and state secrets .158 Failure to fulfill such obligatons could 
result in such disciplinary action as expulsion from the Par-
~y,l59 ~~ extremely serious ?enalty in Chinese society.l60 More-
over, the CCP has the power to turn cadres over to criminal jus-
tice organs for criminal prosecution.l61 In short, the Party is 
the center of an extremely efficient and extensive coet:cive ap-
paratus in the PRC and controls the policy-execution and policy-
making processes of the Chinese governmental infrastructure. 
The unique position of the CCP as the central instrument 
for policy-making in the PR:::: and as the potential su;:>ervisor of 
all inspection activities compels an examination of the operation 
of CCP leadership. From a methodological standpoint, the covert 
nature of much of the CCP policy-making process precludes any 
direct study of the internal machinations of the Party and neces-
sitates instead conclusions based on a significant degree of 
speculation and circumstantial evidence. 
Although the current political scene in the PRC has been 
characterized by "greater stability at the top of the Party 
hierarchy than at any time since the overthrow of the gang of 
four in October 1976 1 •162 Party policies in various domains have 
created resentment.lt>3 Furthermore, an issue as significant as 
an arms inspection agreement might involve some degree of con-
flict and resistance at lower Party levels .164 Nevertheless, 
final acceptance of an arms control agreement and its attendant 
inspection provisions would probably be based on an ostensibly 
unanimous CCP decision, although it would be wiser to assume some 
unarticulated internal disagreement that could hamper full CCP 
support of inspection operations. 
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An arms inspectorate is at a distinct disadvantage in the 
PRC where the absence of direct observations and the unavaila-
bil ty of crucial information contribute to less accurate and 
rel able political assessments. These assessments are critical 
in anticipating potential impediments to the fulfillment of in-
spection obligations, and want of them would make it difficult to 
determine where the support for arms control lies within the CCP 
infrastructure. 
Another potential pitfall in the PRC policy-making process 
is the element of experimentalism: decisions on many important 
issues have a tentative and experimental quality.l65 High-level 
decisions are couched in general, sometimes vague, language that 
is purposefully designed to establish the outermost parameters of 
permissible behavior (or policy) and extend the flexibility of 
the CCP to define exact procedures, forms and relationships as 
experience dictates. The obvious potential for alterations in 
ini.tial policy objectives and guidelines illustrates the impor-
tance of obtaining firm Chinese commitments in order to minimize 
the risk of sudden policy shifts and reduce the gap between the 
expectancy generated by "trial" directives and the reality cre-
ated by later revisions. 
The result of the lack of first-hand knowledge of a firm 
CCP arms control policy, the potential for tentative, mutable 
policy decisions, and the subtleties of behavioral and positional 
changes of upper-echelon PRC officials make it difficult to de-
tect changes in Party interests, such as the "gradual erosion of 
a consensus, the disintegration of a coalition, or the instabili-
ty of a simple majority." 166 Moreover, PRC adherence to the 
principle of the inviolability of its sovereignty and Chinese 
sensitivity to equal and reciprocal treaty obligations presents 
the kind of political environment that is most susceptible of 
sudden shifts of position and, hence, most importunate for the 
orderly and consonant activities of an arms inspectorate. 
Thus, the most important goal for inspectorate members is 
to determine the CCP commitment to the formulation and execution 
of an inspection policy·. An arms inspectorate is best advised to 
assess the CCP commitment by gauging the degree to which Chinese 
leaders support the inspection policy in the public statements 
they issue; by determining the existence of persuasive editorials 
in behalf of an inspection policy in the Chinese press; and by 
reviewing the responsiveness and cooperation of the CCP officials 
most likely to have contact with the inspectorate.l67 By review-
ing. such peripheral variables, the inspectorate could minimize 
the inherent difficulties in determining the extent to which the 
CCP, through its largely covert policy-making process, has de-
cided to contribute to the execution of proper verification 
operations. Moreover, an assessment of such variables would pro-
vide a means by which the inspectorate could trace systematic 
non-compliance or isolated instances of interference with inspec-
tion operations to either the CCP, participating governmental 
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institutions, or particular individuals. Of course, this pre-
vious statement must be punctuated with the caveat that inspec-
torate observations of systematic non-compliance by non-Party 
organs will almost invariably occur with Party knowledge and 
approval. 
b) The Role of the Party in the Policy-Execution 
Process 
The pervasive influence of the CCP in every major aspect of 
Chinese life connotes active Party participation in the policy-
execution processl68 of arms inspection. The influence of the 
CCP in this process is belied by the Preamble of the 1982 PRC 
Constitution, which recognizes the sup.remacy of the constitution 
as the fundamental norm for all state organs, state officers and 
the PLA when, in fact, the Party -- and not the law -- is the 
principal element of control.l69 The role of the CCP in the 
policy-execution process of the PRC is nowhere more clearly man-
ifested than in the dramatic and sometimes frightening aspects of 
mass political campaigns. These campaigns, which span issues 
from the eradication of pests to the implementation of a new le-
gal order,l70 are waged periodically by the CCP and command the 
active participation of millions of Chinese. The formidable 
political apparatus of the CCP can, through such mobilization 
campaigns, generate support for, or opposition to, an arms in-
spection policy.l71 
In truth, the real power structure of CCP leadership prob-
ably differs from the formalistic constitutional one. Thus, it 
is uncertain which CCP command channels would directly supervise 
the execution of inspection operations, though, indisputably, the 
Central Committee,l72 its military commission,l73 and the more 
select Politburol74 will play an integral role. Because the 
highly restricted group of participants who comprise these organs 
conduct their policy-making deliberations and decisions in cam-
era, one can only speculate as to the particular role various 
other departments within the CCP infrastructure would play in 
coordinating the policy-execution process. 
Both the Central Secretariat and Advisory Commission of the 
ccpl75 would most probably be responsible for transmitting the 
commands of the CCP Central committee to Party members throughout 
the PRC. The most probable expressions of CCP commands are 
public statements by CCP leadership, Party communiques, 
editorials in Party publications like the official People's Dai-
ly, resolutions of the Central Committee and Party Congresses, 
and directives of the CCP Politburo. Propaganda and indoctrina-
tion at the provincial levels in the local press and in shools 
would be supervised by regional party committees.l76 An arms 
inspectorate should be aware that the extent to which each of 
these channels is used and the intensity of the language used in 
communicating the messages are good indices of the commitment of 
the CCP to the execution of an arms inspection arrangement. 
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c) Party Control of Quasi-Legal Organizations 
CCP supervision of state organs, administrative depart-
ments, army bureaucracies and peripheral agencies, such as the 
secret police, may also provide a clue as to the willingness of 
the PRC to furnish strong affirmative support for the policy of 
arms inspection. Presumably, the activities of the military, 
procuracy, judiciary, and police all fall within the purview of 
CCP Central Commit tee departments, which, as part of the highly 
centralized CCP political apparatus of the PRC, would maintain 
effective control over the policy-execution process, the agencies 
and organizations most involved with it, and the communications 
systems they control. 
Since complete unanimity among variables of the governmen-
tal system in the formulation of an inspection policy is probably 
unlikely, a c~rtain degree of factionalism within the government 
must be anticipated and tolerated. The most likely sources of 
intragovernmental conflict are from those departments concerned 
with defense and internal security. 
The role of internal security forces in the execution of an 
arms inspection arrangement is the critical component of the 
quasi-legal factor involved in the policy-execution process. 
Internal security in the PRC is distributed among a variety of 
different organizations, each with independent and overlapping 
functions. 
The military organ of the PRC, the PLA, has played a sub-
stantial role both in inculcating in Chinese citizens a positive 
attitude toward armed might and in civilian surveillance. The 
PLA is currently under the leadership of the CCP and the Central 
Militarv Commission and under the direct command of the Chairman 
of the -latter .177 The 1978 Constitution gave statutory expres-
sion to the expansive role of the PLA in the affairs of the PRC, 
though it did not formalize the extent to which the PLA has exer-
cised its power since the Cultural Revolution.l78 The PLA is now 
recognized as an active participant in the work of national con-
struction,l79 in the people,s congresses, and in the maintenance 
of public security.l80 The perceived importance of unity of the 
military, Party, mass organizations, and various governmental 
departments in safeguarding public order is an important contem-
porary element of understanding and dealing with the modern Chi-
nese political machinery. Though local procuratorates are the 
organs constitutionally designated to ensure observance of the 
law,l8l the brief time that has elapsed since the promulgation of 
the recent legal codes and the continuing call for further 
codesl82 has resulted in CCP-controlled cooperative efforts among 
various governmental organs that has effectively blurred the dis-
tinct roles expected to be played by each. 
The role of the PLA in internal security is not confined to 
its participation in public security functions. It extends to 
the potentially obstructive influence on arms inspection gener-
ated by a national emphasis and socialization on the value of 
- 30 -
armed might.l83 Military consciousness emanates from the provi-
sions of the 1982 PRC Constitution. Article 55 notes that it is 
"the honorable duty of citizens ..• to perform military service 
and join the militia in accordance with the law." Each Chinese 
is required to "defend the motherland and resist aggression.•l84 
Articles 91-94 and Article 97 of the PRC Criminal Codel85 indi-
cate the heinousness with which the Chinese perceive treasonable 
activities. 
Mao Zedong's philosophy of fighting a "people's war•l86 has 
imbued the average Chinese citizen with a sense of respect for 
the military and has generated significant patriotic sentiment. 
The intensive process of socializing the Chinese citizen on the 
value of armed might runs counter to an arms inspection policy, 
but is not necessarily inconsistent with it provided an arms con-
trol arrangement has CCP support. Though it is conceivable that 
the military could lead a large-sized factionalist force against 
CCP commands for unobstructed verification procedures, Party con-
trol of the military would seem to preclude such potential 
conflict. 
In addition to the CCP and the PLA, another critical vari-
able in the policy-execution process is the role of the Chinese 
secret police. Though much has been written about CIA and KGB 
activities, very little has been published about Chinese intel-
ligence and its domestic and international ramifications. The 
PRC press is constantly assailing the vast spy rings of the 
superpowers,l87 but does not acknowledge the existence of a Chi-
nese undercover network. In fact, the existence of such a for-
mal, covert intelligence network in the PRC is itself uncer-
tain,l88 not merely because of the lack of actual recognition of 
such a network, but because of its redundancy. 
The recent reintroduction of regulations on local organiza-
tionsl89 illustrates the extensive conduit of information that 
flows to official Party and governmental departments. This en-
tire arrangement is part and parcel to the ideological emphasis 
in the PRC on the control of man, not his performance.l90 The 
extent and effect of this overt, coercive apparatus is difficult 
to gauge with precision, but it has been utilized on a scale that 
tends to reduce the necessity for establishing additional -- and 
largely superfluous -- covert operational networks. 
Nevertheless, at least one author has asserted the alleged 
existence of two critical security agencies in the PRC, the 
General Office of the Central Committee and the so-called 8341 
unit.l91 The General Office is reportedly in charge of security 
for key Party personnel and for confidential Party materials 
while the 8341 unit serves as a military detachment guarding Chi-
nese leaders, though some sources report that the unit has a net-
work of agents throughout the PRc.l92 
Whether the Chinese secret police is a formidable component 
of the Chinese system is diffi~ult to assess without hard 
evidence. Moreover, despite the apparent connection between the 
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alleged security agencies and the CCP, through the Central Inves-
tigation Department of the Central Committee, little can be de-
duced about Party control of the secret pol ice. It is, though 
quite possible that these Chinese security agencies are capable 
of conducting operations without the full knowledge or approval 
of the responsible Party organ. If so, the mere existence of a 
Chinese secret security network may have adverse implications for 
arms inspection. 
Though no giant secret policy apparatus, as exists in the 
Soviet Union, is apparent in the PRC, the relative xenophobia of 
PRC leadership and the importance the the present leadership 
ascribes to unity and order suggest that a strengthened security 
apparatusl93 which maintains surveillance over the armed forces, 
reports on provincial and local developments, and investigates 
the loyalties of key CCP personnell94 is absolutely essential. 
The gradual opening of Chinese society to increasing num-
bers of foreign contactsl95 is destind to result in more as-
siduous and zealous counterintelligence activities. The emphasis 
in the. Chinese press on the obnoxious features of foreign intel-
ligence operationsl96 and the potential efflorescence of coun-
terintelligence operations directed towards foreign visitors sig-
nifies the very likely prospect that the CCP, PLA, local commit-
tees, public security organs, secret police (if it exists) and 
individual Chinese citizen informants can become an obstructive 
factor in arms inspection activities. 
The role of the communications media is also vital in 
facilitating or obstructing arms inspection in the PRC. Chinese 
press, television, radio and cinema could be utilized to acquaint 
the masses with an arms control agreement and the requisite in-
spection provisions, thus diminishing the surprise and intrusive-
ness of verification arrangements. The responsiveness of the 
Chinese communications system to the ccpl97 makes the media a 
valuable and effective tool for propagandizing, publicizing, or 
popularizing any agreement for which the Party requires the· 
mobilization of broad public support or· opposition. 
An arms inspectorate might be advised to measure the volume 
and intensity of the media campaign as a good indicator of the 
CCP's commitment to an arms inspection agreement. However, the 
examination of media reports as a gauge of PRC commitment must be 
punctuated with a caveat: the new socialist order envisaged by 
Mao Zedong, that of "giving full play to democracy among the peo-
ple•l98 may have had a somewhat enervating effect on Party con-
trol of the communications system. The "quadruple weapon• of 
Chinese democracy,l99 dafang darning (allow opinions to be freely 
aired), dabienlun (hold debates in a big way), and dazibao (with 
big character posters), permitted the public criticism of Chinese 
authorities through the "audio-visual media available to the mas-
ses. • 200 The major thorn in the side of the Chinese government 
was dazibao (big-character posters), which government officials 
felt was being abused by certain Chinese individuals who made use 
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of wall-posters to attack and publicize social and personal in-
equities in contravention of an official media blackout on cer-
tain social upheavals.201 Ironically, the initial government 
crackdown on wall-posters was communicated through the press, 
unquestionably the most effective and authoritative medium of 
communication used by the PRC authorities. In fulfilling its 
pedagogic role, the press gave significant editorial coverage to 
the nefarious effects of dazibao and emphasized the benefits of 
abolishing the use of these posters. The result was the rather 
expeditious enactment of an amendment to Article 45 of the 1978 
·PRC Constitution and the expur2ation from its text of the right 
to write big-character posters. 02. 
The role of the press in publicizing the 1979 Chinese legal 
codes indicates CCP reliance on and control of this medium as the 
most potent facilitator of the policy-execution process203 and 
public acceptance of the press as the most authoritative source 
of official policy •. Press coverage preceding the promulgation of 
the legal codes included significant numbers of articles calling 
for public order and for a collection of formal written statutes. 
Followin~ the promulgation of the codes came special feature 
stories, 04 official explanations of certain code provisions and 
legal terms,-205 publicized court cases concerning legal viola-
tions, 206 published reports of coo~eration, 207 and the applica-
tion of the new laws to offenders. 08 The press. also published 
limited criminal statistics.209 
Extrapolating from the role of the press in the execution 
of domestic legal norms to the role of the press in the execution 
of an arms inspection policy ~s not difficult or in·appropriate. 
The press can serve as the forum for CCP pronouncements concern-
ing the advantages of inspection and can· publicize examples of 
compliance and incidents of noncompliance which can serve to 
legitimize PRC participation in any arms control verification 
agreement. Raising the political consciousness of the average 
Chinese citizen on the subject of arms control and indoctrinating 
each on the importance of PRC participation in inspection ar-
rangements is uniquely suited to the Chinese press. The volume, 
diversity and type of reports should serve as an indicator of CCP 
commitment to compliance with inspection provisions. 
However, the press would not serve as the sole means used 
by the PRC regime to legitimize the policy-execution process.210 
The downward transmission of CCP policy directives would need to 
be communicated through other forms of mass media as well as 
through quasi-public mass organizations2ll such as trade 
unions, 212 the Communist Youth League, 213 poor and lower-middle 
peasant associations, women's federations21.4 and other revolu-
tionary mass organizations and individual work units or danwei. 
Each of these organizations is responsible for more direct con-
tact with the average Chinese citizen and more direct control 
over his daily activities.' In the hierarchical pattern that 
emerges as the dominant political structure in the PRC, the 
utilization of these quasi-public organizations to effectuate 
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Party policy is still another indication of the total CCP commit-
ment to arms inspection. 
2) Chinese Communist Ideology 
The second variable, Chinese Communist ideology, provides 
the single, most definitive criterion for determination of the 
attitudes and beliefs that govern political behavior in the PRC. 
In essence, it serves as a code of communication by which the CCP 
can encipher its pronouncements and legitimize its actions. 
Fundamental Chinese Communist ideology is inscrutable. 
Traditional Marxist-Leninist concepts, as embodied in the classi-
cal writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, are selectively 
incorporated into Chinese ideology, to the extent that they serve 
the interests of the PRC. 215 Of course, the interests of the 
PRC are hardly immutable, and Chinese Communist ideology is suf-
ficiently flexible (and amorphous) to permit changes in policy 
which would not contravene ideological precepts or otherwise 
threaten the foundation of Chinese society. 
Major ideological concepts are reflections of Mao Zedong 
thought,216 though the growing challenge to the Maoist image has 
eroded, to some extent, the previously impregnable fortress of 
Maoist dogma. 217 Nevertheless, Mao, s dominance of foreign and 
domestic policy thinking for almost four decades has not entirely 
dissolved. His epistemological constructs continue to guide the 
political culture of the masses and the more select CCP. They 
also provide the framework, if not the substance, of contemporary 
Chinese cognitive and evaluative decision-making functions. 
Thus, to participate in the political process of the PRC, one 
must possess an understanding of the more fundamental Maoist 
ideological concepts. 
The central theme in Mao Zedong thought is the law of con-
tradiction. 218 At the heart of this apocalyptic vision of the 
world is the struggle between two major forces, characterized as 
"friends" and "enemies." Between these two forces exists a num-
ber of antagonistic contradictions, the resolution of which often 
compels the use of armed force. Within each group there exists 
the possibility of nonantagonistic contradictions, which are 
usually resolved through peaceful, non-coercive methods. 
From the basic, perceived conflict between "friends" and 
"enemies" has arisen the Maoist axiom that the enemy must be 
despised strategically but respected tactically.219 This princi-
ple was designed to provide a means by which to assess the rela-
tive ratio of forces between a revolutionary challenger and the 
defender of the status quo.220 More subtly, this principle was 
used by the Chinese to develop strategies· for bridging the gap 
between the PRC and the superpowers. The Chinese belief that the 
PRC must move from a position of inferiority to one of parity 
with major powers221 was a corollary of the belief that the PRC 
could not command respect within the international community 
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until it had become strong and powerful -- politically, economi-
cally and militarily. 
This basic eschatological ideological construct is the lan-
guage of Chinese politics. Such facets of international politi-
cal and legal conduct as negotiating tactics, concessions, 
obligations, flexibility and recalcitrance, as applied to the 
implementation and execution of an arms control agreement, are 
all grounded in this fundamental Maoist tenet. 
Mao Zedong's impact on Chinese legal development has condi-
tioned PRC perception of the role of law in its revolutionary 
scheme, though the force of law and legal institutions in post-
Mao China has generally received greater acceptance than Mao him-
self might have envisioned. The PRC's present approach to the 
role of law is actually an amalgam of Maoist doctrine and practi-
cal necessity. For example, the PRC's emphasis on flexibility 
rather than rigidity in the application of law, on the politici-
zation of the entire legal process, and on the use of law as an 
instrument of social engineering to transform the PRc222 are 
carryovers of traditional Mao Zedong policies and beliefs. At 
the same time, the swing toward institutionalization (as sugges-
ted by the 1979 legal codes) and economic development (particu-
larly as it applies to foreign trade) has necessitated a subtle 
yet discernible revision of the Maoist concepts of the class na-
ture of peoole, s justice, 223 the societal model of law, 224 the 
mass line,225 and the "uninterrupted revolution. "226 The con-
sequence of these adustments is difficult to define with accura-
cy. It does not appear that the Maoist influence on the role of 
law has totally dissipated, but it would not be correct to assert 
that r-taoist precepts have the same potency they once had. In 
truth, each "case" is handled according to its own set of facts. 
Where traditional ideological concepts can be used to justify a 
particular action, they will be. Where these concepts are defi-
cient, or otherwise ill-fitting, they may be altered by the pres-
ent leadership to reflect reality. Deng Xiaoping has labelled 
this policy jingyan shi jianyan zhenli de weiyi biaozhun 
[literally: experience is the only criterion for examining 
truth].227 Such a policy appears to inject greater flexibility 
into Chinese ideology, but it has not yet been sufficiently time-
tested to warrant any presumption of consistency in its applica-
ton, particularly with respect to rather intrusive arms inspec-
tion operations. 
Chinese Communist ideology -- in any form -- is ·an impor-
tant variable of Chinese arms inspection policy, not only because 
of its specific application in particular instances, but because 
of its general effect on the CCP apparatus and the Chinese mas-
ses. The effective use of ideology to veil the content of exter-
nal communications to the PRC has created an internal "atmosphere 
of secrecy reinforced by pervasive suspiciousness and a fundamen-
tally hostile attitude toward other (chiefly Western) political 
and socioeconomic systems.•228 Though the recent rapprochement 
with the United States has piqued the curiosity of the Chinese 
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and sparked their interests in the machinations of Western cul-
ture,. the historical distrust for foreign elements still perco-
lates in official Chinese ratiocinations.229 Chinese ideological 
inflexibility might therefore be expected to be more apparent in 
response to more physically intrusive foreign ventures,' among 
which one can readily expect to include arms inspection and 
verification procedures. 
Although the ideology is subject to the 
inte~pretation of the leadership and there-
fore not inflexible, and although it has 
supported world campaigns for the abolition 
of. • armed forces, its general set for 
the past [thirty-four years] runs counter 
to the idea of arms control, and especially 
the idea of territorial inspection. An 
arms inspectorate should be aware that an 
arms inspection policy may require some 
remolding on the part of the leadership of 
both the mass[es] and elite. • to neu-
tralize or alter potentially obstructive or 
hostile attitudes. This would essentially 
involve a process of partial resocializa-
tion of the citizen [as to] the relation-
ship [toward the West and Soviet Union], a 
process which must start in the schools and 
spread throughout the adult 3gencies of 
political socialization. Obviously, such 
an effort would be a major ideological com-
mitment to long-term peace, and it would 
naturally require a period of time to in-
culcate the new attitude in the masses and 
the elite. 230 
Unless and until the PRC undertakes such a process of par-
tial resocialization and devotes the necessary time to diffuse 
present political hostil.i ty towards foreigners, 231 an arms con-
trol agreement and its concomitant inspection provisions might 
well remain ideologically unacceptable to the Chinese. 
3. The Governmental System of the PRC 
a) Organs of State Power 
The emphasis of this section will be on the apparent power 
of Chinese state organs. Nominally, there are six basic compo-
nents of the governmental system -- the legislative, administra-
tive, judicial, procuratorial, military, and quasi-public organs. 
Despite constitutional and statutory grants of exclusive and 
overlapping ·powers to each of these different organs, essential 
control always rests with the ccp.232 In many instances, the 
actions of these different organs are directly authorized and 
expressly approved by the Party. In other instances, one might 
expect no less than Party knowledge and tacit approval of 
governmental· act·s. 
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Nevertheless, the governmental system of the PRC is treated 
as a separate variable of Chinese arms inspection policy. There 
are two reasons. First, the 1982 PRC Constitution and subsequent 
legal codes have, at least ostensibly, restructured the PRC 's 
socialist legal system and established separate lines of 
governmental authority. Since then, there have been numerous 
calls for the independent exercise of authority of the separate 
organs, pursuant to the letter of the law as laid down in those 
enactments. There seems to be little doubt that the Party will 
never relinquish total effective control of legal and extra-legal 
governmental organs, though the extent to which the CCP may be 
willing to share or transfer limited powers to domestic organs is 
uncertain. An examination of the apparent parameters of power 
which significant governmental organs may possess will provide an 
arms inspectorate with an understanding of the maximum limits of 
permissible authority granted to such organs, and allow inspec-
torate personnel to discount from that point for CCP control. 
Second, though the components of the PRC, s governmental system 
apparently exercise only a marginal influence over CCP policy-
making, they are important to study because of their instrumental 
role in the policy-execution process Party control 
notwithstanding -- vis-a-vis inspectorate operations. 
The Chinese theory of a monolithic state, in which the 
political and legal systems are unified, is embodied in a number 
of principles of Chinese constitutional law. The PRC is con-
stitutionally organized as a "federal" system. At the apex of 
the state structure described in the 1982 PRC Constitution is the 
NPC, the "highest organ of state power (Art. 57).233 The NPC is 
comprised of· deputies elected by the people's congresses of the 
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under 
the central government, and by the People's Liberation Army (Art. 
59).234 
Pursuant to the 1982 PRC Constitution, the NPC exercises 
numerous ostensible legislative, quasi-judicial and constituent 
powers, including the power to amend the Constitution (Art. 
62 ( 1); to make and revise crimina!, civil, state organizational 
and other fundamental laws (Art. 62(3)); to supervise the en-
forcement of the Constitution (Art. 62(2); to decide on the State 
Council Premier (Art. 62(5)); to elect the Supreme People's Court 
President (Art. 62(7)) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate,s 
chief procurator (Art. 62(8)); and to pass upon the major 
economic measures of the state (Art. 62(9)). A blanket clause 
also gives the NPC the right to exercise such other functions as 
it deems necessary (Art. 62(15). 
Sometimes sharing NPC powers and sometimes exercising them 
ad interim is the NPC Standing Committee.235 It also possesses a 
number of exclusive powers, including the right to interpret the 
Constitution and supervise its enforcement (Art. 67(1)); to enact 
and amend laws other than those which should be made by the NPC 
(Art. 67 ( 2)); to make partial revisions and supplements to fun-
damental laws enacted by the NPC when it is not in session (Art. 
67(3)); to interpret statutes (Art. 67(4));236 to revise or annul 
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inappropriate rules, regulations, decisions and decrees of both 
the State Council and local government organs (Art. 67(7)-(8)); 
to decide on ratification and abrogation of treaties (Art. 
67(14)); to decide on the proclamation of a state of war when the 
NPC is, not in session (Art. 67(18)); to decide on the proclama-
tion of martial law (Art. 67(20)); to supervise the work of the 
State Council, the Central Military Council, the Supreme People's 
Court and the Supreme Peoples'Procuratorate (Art. 67(6)) and, to 
"exercise such other functions and powers are vested in it by the 
[NPC)" (Art. 67(21)). 
The State Council of the PRC is the executive organ of 
state power and the highest organ of state administration (Art. 
85). Among the functions and powers of the State Council are: 
to formulate administrative measures, provide and approve ad-
ministrative laws and regulations and issue decisions and orders 
in accordance with the Constitution and statutes (Art. 89(1)); to 
formulate tasks and responsibilities of PRC ministries and com-
missions (Art. 89{3)); to exercise leadership over local organs 
of state administration (Art. 89 ( 4)); to administer foreign af-
fairs and conclude treaties with foreign countries (Art. 89(9)); 
to change or revoke inadequate decisions and orders of local ad-
ministrative organs (Art. 89(13)); and, to exercise such other 
powers as are granted to it by the NPC and NPC Standing Committee 
(Art. 89(18)). In essence, State Council decisions and orders 
cover a wide range of topics and, to a large extent, serve as the 
operative legislation of the PRC whereby the Chinese economy and 
many of the daily activities of Chinese life are regulated.237 
The 1982 PRC Constitution grants procuratorial authority to 
the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Art. 132) and judicial au-
thority to the Supreme People,s Court (Art. 127). 
Although articles 95-122 of the 1982 PRC Constitution grant 
limited powers to local governmental organs, the grant of powers 
to the federal authority is so sweeping as to bring most 
governmental concerns within its competence. The virtual omnipo-
tence of the federal authority grants to constituent organs like 
the NPC, the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court 
almost unlimited responsibility to execute policy and administer 
all major aspects of Chinese economic, political and social life. 
Moreover, the consolidatiqn of power in these major organs 
simplifies CCP control over PRC governmental activities. 
b) Arms Inspection and the Legislative Process 
After the ratification of a disarmament agreement, the 
legislature, in the absence of self-executing treaty provisions, 
would be called upon to implement the arms inspection provision. 
Substantive policy-making and policy-execution processes will 
undoubtedly originate within the upper echelons of the CCP, prob-
ably in the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. These 
will be transmitted through the Central Committee and the 
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Secretariat -- to the proper legislative institutions for final 
rubber-stamp approval. 
As the legislative process appears to evolve under the 1982 
PRC Constitution, the ACD agreement will be signed by an official 
plenipotentiary of the PRC, most likely the PRC chairman, at 
which time reservations may be attached. It will then be sent to 
the NPC Standing Committee for formal ratification.238 Assuming 
automatic incorporation of the agreement into PRC municipal law, 
no further action need be taken. However, since all fundamental 
domestic legislation receives the approval of the NPC, it would 
appear that arms inspection provisions may need to pass a majori-
ty vote of this body, as well as that of the Standing Committee, 
although ratification by the former should make subsequent ap-
proval by the latter a mere formality. Because of the interna-
tional tenor of the ACD agreement, subsequent municipal legisla-
tion will probably not be handled along the lines of current NPC 
national enactments, which are often first disseminated in draft 
form to local ~overnmental units for discussion before official 
promulgation.23 
In essence, there are actually layers of legislatures in 
the PRC. The NPC is the highest legislative authority at the 
federal level, and there are people's congresses and standing 
committees in each of the smaller governmental units of the PRC 
--provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under 
the central government, autonomous prefectures, autonomous 
counties, counties, cities, villages, municipal districts and 
towns. Each of the-se congresses ensures observance of the laws 
and is constitutionally granted the power to issue decisions 
within the limits of its authority (Art. 102). The text of the 
1982 PRC Constitution thus reserves to these smaller governmental 
units only a limited sphere of concurrent powers and reinforces 
the political domination of the lower legislatures by the higher. 
By indisputably creating lines of subordination between legisla-
tive layers, the Constitution assures the unchallenged existence 
of federal supremacy over constituent units and guarantees the 
CCP total domination of the legislative process. 
Since the adoption of the 1979 organic laws, 240 there ap-
pears to have been no single instance where the decrees of the 
NPC Standing Committee and the statutes and decisions of the lo-
cal standing committees have not met with the approval of the 
people's congresses.241 In spite of the fact that the volume of 
normative enactments promulgated by the legislatures of the 
various levels since mid-1979 has hardly been overwhelming, con-
tinuing CCP supervision of the various levels reduced any pos-
sibility for future clashes between different centers of power. 
NPC and State Council laws, regulations, and decrees are often 
implemented within the PRC through constituent legislative enact-
ments known as circulars. In essence, circulars are no more than 
official notices of "federally-enacted" legislation, although 
their formal, official promulgation by local party committees and 
governmental units invites the supposition that they are akin to 
regional implementing legislation.242 
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Strict horizontal and vertical subordination -- giving su-
perior party and legislative organs the right to modify or cancel 
ultra vires decisions of lower-level departments indicates 
that Chinese participation in the adoption and execution of an 
arms inspection policy is first and foremost a subject for the 
attention of the CCP, and the NPC and its Standing Committee. 
Since arms control legislation would be a ~ational responsibili-
ty, lower-level legislation would probably be minimal. Because 
of the requirement of compliance with the principles enacted by 
the national legislature, the more important and relevant local 
laws will probably exhibit complete homogeneity. The proceedings 
and decisions of the NPC are carefully and extensively covered by 
the various forms of Chinese news media, a process ensuring wide 
dissemination of the contents of national laws and portraying the 
proper official attitude toward the policies underlying them. As 
such, it is hardly likely that lower-level legislative tiers, 
despite some degree of· autonomy and discretion, will promulgate 
and administer local arms control laws which do not strictly con-
form to those of the NPC. Where non-conformities do exist, the 
PRC system would appear to provide an arms inspectorate with the 
opportunity to bring non-conforming lower-level legislation to 
the attention of the Chinese institutions vested with the au-
thority to modify or cancel such decisions.243 However, this is 
not to assert that there would not be underlying difficulties 
resulting from inspectorate requests for conforming legislation. 
For instance, there is no evidence that the Chinese have ever 
applied the concept of severability244 to statutes with invalid 
provisions or applications. Thus, it is uncertain whether Chi-
nese authorities would be amenable to striking invalid portions 
of an enactment or whether they might resist requests for 
modification because of a perceived necessity for invalidating an 
entire statute. This particular problem, though, may well be 
mooted by legislative and administrative processes at lower-
levels, which would most liKely be characterized by a minimiza-
tion of· policy conflict and a maximization of expediency. That 
would ensure effective centralized CCP control of the policy-
execution process. Thus, the extent to which the legislative 
process facilitates or obstructs an arms inspection arrangement 
would serve as an important political weathervane of CCP commit-
ment to effective inspection operations. 
The shortage of published materials on Chinese law has the 
potential for imposing significant limitations on the sources of 
an arms inspectorate's legal information. The relative paucity 
of available published regulations outside the PRC is largely the 
result of the 1979 legal codes; Chinese limitations on the dis-
tribution of legislative and administrative materials; 245 and, 
the lack of interpretive precision occasioned by PRC mass media 
translations of Chinese legal materials by non-legal journalists. 
Though legal journals, which ceased publication during the 
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, have reappeared,246 they often 
contain only peripheral legal information of marginal utility to 
inspectors. 
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!1ore direct legal information was recently made available 
in a 1980 collection of statutory material,247 though the volume 
includes enactments which have subsequently been declared null 
and void. No systematic publication of judicial decisions exist. 
At best, such decisions receive only selective and often cursory 
treatment in the Chinese press.248 
Chinese newspapers may, in fact, be the most significant 
source of legal information for foreign perusal that exists in 
the PRC today. The 1979 legal codes and many 1979 and 1980 reg-
ulations appeared in Renmin ribao (People's Daily) and were 
subsequently translated and distributed by foreign wire ser-
vices,249 though the lack of legal training of many of the Chi-
nese and foreign correspondents and journalists has resulted in 
non-precise, often inaccurate translations, the consequences of 
which could be most deleterious to an accurate assessment of Chi-
nese law. 
Moreover, CCP control of the press and the generally 
limited accessibility of foreign media personnel to legal in-
stitutions can only raise suspicion and doubts as to the preci-
sion of distributed published legal material. In addition, the 
legislative power granted to local people's congresses and their 
respective standing committees indicates that there is an effec-
tive body of Chinese legislation which is simply too voluminous 
for dissemination through the PRC press. Hence, inspectorate 
personnel could find lower-level legislation difficult to obtain. 
Finally, Harold Berman and Peter Maggs have suggested what 
would appear to be a problem that might well be endemic to Party-
controlled totalitarian societies, that of secret legislation.250 
In the first instance, of course, the possibility of secret 
legislation and the existence of legal materials for internal 
circulation only create problems for an arms inspectorate, inas-
much as the inspectorate would have difficulty in distinguishing 
between a clear-cut violation of an inspection provision au-
thorized by the CCP and a violation due merely to the mistakes or 
inefficiency of local authorities.251 
Moreover, the possibility of secret legislation creates 
problems for Chinese officials who must obey secret orders to 
sabotage activities which published Chinese legislation has seem-
ingly sworn them to uphold. In like fashion, Chinese judges, 
lawyers and administrators may well find themselves uninformed of 
secret legislation, a possibility which only adds to the confu-
sion. Because of the shortage of published legal materials, the 
slant of the CCP-controlled press, and the potential for secret 
legislation, an arms inspection arrangement concluded with the 
PRC faces a number of significant challenges and compels an arms 
inspectorate, for the successful execution of inspection provi-
sions, to seek and obtain the active cooperation of Chinese 
officials. 
- 41 -
c) Arms Inspection and the Procuratorates, 
Judicial Organs and Public Security Departments 
The procuratorates, judicial organs and public security 
departments would play a significant role in the execution of an 
arms inspection arrangement: the procuratorates as an adminis-
trative and prosecuting organ, the judiciary as an organ for the 
resolution of disputes and the public security departments as an 
organ of law enforcement. 
In theory, an arms inspectorate might desire to coordinate 
its operations with the Ministry of Justice, which was restored 
in 1979252 and which supervises the work of the courts, pro-
curatorates, and judicial administrative organs.253 As the cen-
tral organ in charge of judicial work, the Ministry would or-
dinarily be th~ proper organ to contact to alleviate the poten-
tial of local judicial and procuratorial interference with in-
spection operations. However, it is not altogether clear :.>hat 
authority the Ministry of Justice actually possesses, since its 
assigned tasks appear to be largely ministerial in nature.254 As 
a result, an inspectorate could not rule out the possibility --
and potentially obstructive process -- of having to deal with 
these organs individually. Nevertheless, at the very least, the 
Ministry may help to improve the quality of the judicial and 
procuratorial processes and help to partially redefine procurato-
rial and judicial responsibilities and powers. 
Judicial and procuratorial participation in an arms inspec-
tion arrangement would essentially be determined by the nature of 
the particular situation, but would undoubtedly be influenced by 
the internally communicated CCP position on arms inspection poli-
cy and by the professional guidelines acquired by ~udicial and 
procuratorial personnel in the course of their work.2 5 
The procurator's off ice was restored as a government in-
stitution as part of the state structure set up under the 1978 
PRC Constitution.256 The 1979 Organic Procuratorate Law 257 
calls on the procuracy to exercise its authority with regard to 
cases of treason, attempts to split the country and other major 
criminal cases disrupting uniform conduct (Arts. 4, 5). It also 
places a strong emphasis on the procuratorate's punitive 
power.258 Only passing reference is made of the procuratorate's 
power to supervise the observance of citizen's rights by state 
organs. Article 2 of the Organic Procurator ate Law pe r:ni ts the 
formation of special people's procuratorates, including military, 
railway transport, water transport and "other special" pro-
curatorates. In this way, the procuratorial network has been 
expanded to become •universal.•259 
Under its general supervisory powers over the administra-
tion of justice, the procuracy exercises significant influence 
over the manner in which the law is applied. Pursuant to the 
Organic Procuratorate Law, the procuratorates possess extensive 
investigative powers, including the legal authority to issue an 
- 42 -
indictment (Art. 13) and to question the legality of judicial 
decisions (Arts. 17-19) though, in practice, this latter power 
appears more illusory than real.260 Such sweeping powers imply 
that the procuracy could be expected to intervene in any one of a 
number.of multifarious legal predicaments between an arms inspec-
torate and the PRC. 
The potential role of the procuracy in arms inspection is 
further complicated by other provisions of the 1979 Organic Pro-
curatorate Law. In an effort to promote greater centralization 
of procuratorial bodies, the 1979 Law provided that higher level 
procuratorates shall exercise "leadership" over lower-lovel pro-
curatorates (Art. 10), thus suggesting strict vertical subordina-
tion. At the same time, lower-level procuratorates are also 
responsible to corresponding level people's congresses and stand-
ing committees, the bodies to which they report. Such "twin" 
subordination "creates some difficulties for uniform application 
of laws nationwide and in the final analysis reduces the role of 
the procurator's office as a body supervising legality.•261 
Revealingly, Chinese procuratorial offices have themselves dis-
closed that procuratorates are simply unclear on the scope of 
their functions and powers.262 The uncertain position of the 
procuratorates, in a society where law is often an instrument of 
CCP policy, further erodes any sense of legal security or 
stability and tends to undermine statutory assertions of indepen-
dent procuratorial authority.263 
Despite an incomplete cyrstallization of the process of 
casting the procuratorates in the PRC's present state structure, 
the relevance of the procuracy to arms inspection is not lost, 
though procuratorial discretion may well be circumscribed by CCP 
directives. The vital role of the procuratorates in inspection 
operations may rest largely on its assigned task of questioning 
the validity of judicial decisions and judgments since judicial 
review does not exist under PRC law. The procuracy is thereby 
granted significant responsibility for examing the con-
stitutionality of various rulings and for ensuring compliance 
with enabling legislation. However, the breadth of this power is 
uncertain. Can an arms inspectorate protect an administrative 
ruling, local ordinance, or judicial decision inimical to arms 
inspection to procuratorial authorities? Pursuant to procura-
tional powers, procuratorial officials presumably after 
receiving CCP clearance would be charged with the respon-
sibility of pressing for the reversal of bad judicial decisions, 
which has some established precedent in PRC law. But, whether 
this power extends to pressing for the repeal of an offensive 
local statute is doubtful, although technically that would elimi-
nate any form of statutory review and would require inspectors _to 
resort to some form of grievance issued to local standing commit-
tees (or the NPC Standing Committee) to initiate new legislation. 
The procuracy works closely with another political-
juridical body, the people's courts. Pursuant to the Organic 
Court Law,264 the courts of the PRC are the judicial ogans of the 
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state in charge of dispensing justice~ Despite granting indepen-
dent authority to the people's courts, the Organic Court Law 
fails to confer exclusive judicial power of them, an act of omis-
sion which preserves the dependence of the courts on local organs 
of state power (and on the CCP). People's courts are subordinate 
and accountable to local people's congresses and to their stand-
ing committees between LPC sessions (Art. 17). Moraover, Article 
28 of the Organic Law for Local Congresses and Governments grants 
to standing committees the power to supervise the activities of 
the courts. In practice, Chinese judicial authority has been 
further diluted by the frequent interference of local Party and 
administrative organs in the judicial process265 and by the dual 
allegiance of many judges to the judicial system and the Party. 
Such practices, combined with court accountability to LPCs and 
their standing committees, create judicial dependence on the or-
gans of local government and significantly attentuate the in-
dependent power of the court system.266 
Pursuant to the Organic Court Law, the judiciary is com-
posed of a broad stratum of district, intermediate, and higher 
people's courts with jurisdiction over "both crimina! and civil 
cases" (Art. 3). In actuality, though, mass organizations handle 
the task, under the Provisional General Rules Governing the Or-
ganization of the People's Mediation Committees of February 25, 
1954 ·reintroduced by the Twelfth Session of the NPC Standing Com-
mittee in 1979,267 of "mediat[ing] civilian disputes and minor 
criminal cases in general and •.. carry[ing] out propaganda and 
education in policies and laws in the course of mediation" (Art. 
III). 268 The committees are not empowered to use any sanctions 
to compel reconciliation and their reintroduction as a judicial 
appendage may only be "a temporary if incomplete answer to the 
acute shortage of judicial personnel which is the result of the 
deliberate Maoist policy of contempt for laws.•269 
In the administration of justice, the people's courts of 
the PRC under the Organic Court Law have adopted the system of 
"rendering judgment after two trials. •270 The initial trial of 
crimina! and some civil cases is conducted by the basic-level 
people's court (Art. 21). At the next level, the intermediate 
courts exercise appellate review over basic-level people's courts 
and, in addition, have original jurisdiction over cases pre-
scribed to them by law (Art. 25(1)), or referred to them by local 
courts (Art. 25 ( 2)). The higher people's courts stand in like 
relation to the intermediate courts.'271 Both intermediate and 
higher-level people's courts have the right to review decisions 
of lower-level people's courts which have taken legal effect pur-
suant to their powers of judicial supervision (Art. 14). 
The highest judicial organ is the Supreme People's Court 
(Art. 30),272 which has been granted powers identical to those 
of intermediate· and lower-level courts, including the power of 
original jurisdiction in important cases,273 (Art. 32), but which 
is also entrusted with the power to exercise judicial supervision 
over the decisions of local people's courts and special courts. 
The Supreme People's court is empowered to provide judicial 
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interpretation concerning the specific application of laws and 
decrees (Arts. 30, 33)27~ and approves or passes the death penal-
ty in many cases of capital punishment (Art. 13).275 In addi-
tion, the Supreme People's Court is vested with the authority to 
issue explanatory decrees (Art. 33) designed to publicize and 
eliminate the more common errors made by lower-level courts. To 
date, few explanatory decrees have ever been publicly issued. 
Moreover, the lack of trained judicial personnel in the PRC has 
left the Supreme People's Court unable to handle the deluge of 
lower-level cases appealed to it and to carry out its supervisory 
legal functions as well. The Supreme People's Court is not the 
custodian of the PRC Constitution and has not questioned the 
validity of any of the recently enacted legal codes and regula-
tions. Its role appears to be significantly more passive. In 
effect, this passive role cuts both ways. An arms control in-
spectorate should have little or no concern about the possibility 
of the Supreme People's Court's initiation of judicial review of 
inspectorate provisions passed by the NPC. 
Chinese law permits only one appeal by a defendant to the 
next highest court as a matter of right.276 While appellate re-
view in the West is concerned mostly with questions of law, such 
review in the PRC does not seem to be so limited. The factual 
record may be reviewed or expanded by the introduction of new or 
further evidence, and indications are that full-dress re-trials 
are not beyond the scope of appellate authority.277 Appellate 
review by way of judicial supervision of decisions which have 
taken effect (usually by virtue of an adverse decision on appeal 
or by the lapse of the 5-day requirement for filing an appeal)278 
encompasses review of both facts and law. If a higher-level 
court or the procuracy feels that the appellate decision would 
cause a miscarriage of justice, either body may then object to 
the decision by filing· a protest. The paucity of actual judicial 
or procuratorial protests notwithstanding, an arms inspectorate 
might well gauge Chinese commitment to an arms control arrange-
ment by the willingness of the superior courts or procuracy to 
protest decisions inimical to arms inspection •. 
In addition to the local people's courts and the Supreme 
People's Court, the Organic Court Law has added a third type: 
special people's courts (Art. 2). The NPC Standing Committee is 
vested with the power to determine the organization and jurisdic-
tion of special people's courts,279 despite the constitutional 
grant of judicial supervisory authority to the Supreme People's 
Court. Undoubtedly, "the fact that the special courts are under 
the scrutiny of particular government departments goes a long way 
to determine the nature of their activity.•280 The use of a spe-
cial court and special procuratorate for the Gang of Four trial 
suggests that special courts are most likely to be used in publi-
ci zed cases of significant importance and sens i ti vi ty. Claims 
brought against an arms inspectorate in cases where it was not 
shielded by immunity would seem to be the most likely candidates 
for the creation of special courts, which, by their very nature, 
would not be entrusted with a flood of other cases, and which, 
because of the legal machinations surrounding their creation, 
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would portray to the international community the Chinese commit-
ment to judicial fairness. On the other hand, claims brought on 
behalf of an inspectorate for alleged acts of Chinese inter-
ference in inspection operations may or may not receive the at-
tention of a special court, depending on the nature of the 
obstruction and the reasons fo.r it. Moreover, trials in people's 
courts on non-secret. or other non-special matters would give the 
Chinese the option of conducting the trial publicly pursuant to 
Article 125 of the 1982 PRC Constitution.281 In many instances, 
that option could be exploited by the PRC to garner public sup-
port for Chinese policy, publicize the indiscretions of inspec-
torate personnel, or simply legitimize the judicial process. 
Public security departments (gonganju) are the third divi-
sion of political-juridical bodies in the PRC. Prior· to the 
adoption of the 1978 PRC Constitution the public security bodies 
"performed secondary functions of the procurator's office in con-
ducting inquiries and preliminary investigations, instituting 
criminal proceedings and maintaining public accusations in court, 
as well as supervising the fulfillment [sic] of court 
sentences.•282 
The public security organs functioned outside the scope of 
any established legal norms and "enjoyed a higher status" than 
the procuracy.283 Such functions and powers would indicate that 
the participation of public security organs in the arms inspec-
tion process would have significant ramifications for an inspec-
torate, largely because of the public security departments' un-
controlled responsibility in the criminal process. 
Although ostensible oower of public security organs has 
since been circumscribed,2S4 this vast control apparatus still 
retains impressive -- and disturbing -- authority. For example, 
the Regulations of the People's Republic of China Governing the 
Arrest and Detention of Persons Accused of Crimes, adopted 
February 23, 1979285 [hereafter Arrest Regulations], requires 
procuratorial or 286 judicial approval in the form of an arrest 
warrant before public security bodies were entitled to make ar-
rests. But, Article 6 of the Arrest Regulations permits public 
security organs, in an "emergency,•287 to detain up to four days 
a person who has committed a crime or one who is "suspected of 
having committed a major crime.•288 Public security organs main-
tain visa inspection stations for foreign travellers and are 
otherwise in charge of monitoring foreign activities in the 
PRc.289 11oreover, public security organs allegedly have exclu-
sive power to enforce fines through detention and to determine 
fault at the site of an accident for purposes of compensation.290 
Public security organs are apparently not accountable t9 the 
courts or the procuracy.291 simply phrased, public security or-
gans and the Public Security Ministry in charge of them, operate 
a largely unfettered surveillance system in the PRC. 
A 1978 report given by the chairman of the PRC Supreme Peo-
ple's Court, Jiang Hua (Chiang Hua), noted that "security bodies 
widely practice extraction of 'confessions' from the accused 
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under duress."292 Although the Arrest Regulations grant the pro-
curatorates the power to investigate "responsible personnel who 
carried out arrests, detentions and searches of citizens in 
violation of the law" (Art. 13),293 in reality, the zeal with 
which any investigation will be conducted will depend largely on 
the nature of the offense and the offender. A genuine Chinese 
commitment to an arms inspecti~n policy would probably result in 
official disciplining of any public security organ for flagrant 
misconduct displayed towards the inspectorate team. Unpunished, 
obstructive actions, such as gross provocations or dilatory 
detention procedures294 carried out by public security organs, 
may simply evince a lack of good faith on the part of the PRC. 
The extent to which the political-juridical organs partici-
pate in an arms inspection arragnement undoubtedly remains a 
function of CCP policy directives. The development of the procu-
ratorial, judicial and public security bodies since 1979 is still 
incomplete and their interaction within the governmental mecha-
nism is still unsettled. Nevertheless, the mass public campaign 
to strengthen the PRC legal system295 has inculcated Chinese 
citizens with a manifest respect for legal institutions and a 
positive attitude toward Chinese justice. As a result, the pro-
curacy, the courts, and the public security organs could signifi-
cantly facilitate the policy-execution process of arms inspec-
tion. The procuracy, the most active of the three political-
juridical ~odies in the Chinese legal system, could offer a 
strong indication of the overall Chinese commitment to arms in-
spection by its willingness to cooperate with an inspectorate in 
removing local legal obstacles to inspection. The courts, as 
institutions empowered to settle disputes, often through public 
procedures, could influence Chinese attitudes towards inspection 
procedures by providing a forum for legal challenges to inspec-
tion functions. The public security departments, as the official 
policing agency for the PRC, could be particularly assiduous in 
removing threats to the inspectorate and the inspection process. 
Consistent, unequivocal acts of cooperation from these three or-
gans would substantially contribute to the creation of a climate 
in the PRC which is conducive to the execution of an inspection 
arrangement. 
4) The Chinese Attitude Toward Disarmament 
The acquisition of strategic.nuclear weapons capability by 
the PRC, shown most recently 1n the successful Chinese test 
launching of an ICBM,296 has added a new dimension to the gobal 
strategic balance; given the PRC a leading voice on pressing con-
temporary international issues; and, provided a stronger, more 
stable domestic environment in which to embark on the program of 
•four modernizations."297 
The evolution of Chinese disarmament pol icy has been a 
function of Chinese national security interests. The PRC has 
regarded possession of a limited nuclear arsenal as an absolutely 
essential requisite for self-defense purposes and for world 
security.298 Chinese perceptions of PRC military vulnerability 
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have created a domestic political posture generally unswerving in 
its rigid opposition to international agreements that would 
hinder continued sophisticated weapons development. With few 
exceptions, the PRC has not acceded to or ratified any interna-
tional agreement related to arms control and disarmament.299 
Moreover, the Chinese have stated unequivocally that the PRC 
would not be bound by any agreement without the formal participa-
tion and signature of her delegate.300 
An understanding of Chinese attitudes toward arms control 
and disarmament begins with an understanding of the characteris-
tic differences between the terms "arms control": and 
"disarmament:" 
Disarmament normally means a quantitative 
reduction or elimination of armaments and 
military forces, whereas arms control 
refers to measures designed to regulate and 
restrict armaments so as to maintain a mea-
sure of military power balance and to re-· 
duce the probability of accidental war.301 
Chinese policy implicitly differentiating between these two 
forms of arrangements was largely the result of a defensive 
political outlook borne by military inferiority. From the 
vantage point of national security interests, the PRC disapp~oved 
of any measures which would neutralize China's man-power ad-
vantage vis-a-vis the technological superiority of the United 
States and the Soviet Union~ or which would perpetuate the super-
powers' nuclear monopoly.30~ AS a result, the ~hinese formulated 
in the 1960s an independent policy grounded upon the complete 
prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons,303 
otherwise expressed as total and complete nuclear disarmament. 
In effect, this policy has been the cornerstone of subse-
quent Chinese disarmament proposal modifications, although inter-
national disharmony has compelled the PRC to underscore more 
limited measures as a means to eventually achieve complete 
nuclear disramament. Moreover, the PRC has added conventional 
disarmament to its proposals, something it had heretofore been 
reluctant to do.304 The result is that the current Chinese poli-
cy of disarmament is an amalgam of what are arguably the more 
preferable (i.e., comprehensive) features of arms control and 
general disarmament measures. The basic premise continues to be 
the reduction in number of weapons systems components. Hence the 
terms -- arms control and disarmament -- are used interchangeably 
with respect to inspection operations, because verification pro-
cedures may accompany either arrangement. 
It is only in the last decade -- since China's entry into 
the United Nations in 1971 -- that Chinese representatives have 
articulated the PRC 's principled stand on disarmament issues. 
Only nine days after being admitted to the United Nations, the 
PRC, through UN representative Jiao Guanhua (Chiao Kuan-hua) 
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reiterated Chinese support for total nuclear disarmement and op-
position to superpower arms control arrangements.305 Jiao reas-
serted that the proper condition precedent for genuine disarma-
ment was a pledge by all the nuclear powers "to guarantee that 
they will not use nuclear weapons against [non-nuclear] countries 
and [non-nuclear] zones and will withdraw all their nuclear 
forces and dismantle all nuclear bases and nuclear installations 
from these zones.•306 This pledge came to be known as the "no-
first-use" pledge307 and remains one of the guiding principles of 
subsequent Chinese disarmament proposals.308 
Despite Jiao's cogent remarks during the introductory phase 
of Chinese participation in the United Nations, the PRC voted 
against a sid'nificant number of disarmament and arms control 
resolutions,3 9 some of which were supported by a majority of 
Third World countries.310 The Chinese justified their own 
nuclear development program as well as their opposition to UN 
arms control measures on the basis that nuclear deterrence among 
a number of countries would break the superpower monopoly,311 
eliminate the danger of a new world war,312 and contribute to the 
maintenance of global stability. 
During UN debates on arms control and disarmament issues, 
Chinese representatives condemned both superpowers though 
their verbal attack on the Soviet Union was more vituperative --
for increased arms expansion and denounced their negotiations.313 
·. The Chinese envisaged the ns~ng powers of Third World 
countries, often portrayed proverbially in the PRC press (~, 
shanyu yulai fengmanlou314), as an effective counter.weight to 
superpower imprudence. In the face of such united global opposi-
tion the United States and the Soviet Union were depicted as iso-
lated and debilitated sovereign powers, "in the plight of wuke 
naihe hualuo qu (flowers fall off, one is helpless) •"315 Never-
theless, the Chinese constantly admonished Second and Third World 
countries to guard against superpower military pressure --
qianmen ruhu houmen j inlang (repel the tiqer at the front gate 
and the wolf sneaks in at the back door).3lo 
The formulation of Chinese policy has resulted from deduc-
tive logic, syllogistically progressing from general Chinese per-
ceptions of the state of the world to the more specific issues of 
arms control and disarmament.317 For example, Chinese denuncia-
tions of disarmament negotiations in the 1960s and early 1970s 
reflected both PRC disagreement with the Soviet Union and the 
perceived military vulnerability of China. The PRC's censure of 
the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty reflected the Chinese position 
that nuclear status was regarded as the mark of a major military 
power and could not be fairly limited to only the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The Chinese had not yet attained nuclear 
capability; hence they labelled the treaty a "fraud" and accused 
the superpowers, with their nuclear arsenals, of attempting to 
consolidate their nuclear monopoly and prevent "peace-loving 
countries" (including the PRC) from strengthening their own self-
defense techniques through nuclear weapons development.318 Since 
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the PRC was regarded as having "more nations on its border, more 
insecure frontiers and more controversies with neighboring states 
than any other large or small powers,"319 military might in the 
form of nuclear capability was considered a constituent national 
power ingredient. To enhance its global image and protect itself 
from the superpower threat, the Chinese regarded their own uncon-
strained weapons development as essential. 
At the same time the Chinese described the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963 as insufficiently comprehensive, they also sought 
to avoid support for general and complete disarmament proposals, 
since conventional force reductions embodied in those proposals 
would remove China's only strategic advantage over the super-
powers. Moreover, China perceived that its large size made pos-
sible dispersion of industry and population so that a nuclear 
attack would not compleely immobilize the PRc.320 Therefore, the 
Chinese reasoned that they could, in a sense, afford to oppose 
any international conclave which sought to maintain the military 
status quo or prevent the PRC from acquiring its own nuclear 
weapons. This position was tempered by the realization that low 
quality medical f:cilities dictated that germ, c~emi~al, or 
radiological warfare against China would be very effective,321 a 
fact that certainly justified PRC ratification of the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol and indicated the extent to which Chinese policy was 
both self-serving and politically practical. 
As various arms control and disarmament negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union continued, the PRC 
accused the superpowers of "collusions in their arms control 
plots"322 and observed that the purpose and. result of these 
negotiations were meraly to set high ceilings for missile deliv-
ery systems, leaving plenty of elbow room for research and ex-
perimentation.323 The Chinese perceived no real disarmament 
resulting from the SALT negotiations, noting often in UN speeches 
and domestic news articles that the SALT agreements were ineffec-
tive and would eliminate quantitative competition and confine it 
to qualitative in the development of strategic nuclear 
weapons.324 
The Chinese historical portrayal of the superpowers as two 
giant .forces locked in fierce contention for global hegemony has 
given way, partly as a result of recent SALT negotiations, to an 
increased regularity of Chinese press releases and official 
statements characterizing the Soviet "hegemonists" as the pr in-
cipal threat to other countries.325 Opposition to Soviet expan-
sionism "remains the principal basis for accommodation between 
the PRC and a broad spectrum of states.•326 Chinese behavior has 
manifested itself in salutary gestures that seem almost uncharac-
teristic, including an alleged offer by Vice-Premier Deng 
Xiaoping to the United States to allow the latter to install 
American equipment on Chinese soil to monitor Soviet compliance 
with the SALT II Treaty.327 
The PRC continues to oppose the Partial Test Ban Treaty, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the proposed comprehensive test 
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ban treaty.328 The overriding reason for opposition to these 
treaties has been the firm Chinese assertion that limited arms 
control and disarmament measures "establish nothing•:329 super-
power nuclear weapons were considered to be entirely offensive 
and continually geared for war. Each superpower was accused of 
using arms control and disarmament negotiations as a method "to 
attain nuclear superiority by limiting the strength of the 
other.•330 Between 1963 and 1978, the United States was alleged 
to have conducted 343 nuclear tests and the Soviet Union 234.331 
The PRC asserted that such tests indicated that arms limitation 
talks had sim~ln failed to halt the escalation and expansion of 
nuclear arms. The superpowers had military strength "far 
beyond their defense needs•333 and their bilateral negotiatons 
were designed to preserve the superpower nuclear monopoly and 
foreclose the development of nuclear programs by developing 
countries.334 
The PRC has also refused to ratify the Outer Space Treaty, 
the Seabed Treaty, the convention on environmental warfare 
(ENMOD), and the convention banning biological warfare.335 Much 
of Chinese opposition to these arm 1 i:ni tat ion agreements stems 
from the "deep rooted suspicion •.. about Russian and American 
intentions [and) a long history of Soviet intervention in 
China and u.s. support for the rival government on Taiwan. •336 
Though the PRC has not opposed the basic premise of these trea-
ties and conve:1tions, it has object~d to the proc<:dur:~~ :~nd sub-
stantive control exerted by the superpowers which, the Chinese 
have felt, precluded meaningful discussion and the adequate for-
mulation of arms limitation policies which incorporate the rea-
sonable proposals of Third World countries.337 
China's arms control and disarmament policies are oc-
casionally inconsistent. On the question of chemical and bio-
logical warfare, for instance, the PRC has asserted its support 
for the complete and thorough destruction of chemical and toxic 
wea(?ons338 and denounced their use by other countries in war-
fare.339 The Chinese have not only ratified the 1925 Geneva Pro-
tocol [on Chemical Weapons) but have also included a (?revision on 
the (?rohibition and destruction of biological and chemical 
weapons in their 1982 disarmament proposal and in their Com-
prehensive Programme on Disarmament.~40 Moreover, the PRC voted 
for the 1973 resolution on na(?alm and other incendiary weapons341 
and ratified the UN Convention restricting or prohibiting the 
uses of certain conventional weapons (landmines, booby traps, 
incendiary weapons and small calibre weapons systems).34~ Never-
theless, China has op(?osed the superpower-sponsored biological 
warfare convention as a tool of the United States and the Soviet 
Union for (?eddling their disarmament fraud.343 
The PRC has not failed to attack the Soviet Union for the 
latter's deployment of biological weapons on the grounds that 
such wea(?ons are ecologically destructive. 344 Yet, the Chinese 
themselves have ignored the environmental repercussions of their 
own above-ground nuclear tests.345 
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Despite the appar~nt inconsistencies in Chinese policy 
regarding weapons testing and biological and chemical warfare, 
the PRC has been most unequivocal in her support for the es-
tablishment of nuclear-free zones around the world, a concept 
which the Chinese have offered as proof that they are committed 
to the genuine disarmament demanded by Third world countries.346 
By voting for UN resolutions on the establishment of a zone of 
peace in the Indian Ocean, the nuclear weapon-free zones in the 
Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Latin America347 as well as 
ratifying Additional Protocol II of the Tlateloco Treaty, the PRC 
has established itself as the only major nuclear power which has 
taken firm, consistent and unequivocal action on any issue in-
volved in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Tlateloco 
Treaty was not without a number of self-service political mo-
tives. At one and· the same time, the PRC hoped further to iso-
lat~ the Soviet Union by denouncing Soviet "acceptance" of Addi-
tional Protocol II as a fraud348 and more closely to align itself 
with the "reasonable" position of Third World countries.349 
The flexibility that the PRC has shown toward arms control 
and disarmament negotiations in the recent past is further 
evidence of the continuing Chinese predilection toward retaining 
its position as the vanguard of the Third World. The year 1978 
marked the first instance in which the Chinese expressed an 
interest in directly participating in disarmament negotia-
tions.350 Huang Hua, who represented the PRC delegation at the 
lOth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 
1978,351 noted that the convocation of the Session, at the insis-
tence of the non-aligned countries, was the result of the in-
creased dissatisfaction with the "intensified [superpower) arms 
race.•352 Developing countries continued to struggle to protect 
their sovereignty and national security. 353 In "reviewing the 
past to know better the future," Hua noted that the key reason 
for· the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations had been the 
insincerity of the superpowers.354 The PRC representative asser-
ted that the people of the world wanted genuine and not sham dis-
armament. To the Chinese delegation, genuine disarmament could 
only begin with the superpowers.355 To reduce the danger of war, 
Hua called for the simultaneous reduction of both nuclear and 
conventional armaments, 356 something the PRC had heretofore te=" 
jected. He also called for the United States and the Soviet 
Union to adopt the no-first-use pledge to withdraw their armed 
forced from abroad, and to dismantle their foreign military in-
stallations.357 Moreover, the Chinese viewed as "understandable" 
the proposal of small and medium-sized countries that the reduc-
tion of military expenditures under disarmament measures be chan-
nelled toward the economic development of the developing 
countries.358 
During the Tenth Special Session, the Chinese delegation 
also announced its willingness to participate in future disarma-
ment negotiations if and only if the superpower-dominated Geneva 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was reorganized under 
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UN auspices "so as to bring the role of the Third World into full 
play •.. !by adhering to] the principle of equality among all 
countries." 359 Throughout the Session, the Chinese press con-
tinued to denounce the superpowers' obstruction of disarmament360 
and to support the proposals of the developing countries.361 The 
final document of the Session, approved by the General Assembly 
on June 30, 1978, gave its "highest priority" to nuclear disarma-
ment and the prevention of nuclear war.362 The previous 
negotiating body for disarmament measures, which met in Geneva, 
was reorganized and renamed the Committee on Disarmament with an 
expanded 39 member representation, including the PRc.363 A new 
Disarmament Commission, composed of all UN members, was also es-
tablished by the General Assembly and was designed to report an-
nually to the Assembly and make recommendations on ACD problems. 
The Chinese delegation maintained that it was pleased that 
the superpowers did not control the negotiations. Yet, it re-
mained concerned that the final documents failed to specify ex-
plicitly that the new negotiating body, the Committee on Disarma-
ment, be fully representative and that it be composed on the ba-
sis of equitable geographical distribution.364 Moreover, the PRC 
alleged that the document incorporated many of the unreasonable 
positions of the superpowers,365 omitted any mention that the 
superoowers' rivalry increased the likelihood of a new world 
war366 and failed to c:: iticize the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
projected comprehensive test ban treaty.367 Perhaps most reveal-
ingly, a Chinese press release during the Special Session asser-
ted that the PRC could not agree to disarmament alongs.ide the 
superpowers while Soviet troops were arrayed along China's north-
ern border and while Taiwan remained unliberated.368 Though the 
latter assertion had heretofore been absent from Chinese disarma-
ment proposals and has not appeared as explicitly since, PRC con-
cern for foreign arms sales to Taiwan and continued calls for the 
island's liberation in the Chinese press imply the possibility 
that the Taiwan issue could become a complicating factor in es-
tablishing Chinese support for full-fledged participation in the 
disarmament process. 
Throughout 1978, the Chinese continued to view with dis-
favor the increasing intensity of the superpower arms race and 
the failure of bilateral Soviet-American disarmament delibera-
tions. 369 When the newly-formed Committee on Disarmament held 
its first session in 1979, the PRC attended only as an observer, 
though it reserved its right to take its seat at a future 
time. 370 The Chinese, as part of their plan to assume a more 
active role in disarmament negotiations, proposed at the first 
session of the UN Disarmament Commission on May 15, 1979 their 
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which has become the core 
of later PRC disarmament proposals.371 In its Programme, the PRC 
proposed the reduction of nuclear conventional weapons as well as 
biological, chemical and other weapons of mass dstruction ini-
tiated and executed first by the superpowers.372 In addition, 
the Chinese called for the establishment of zones of peace in 
Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean and respect for the Indian 
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Ocean peace zone.373 The Programme also called for the es-
tablishment of nuclear-free zones 1n the Middle East, Africa and 
South Asia and respect for the status of the nuclear-free zone in 
Latin America.374 
Among the more basic principles emphasized were the 
no-first-use principle,375 the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence376 and the declaration that no disarmament measure 
may im~air the sovereignty, independence and security of any 
state.J77 The bottom line, however, was that the PRC and other 
nuclear powers would join in serious disarmament negotiations at 
some point after the superpower3 had made substantial and satis-
factory progress in the reduction of their armaments.378 
Other elements in the PRC's Comprehensive Programme of Dis-
armament were included as inducements to garner the support of 
the Third World. Phrases such as: "the actual process of disar-
mament should benefit the economic and social development of 
States•; 379 "no disarmament measure may prejudice the right of 
States to make use of modern scientific and technological 
achievements to promote their economic development•;380 "the 
question of disarmament •.. shjuld be discussed and settled by 
all States on an equal footing"; 81 and, "the role of the United 
Nations in the field of disarmament should be strengthened,•382 
were probably incorporated for their propagandistic, rather than 
their normative, effect. 
However, the last reference -- to UN participation in dis-
armament negotiations -- has since been characterized as an "un-
usually warm endorsement of the UN role and recommendations in 
disarmement," and may "indicate a willingness now to consider 
other arms limitation treaties endorsed by the United Nations 
•383 
By implication, the PRC has advanced its support for disar-
mament verification provisions in its 1979 Comprehensive Pro-
gramme on Disarmament and in its 1980 proposal for chemical dis-
armament. The former contains provisions on superpower reduction 
of nuclear and conventional arsenals;384 the latter, a provision 
for the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons 
and the dismantling of production facilities.385 It seemed unre-
alistic that the Chinese would envision the execution of either 
provision without adequate verification procedures. 
What lingering doubts existed about PRC support for 
verification dissipated in 1982, when the Chinese introduced 
their "Proposal on Essential Measures for an Immediate Halt to 
the Arms Race and for Disarmament" before the Second Special Ses-
sion of the UN General Assembly.-386 Provision five of the pro-
posal called for ·"strict and effective measures of international 
verification." The international nature of verification is fur-
ther clarified in the proposal as a "group .•. [of] representa-
tives from all nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states 
[which] should submit reports to the UN General Assembly annually 
and whenever necessary.•387 In this manner, the 1982 disarmament 
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proposal also fuels the supposition that the PRC seeks a more 
acti~e role for the United Nations in disarmament. 
The PRC' s proposal in most other respects parallels the 
principles espoused in the Comprehensive Frog r amme of Disarma-
ment: the no-first-use. principle is retained; nuclear and 
conventional armaments should be reduced; chemical weapons should 
be prohibited; and all states should participate in disarmament 
negotiations on an equal footing. The only addition to these 
principles appears to be the Chinese call for a 50 percent reduc-
tion in superpower nuclear arsenals -- previously the PRC had 
used the term "substantial" reduction -- before the advent of 
serious negotiations. 
If there are troubling aspects to this proposal, they ap-
pear to be with respect to verification. First, the Chinese sug-
gestion for an international verification group composed of 
nuclear and non-nuclear Neapon states appears cumbersome and un-
wieldy. -second, the 1982 proposal retains the provisions of the 
1979 proposal that disarmament measures should not threaten the 
sovereignty of any state. How the PRC perceives the reconcilia-
tion of potentially intrusive "effective verification" operations 
-- through national technical means or on-site verification --
with the inviolability of sovereignty is unclear. Nevertheless, 
the most recent Chinese disarmament proposal is the first to sug-
gest the need for verification and remains an unprecedented step 
in PRC disarmament policy, however impractical that policy may 
appear.388 
Throughout all its deliberations, the Chinese have con-
tinued to stress the "stark reality of accelerated arms expansion 
and intensified military expansion abroad by the superpowers,n389 
and the right of Third World Countries to develop their own self-
defense programs and to use nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses.39~ The effect of this position has been to chill somewhat 
the atmosphere surrounding disarmament negotiations and attribute 
to the United States and the Soviet Union the primary respon-
sibility for arresting the arms race and initiating the disarma-
ment process. 
The tradition of extensive opposition to superpower disar-
mament efforts provides one of the most obstructive elements for 
arms inspection in the PRC. Chinese participation in an arms 
inspection arrangement would first involve the initiation and 
implementation of a substantial resocialization of the population 
on arms control and disarmament issues, an undoubtedly lengthy 
and complicated process. Furthermore, this process of 
resoc ial i za t ion would necessarily involve some form of recon-
ciliation or rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The political 
rift that has existed between the Chinese and the Soviets is one 
of the fundamental reasons the PRC refuses to negotiate with the 
nuclear powers on arms control and disarmament issues. The Chi-
nese have consistently regarded the Soviet Union as the major 
source of world tens ion. The PRC response to the aggressive 
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military presence of the Soviets along the Chinese-Soviet bor-
der391 and around the world has been a declaratory policy which 
has stressed a posture of finite nuclear deterrence.3~2 The goal 
of the Chinese nuclear deterrent strategy has been to minimize 
the likelihood of a Soviet preemptive attack and reduce the vul-
nerabi 1 i ty of the PRC 1 s nuclear systems. The Chinese have thus 
undertaken a number of measures designed to "disperse, camouflage 
and diversify•393 their nuclear delivery systems, hiding some 
missiles in silos and others in mountainous locations, thus com-
plicating detection.394 An arms inspection arrangement would run 
counter to such a continuous and intensive process of war pre-
paredness based on a limited retaliatory capacity requiring the 
utmost in non-detection to be effective. 
In effect, Chinese participation and interaction in the 
international community will always depend, to a great degree, on 
PRC-perceived priorities, values, and vulnerability.395 The 
PRC 1 s sensitivity to previous superpower-controlled disarmament 
negotiations and its ardent distrust of the Soviet Union makes 
the likelihood of unreserved approval of intrusive arms inspec-
tion procedures presently improbable, particularly if the com-
position of the inspectorate includes Soviet participants. The 
entire approach of the Chinese to arms control and disarmament 
issues suggests the formation of an inspectorate body composed of 
impartial, Third World members whose reports are eventually fun-
neled through a representative international body. Such an in-
spectorate would receive a potentially greater degree of initial 
cooperation from the relevant PRC governmental bodies involved in 
the inspection process and could minimize Chinese assertions of 
potential ulterior motives on the part of individual inspectors. 
Moreover, the discernible anti-Soviet trends among the general 
population would fail to disrupt as readily an inspection pro-
cedure which did not involve direct Soviet participation. Final-
ly, greater Third World participation in the inspection proces~ 
would provide the PRC with what it may consider a more sym-
pathetic ear towards potential superpower violations of the in-
spection agreement, a point not to be disregarded lightly giver 
past Chinese attacks on superpower-controlled disarmament organs. 
Though it is not the intent of this study to propose in detail 
the working composition of an arms inspectorate, an awareness of 
Chinese receptiveness to present disarmament proceedings may mak1 
the finalization of future agreements somewhat easier. 
Of course, PRC apprehension toward, and skepticism of. 
present disarmament negotiations may prove obstructive of arm1 
inspection inasmuch as the Chinese would be likely to envelop th1 
operations of the governmental system in secrecy and encurnbeJ 
even the simplest problems in bureaucratic red tape. The CCP anc 
Chinese media have never been remiss in inculcating the masse: 
with an attitude "that constant vigilance on the part of ever: 
citizen is essential to prevent both foreign agents and subver· 
sive ideas from penetrating•396 Chinese society. This attitud• 
endures despite the kind of PRC control over the population whicl 
has been so thorough that it is unlikely a limited contingent o 
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foreign inspectors would prove politically disruptive. Inspec-
tors would probably not be attending Chinese schools, working in 
Chinese factories, or otherwise engraining themselves in the 
fabric of PRC society so as to cause the system to break down. 
Yet, increased cultural contacts and present-day reports in the 
Chinese press criticizing Mao397 -- for so long the patriarch of 
Chinese society -- may invariably lead to the kind of psychologi-
cal self-reevaluation that encourages Chinese people to seek 
knowledge of the outside world and prompts the PRC leadership to 
labor under an anxiety about Chinese society becoming contami-
nated by foreign influence. Chinese reluctance to accept inspec-
tion for reasons of national security may manifest itself in im-
plementation of stricter standards of civilian and police (public 
and secret) surveillance over inspectorate members, particularly 
since it would be unlikely that the PRC would be permitted to 
maintain effective, selective control of the insoectorate's offi-
cial itinerary within the country.398 • 
Although Chinese support for verification remai:1s one of 
the more laudable aspects of PRC disar~ament policy, the Chinese 
have never publicly endorsed on-site inspection. In fact, in 
what was one of the very few press reports to even faintly allude 
to on-site inspection, the Chinese noted that the United States 
would have difficulty monitoring Soviet compliance with SALT II 
because "there is no perfect solution to verification.•399 There 
is no hint that the PRC considers on-site insoection less flawed 
than other surveillance techniques nor that it- would find on-site 
operations acceptable under provisions of its disarmament pro-
posals opposing measures that impair the sovereignty, indepen-
dence and security of any state. At present, the net impact of 
Chinese attitudes and policies toward disarmament would probably 
prove obstructive to PRC participation in on-site inspection 
arrangements. 
In the final analysis, the single most constructive factor 
conducive to Chinese participation remains, despite pervasive PRC 
suspicion of superpower motives, the willingness and sincerity of 
the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in genuine dis-
armament. The reluctance of the superpowers to proceed pursuant 
to the terms of the PRC 's disarmament proposals will probably 
have an enervating effect on Chinese participation in, and affir-
mative support for, effective verification procedures. 
But this is not to assert that the PRC would limit its par-
ticipation in arms control and disarmament measures to arrange-
ments based exclusively on its programs. Chinese declarations on 
the strengths and weaknesses of recent proceedings are oc-
casionally equivocal and often indecisive in suggesting more 
feasible alternatives. Any lack of resolve, however, is not to 
be mistaken for weakness. Rather, it is the result of the rela-
tive brevity of PRC participation in official international 
intercourse. The Chinese are frequently proferring official and 
semi-official proclamations as lithmus tests for official inter-
national reaction. Chinese positions are pliable; they may be 
altered in response to vigorous foreign dissent or .adjusted to 
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more appropriately fit the dictates of CCP ideology. The more 
positive the relationship between such variables, the greater the 
likelihood for compromise. The position of the PRC with respect 
to present-day disarmament measures is arguably more conducive to 
Chinese participation than it has ever been. This is a first 
significant concrete move in the direction of disarmament and 
suggests that the PRC no longer considers genuine disarmament a 
mere hackneyed slogan. 
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1. See LA\i IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND 
SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 ( Leng and Chiu 
ed. 1972) [hereafter LENG AND CHIU]. SEE ALSO CHOU-FU-
LUN, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Modern International 
Law, Chiao hsueh yu yen-chiu (Teach~ng and research) Nov.3, 
1958, at 52: M. HALPERIN AND D. PERKINS, COMMUNIST CHINA 
AND ARMS CONTROL 142 ( 1965) [hereafter HALPERIN AND 
PERKINS]. 
2. LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 243. For a detailed dis-
cussion of Chinese views on international law, see Chiu, 
Communist China's Attitude Towards International--r::-aw, 60 
AJIL 245, 251-57 (No.2, April 1966): Wang Tieya and Wei 
Min (eds.), Gucij Ha (International Law), (Legal education 
teaching materials), Chapter 2, Liu Zenzhang and Wei Min, 
Guojifa de jiben yuanze (Basic principles of international 
law), pp. 48-53 [published by the Law Publishing Co., Beij-
ing: 1981, lst ed .] [hereafter cited as Guoj if a]. On 
doctrinal grounds, the PRC is said to recognize two sepa-
rate systems of international law, "bourgeois" and 
"socialist." LENG AND CHIU, supra note l, at 243: HALPERIN 
AND PERKINS, supra note 1, at 143. Regardless of these 
"bourgeois" and "socialist" international law distinctions, 
the PRC: will justify the use of "bourgeois" principles -:md, 
in effect, transform them into "socialist" ones where they 
serve national interests. Cf. note 40 infra. 
Although some have ascribed to the ?RC this distinc-
tion in internati.Jnal law principles, the Chinese them-
selves have not recently resorted to such a distinction in 
foreign language legal publications, though it continued to 
appear in Chinese documents. See, ~· Guanyu xiandai 
guojifa dingyi wenti (Problems in the Definition of Contem-
porary International Law). Xinhua yuebao, June 1980, at 
10-12. According to this article, the Chinese continue to 
debate the merits of the "socialist system of international 
law• (shehui zhuyi tixi quojifa) and the "bourgeois system 
of international law." [translation by author]. One pos-
sible explanation for the absence of such articles in, say, 
English legal publications of the PRC is that the Chinese 
quest for economic modernization with Western aid may re-
quire less vehement and aggressive opposition to "bour-
geois" principles. 
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Cf. "PRC Delegate Addresses Security Council on U.s. 
Hostages," Foreign Broadcast Information Service on China 
[hereafter FBIS-CHI], No. 001, 1980 [hereafter cited by 
year and number: ~, 80-001] (Jan. 2, 1980), at Al: Og-
den, The Approach of the Chinese Communists to the Study of 
Internatonal Law, State Sovereignty and the International 
System, 70 CHINA Q. 315, 315-19 (June 1977). 
The traditional Chinese image of world order conceived 
of the PRC as a cultural epicenter, as illustrated by Chi-
nese use of the term "tianxia" or "all under heaven• to· 
describe its culture. See Hoffheimer, China and Interna-
tional Legal Order: An HIStorical Introduction, 11 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT'L L. 251, 252 (Nov. 2, 1979). Even the Chinese 
characters for "China • Zhongguo -- mean the "middle 
kingdom." The implication would be that China perceived 
itself not as an equal among others but as world order in 
itself. See id. For this reason, it may not be surprising 
that traditional Chinese jurisprudence is devoid of any 
sytematic treatise on comparative or international law. 
!d., at 253; With the increasing interdependence of na-
tions and the introduction of foreign philosophies and 
ideals, however, China's view of international law as "sim-
ply China," ( id., at 252) was forced to undergo 
readjustment. --
International law as an academic discipline has again 
appeared for the first time since the start of the Cultural 
Revolution. See "Renmin Ribao Calls for International Law 
Studies," FBIS-CHI 79-070 (April 10, 1979) at L9. 
4. Often these agreements are embodied in treaties, a facet of 
international relations the PRC deems as one of the most 
important sources of international law. ~ Anguilo, supra 
note 2, at 86; Guojifa, supra note 2, Chapter 9: Wei Min, 
Tiaoyue (Treaty Law), pp. 319-62. See also J. HSIUNG, LAW 
AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 225 (1972). Cf. 
"Xinhua on Soviet Friendship Treaties, Afghanistan,• FBIS-
CHI 80-002 (Jan. 3, 1980), at C3. 
Basic to Chinese international relations and to many 
of the treaties entered into by the PRC are the five prin-
ciples of peaceful coexistence which embody the fundamen-
tals of Chinese foreign policy and have been "expounded 
upon as the quintessence of modern international law.• 
Anguilo, supra note 2, at 86 citing HSIUNG, supra note 4, 
at 40. These principles were reportedly originally promul-
gated in 1954.· G. SCOTT, CHINESE TREATIES: THE POST-
ItEVOLUTIONARY RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 53 
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( 1976). They are considered by the PRC to be peremptory 
norms designed to ensure international order. See HSIUNG, 
supra note 4, at 38. See also infra note 32 and-accompany-
ing text. 
PRC views often reflect the exigencies of Chinese 
politics, economics and ideology. As such, the PRC has 
resorted to use of the term "unequal treaties" as jus-
tification for avoiding compliance with, or for denouncing, 
treaties distasteful to it. The Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, 14 UST 1313, TIAS No. 5433, 480 UNTS 43 (Aug. 5, 
1963) [hereafter 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty] is a case in 
point. Cf. "U.S., USSR Nuclear Disarmament Roles Dis-
cussed," Fins-CHI 82-188 (Sept. 28, 1982) at Al (PRC re-
fused to JOln ad hoc working group on nuclear test ban 
under Geneva Disarmament Committee on the basis that the 
ban would help the superpowers consolidate their nuclear 
monopoly). 
The PRC objected to the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
on the grounds that the treaty was designed to prevent 
other countries from conducting nuclear tests and possess-
ing nuclear capability. Since, at the time the treaty en-
tered into force, the PRC had not yet developed its own 
nuclear capability, the agreement was perceived as a plot 
on the part of the United States and Soviet Union to monop-
olize nuclear weapons. See HALPERIN AND PERKINS, supra 
note 1, at 115; Beijing Review, July 26, 1963, at 47-79; 
"People of the World Unite for the Complete, Thorough, To-
tal and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear 
Weapons (Peking, For. Lang. Press, 1963); LENG AND CHIU, 
supra note 1, at 244; Steiner, Mainsorings of Chinese Com-
munist Foreign Policy, 44 AJIL 69, 94-8 (No. 1, Jan 1950). 
The Chinese continue to justify their nuclear tests as 
a means to prevent monopolization of nuclear weapons by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. See, ~·, "US-USSR 
SALT Talks Used to Gain Military Advantages," FBIS-CHI-78-
035 (Feb. 21, 1978), at A2; "PRC Delegate to Arms Con-
ference Comments on Restrictions," FBIS-CHI-79-179 (Sept. 
13, 1979), at Al; "Hongqi Article Criticizes Superpower 
Disarmament Efforts," FBIS-CHI-80-119 (June 18, 1980), at 
Al; "Nuclear Weapons Controversy in Europe Continues," 
FBIS-CHI-81-065 (April 6, 1981), at A3; "Renmin Ribao Dis-
cusses u.s., USSR 'Nucleomania'," FBIS-CHI-82-195 (Oct. 7, 
1982). See generally Chapter 2(B)4, infra. See also note 
12, infra. 
5. The Chinese recently condemned the Iranian seizure of 
American hostages in Teheran on the basis of the principle 
that "accepted diplomatic immunities should be universally 
respected." See Security Council: Release of American 
Hostages Urged, Beijing Review, No. 49 (Dec. 7, 1979), at 
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25. See also "PRC Expresses Regret Over U.S. Rescue At-
tempt-: -Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Renmin Ribao Commenta-
tor's Article," FBIS-CHI-80-083 (April 28, 1980), at Al; 
"PRC Delegate Addresses Security Council on U.S. Hostages," 
FBIS-CHI-80-001 (Jan. 2, 1980), at Al; "Ta Kung Pao Com-
ments on US-Iranian Crisis," FB!S-CHI-79-229 (Nov. 27, 
1979), at Ul; "Recent Developments in Teheran Hostage Inci-
dent," FBIS-CHI-79-228 (Nov. 26, 1979), at Il. The PRC 
also protested Soviet violations of international 
diplomatic norms. See "PRC Protests KGB Attempt to Force 
PRC Diplomat to Defect," FBIS-CHI-80-170 (Aug. 29, 1980), 
at Cl. 
The Chinese have invoked the principle of sovereignty 
to justify their claims over the Xisha and Nansha Islands." 
See e.g., "Xinhua Commentator Rebuts SRV on Xisha Islands," 
l"'BTS-CHI-82-113 (June 11, 1982), at El; Hanoi Goes Back on 
Its Word, Beijing Review, No. 34 (Aug. 24, 1979), at 24; 
"Foreign Ministry Document on Xisha, Nansha Islands," FBIS-
CHI-80-021 (Jan. 30, 1980), at El; "Han Nianlong 's Speech 
at Fourth PRC-SRV Meeting," FBIS-CHI-79-094 (May 14, 1979), 
at El (reaffirming PRC sovereignty over the islands). They 
have used the same principle to justify their position on 
reassuming control over Hong Kong in 1997. See, ~· 
"Cheng Ming Cites PRC Officials on Hong Kong," FBIS-CHI-82-
173 (Sept. 7, 1982), at Wl; "PRC Firm Stand on Sovereignty 
Decision Noted," FBIS-CHI-82-178 (Sept. 14, 1982) at W9. 
Furthermore, the sovereignty principle has been used 
to condemn, inter alia, the Israeli occupaticn of Arab ter-
ritories, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the South 
African occupation of Namibia, the J apanese-ROK Agreement 
on the Joint Development of the Continental Shelf in the 
East China Sea, the Vietnamese l?rovocations along the Chi-
nese-SRV border, the U.S. Taiwan-Relations Act, and Ameri-
can arms sales to Taiwan. See, ~·, New Provocations, 
Beijing Review, No. 18 (May 4, 1979), at 29 (Israeli Shell-
ing of Lebanon); Palestine's National Rights Must be Re-
stored, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 50 (Dec. 9, 1977), at 
28; "Lai Yali Addresses UNSC on Jewish Resettlements Is-
sue," FBIS-CHI-79-143 (July 24, 1979), at A4; "PRC Issues 
Statement Against Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan," 
FBIS-CHI-79-252 (Dec. 31, 1979), at Cl; "Renmin ribao: 
Soviet Invasion of 'Utmost Gravity,' FBIS-CHI-80-001 (Jan. 
2, 1980), at C4; Chen Chu Speaks on Nambia Question, Peking 
(Beijing) Review, No. 32 (Aug 11, 1978), at 28; "PRC UN 
Delegate Scores South African Occupation of Nambia," FBIS-
CHI-79-239 (Dec. 11, 1979), at A2; Chinese Foreign Minitry 
Statement Protesting Japanese Government's Infringement on 
China's Sovereignty, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 26 (June 
26, 1978), at 25; Foreign Forces Called on to Withdraw Im-
mediately From Kampuchea, Beijing Review, No. 47 (Nov. 23, 
1979), at 20; "PRC's UN Representative Condemns SRV Aggres-
sion on Kampuchea," FBIS-CHI-79-220 (Nov. 13, 1979), at A4; 
"Xinhua Roundup of SRV Provocations Against China in 
Jan[uary]," FB.IS-CHI-80-026 (Feb. 6, 1980), at El. See 
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also, At UN Security Cou·nc il: Chinese Representative 
DenOunces Soviet and South African Intervention in Angola, 
Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 14 (April 2, 1976), at 13; 
Invasion of Benin Condemned, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 9 
(Feb. 25, 1977), at 29; "Taiwan Relations Act Seen as 
'Serious Obstacle'," FBIS-CHI-82-131 (July 8, 1982), at Bl; 
"U.S. Accused of Interference in PRC Affairs," FBIS-CHI-82-
133 (July 12, 1982), at B2; "Press Reaction to Reagan 
Statement on Taiwan," FBIS-CHI-82-199 (Oct. 14, 1982), at 
W5 (criticizing Reagan for linking peaceful reunification 
to the cessation of U.s. arms sales to the ROC); "PRC Legal 
Expert on u.s. Taiwan Relations Act,• FBIS-CHI-81-036 (Feb. 
24, 1981), at U2; "Xinhua Chinese Account of US-Taiwan 
Agreement Violation," FBIS-CHI-80-197 (Oct. 8, 1980), at 
Bl; "The Just Struggle of the Petroleum Exporting Counties 
Brooks No Vilification," Survey of China's Mainland Press 
[hereafter SCMP) No. 5791 (Feb. 10, 1975), at 8; Wren, Chi-
nese Ease Taiwan Arms Stance a Bit, N.Y. Times, Feb :--1; 
1982, at A3. See generally J. COHEN AND H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S 
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-18 (2 Vols., 1974) 
[hereafter COHEN AND CHIU]. 
6. M. YAHUDA, CHINA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS 238 (1978). 
7. Id. Cf. "USSR Seen Partly to Blame for Arms Talks Halt," 
FBIS-CHI-82-149 (Aug. 3, 1982), at Cl. 
8. ·The Paris Agreements were signed on January 27, 1973. 
Yahuda, supra note 6, at 239. 
9. Egypt adopted its bill to abrogate the treaty on March 15, 
1976. See Egypt Hails Abrogation of Egvotian-Soviet 
Treaty, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 13 (March 26, 1976), 
at 13. See also "Jen min Jih pao Hails Egypt's Abrogation 
of TreatyWith Soviet Union," SCMP No. 6062 (March 25, 
1976), at 191; "Commentary by Hsinhua Correspondent: 
Despicable Soviet Sophistry," SCMP No. 6062 (March 25, 
1976), at 212. 
10. See YAHUDA, supra· note 6, at 239. See also lOth Member 
State, Beijing Rev~ew, No. 23 (June 8,-r97gr;-at 27. 
11. For an analysis of the three world's theory, see CHINA AND 
THE THREE WORLDS (K.D. Chen. ed., 1979); YAHUD~supra note 
6, at 240-66; D. BONAVIA, THE CHINESE (1980); Chairman 
Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is 
a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism, Peking (Beijing) 
Review, No. 45 (Nov. 4, 1977), at 10-41. See also The Im-
portance of Grasping the Theory of the Three-worTdS, Peking 
(Beijing) Review No.3 (Jan. 20, 1978), at 23; "People's 
Daily Article on 'Three Worlds Theory'," FBIS-CHI-77-210 
(Nov. 1, 1977), at Al; "Chairman Mao's Great Strategic Con-
cept - About Differentiating the Three Worlds,• SCMP No. 
6416 (Sept. 6, 1977), at 1. 
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In pertinent part, the Chinese analysis of the three 
worlds was stated as such: 
Judging from the changes in interna-
tional relations, the world today actual-
ly consists of three parts, or three 
worlds, that are interconnected and in 
contradiction to one another. The United 
States and the Soviet Union make up the 
First ~orld. The developing countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America and other 
regions make up the Third World. The 
developed countries between the two make 
up·the Second World. 
Vice~Premier Deng Xiaoping, as Chairman of the Delega-
tion to the UN General Assembly's Sixth Special Session (on 
Raw Materials and Development), presented this theory in a 
speech delivered on April 19, 197 4. For the text of the 
speech, ~ Chairman of Delegation of People's Republic of 
China Teng Hsiao-ping 's Speech at Special Session of UN 
General Assembly, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 15 (April 
12, 1974), Supplement [hereafter Three World's Speech). 
I 
12. Feeney, Sino-Soviet competition in the United Nations, 17 
ASIAN SURVEY 809, 818-19 (No. 9, Sept. 1977). 
13. Id. at 819 citing Wilson, China and the Third World, 7 
PACIFIC COMHUNITY, at 216-17 (No.2, Jan. 1976). Cf. "PRC 
Delegate to Arms Conference Comments on Restrictions," 
FBIS-CHI-79-179 (Sept. 13, 1979), at Al. ·see also Levine, 
China and the Superpowers: Policies Toward~ United 
States and the Soviet Union, 90 POL!. SCIENCE Q. 637, 638 
(No. 4, 1976-76). 
The Chinese penchant for labels and belief in the 
destructive power of words must be carefully analyzed by 
any serious student of Chinese studies. The structure of 
communications in the PRC suggests that Chinese use of the 
media is designed to ensure the stability of the system, 
promote individual devotion to conformity and enforce con-
sensus. For an excellent ·analysis of the relationship of 
communication and politics in the PRC, see Pye, Communica-
tions and Chinese Political Culture, lBASIAN SURVEY 221, 
esp. 228-40 (No. 3, March 1978). See also Liu, Problems in 
Communications in China's Modernization, 22 ASIM SURVEY 
481 (No. 5, May 1982); R. WICH, SINO-SOVIET CRISIS 
POLITICS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL CHANGE AND COMMUNICATION 
(1980). 
In ordinary journalistic and academic parlance, the 
term "superpower • connotes considerable size, population, 
industrial-technological capacity and strategic power which 
are all used to exert influence in the international com-
munity. In the Chinese political lexicon, however, the 
term "superpower" is distinctly more perjorative. The 
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policies of those countries "designated by the PRC as super-
powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- are 
often linked with expansionism, subversion, aggression, 
racism, intervention, territorial encroachments, infringe-
ments on sovereign rights, colonialism, Zionism, hegemonism 
and, inevitably, war. f!· Three World's Speech, supra 
note 11, at p. 11. 
The distinguishing feature of the superpowers is their 
quest for hegemony [bachuan], a word indicating "not the 
legitimate leadership of an alliance or association founded 
on common interest, but the unlawful and tyrranical use of 
coercive force over the weak and the defenseless." Levine, 
supra note 13, at 639. Cf. Walder, Press Accounts and the 
Study of Chinese Society, 79 CHINA Q. 568 (Sept. 1979). 
As such, the term "superpower" is a focal point around 
which the Chinese have attempted to create a united front 
of Third World and Second World countries whose common 
interest is to defend their sovereignty against superpower 
encroachment. Levine, supra note 13, at 638. 
Though the PRC is itself committed to military 
modernization and has, in fact, already tested an ICBM, it 
lacks the "malevolent ambition" of the superpowers. Id., 
at 639. See also "Beijing Press Reports on Successful Mis-
sile Test:-- 'Jiefangjun Bao Commentary,'" FBIS-CHI-80-103 
(May 27, 1980), at L8; "Submarine-Launched Carrier Rocket 
Tested," FBIS-CHI-82-201 (Oct. 18, 1982), at Kl. 
Thus, any enlightened attempt to include the PRC as a 
"superpower" based on its aggregate power potential, rather 
than on its use of such power, would be strongly denounced 
by the. Chinese. Moreover, the Chinese definition of the 
term would render its applicability to the PRC largely 
incorrect. 
14. Feeney, supra note 12, at 819. 
15. g. 
16. ~Three .World's Speech, supra note 11. See also YAHUDA, 
supra note 6, at 241; "Newspapers Note Importance of Three 
Tasks for 1980s," FBIS-CHI-80-025 (Feb. 5, 1980), at Ll; 
"Huang Hua Addresses UN General Assembly," FBIS-CHI-82-193 
(Oct. 5, 1982), at Al. 
17. Guojifa, supra note 2, Chapter 4: Wang Xuan, Guojia lintu 
(National territory), pp. 135-62. LENG AND CHIU, supra 
note 1, at 244-45; HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 72-77; YAHUDA, 
supra note 6, at 264; See generally, COHEN AND CHIU, supra 
note 5, at 106-18; Guojifa ziliao xuanbian (Selected 
materials on international law) compiled by Wang Tieya and 
Tian Ruxuan (Law Publishing Co., Beijing, 1981). 
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18. The PRC justified its 1979 counterattack against Vietnam 
(SRV) on the basis of its right of self-defense. The coun-
terattack was designed to punish the Vietnamese for their 
repeated incursions into Chinese territory. See, e.g., 
Counterattack in Defense of Our Frontiers, Beijing Review, 
No. 8 (Feb. 23, 1979), 3t 9; "Chinese Government Statement 
on Counterattack Against SRV," FBIS-CHI-79-036 (Feb. 21, 
1979), AT AS. Cf, "Statement by Chinese Foreign Ministry 
Spokesman," SC~P No. 5975 (Nov. 14, 1975), at 236 (PRC 
troops killed members of an Indian patrol who had crossed 
into Chinese territory. Chinese justification was self-
defense). 
19. See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 244. For China's 
refusal to refer the Sino-Indian border conflict to an 
international tribunal, see, "Text of Chinese Foreign 
Ministry Note to India," SCMP No. 3081 (Oct. 16, 1963) cit-
ed in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1441-42. But see 
Ellis and Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement in 
the People's Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L. J. 155, 
159 n. 22 (No.2, 1981); Cf. "China Daily on Suit Against 
U.S. Over Cargo," FBIS-CHI-82-104 (May 28, 1982), at Bl 
(PRC demand for cargo compensation caused by u.S. subma-
rine-Japanese freighter collision. China's CCPIT legal 
office presented brief to u.s. Jag Corps). 
20. Ch.inese commentators have consistently insisted that the 
United Nations, in exercising its role in the maintenance 
of international peace and security, should not intervene 
in the internal affairs of other states. in. violation of 
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, 59 Stat •. 1031, 3 
Bevans 1153 (1945). S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
WORLD ORDER 411 (1979). Consistent with this belief, the 
PRC objected to the UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) I 
General Assembly resolution during the 1956 Suez Crisis as 
ultra vires because Article 24 of the UN Charter assigned 
the primary responsibility of maintaining international 
peace and security to the UN Security Council. 1£., citing 
Sun Nam, What is the United Nations Emergency Force?, Shih-
chieh chi-shih [World Knowledge], No. 24 (Dec. 20, 1956), 
at 22. 
The PRC has also objected to UN troop deployment in 
Korea, Hungary, the Congo [ONUC], Cypress [UNFICYP], Viet-
nam, Tibet, Hong Kong anq Macao as contraventions of UN 
Charter principles. KIM, supra note 20, at 411. See also 
"UN Extends Mid-east Observer Force; PRC Does Not Vote,• 
FBIS-CHI-80-110 (June 5, 1980), at Al; "UN Peacekeeping 
Force Extended in Cyprus," FBIS-CHI-80-244 (Dec. 17, 1980), 
at A3 (PRC did not vote). 
In 1981, however, the PRC for the first time agreed to 
help finance UN peace-keeping forces, declaring itself pre-
pared to adopt a more flexible attitude on UN peace-keeping 
operations. See "PRC to Help Finance UN Peac·e-Keeping 
Operations," FBIS-cHI-81-238 (Dec. 11, 1981), at. Al; "UN 
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Envoy on Support to Peace-Keeping Forces," FBIS-CHI-81-241 
(Dec. 16, 1981), at Al. 
21. See, ~~ Struggle for New International Economic Order, 
Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 7 (Feb. 13, 1976), at 13; 
Struggle for New Code (5th Session of UN Sea Law Con-
ference), Peking (9eijing) Review, No. 32 (Aug. 9, 1976), 
at 27; New International Economic Order: An Irrestistible 
Historical Trend - Speech by Liu Xiwen, Head of the Chinese 
Delegation at UNCTAD V on May 10, Beijing Review, No. 20 
(May 18, 1979), at 11; "Issues at Law of Sea Conference in 
Geneva Noted," FBIS-CHI-78-088 (May 5, 1978), at Al (sup-
porting sovereignty and security of coastal state); "Xinhua 
Reports on Law of Sea Conference Geneva Meeting": 'Opening 
Session,' FBIS-CHI-79-056 (March 21, 1979), at Al (support-
ing international regime to oversee exploitation of the 
seabed); "Xinhua Hails Adoption of Law of Sea Convention," 
FBIS-CHI-82-085 (May 3, 1982), at Al. 
22. Two of t!"le more recent Chinese responses to the use of 
force by one nation against another concerned the aborted 
American rescue attempt of the US hostages in Iran and the 
Israeli occupation of Lebanon. See "PRC Expresses Regret 
Over U.S. Rescue Attempt," FBIS-CHI-80-083 (April 28, 
1980), at Al; "Renmin Ribao Commentator's Article," id; 
"China Daily Assails Isr:ael's Lebanon Invasion," FoiS-CHI-
82-114 (June 14, 1982), at I3; "Government Condemns Is-
rael's Invasion of Lebanon," FBIS-CHI-82-116 (June 16, 
1982), at Il. See also note 5, supra. 
23. Chinese authorities have enunciated eight principles guid-
ing economic aid to other countries, the second of which is 
respect for sovereignty of recipient countries. See Eight 
Principles Guidina China's·Economic Aid to Other Countries, 
Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 4 (Nov. 25, 1977), at 28. 
24. KIM, supra note 20, at 411. Because the law regarding the 
sovereignty of a state was perceived as so immutable and 
the power of a sovereign so superior, attempts to subvert, 
dilute or transform sovereignty through such concepts as 
"world law" [shijiefa] or "transnational law" [chaoguojifa] 
were considered by the Chinese to violate international 
law. ~· See also LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 244. 
25. KIM, supra note 20, at 411 citing Chou Keng-sheng, Hsin-tai 
ying-mei, pp. 65-66. 
26. Id. 
27. The PRC became a member of the UN world organization on 
October 25, 1971. See 25 UN Y.B. 126 (1971). See also H. 
CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA: -x-cAL-
ENDAR OF EVENTS 1966-1980, 213 (1981) [hereafter PRC AGREE-
MENTS 1966-80] • 
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28. See Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist 
Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties in CHINA'S PRACTICE: OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME: CASE: STUDIES 239-67 (Cohen ed., 
1972). See also "Hsin Wan Pao Comments on Sino-Soviet 
Treaty,• FBIS-CHI-78-242 (Dec. 15, 1978), at Nl (noting 
that the USSR-PRC Peace and Friendship Treaty should be 
abrogated because of Soviet abuses of it) 1 "Wen Wei Po on 
I Unequal Treaties, I Sovereignty, n FBIS-CHI-82-195 (Oct. 7, 
1982), at W3 (noting that the UN Charter and the 1969 Vien-
na Convention on Treaties invalidate treaties signed under 
duress) 1 "Shaanxi Ribao Discusses Nanj ing Treaty," FBIS-
CHI-82-113 (June 11, 1982) at K9 (denouncing the PRC-UK 
treaty - granting the British, in effect, control over Hong 
Kong- as unequal). 
29. The Interplay of Wesphalia and Charter Conception of Inter-
national Legal Order in THE: FUTURE: OF THE: INrE:RNATIONAL 
LF;GAL ORDER: TRENDS AND PATTERNS ( Falk and Black ed., 
1969) cited in KIM, supra note 20, at 410. 
30. KIM, s~pra note 20, at 415. The Soviet invasion of Czecho-
slovakla illustrates this rationale. The exercise of abso-
lute sovereignty by the Soviet Union 
sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. Id., citing 
yang, Smash the New Tsars' Theory of Limited 
Hung-Ch'i (Hongqi), No. 5, pp. 87-90 (1969). 
limited the 
Chi Hsiang-
Sovereignty, 
31. KIM, supra note 20, at 415. See also LE:NG AND CHIU, supra. 
note 1, at 244-45. Cf., YAHUDA, supra note 6, at 2281 
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 110. 
32. The five Principles [wuxiang yuanze] were first enunciated 
by Jawaharlal Nehru on June 28, 1954. In China's joint 
declaration with Burma on June 29, 1954, these same princi-
ples were reaffirmed. The text is found in Kuo-chi kung-fa 
ts'an-k'ao wen-chien hsuan-chi (Selected Reference Docu-
ments on Public International Law), (Peking Shih-chieh 
chih-shih ch'u-pan she, 1958), pp. 2-3. The five Princi-
ples are: 
A) mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity1 
B) non-aggression1 
C) non-interference 
affairs1 
in each other's 
D) equality and mutual benefit, and1 
E:) peaceful coexistence. 
internal 
One of the more succinct and penetrating analyses ·of the 
Five Principles is found in LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 
36-77. See also HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 381 COHEN AND 
CHIU, supra note 5, at 1191 YAHUDA, supra note 6, at 228-
29. 
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33. · See generally, "Renmin Ribao Discusses PRC Foreign Policy," 
FBIS-CHI-82-211 (Nov. 1, 1982), at Al (Five Principles 
serve as cornerstone of PRC relations with other 
countries). See also "PRC Establishes Diplomatic Relations 
With Portugal";" FBIS-CHI-79-028 (Feb. 8, 1979), at Al2l 
"Ireland, PRC Establish Diplomatic Relations," FBIS-CHI-79-
L24 (June 26, 1979), at Gl1 "PRC, Ecuador Establish 
Diplomatic Relations," FBIS-CHI-79-250 (Dec. 27, 1979), at 
Jl1 "PRC, Angola to Establish Diplomatic Relations," FBIS-
CHI-82-188 (Sept. 28, 1980), at 13. Cf. "Diplomatic Rela-
tions Established with United States," FBIS-CHI-78-243 
(Dec. 18, 1978), at Al (not specifically mentioning the 
Five Principles). 
Note that the PRC publishes the joint communiques es-
tablishing such relations in its treaty collection (tiaoyue 
huibian), which seems to give these communiques the same. 
force as treaties. In the United States such communiques 
are a form of political declaration only and do not have 
the force of law. 
34. KIM, supra note 20, at 414. See also note 5, supra. 
35. Id. at 414-15. Note also that the PRC, in its provisional 
Civil Procedure Law of 1982, has stated that "cases submit-
ted to China by [a) foreign court <~ill be refused .if they 
are incompatible with the sovereignty and security of the 
PRC." See Yanling, China's Law of Civil Procedure, Beijing 
Review, No. 33 (Aug. 16, 1982), at 22. 
36. KIM, supra note 20, at 415. 
37. Z. ZILE, R. SHARLET AND J. LOVE, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEt4 
AHD ARHS INSPECTION: A CASE STUDY IN POLICY IMPLE14E:rr.\·riON 
19 (1972) [hereafter ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE). 
38. See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 199. For acceptance of 
this principle by Soviet juries, see, ~· J. TRISKA AND 
R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAWS, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES 
S0-52 (1962) cited in id., at 223. See also L. HENKIN, R. 
PUGH, 0. SCHACTER AND-H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 216-28 
(1980). 
39. For an assessment of Chinese attitudes toward the legal 
status of the United Nations, the binding force of UN 
resolutions and Chinese representation in the world or-
ganization, see Chiu, The United Nations in LENG AND CHIU, 
supra note l~t 195-242. See ~ KIM, supra note 20, at 
40 5-44. Cf. HS IUNG, supra note 4, at 24 3. Note that the 
PRC has not acceded to the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations, 21 UST 1418, TIAS No. 
6900, 1 UNTS 15 (Feb. 13, 1946). But cf. "Renmin Ribao 
Urges Stronger United Nations Role," FBIS-CHI-82-207 (Oct. 
26, 1982), at Al. 
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40. PRC publicists perceived a distinction between internation-
al legal order and world legal order. .The former was based 
on the UN Charter's principles of national sovereignty. 
The latter was considered to be an imperialist conspiracy 
to remake the Charter into an instrument of a world govern-
ment under the domination of the United States. KIM, supra 
note 20, at 411. See also K'ung Meng, A Criticism of the 
Theories of Bourgeo~International Law Concerning the Sub-
jects of International Law and Recognition of States, Kuo-
chi wen-t' i yen-chiu [Research on International Problems] 
No. 2 (Feb. 1960) in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 88-
99. See also J. COHEN, CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 33'7(1972). 
41. Accession was deposited on September ll, 1979. See PRC 
AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 27, at 219. 
However, since that the time PRC has not officially 
·published any change of position with respect to other 
international organizations, nor did it publicize its ac-
cession to this Convention. The main thrust of the Conven-
tion is its extension of diplomatic privileges to the per-
sonnel of certain international organizations. See TIAS 
No. 521, 33 UNTS 261 (Nov. 21, 1947). The PRC's accession 
was with respect to the UN Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion (second revised text of annex II), the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (annex III), the UN Education-
al, Scientific and Cultural Organization (annex IV), The 
World Health Organization (third revised text ·of annex 
VII), the Universal Postal Union (annex VIII), the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union (annex IX), the World 
Meteorological Organization (annex XI) and the Internation-
al Maritime Consultative Organization (revised text of an-
nex XII). See Statement of Treaties and International 
Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the 
Secretariat During the Month of September 1979, at 510 no. 
521, U.N. DOC. ST/LEG/SER.A/391 (1981). 
~ also Guoj if a, supra note 2, Chapter 10, Guoj i 
zuzhi (International Organizations), pp. 363-410. 
42. 21 UST 1418, TIAS No. 6900, 11 UNTS 15 (Feb. 13, 1946). 
43. See, ~· "PRC Delegate Addresses Secrity Countil on u.s. 
Hostages," FBIS-CHI-80-001 (Jan. 2, 1980), at Al (support-
ing the implementation of the provisions of UN Security 
Council Resolution 457 (1979) calling on Iran to release 
the hostages); "PRC UN Delegate Supports Resolution Against 
USSR," FBIS-CHI-80-005 (Jan. 8, 1980) (reaffirming Afghani-
stan's sovereignty and demanding the withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Afghanistan soil); "Chinese UN Representative 
Supports Resolution on Lebanon," FBIS-CHI-80-088 (May 5, 
1980), at Al (supporting a Security Council resolution con-
demning Israeli military intervention in Lebanon); "Chen 
Chu Addresses UNSC on I Palestine Question, In FBIS-CHI-80-
089 (May 6, 1980), at Al (calling for Security Council 
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resolutions to support Arabs and Palestinians); "Xinhua 
Commentary Praises UN Resolution of Palestine," FBIS-CHI-
80-149 (July 31, 1980), at Al (supporting a Security Coun-
cil resolution in favor of Arab rights), "PRC Envoy Raps 
South Africa, Supports Sanctions," FBIS-CHI-81-100 (1·1ay 6, 
1981), at I4; "Government Condemns Israel's Invasion of 
Lebanon," FBIS-CHI-82-116 (June 16, 1982), at Il (calling 
on Israel to "abide by the relevant resolutions of the U.N. 
Security Council"). 
Since 1979, the PRC has resorted more frequently to 
the practice of applying UN resolutions to Chinese princi-
pled stands on aggression and disarmament. 
44. See, ~, "PRC UN Delegate Urges UK to Observe Rhodesian 
Agreement," FBIS-CHI-80-024 (Feb. 4, 1980), at Al (urging 
the UK to adhere to the London Agreement on peace in Rhode-
sia); "UN Commission on Human Rights Ends Session," FBIS-
CHI-80-055 (March 19, 1980), at Al (praising UNHCR resolu-
tions condemning the invasions of Afghanistan and Kam-
puchea); "China's Representation in II~F 'Restored,'" FBIS-
CHI-80-077 (April 21, 1980), at Al; "PRC Representative 
Supports UN Resolution on Aid to Kampuchea," FBIS-CHI-80-
092 (May 9, 1980), at Al (supporting a UNESCO resolution on 
aid to Kampuchea); "World Bank Formally Restores China's 
Membership," FBIS-CHI-80-098 (May 19, 1980), ·at A3. Cf. 
note 55, infra. --
45. See, ~, LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 11. See also 
Chou Keng-sheng, "The Persecution of Chinese Personnel by 
Brazilian Coup d'Etat Authority is a Serious International 
Illegal Act," Jen-min jih-pao, April 24, 1964 in id., at 27 
n. 49. 
46. See O.O.N; Poderzhani Mezhdunarodnovo Mira [United Nations 
and Support of International Law] 43-58 (1973) for support 
of this principle. 
47. See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 11. See also Fu Zhu, 
u.s. Court Trial Violates International t:aW, Beijing Re-
view, No. 11 (March 14, 1983), at 24-27; Guoj ifa, supra 
note 2, Chapter 1: Daoren (Introduction), Section 3, Part 
5, p. 33. 
48. See id., at 28 n. 51 citing Ying Tiao, Recognize the True 
Facts of Bourgeois International Law From a Few Basic Con-
cepts, Kuo-chi wen-t' i yen-chiu (Studies in Interntional 
Problems) No. 1, Jan. 6, 1960. 
49. KIM, supra note 20, at 413. Kim also notes that the PRC 
has never nominated a candidate to the court. Id., at 417. 
But cf. "UN Adopts Declaration on Peaceful Settlement," 
FBIS-CHI-82-221 (Nov. 16, 1982), at Al (noting the adoption 
of a UNGA resolution calling for, inter alia, the use of 
the ICJ as a UN judicial organ, without stating that the 
PRC was opposed to the resolution). 
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50. Id., at 417. Cf., COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1283-
D07. 
Recently, however, the PRC has shown a greater will-
ingness to participate in numerous international conferen-
ces. The Chinese have attended, inter alia, the UN Con-
gress on Crime Prevention, the Belgradeworld Law Con-
ference, Geneva Disarmament Committee Talks, the UN Disar-
mament Committee discussion on the UN Refugee Committee's 
Work and the Human Rights Commission. See, ~· "PRC to 
Attend UN Congress on Crime Prevention," FBIS-CHI-80-148 
(July 30, 1980), at A3; "PRC Official Attends World Law 
Conference in Belgrade," FBIS-cHI-80-165 (Aug. 22, 1980), 
at A3; "PRC to Participate in UN Geneva Disarmament Talks," 
FBIS-cHI-79-177 (Sept. 10, 1979), at A2; "PRC Attends UN 
Conference on Arms Restriction," FBIS-CHI-80-181 (Sept. 16, 
1980), at A2; "PRC to Take· Part in Work of Disarmament Com-
mittee," FBIS-CHI-79-240 (Dec. 12, 1979), at Al; "PRC UN 
Official Addresses Disarmament Committee," FBIS-CHI-80-095 
(May 14, 1980), at A6; "PRC Participates in UN Refugee Com-
mittee's Nork," FBIS-CHI-79-128 (July 2, 1979), at A3; "PRC 
Takes Part in Human Rights Commission l~ork ," FBIS-CHI-82-
0 56 (March 2 3, 1 9 8 2 ) , at Al. 
5:!.. KIM, supra note 20, at 417. But cf. "PRC Reaffirms Support 
of Sali!ll in UN Stalemate," FBIS-CHI-81-232 (Dec. 3, 1981), 
at Al (reaffirming support for Tanzanian Foreign Minister 
Salim for UN Secretary General). 
52. For the statute of the ICJ, see 3 Bevans 1179 (1945). The 
PRC, as a member of the United Nations, is ipso facto a 
party to the Statute of the ICJ. However, about a year 
after the PRC became a UN member, it asserted its right 
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, not to ac-
cept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. See Kim, su-
~ note 20, at 418. Since 1972, the PRC has included 
reservations to a variety of international agreements and 
conventions it has acceded to, refusing to accept ICJ 
jurisdiction over disputes arising thereunder. 
53. See KIM, supra note 20, at 457-62. 
54. Id., at 437-44. See "Special Committee Discusses Revision 
of UN Charter," FBIS-CHI-78-060 (March 28, 1978), at Al; 
"Third World Scores Opposition to Revision of UN Charter," 
FBIS-cHI-78-209 (Oct. 27, 1978), at Al. In both of these 
examples, the PRC supported Third World demands for revi-
sion of the Charter to reflect the changing world situa-
tion. Review of UN Charter - An Irreversible Trend, Peking 
(Beijing) Review, No. 13 (March 26, 1976), at 21 (noting 
that revision is reasonable in order to promote equality 
among nations and destroy the privileged positions of the 
superpowers) particularly with respect to the use of the 
veto. See also "Xinhua Sees Soviet Isolation in Using UN 
Veto," FBIS-CHI-80 020 (Jan. 29, 1980), at Al; "NCNA Re-
ports Deliberation on Composition of UN Organs," FBIS-cHI-
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77-241 (Dec. 15, 1977), at A2; "A Mantis Can Never Stop a 
Cart,• SCMP No. 5776 (Jan. 6, 1975), at 26. 
55. The Chinese position on international terrorism is a func-
tion of its role as vanguard of the Third World. Though 
the PRC objected explicitly to what it termed "adventurist 
and terrorist acts," it also noted that imperialists, 
Zionists, et al. often incorrectly brand legitimate inter-
national revolutionary movements as terror1sm. See China's 
Stand on International Convention Against Taking-Hostages, 
Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 50 (Dec. 10, 1976), at 32. 
See also Aerial Hijacking Condemned. Peking (Beijing) Re-
view, No. 48 (Nov. 25, 1977), at 29 (supporting a UN 
resolution condemning the threat or use of force against 
aircraft or passengers but declaring reservations on parts 
of the resolution referring to conventions ratified by the 
"Chiang Clique" without formal PRC adherence); "PRC Joins 
International Antihijacking Convention," FBIS-CHI-78-241 
(Dec. 14, 1978), at A2; "UN Political ·committee Condemns 
Aerial Hijacking," FBIS-cHI-77-213 (Nov. 4, 1977), at A2. 
But see "Teng Hsiaoping Meets French Newspaper Delegation," 
FBIS=cHI-77-206 (Oct. 26, 1977), at Al4 (Teng comments con-
demning all terrorist acts as "anti-revolutionary and anti-
Marxist.") 
56. In 1981, the General Assembly enlarged the International 
Law Commission from 25 to 34 members. The PRC, for the 
first time, nominated a member, Zhengyu Ni. He was elected 
on Nov. 23, 1981 for a one-year term beginning Jan. 1, 
1982. See Law Commission Enlarged From 25 to 34 Members, 
19 U.N. CHRONICLE 40 (No. 1, Jan. 1982). 
57. KIM, supra note 20, at 418-19. 
58. The Conferences were: 
a) The UN Conference on Prescription (Limitation) 
in the International Sale of Goods (1974); 
b) The· UN Conference on the Representation of 
States in Their Relations With International 
Organizations (1975); 
c) The UN Conference on Plenipotentiaries on Ter-
ritorial Asylum (1977); 
d) The UN Conference on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties (1977); and, 
e) The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation 
and Development of International Humanitarian 
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict (1975-77 ses-
sions). Id., at 419. But~ note 50, supra. 
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59. The PRC is notorious for the publication of articles refer-
ring to violations of "well-known" international law prin-
ciples, though the PRC itself never formally acknowledges 
the existence of such principles. For a case in point, see 
· "PRC Delegate Addresses Security Council on U.S. Hostage~ 
FBIS-CHI-80-001 (Jan. 2, 1980), at Al (referring to the 
principles of ••• "accepted diplomatic immunities"). Cf. 
"International Law Research to be Strengthened," FBIS-CHI-
80-025 (Feb. 5, 1980), at LlO (calling for development of 
PRC international law theory on basis of its "experience in 
the international arena"). 
60. The PRC has recently expressed its concern for strengthen-
ing education of international law. See "International Law 
Research to be Strengthened," FBIS-CHI-80-025 (Feb. 5, 
1980), at LS; "International Law Society Founded," FBIS-
chi-80-026 (Feb. 6, 1980), at L2. Previous leading jour-
nals on international law and politics, including Guoji 
wenti yanjiu [Journal of International Studies] and Shijie 
zhishi [World Knowledge], which ceased publication as a 
result of the Cultural Revolution, have recently resumed 
publication. The publication of World Knowledge resumed in 
1980; the Journal of International Studies in 1981. See 
also note 258 infra. --
With the enactment of several funda:ner.tal legal codes 
and media coverage of domestic crime and international 
events, Chinese legal consciousness has been enhanced. 
Previously non-existent legal associations and a renewed 
enthusiasm for legal training have recently surfaced. See, 
~,Lawyer's Association Set Up, Peking (Beijing) Review, 
No. 21 (May 25, 1979), at 7 {providing legal advice and 
representation in civil and criminal cases and foreign 
trade and maritime disputes); Training Personnel in Politi-
cal Science and Law, Beijing Review, No. 23 (June 8, 1979), 
at 6; More Legal Advisory Offices in Beijing, Beijing Re-
view, No. 7 (Feb. 16, 1981), at 4; China's Lawyers, Beijing 
Review, No. 23 (June 7, 1982), at 14; "PRC Adopts 8-Year 
Plan for Study of Law," FBIS-CHI-79-065 (April 3, 1979), at 
L8; "Chinese Schools Training More Students in Politics, 
Law," FBIS-CHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at Ll8; "Beijing 
Lawyers' Association Formed: To Provide Legal Advice," 
FBIS-(HI-79-096 (May 16, 1979), at R2; "Tianj in Law 
School," FBIS-CHI -79-14 3 (July 24, 197 9) , at R3; "Tianj in 
Municipality Establishes Law Society," FBIS-CHI-79-145 
(July 26, 1979), at Rl; "Northwest Political Law College," 
FBIS-cHI-79-165 (Aug. 23, 1979), at T3; "Beijing Lawyers 
Prepare for Codes Taking Effect in January," FBIS-CHI-79-
173 (Sept. 5, 1979), at LS; "Fujian Law Conference," FBIS-
CHI-79-204 (Oct. 19, 1979), at 08; "Jiang Hua Speaks at 
Reopening of Beijing Law Institute," FBIS-CHI-79-208 (Oct. 
25, 1979), at Rl; "PLA Revives Military Courts, Procurator-
ates," FBIS-CHI-78-237 (Dec. 8, 1978), at E21; "Harbin 
Reopens Legal Office," FBIS-CHI-80-013 (Jan. 18, 1980), at 
52; "Yunnan PLA Units Organize Legal Training Course," 
FBIS-cHI-80-015 (Jan. 22, 1980), at QS; "Heilongjiang 
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Counties Legal Service," FBIS-CHI-80-022 (Jan. 31, 1980), 
at 53; "Justice Ministry Announces Plans to Train More 
Lawyers," FBIS-CHI-80-101 (May 22, 1980), at L5; "Chinese 
Judicial Weekly,", FBIS-CHI-80-121 (June 20, 1980), at Ll4; 
"Course on Patent Law," FBIS-CHI-81-040 (March 2, 1981), at 
A2; "Legal Consultants Office Set Up in Beijing," FBIS-CHI-
82-072 (April 14, 1982), at Kl7; "Xinhua Discusses Role of 
Lawyers in Beijing," FBIS-CHI-82-077 (April 21, 1982), at 
Rl; "Shenzhen Legal Advisory Department," FBIS-CHI-82-104 
(May 28, 1982), at P4; "Sino-U.S. La•,o~ Symposium Held in 
Beijing 8-13 June", FBIS-CHI-82-123 (June 25, 1982), at Bl; 
"Inaugural Meeting of Science of Law Society Opens," FBIS-
CHI-82-142 (July 23, 1982), at Kl. 
These acts, coupled with China's official pronounce-
ments on the establishment of an international law society 
and China's increasing contacts with foreign governments on 
issues of trade and law, generate optimism among lie stern 
scholars that more formal publications on China's official 
stance on international law issues will appear. Recent PRC 
editorials on international law appeared in Xinhua yuebao, 
June 1980. See especially Wang Tieai, Guojifa dangjinde 
dongxiang [Trend of Today' s International Law], at 13. 
Translation by author. See also Guanyu xiandai guojifa 
dingyi wenti, ~note 2. 
61. Jessup and Lauterpacht are two of the more notable "monist" 
theory proponents. See Ogden, supra note 3, at 326. 
62. Id. at 327. 
63. ..!.£., citing K'ung Meng, 
Capitalist International 
Recognition of States, 
(Feb. 3, 1960), at 44-53. 
A Criticism of 
Law on Elitist 
Kuo-chi-wen t'i 
tbe Theories of 
Entities and the 
yen-chiu; No. 2 
Note, however, that the PRC has rather actively pro-
moted the work of the UN High Commission on Refugees 
(UNHCR) in recent months and has supported the distribution 
of relief material by UN personnel -- at least in Kampuchea 
-- as a result of alleged Vietnamese (SRV) human rights 
violations. See, ~, "China, Cambodia Condemn SRV at UN 
Human Rights Session," FBIS-cHI-79-052 (March 15, 1979), at 
Al3; "PRC UN Representative Gives Statement on Human 
Rights," FBIS-cHI-79-208 (Oct. 25, 1979), at A2; "UN Pledg-
ing Conference Urges Aid to Kampuchea," FBIS-CHI-79-216 
(Nov. 6, 1979), at E4; "PRC UN Delegate Condemns SRV for 
Creating Refugee Issue,• FBIS-cHI-79-221 (Nov. 14, 1979), 
at A2; "UN Commiss~on on Human Rights Ends Session," FBIS-
CHI-80-055 (March 19, 1980),· at Al; "PRC Takes Part in Hu-
man Rights Commission Work," FBIS-CHI-82-056 (March 23, 
1982), at Al. 
64. KIM, supra note 20, at 406. Hungdah Chiu and Douglas John-
ston used over 80 sources in a dozen languages to compile 
their work. D. JOHNSTON AND H. CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE 
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1967: A CALENDAR (1968) 
[hereafter JOHNSTON AND CHIU). 
65. KIM, suora note 20, at 406. See also Pye, suora note 13. 
See ~ally J. TOWNSEND, POLITICS IN Cii'INA 289-337 
(1980). 
66. See Chiu, Communist China's Attitude Toward International 
Law, 60 AJIL 245, 259 n. 55 (April 1966). See also LENG 
AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 10; HSIUNG, supra ~ ~t 22. 
In particular, Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ 
refers to international conventions, international custom, 
general principles of law and the teachings of highly 
qualified publicists as sources of international law. See 
Art. 38, I(a)-(d) of the Statute of the ICJ, supra note~ 
67. · LENG AND CHIU, supra note ·1, at 10. A new international 
law anthology was recently published by the PRC in early 
1983. See Guojifa, supra note 2. 
68. HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 27 citing Chen T'i-ch'iang, 
Tawain-A Chinese Territory, Review of Contemporary Law 
(Brussels), No. 5 (1956), at 38-44. 
59. LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 5. ~ also Chiu, ~ 
note 66, at 251. 
70. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, suora ~ote 37, at 20. 
71. One school subscribes to the view that there are two sys-
tems of international relations, bourgeois and socialist, 
and, therefore, two systems of international law. The ad-
herents of a second school of thought contend that a single 
system of international law exists which is binding on both 
bourgeois and socialist countries. The third and apparent-
ly strongest school holds that there is a general interna-
tional 1 aw over and above, as well as d ist inc t from, the 
bourgeois legal system. See HSIUNG, supra note· 4, at 17-
18. 
At least one other scholar pointed out that the 
Shanghai Law Association in 1958 considered the possibility 
of three systems -- socialist, bourgeois and general. See 
Chiu, International Law and a Universal System in LENG AND 
CHIU, supra note 1, at a. ~ ~ Chiu, supra note 66, at 
256; COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 42-46. 
72. HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 16 citing Chou-Fu-lun, An Inquiry 
Into the Nature of Modern International Law, Chiao-hsueh yu 
yen-chiu [Teaching and Research) No. 3, 1958, at 52. The 
Chinese conception of international law is probably best 
exemplified by Zhou Fu-lun's passage: 
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International law, in addition to being a body of 
principles and norms which must be observed by every coun-
try is also, just as any law, a political instrument; 
whether a country is socialist or capitalist, it will to a 
certain degree utilize international law in implementing 
its foreign policy. 
See also Goujifa dangjinde dongxiano, ~note 60. 
Cf. Onuf, International Legal Order as an Idea, 73 AJIL 
244, 254-56 (No. 2, April 1979). 
For a discussion of the evolution and politicalization 
of another contemporary issue, see "Renmin Ribao Examines 
Issue on Human Rights," FBIS-CHI-82-072 {April 14, 1982), 
at Kl4. 
73. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 19. Cohen and 
Chiu perceived the Soviet attitude towards custom to be 
somewhat more flexible than Zile, Sharlet and Love indi-
cated. COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 77. See also K. 
GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINE AND 
DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (1977). 
74. Chiang Yang, "The Reactionary Thought of 'Universalism' in 
American Jurisprudence," Jen-min jih-pao (Dec. 17, 1963), 
at 5 in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 902 n. 15. 
75. The Chinese have used such euphemisms as "principles of 
international law and humanitarianism" and "standards of 
international law and dignity and justice." COHE~ AND 
CHIU, supra note 5, at 78. More recently, the Chinese have 
employed the phrase "customary international . prac-
tice" in referring to diplomatic privileges and immunities. 
See note 5, suora. See also Agreement on Trade Rel3tions 
Between the Uii'Ited States-of America and the People's 
Republic of China, TIAS no. 9630, signed at Beijing, July 
7, 1979, Art. I, para. 3; Chiu, China's Legal Position on 
Protecting Chinese Residents in Vietnam, 74 AJIL 685, 685-
89 (1980). Bu Langli, Guojigongfa yuanli [General Princi-
ples of Public International Law) (3d ed., 1979), cited in 
Zhongguo guoj ifa niankan [Chinese International Law Year-
book), 1982, pp. 393-95. 
76. Cohen and Chiu cited an incident between Burmese border 
guards and Chinese residents. The PRC accused the Burmese 
of departing from "historical factors and 
traditional custom." COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 78. 
Cf. note 5, supra, espcially SRV infringements on Chinese 
sovereignty over the Hsisha (Xisha) and Nansha Islands. 
77. LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 10 citing Wei Liang, On the 
Post Second World War International Treaties 1953-55, Kuo-
chi t'iao-yueh chi [International Treaty Series) 1961, at 
660. See also Guojifa, supra note 2, Chapter 9, Wei Min, 
Tiaoyue [Treaty Law), pp. 319-62. 
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78. HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 27. 
79. Id. See also Wei Liang, supra note 77;. Guojifa, supra 
note ~Chapter 9, Wei Min, Tiaoyue [Treaty Law), pp. 319-
62. 
80. LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 244. Cf. note 72, supra. 
81. This quantity reflects the number of treaties included in 
Professor Hungdah Chiu' s study. See PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-
80, supra note 27. 
Scott included 1660 treaties in his study, 41 pecent 
of which were concluded in the trade category. See SCOTT, 
supra note 4, at 253. The number of treaties concluded by 
the PRC in the trade area constitutes a political barometer 
of the present importance of economic development in the 
PRC. 
82. See generally COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1109-1282, 
esp. 1239-54; L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: 
A STUDY OF COMPLIANCE (1969). See also SCOTT, supra note 
4, at 253. Cf., "Renmin Ribao Refutes USSR Statement on 
Sino-Soviet Treaty,• FBIS-cHI-79-075 (April 17, 1979), at 
Cl (PRC has sovereign right to terminate treaty in view of 
changed circumstances [rebus sic stantibus) and in accor-
dance with provisions of the treaty). 
83. LEE, supra note 82, at 61; SCOTT, supra note 4, at 253. 
Cf., HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 276-84. 
84. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 253. 
85. Id., at 254. 
86. .!.£. , at 9 0. 
87. In 1963, the U.S. State Department charged the PRC with. 
violations of a number of treaties, including the 1953 
Korean Armistice Agreement, the April 29, 1953 and October 
14, 1954 PRC-Indian trade agreements and the 1955 Agreed 
Measures Announcement between the United States and PRC 
regarding the repatriation of civilians. Id., at 36. ~ 
also HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 276-84. 
The Soviet Union continues to charge the Chinese with 
treaty violations and other violations of international 
law. One recent example of Moscow's reaction was the Chi-
nese abrogation of the Sino-Soviet Peace and Friendship 
Treaty. See, What Reason is There for Moscow to Fly Into a 
Rage?, Beij1ng Review, No. 16 (April 20, 1979), at 8; "Ren-
min Ribao Refutes USSR Statement on Sino-Soviet Treaty ,• 
FBIS-cHI~79-075 (April 17, 1979), at Cl. 
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88. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 90. · the "perpetual use, occupation 
and control," of the Panama Canal was condemned as a usur-
pation of Panamanian sovereignty over the zone. Thus, the 
1903 U.S.-Panama Treaty was viewed as unequal. See New 
Canal Treaty - Panamanian People's Victory, Peking(i3ei)-
ing) Review, Nos. 37-38 (Sept. 13, 1977), at 34. 
89. See SCOTT, supra note 4, at 90. The twin themes of coer-
cion and exploitation have recently been cited in PRC arti-
cles addressing the British control over Hong Kong during 
PRC-UK negotiations on the status of Hong Kong after 1997. 
See, ~, "Shaanxi Ribao Discusses Nanjing Treaty," FBIS-
CHI-82-113 (June 11, 1982), at K9. 
90. See Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political 
or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties in 8 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'S. 733 (1969), Annex to Final Act of Law of 
Treaties Conference, A/CONF. 39/26, May 23, 1969. 
91. H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 68 (1972) [hereafter cited as CHIU]. See also 
SCOTT, supra note 4, at 94. 
92. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 94. 
93. ~., at 93. See also note 4, supra. 
94. See A Nuclear Fraud Jointly Hatched by the United States 
and the Soviet Union, Peking (Beijing) Review (June 21, 
1968), at 5. See generally Part I, Chapter 2(3)4, infra on 
the Chinese attitude on disarmament. 
95. See notes 32 and 33, supra. Cf. generally A. LALL, HCW 
COMMlmiST CHINA NEGOTIATES (1968). 
96. KIM, supra note 20, at 426. Kim notes that Chinese accep-
tance of multilateral agreements and UN multilateral trea-
ties has been minimal. See especially id., at 421-25. 
Within the last three years, however, the PRC has ratified 
numerous conventions. See. ~, PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, 
supra note 27, at 213-21. See also "PRC Joins Internation-
al Hijacking Convention," FBIS-cHI-78-241 (Dec. 14, 1978), 
at A2; "PRC Sign UN Convention on Discrimination Against 
Women," FBIS-CHI-80-140 (July 18, 1980), at Al; "Ling Qing 
Signs UN Accord on Conventional Weapons," FBIS-CHI-81-179 
(Sept. 16, 1981), at Al; "Further on NPC Standing Committee 
Session: Weapons Convention Resolution," FBIS-cHI-82-046 
(March 9, 1982), at K8; "Renmin Ribao on Refugee-Status 
Pact, Protocol," FBIS-cHI-82-170 (Sept. 1, 1982), at Al 
(PRC ratified UN "Pact on Refugee Status" and "Protocol on 
Refugee Status"). 
97. KIM, supra note 20, at 421-25. 
98. Id., at 426. 
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99. Id., at 427. Kim also notes that the PRC has promptly 
ratified amendatory protocols to convention or consti tu-
tions of specialized agencies and the Amendment to Article 
61 of the UN Charter, all of which are designed to increase 
the representation in limited membership organizations. 
Id. 
100. g., at 431. COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1230-38. 
101. COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1230-38. 
102. Jih-pen wen-t'i wen-chien hui-pien [Collection of Documents 
on the Problem of Japan] (1948), at 125 cited in LENG AND 
CHIU, supra note 1, at 12. See also Chiu, supra note 66, 
at 260. 
103. See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 12. The 1955 Sino-
Indonesia Dual Nationality Treaty is cited as one example 
of what is included in the compilation. See id. See also 
Guojifa, supra note 2, Chapter 1: Daorei1(Introduction), 
Section 5, pp. 42-7. Note that there is a recent publica-
tion of major treaties, General Assembly resolutions and 
international agreements,· some of which the PRC is a party 
to, that can now be found in a separate international law 
text entitled Guojifa ziliao xuanbian, supra note 17, which 
includes Chinese texts of 88 major documents. 
104. The 1982 PRC Constitution was adopted on Dec. 4, 1982 to 
replace the 1978 Constitution. The 1978 Constitution had 
60 articles; its successor has 138. See "Text of New PRC 
Constitution Published," FBIS-cHI-82-2:rs--(Dec. 7, 1982), at 
Kl-28 [hereafter 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION]. For the Chinese 
text, see Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa, Renmin ribao 
(People' S· Daily), Dec. 6, 1982, p.l. 
105. See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
~October 7, 1977 (Hazard trans.) in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Vol. VIII, Blaustein and Franz ed. 
1978). 
The text of the provision reads as follows: 
The USSR grants the right of asylum 
[pravo ubezhitsa] to foreigners perse-
cuted or defending the interests of 
the working people and the cause for 
peace, for participation in the rev-
olutionary and national 1 iberation 
movement, [or] for progressive social, 
political, scientific, or· other cre-
ative activity. 
Compare the superseded 1978 Chinese Constitutional 
provision (Art. 59); "The People's Republic of China grants 
residence [ jul iu] to any foreign national persecuted for 
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supporting a just cause, for taking part in revolutionary 
movements or for engaging in scientific work." 
106. The recently circulated PRC Provisional Civil Procedure Law 
contains provisions noting that, in the absence of strict 
language to the contrary, any conflict between internation-
al treaties and conventions (to which the PRC is a party) 
and the Law of Civil Procedure will be resolved in favor of 
those international treaties and conventions except where 
contractual clauses which specifically designate that Chi-
na's law will be applied. Yanling, China's Law of Civil 
Procedure. Beijing Review, No. 33 (Aug. 16, 1982), 20 at 
22. 
107. See note 5 supra. 
108. The PRC deposited its accession on Nov. 26, 1975 with 
reservations concerning "the provisions about nuncios and 
the representative of the Holy See in Arts. 14 and 16 and 
on the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Art. 37 
(regarding the privileges and immunities of service, tech-
nical and administrative personnel). See PRC AGREEMENTS 
1966-80, supra note 27, at 217. See aisoKIM, supra note 
20, at 425-26. For the Convention, see 23 UST 3227, TIAS 
No. 7502, 500 UNTS 95 (April 18, 1961-)-.-
109-. PRC accession was deposited on July 2, 1979. See PRC 
AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 27, at 218. For the Conven-
tion, see 21 UST 77, TIAS No. 7502, 596 UNTS 261 (April 24, 
1963).-
110. See note 41 supra. 
111. KIM, supra note 20, at 423 .. 
112. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 113. Hsiung, supra note 4, at 234. 
See generally COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1162-65; 
CHIU, supra note 91; G. RHODE and R. WHITLOCK, TREATIES OF 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1978: AN ANNOTATED 
COMPILATION 1-6 (1980); PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 
27. Note the problems that would arise by the application 
of such a definition to a situation where one party to an 
arms control or disarmament agreement is an international 
organization, such as a UN special agency. See generally 
H. CHIU, THE CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO 
CONCLUDE TREATIES, AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 
TREATIES SO CONCLUDED (1966) [hereafter cited as TREATIES 
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS]. 
113. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 113; HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 234; 
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1163. 
114. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 114; COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, 
at 1163. 
115. Id. 
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116. Id. See also HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 234. 
117. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 114; HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 234; 
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1164. 
118. It is worthy of note that joint communiques have been 
published in the official compilation of Chinese treaties 
( tiaoyue huibian), which would imply that such communiques 
have the force of treaties. See also infra note 149. 
119. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 114; COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, 
at 1164. Cf., HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 234. 
120. In his work on international trade treaties, Wang Yao-t' ien 
defined treaties as • documents which relate to the es-
tablishment, modification, or termination of the sovereign 
rights and duties between two or more states." SCOTT, su-
~ note 4, at 109 citing Wang Yao-t' ien, Kuo-c.hi mao=¥f 
t'iao-yueh ho hsieh-ting (International Trade Treaties and 
Agreements) Beijing· (Peking), 1958, at 9. See also Faxue 
Cidian [Law Dictionary], Shanghai, 1980, at 338. 
Another author, Wei Liang, defined treaties as "agree-
ment[s] between two or more states which must have received 
the unanimous consent of ali contracting parties." SCOTT, 
~note 4, at 109 citing Wei Liang, Looking at the So-
Called McMahon Line From the ViewPoint of International 
Law, Kuo-chi wen-t' i yen-chiu (Studies in International 
PrOblems), No. 6 Beijing (Peking) 1960, at 46. 
121. In practice, the Chinese have recognized the capacity of 
revolutionary groups to conclude treaties and have also 
acknowledged semi-official arrangements between a special 
agency of the PRC and a similar agency of a foreign country 
as having the binding force of treaties. SCOTT, supra note 
4, at 110;· Faxue Cidian [Law Dictionary], Shanghai, 1980, 
at 338. 
Professor Hungdah Chiu noted that the PRC "does not 
seem to exclude international organizations from concluding 
treaties." See CHIU, supra note 91, at 8. Chiu cited PRC 
participation in the International Organization for the 
Cooperation O·f Railroads and the Korean Armistice Agreement 
with the United Nations Command in Korea as examples sup-
porting his hypothesis. See also note 41, supra, on Chi-
nese ratification of the UN Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies; TREATIES OF INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 112. But see SCOTT, 
supra note 4, at 112. 
122. For example, the PRC, before joining the International 
Hijacking Convention, expressed its opposition to civil 
aircraft hijackings in a UN General Assembly resolution. 
The PRC noted that it had reservations on the positions of 
the resolution dealing with the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal 
Conventions on aerial hijacking since they had been nsigned 
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and ratified by the Chiang clique by usurping the name of 
'China.'" See "UN Political Committee Condemns Aerial 
Hijacking," FBIS-CHI-77-213 (Nov. 4, 1977), at A2. 
123. See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1112. For the text of 
the treaty, see 8 INT'L L. MATS. 679-727. 
124. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. 
125. The present general tasks for the PRC include making China 
a great and powerful socialist country by the twenty-first 
century by completing four moderniza.tions in agriculture, 
industry, national defense, and sc1ence and technology. 
See the preamble to the 1982 CONSTITUTION, supra note 104. 
Cf., "AFP: Teng Says PRC to Buy '.-Teapons Technology 
Abroad," FBIS-cHI-77-196 (Oct. 11, 1977), at A6. 
126. See SCOTT, supra note 4, at 237. 
127. 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Arts. 57, 67(14). 
128. The most recent example of the treaty abrogation process is 
illustrated by the St"anding Committee's abrogation of the 
1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty. See "NPC Abrogates 
1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty," FBIS-CHI-79-065 (April 
3, 1979), at Cl. See also "Huang Hua on Abrogation," FBIS-
CHI-79-064 (April ~1979), at C2. 
129. 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, ~ note 104, A.rt. 85. 
130. See 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 89(9). 
131. See SCOTT, supra note 4, at 122. See also HSIUNG, supra 
note 4 , at 2 3 7. 
132. 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 67(13). See 
also "Decisions Announced at Fifth NPC Standing Committee 
Session," FBIS-CHI-79-180 (Sept. 14, 1979), at Ll; "NPC 
Standing Committee Makes Appointments, Concludes Session," 
FBIS-cHI-78-162 (Aug. 21, 1978), at E4. 
133. See HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 237; SCOTT, supra note 4, at 
122. 
134. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 123. 
135. This procedure is outlined in id., at 124. Scott noted, 
though, that at the time of thepublication of his work, 
the current. (post-Cultural Revolution) ratification process 
was in doubt, largely because the Chinese had not ratified 
any multilateral treaties through formally publicized pro-
cedures. However, since the enactment of the 1978 PRC Con-
stitution, there have been numerous examples of published 
reports on ratification, including the procedure and the 
relevant organs involved. See, ~· "NPC Ratifies Treaty 
With Japan, Accord With Romania," FBIS-cHI-78-160 (Aug. 17, 
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1978), at Al; "NPC Approves Cooperation Agreement with 
Romania," FBIS-cHI-78-160 (Aug. 17, 1978), at All; "NPC 
Abrogates 1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty: Official 
Notification," FBIS-cHI-79-065 (April 3, 1979), at Cl. See 
also "Kyodo: NPC Meeting Discusses Status of Sino-Soviet 
Treaty: Huang Hua on Abrogation," FBIS-CHI-79-064 (April 
2, 1979), at C2; "Tanjung Reports PRC Revokes Fr iendshp 
Treaty with USSR," FBIS-CHI-79-064 (April 2, 1979), at C3; 
"Wanhu Presides at NPC Meeting Abrogating Sino-Soviet 
Treaty," FBIS-cHI-79-066 (April 4, 1979), at Ll; "Renmin 
Ribao Refutes RUUS Statement on Sino-soviet Treaty,• FBIS-
CHI-79-075 (April 17, 1979), at Cl; "Ta Kung Pao on Expira-
tion of Sino-Soviet Treaty," FBIS-cHI-80-072 (April 11, 
1980), at U2; "Wen Wei Po on Expiration of Sino-Soviet 
Friendship Treaty," FBIS-cHI-80-073 (April 14, 1980), at 
Ul. 
In these instances -- the ratification of the Japanese 
treaty and the Romanian accord and the abrogation of the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty -- the NPC Standing Committee submitted 
its decision on the treaty to the entire NPC for formal 
action. There were no indications that the State Council 
played any role in this procedure, despite the 1982 PRC 
Constitutional grant of power to the State Council to "sub-
mit proposals on laws and other matters to the National 
People's Congress or its Standing Committee" (Art. 32(2)). 
Though the State Council's role in the ratification process 
cannot be dismissed out of hand, present indications sug-
gest a de minimis role for the executive organ in treaty 
ratification or abrogation. 
136., The PRC recently acceded to the UN Convention Restricting 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and to UN protocols 
regarding refugees. See note 96, ~· The PRC has also 
acceded to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. See "Fifth NPC 
Standing Committee Reportage Continues: UNConvention on 
Women," FBIS-cHI-80-191 (Sept. 30, 1980), at Al; "PRC Signs 
UN Convention on Discrimination Against Women," FBIS-cHI-
80-140 (July 18, 1980), at Al; Guojifa ziliao xuanbian, 
supra note 17, No. 37. Previously the ·PRC acceded to the 
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Commit-
ted on Board Aircraft. See "PRC Joins International 
Hijacking Convention," FBIS-cHI-78-241 (Dec. 14, 1978), at 
A2. ~ also SCOTT, supra note 4, at 125; HSIUNG, supra 
note 4, at 239; COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1202. 
137. See, ~· "Peking Joins International Hijacking Conven-
tion," FBIS-cHI-78-241 (Dec. 14, 1978), at A2; "Further on 
NPC Standing Committee Session: Weapons Convention Resolu-
tion," FBIS-cHI-82-046 (March 9, 1982), at K8. See also 
HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 239. --- ----
138. ~ HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 239, citing the PRC reserva-
tion to Article 85 of the Geneva Convention Relating to 
POWs. More recently, the PRC expressed its reservation as 
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to Sec. 1, Art. 29 of the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 136. ~ also 
note 122, supra. 
139. HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 239. 
14 0. Id. 
141. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 132. 
142. The composition of the arbitral tribunals has varied with 
the treaties the PRC is party to. In some agreements, the 
arbitrators must be citizens from the nation party to the 
treaty; in others, they must be citizens of the country in 
which the arbitration takes place. In rare instances, 
arbitrators may be nationals ·of a third country if the con-
tracting parties can so agree. 1£., at 133. 
143. Id., at 132. ff., KIM, supra note 20, at 417-18. 
144. The Soviet doctrine holds thai: treaties and national law 
are legal categories of different legal systems. Treaty 
and municipal law have equal juridical force and are inter-
connected. See Mironov, Sootnoshenie Mezhdunarodnovo 
Dogovora i Vn'ii't'rigosudarstvennovo Zakona (The Relationship 
of International Tresties and Municipal Law) 1963 SOV!ET 
Y.B. INT'L LAW 157-58 (1965). 
145. See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 12. But cf. Article 46 
of the UN Convention on Privileges, supra note 41, which 
reads: "It is understood that, when an instrument of ac-
cession or a subsequent notificaton is deposited on behalf 
of any State, this State will be in a position under its 
own law to give effect to the terms of the Convention .•• 
n 
146. COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 10 5. The most recent 
published Chinese compilation of domestic laws and decrees, 
Gong an fagui huibian [COLLECTION OF PUBLIC SECURITY LAWS], 
printed by the Commission on the Study of Policy and Law, 
Department of-Public Security, Beijing (1980) did not con-
tain any such treaty. The 1980 volume, however, does not 
appear to be in tended to supersede preceding volumes and 
past compilations are, therefore, still valid. 
147. See Article 17 of the Act Regulating the Entry, Exit, Tran-
Slt, Residence, and Travel of Foreign Nationals, promul-
gated by the State Council on April 13, 1964, cited in 
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 510-13. -------
148. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, U.N. DOC. A/ 
CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L. L. MATS. 
679-727. 
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149. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
id., states, inter alia: "A party may not invoke the pro-
visions of itsinternal law as justifications for its 
failure to perform a treaty." Since the PRC is not a party 
to the Convention, it is not bound by this provision. ~ 
cf. "Legality of u.s. Arms Sales to Taiwan Questioned," 
FBIS-cHI-82-025 (Feb. 5, 1982), at Bl (noting that, with 
respect to the Taiwan Relations Act of the United States as 
interfering with PRC sovereignty: "a state cannot plead 
its own law as an excuse for noncompliance with interna-
tional law. There is not the slightest doubt on this point 
among various nations and international lawyers.") Note, 
though, that the PRC adheres to many principles which have 
become embodied in the Convention. By not ratifying it, 
the PRC may pick and choose from among those provisions it 
may consider innocuous at any particular time. 
Recently, the Chinese exhibited the kind of selective 
behavior that created a lack of predictability in the 
international legal community. Chinese jurists accused the 
United States of violating international law on the basis 
that the Taiwan Relations Act (a U.S. statute permitting 
quasi-official recognition of Taiwan) contravenes the us-
PRC Joint Communique, which the Chinese consider to have 
the legal force of treaty law. As such, the Taiwan Rela.-
tions Act violates Article 27 of the Vienna Convention. 
The United States, moreoever, is also not a party to the 
·Convention. Whether Chinese jurists were simply mistaken 
as to the application of the Convention to a non-party, or 
made their assertions on the grounds that the Convention 
codified customary practice and was therefore binding on 
nonmembers (although ths argument would bind the PRC as 
well), is unkown. 
150. Article 100, of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, 
grants local people's congresses the right to "adopt local 
regulations" as long as these local regulations do not con-
flict with the Constitution, laws, decrees and administra-
tive orders. 
151. At the Second Session of the Fifth NPC o.n July 1, 1979, the 
PRC adopted the Organic Law for Local Congresses and 
Governments1 the Organic Law for People's Courts [hereafter 
ORGANIC COURT LAW]1 and, the Organic Law for People's Pro-
curatorates [hereafter ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAii]. All 
laws entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980. For the Court and 
Procuratorate laws, see Gongan faqui huibian, supra note 
146, at 449-57, 458-~ For the English texts, see "Seven 
PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-cHI-79-
146 (July 27, 1979) PART I: Supp. No. 019. 
152. ~ note 82 supra. 
153. U.S. CONST.·, art. VI, para. 2 states: "This Constitution 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof1 and all Trea"ties made, or which shall be 
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made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land •••• " The 1982 PRC CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 104, Article 5 states: "No law or ad-
ministrative or local rules and regulations shall con-
travene the constitution." 
154. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 27. 
155. In this regard, one might note that the NPC is supposed to 
meet only once a year. See Article 61 of the 1982 PRC CON-
STITUTION, supra note 104. 
156. See "NPC Session Presidium Holds Fourth Meeting 9 Sept.: 
Article 45 Revision," FBIS-CHI-80-177 (Sept. 10, 1980), at 
Ll. 
157. See generally "Further Coverage of 12th CPC National Con-
gress: Text of Constitution," FBIS-cHI-82-175 (Sept. 9, 
1982), at Kl-19, [hereafter CCP CONSTITUTION], esp. Art. 
30. 
158. Id., Art. 3. 
159. Id., Art. 39 •. Artice 39 actually lists 5 measures of Party 
discipline in order of severity: warnings, serious warn-
ings, removal from posts, probation, and expulsion. 
160. The significance of expulsion from the CCP is indicated 
both by the volume of press coverage accorded such Party 
sanctions and the use of rather vitriolic language denounc~ 
ing the activities of such CCP cadres. See, ~· "Anhwei 
CCP Committee Punishes Errant County Officials," FBIS-CHI-
78-177 (Sept. 12, 1978), at Gl (expelling a number of peo-
ple from their posts for forgery and their resort to tor-
ture against others): "Yunnan Rally Reveals Case of Stolen 
Party, State Secrets," FBIS-CHI-78-94 (May 15, 1978), at J3 
(condemning the "grave crimes" of four Chinese Party cadres 
for "stealing and revealing Party and state secrets"): 
"Reportage, Comment on Dismissal of Luta Officials," FBIS-
CHI-78-70 (April 11, 1978), at El (expelling Luta officials 
who embezzled money and acted "in chorus with the gang of 
four"): "State Council Military Commission Decision 
Punishes Luta Officials," FBIS-cHI-78-067 (April 6, 1978), 
at E2: "Hangchow CCP Exposes Incident of TV-Selling 
'Through Back Door,'" FBIS-cHI-78-064 (April 3, 1978), at 
Gl (punishing cadres who sold TV sets to special customers 
at "special" prices, leaving only a few sets to sell to the 
public through normal distribution channels) • See also 
"Zhejiang Reopens Case, Dismisses Former City Officials," 
FBIS-cHI-80-165 (Aug. 22, 1980), at 06: "Liaoning Education 
Worker Punished for Violating Discipline," FBIS-cHI-79-164 
(Aug. 22, 1979), at 57; "Renmin Riabao Stresses Discipline 
for Cadres,• FBIS-cHI-81-172 (Sept. 4, 1981), at K7; "Zhang 
Yun Article on Punishing Corrupt Officials," FBIS-cHI-82-
062 (March 31, 1982), at K2; "Chemical Vice Minister Yang 
Yibang Punished ,• FBIS-cHI-82-145 (July 28, 1982), at K4 
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(expulsion of Yang for "illegal activities"); "Eliminating 
CPC 's Degenerate Elements Stressed," FBIS-cHI-82-156 (Aug. 
12, 1982), at Kl; "Ming Pao: CPC to Expel 2 Million Mem-
bers," FBIS-cHI-82-193 (Oct. 3, 1982), at W4. 
More often than ·not, cadre acts considered marginally 
undesirable are subjected to probation from the CCP and to 
various forms of criticism; to wit, criticism (piping), 
self-criticism (ziwopiping) and mutual criticism 
(huxiangpiping). See "Private Interests Criticized in 
Zhejiang Fraud Case," FBIS-cHI-80-204 (Oct. 19, 1979), at 
07; "Newspapers Stress Need for Crticism, Self-Criticism," 
FBIS-CHI-81-161 (Aug. 20, 1981), at K3; "Renmin Ribao Arti-
cle on Criticism, Self-Criticism," FBIS-CHI-81-168 (Aug. 
31, 1981), at K3; "Radio, Youth Paper on Criticism, Self-
Criticism," FBIS-cHI-81-171 (Sept. 3, 1981), at K3; "Tian-
jin Ribao Stresses Criticism, Self-Criticism," FBIS-CHI-81-
172 (Sept. 4, 1981), at R4. 
161. See, ~· "State Council-Military Commission Decision 
Punishes Luta officials," FBIS-CHI-78-067 (April 6, 1978), 
at E2 (noting that Luta Party Secretary Hsuan Shih-ming was 
expelled from the CCP and arrested for his part in an em-
bezzlement scheme); "Article Discusses Concealing Criminal 
Behavior," FBIS-cHI-82-054 (March 19, 1982), at K8; "Zhang 
Yun Article on Punishing Corrupt Officials," FBIS-CHI-82-
059 (11arch 26, 1982), at K2; "Hennan Arrests 'Political 
Swindler' From Shandong," FBIS-CHI-82-070 (April 12, 1982), 
at 04; Hsin Wan Pao on Imprisonment of Corrupt Officials," 
FBIS-cHI-82-150 (Aug. 4, 1982), at Rl; "Guangdong's Wang 
Zhong Expelled from Party," FBIS-cHI-82-168 (Aug. 30, 
1982), at KlO (Wong was expelled from the CCP and arrested 
for taking bribes.) 
162. Ching, The Current Political Scene in China, 80 CHINA Q. 
691 (Dec. 1979). Cf. Woodruff, China's development plans 
must bear burden of past, Balto. Sun, Nov. 15, 1982, at C7. 
163. The removal of the derogatory labels of "landlords and rich 
peasants" by the CCP Central Committee apparently occa-
sioned such resentment. See id., at 704. See also "CCP 
Central Committee Decide-s-to Remove 'Labels, Designa-
tions' ,• FBIS-cHI-79-021 (Jan. 30, 1979), at El. The la-
bels of "counterrevolutionary" and "bad element" continue 
to be connected to criminal activity. 
164. Factionalism is an important element in both the implemen-
tation and execution of any CCP pol icy. One should be 
aware, however, that major policies are not susceptible of 
intense mass debate and discussion in the PRC because they 
are usually formulated in camera by only a small, select 
number of CCP officials-=:. those comprising the members of 
the Party Politburo and Central Committee. 
However, some degree of disenchantment and conflict 
has even been made public. In 1980, NPC deputies passed a 
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citizenship bill by a margin of about 3500-1, and four NPC 
deputies abstained from voting on the PRC Marriage Law. 
SeeP. SHORT, THE DRAGON AND THE BEAR 388 (1982). 
165. TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 294. See also R. BERNSTEIN, 
FROM THE CENTER OF THE EARTH 73-4 (1982). 
166. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 5. Note, for 
instance, a Tokyo-based report that four members of the CCP 
Politburo, the most powerful organ of the CCP and, argu-
ably, of the PRC, were dismissed for "grave mistakes." The 
study was not subsequently denied by the Chinese media, 
lending credibility to the original report. See "KYOOO: 
Four Politburo Members Dismissed for 'Grave Mistakes'," 
FBIS-CHI-80-043 (March 3, 1980), at Ll5. 
167. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 6. 
168. See TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 82-176, 289-337. 
The role of the CCP in the policy-execution process 
was, at least before 1978, considerably more complex and 
was interlaced with judicial and procuratorial functions. 
In established Chinese practice, local CCP leaders and ad-
;ninistrative officials often interfered in the legal pro-
cess. In fact, a system of criminal justice was imple-
mented, whereby the CCP secretary in charge of political-
legal'affairs at the local committee level was given direct 
responsibility for review and approval of judicial deci-
sions. This sytem, known as shuj ipian ("deciding a case by 
the secretary"), was rampant prior to the adoption of the 
legal codes in 1979 and, despite PRC press exhortations to 
the contrary, is suspected of being in existence even to-
day. See generally Chiu, Structural Changes in the Or-
ganization and Operation of China's Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN 
STUD. No. 1-1981( 38), at 59. Chiu, China's New Legal Sys-
tem, 79 CURRENT HIST. 29, 45 (No. 458, Sept. 1980); Chiu, 
SOCialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 17 ISSUES AND STUD. 45, 53-55 (No. 
11, Nov. 1981) [hereafter Chiu, Socialist Legalism]. See 
also Yegorov, Changes in China's State Structure, 4 FAR 
EASTERN AFF. 118, 125-26 (1980). Yegorov noted a Jan. 15, 
1979 Guangming Ribao report in which a Party secretary mis-
takenly wrote the number • eight" when, at the behest of a 
local people's court, he was asked to approve a seven-year 
sentence handed down to a defendant by that same court. 
The Party secretary refused to correct his error, noting 
that it was • improper to correct a writ ten resolution.• 
Id., at 126. See also Hsia, Sources of Law in the People's 
Republic of China: Recent Developments, 14 INT 'L LAW 25, 
29 (no. 1, 1978)[hereafter Hsia, Sources of PRC Law]. 
A less direct role in the legal process was recently 
played by the CCP Central Commi~tee, which organized cadres 
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to fan out into areas of local government and help thou..:. 
sands of Chinese who were seeking "appeal of previous false 
charges" levied before and during the Cultural Revolution. 
See, ~' "Central Authorities to Aid Beijing 
·Petitioners," FBIS-cHI-79-131 (Sept. 17, 1979), at Ll; 
"Central Authorities Respond to Beijing Petitioners," FBIS-
C HI -7 9-17 6 (Sept • 10 , 19 7 9 ) , at L 1. 
The exercise of concurrent procuratorial and judicial 
powers by Party cadres may actually have been imposed by 
the 1 anguage of the PRC state constitution then in force 
(1954). Such constitutional language nowhere granted ex-
clusive judicial or procur.atorial power to the judiciary or 
procuratorate, respectively. Nevertheless, just prior to 
the promulgation of the 1979 legal codes -- and, ironical-
ly, just after the enactment of the 1978 PRC Constitution 
-- news articles appeared in which the CCP Central Commit-
tee called for the independence of the judicial and procu-
ratorial organs and for the abolition of Party interference 
in the legal process. See "CCP Plenum Elects New Politburo 
Members, Communique Issued: CCP Central Committee Com-
munique," FBIS-cHI-73-248 (Dec. 26, 1978), at E4; "Beijing 
Ribao Decries Interference in Legal Cases," FBIS-CHI-81-021 
(Feb. 2, 1981), at LB. 
Note the sequence of events in this instance: Party 
interference in the legal process, constitutiona: revision 
requiring procuratorial and judicial independence, and a 
CCP directive calling for the independent exercise of 
power. Only after the last event occure~ was the matter 
seriously addressed. By virtue of such an example, the 
omnipotence of the Party appears obvious. 
However, the Party directive has not been strictly 
followed. See "Supreme Court President Discusses Legal 
System Reforms," FBIS-CHI-80-168 (Aug. 27, 1980), at A7. 
See also "Renmin Ribao on Rule by Law, Rule by Man," FBIS-
CHI-81-166 (Aug. 27, 1981), at Kl (supremacy of law is not 
fundamental to the PRC for it blindly negates the role of 
the CCP and undermines socialism). But see the Preamble to 
the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note """T04, which reads: 
"This constitution is the fundamental law of the 
state and has supreme legal authority;" "Guangming Ribao on 
Party, Constitution Roles," FBIS-CHI-82-142 (July 23, 
1982), at K7. 
169. There is, however, an undercurrent of sentiment in the PRC 
that the Party be not above reproach. In accord with the 
present PRC policy of equality before the law, radio broad-
casts and press articles have appeared which have, at least 
ostensibly, rejected the notion of Party privilege. See, 
~, "Pai Hsing on Arrest of Children of CPC Members," 
FBIS-cHI-82-192 (Oct. 4, 1982), at W3; Discipline Commis-
sion on Inner Party Member Privileges," FBIS-CHI-80-204 
(Oct. 20, 1980), at L2; "Beijing Denounces Seeking of Spe-
cial Privileges," FBIS-cHI-80-202 (Oct. 16, 1980),· at Ll; 
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"Liaoning Holds Leading Cadres Responsible for Massacre," 
FBIS-cHI-80-183 (Sept. 18, 1980), at 51; "Radio Beijing: 
Party Cadres Not Above State Law," FBIS-cHI-80-166 (Aug. 
25, 1980), at Ll5; "Yin Fatang Deplores Xizang County Offi-
cials' Law Violations," FBIS-CHI-80-159 (Aug. 14, 1980), at 
Q2; '"Youth Paper Comments on Sentences of Cadres' Chil-
dren," FBIS-cHI-80-129 (July 2, 1980), at L6; "Renmin Ribao 
Discusses Implementation of Law," FBIS-CHI-79-150 (Aug. 2, 
1979), at Ll3. Accord "Renmin Ribao Stresses Rule of La\~ 
Over Role of Individual," FBIS-CHI-80-186 (Sept. 23, 1980), 
at Ll 7. 
The responsiveness of the CCP to democratic principles 
was also indicated in an article calling for the abolition 
of 1 ifetime tenure for cadres in order to ensure respon-
sible actions on the part of Party leaders. "Renmin Ribao 
on Abolishing Lifetime Tenure for Cadres," FBIS-cHI-80-113 
(June 10, 1980), at Ll; "Renmin Ribao on Advisory System 
for Old Cadres," FBIS-cHI-81-098 (May 21, 1981), at Kl9. 
See also Falkenheim, Liberalization and Reform in Chinese 
POlitiCs, 79 CURRENT HIST. 33, 45 (No. 458, Sept. 1980). 
The purpose of abolishing lifetime tenure is twofold: 
it presents to the masses a flexible policy of reassessment 
of cadre behavior designed to ensure consensus among Party 
members toward evolving Chinese tactics and strategies; 
and, it promotes c:ontrol by t:,e Party elite over the Party 
bureaucracy by creating the possibility of a more rapid 
personnel turnover rate. In a sense, the call for the 
abolition of lifetime tenure is the necessary corollary of 
a democratic principle giving Party cadres .the right to 
ventilate their personal views at organizational meetings 
(granted by the CCP Constitution, supra note 157, Art. 4), 
for the former grants the upper crust of Party leadership 
-- a body of Party members most likely immune from lifetime 
tenure modifications, notwithstanding such proposals 
control over perceived irregular or abnormal behavior among 
Party members at lower levels. 
CCP control of the PLA may be illustrated by the 1978 
enactment of PLA security regulations by the Party's Mili-
tary Commission. See "Military Commision Issues Documents 
on Security," FBIS-cHI-78-099 (May. 22, 1978), at El. See 
also "Provisional Regulations on Military Offenses," FBIS-
CHI-81-113 (June 12, 1981), at Kl. 
170. Mobilizing the masses is part of the Chinese pol icy of 
duhuizhan ("Battle in which all forces are moblized"). See 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 118. See generally J. WANG, 
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION (1980). 
The CCP used its full arsenal to publicize the new legal 
order, including scores of press reports on domestic law 
enforcement. Mass rallies were used in many instances to 
help garner support for the legal codes, publicize crimes 
for different purposes and lend legitimacy to the new legal 
system. See, ~· "Anhui Prefecture Calls Rally on Arrest 
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of Cadre," FBIS-cHI-89-117 (June 15, 1980), at 01; "Qinghai 
Court Sentences Criminals, Holds Rally," .FBIS-cHI-80-002 
(Jan. 3, 1980), at T8; "Guangdong Criminals," FBIS-cHI-81-
023 (Feb. 4, 1981), at P5. 
171. The CCP has used PRC media to transform other issues into 
mass campaigns. See, ~· "Renmin Ribao Criticizes Ja-
pan's Revised Textbooks," FBIS-CHI-82-140 (July 21, 1982), 
at D3. The Chinese, Party dominance of the entire 
bureaucratic system of the PRC may well be a basic feature 
of politics in Communist systems. According to such rea-
soning, the CCP has: 1) ultimate authority over the ap-
pointment and removal of high-level bureaucrats; 2) the 
ability to maintain considerably high personnel mobility; 
and, 3) authority over the bureaucracy by effecting a rap-
id personnel turnover rate. See Chai, Communist Party Con-
trol Over the Bureaucracy: The Case of China, 11 COMP. 
POL. 359 (April 1979). 
172. The Central Committee is composed of leading Party members 
who directly manage the Party, the army, and the govern-
ment. It is the symbol of established authority. The 
Chairmanship of the Central· Committee is the most presti-
gious office of the PRC. See L. PYE, CHINA: AN INTRODUC-
TION 191 ( 1978). The chairmanship is presently held by Hu 
Yaobang. In 1977, there were 201 members of the Central 
Committee and 132 alternates. See List of the 333 Members 
and Alternate Members of the llthCentral Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, Beijing Review, No. 35 (Aug. 26, 
1977), at .15. See generally TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 
294-305. 
173. The members of the Military Commission of the Central Com-
mittee are chosen by the Central Committee. See CCP CON-
STITUTION, supra note 157, Art. 21, para. 5. 
174. Apparently, real power in the Party rests with the Politbu-
ro. The Central Committee merely legitimizes policies. 
PYE, id. , at 181 • 
Since the Politburo is somewhat too large to operate 
effectively, major decision-making power is entrusted to 
its Standing Committee. See generally TOWNSEND, supra note 
65, at 89, 294-96. · 
175. The Central Advisory Commission is beneath the Political 
Bureau and the Secretariat and is responsible for, inter 
alia, "the formulation and implementation of the party's 
principles and policies .. " CCP CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 157, Art. 22. The interaction between the Secretariat 
and the Advisory Commission is not altogether clear, al-
though it is known that the latter body, by request of the 
Secretariat, is entrusted with the investigation of 
economic crimes by CCP officials. See •china Daily Cites 
Deng on Advisory Commission," FBIS-cHI-82-210 (Oct. 29, 
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1982), at Kl5; "Deng Discusses Advisory Commission Role, 
Future," FBIS-cHI-82-208 (Oct. 27, 1982), at KS. 
1'76. The fundamental Party unit is zhibu or branch committee. 
TOWNSEND, suora note 65, at 180.~se Party branches pro-
vide guid~to, and surveillance of, lower-level Party 
activities. Yet, the real strength of the CCP lies with 
the dedicated cadre, the " [treasure] of the nation and 
pride of the whole Party." Liu Shao-ch'i, ON THE PARTY 101 
(1952) cited in id., at 182. 
177. The affairs of the PLA are constitutionally entrusted to 
the Military Commission (Art. 93 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITU-
TION). See also Art. 21 of the CCP CONSTITUTION. supra 
note 157. Presumably, the CCP Military Commission directs 
military pol icy and supervises the work of the political 
commisars in the army structure. See PYE, supra note 174, 
at 181. See also "CCP Military Commission Decides to Sus-
pend Vietnam Action," FBIS-CHI-79-044 (March 5, 1979), at 
AS (suspending the PRC self-defense counterattack against 
SRV forces on the Guangzi-Yunnan border); "CCP Military 
Commission Issues Decision on Discipline," FBIS-CHI-78-069 
(April 10, 1978), at E4 (calling for strict discipline of 
army personnel according to Party pol icy); TOWNSEND, supra 
note 65, at 91-95.· Cf. note 169, ~· 
High-lavd milic3ry personnel in the PRC are found in 
~ost key ?Olitical positions. The Chinese do not have any-
thing similar to the National Security Act of 1947 which 
set up the u.s. Central Intelligence Agency and which does 
not allow the military to occupy the top two CIA positions 
at the same time. 
178. See Kakkar, The Role of the PLA During the Cultural Revolu-
tion, 13 CHINA REP. 29, 29-36 (No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1977); 
Terrill, China and the \'lorld: Self-Reliance or Interdepen-
dence, 55 FOR. AFF. 295, 304 (Oct. 1976). See also 
TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 91-95. --- ----
179. See, ~· "Tung Hsiang Comments on PRC War Preparedness," 
FBIS-cHI-78-232 (Dec. 1, 1978), at N3 (noting that the PLA 
continues to remain vigilant in defending PRC interests so 
as to help maintain the orderly and peaceful environment 
the PRC needs in its quest to achieve the four 
modernizations). 
180. See, ~· "Renmin Ribao Points Out Duties in Fighting 
Crime," FBIS-cHI-80-007 (Jan. 10, 1980), at Ll3. In this 
editorial, Wang Zhij iang noted the importance of the unity 
of the Party, government, mass organizations, and cultural 
and educational depart;nents in safeguarding public order. 
See also "PLA Patrols Protect Border From SRV Attacks," 
FBIS-cHI-82-146 (July 29, 1982), at E2; "Beijing Soldiers 
Maintain Law, Order," FBIS-cHi-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at 
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Rl (noting that soldiers were helping public security de-
partments to make arrests): "Peking Radio on PLA Duties, 
Accomplishments," FBIS-CHI -77-2 32 (Dec. 2, 19 77), at Al. 
No articulated code mandates PLA involvement in law 
enforcement. Whether PLA participation in combating crime 
will diminish as a result of the formal establishment of 
public security and procuratorial organs is uncertain, 
though it would seem to contravene previous PRC policy of 
mass participation in public security activities. See Pol-
lack, The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy, 35 BULL. OF 
ATOM. SCIENTISTS 22, 25 (Jan. 1979): 
The PLA is the backbone of [PRC] armed forces. The 
militia is the PLA 's effective assistant and powerful 
reserve In accordance with Chairman Mao's 
teachings ••• the militiamen in the cities and the 
countryside in positi-ve coordination w~th the PLA and 
·public security depart!nents, have for years maintained 
public order, dealt blows at the sabotage activities 
by class enemies and protected the people's 
interests. Id. 
181. 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 131. 
182. The PRC continues to prepare a civil code. A recent draft 
contained 501 articles. 
The Civil Procedure Law was provisionally implemented 
as of Oct. 1, 1982. See "Jeij ing Radio Comments on Civil 
Law Enforcement," FBIS-CHI-82-192 (Oct. 4, 1982), at Kl7. 
See also "National Conference on Civil Law Closes," FBIS-
CHI-82-134 (July 13, 1982), at Kll; "NPC Standing Committee 
Session Ends in Beijing: Civil Procedure Law," FBIS-CHI-
82-045 (March 8, 1982), at KG. See also "Peng Zhen Reports 
to NPC on Draft Laws: Civil, Civil Procedural Law," FBIS-
CHI-80-171 (Sept. 2, 1980), at L36; "Regulations on Civil 
Law Procedures Outlined," FBIS-cHI-79-017 (Jan. 24, 1979), 
at El2. · 
The PRC has also called for a more formalized Chinese 
theory of international law. See "International Law 
Research to be Strengthened," FBIS-cHI-80-025 (Feb. 5, 
1980), at LlO. Formal international law enactments are not 
as urgent as domestic law .enactments to the PRC. The 
former are 1 ikely to be forthcoming only after the PRC has 
reviewed and approved its domestic laws and has sufficient-
ly tested the waters of the international legal order to 
formulate precise rules flexible enough to permit Chinese 
pursuit of the four modernizations with a minimum of for-
eign interference and a maximum of non-intrusive foreign 
support. 
183. See generally, Heaton, Professional Military Education in 
China: A Visi·t to the Military Academy of the People's 
Liberation Army, 81 CHINA Q. 122 (Marc, 1980). 
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184. 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 55. 
185. The PRC CRIMINAL CODE: was passed on July 1, 1979 at the 
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and 
entered into force on January 1, 1980. See Gongan fagui 
huibian, supra note 146, at 4-33. Article 91 reads: 
Offenders colluding with foreign countries and con-
spiring to jeopardize the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and security of the motherland will be sen-
tenced to 1 ife imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment: 
of not less than 10 years. 
Article 92 reads: 
Those plotting to over throw the govenmen t and split 
the country will be sentenced to 1 ife imprisonment or 
fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years. 
Article 93 reads: 
Those instigating, seducing, or bribing any state 
functionary or any member of the armed forces, the 
people's police, or the militia to detect, turn trai-
tor or rebel will be sentenced to 1 ife impr ison:nent or 
fixed-term imprison~ent of not less than 10 years. 
Article 94 reads: 
Those defecting and turning traitor will be sentenced 
to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 3 and not 
more than 10 years. Those guilty of serious cases of 
defecting and turning traitor or who lead their men to 
defect to the enemy and turn traitor will be sentenced 
to imprisonment of not less than 10 years or 1 ife 
imprisonment. 
Article 97 reads: 
Those committing espionage or supporting the enemy in 
the following manner will be sentenced to imprisonment 
of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment; in 
less serious cases, they will be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not less than 5 and not more than 
10 years: 
1) Stealing, spying and supplying information 
to the enemy; 
2) Supplying arms or other military materials 
to the enemy; and 
3) Joining a 
organization 
enemy. 
secret service or espionage 
or receiving orders from the 
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These prov1S1ons are all part of the section of the 
PRC Criminal Code on counterrevolutionary activities, the 
most serious criminal violations in the PRC. The English 
text of the Criminal Code may be found in "Seven PRC Laws 
Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-CHI-79-146 (July 
27, 197 9) PART I: Supp. No. 019 [hereafter PRC CRIMINAL 
CODE). The effective date of the laws published therein 
was January 1, 1980. 
186. Mao's philosophy is often cited. ~· ~· On Protracted 
War (May 1938) in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 143-44 
(Vol. II 1965). See also J. COPPER, CHINA'S GLO.BAL ROLE 85 
(1980); COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 181-89; Kux, China 
- A Nuclear Power: Strategic Posture and Defense Modern-
ization, 2 AR.IIIADA INT'L. 106, 107-08 (Vol. 4, March-April 
1980); Liu, The Modernization of the Chinese Military, 9 
CURRENT HIST. 9 (Sept. 1980); YAHUDA, supra note 6, at 110; 
note 221, infra. Cf. Jencks, China's "Punitive" War on 
Vietnam: A~itarYAssessment, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 801 (No. 
8, Aug • 19 7 9) • 
187. The PRC press has been particularly acrimonious with 
respect to KGB activities,. which were perceived as part of 
the Soviet's hegemonic plan to rule the world. See, ~· 
"Soviet Activiti&s in Singapore Denounced," FBIS-cHI-82-040 
(March 1, 1982), at Cl; "USSR's Global Espionag~ Activities 
Examined," FBIS-CHI-81-183 (Sept. 22, 1981), at Cl; "Renmin 
Ribao Looks at KGB Activities in U.S.," FBIS-CHI-81-234 
(Dec, 7, 1981), at Bl; "PRC Protests KGB Attempt to Force 
PRC Diplomat to Defect," FBIS-CHI-80-170 (Aug. 29, 1980), 
at Cl; "Soviet Spy Imprisoned, Chinese National Sentenced 
to Death," FBIS-cHI-80-141 (July 21, 1980), at Cl: • 'Enemy 
Agent' Caught Last Year Near Xinjiang Border," FBIS-cHI-79-
187 (Sept. 25, 1979), at T5; "Soviet Spy Activities at UN 
Uncovered," FBIS-CHI-78-101 (May 24, 1978), at A4; "KGB's 
Infiltration Into Foreign Countries Noted," FBIS-cHI-78-092 
(May 11, 1978), at A6; "People's Daily Editor Warns KGB has 
'Murder in its Heart'," FBIS-cHI-78-072 (April 13, 1978), 
at A3; "US, USSR Expel Diplomatic Officials," FBIS-cHI-78-
016 (Jan. 24, 1978), at Al; "People's Daily Attacks Soviet 
Spying in Europe," FBIS-cHI-78-014 (Jan. 20, 1978), at A6. 
See also "AFP: Gongren Ribao Warns Against 'Enemy 
AgentS"';" FBIS-cHI-79-069 (April 9, 1979), at L2. 
188. ~~generally, SAO RUE-WANG AND R. CHELMINSKI, PRISONER 
OF MAO (1976); R. DEACON, THE CHINESE SECRET SERVICE 
(1974). See also Scalapino, The Policies of the Post-Mao 
Era: An EXam Iilation of the 11th Party Congress, 17 ASIAN 
SURVEY 1049, 1051-53 (No. 11, Nov. 1977). 
Contemporary Chinese intelligence forces may be a 
throwback to the Chinese Censorate (dujiayuan) in Imperial 
China, which served as special watchdog over the civil ser-
vice and performed inspector-general and secret police 
functions. PYE, supra note 172, at 79. 
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189. The NPC reintroduced the Organic Regulations of the Urban 
Neighborhood Committee, the Organic Regulations of the Sub-
district Office, the Temporary Organic Regulations of the 
People's Meditation Committee and the Temporary Organic 
Regulations of the Social Order and Security Co:nmi ttee. 
See "Central Press Publishes NPC Regulations on Local Or-
ganizations," FBIS-cHI-80-017 (Jan. 24, 1980), at L2-9. 
The statutes permit local authorities to recruit members of 
the population through the latters' work in mass volunteer 
organizatons, to administer and enforce governmental deci-
sions and to preserve law and order. The Security Commit-
tee regulations permit the formation of 3-11 members public 
security committees in goverrunent organizations, plants 
enterprises, schools and neighborhoods in cities and ad-
ministrative villages in rural areas (Art. III) to assist 
the government • in preventing traitors, spies, thieves and 
arsonists and in eliminating counterrevolutionaries in or-
der to safeguard state and public security" (Art. I). See 
also "Anhui Radio Calls for Suppression of Criminals, 
Spies," FBIS-cHI-80-024 (Feb. 4, 1980), at 02; 1982 PRC 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 111. 
190. TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 318. 
191. See Scalapino, supra note 188, at 1052. 
192. Id. See generally DEACON, supra note 188. The existence 
of the 8341 unit was implied in a recent reports on an at-
tempted assassination of Deng Xiaoping. See "Taipei Rumors 
Say Xu Shiyou Wounded in Attempt on Deng~FBIS-CHI-80-083 
(April 28, 1980), at Lll. See also "AFP: Spokesman Denies 
Taiwan Claims of Xu Attempton Deng ,• FBIS-cHI-80-186 (May 
1, 1980), at LlO. Perhaps significantly, neither report 
originated on the Chinese mainland. Both were sent through 
AFP (a foreign news service) wire services in Hong Kong. A 
second report was issued through Hong Kong in 1982. See 
"Paper Reports Deng Xiaoping Shot in October," FBIS-CHI-82-
019 (Jan. 28, 1982), at Wl. The PRC did not confirm the 
accuracy of the report. 
193. Scalapino, supra note 188, at 1052. The need for a clan-
destine security apparatus may also be seen in an uncon-
firmed report from Hong Kong of the existence of terrorist 
organizations in the PRC. See "Beijing Reported Inves-
tigating Terrorist Organizations,• FBIS-cHI-80-120 (June 
19, 1980), at Ul; "Wan Jen Jih Pao: Plane Crash Due to 
Sabotage," FBIS-cHI-82-084 (April 30, 1982 ), at WS (plane 
crash over Guangxi caused by terrorist group). 
The PRC internal security apparatus is rather intri-
cately structured at present. The recent promulgation of 
the Chinese criminal, marriage, and tax codes, the expected 
promulgation of the civil codes, and the intensification of 
Chinese contacts with foreigners has required a joint ef-
fort on the part of the Party, the government, the army and 
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militia, the mass organizations, the cultural and educa-
tional departments and the public security organs in the 
PRC to help safeguard public order. Such a joint effort is 
probably a product of Party paranoia as to the effects of 
Western principles on Chinese society, the lack of a clear-
ly articulated role for any particular organ in the main-
tenance of public security, and the sheer number of Chinese 
citizens who must be policed. See "Renmin Ribao Points Out 
Duites in Fighting Crime," FBIS-CHI-80-007 (Jan. 10, 1980), 
at Ll3 (noting the importance of unity among Party and 
governmental organizations in the preservation of public 
order); "Jilin Founds People's Police Armed Forces," FBIS-
CHI-82-209 (Oct. 28, 1982), at 56. 
The masses also have a role in preseving public 
security, that of "self-surveillance." See, Butterfield, 
How the Chinese Police Themselves, N.Y. Times, .April 18, 
1982, p. 32 (Magazine). Cf. "AFP: Shanghai Mob Kills 
Drunken Hooligan," FBIS-CHI-80-099 (May 20, 1980), at 03 
(noting that a crowd of about 100 people lynched a drunken 
hooligan who had slapped a passerby. The police took no 
action against the lynchers. The use of "mob" in the title 
may be attributed to the fact that the report was issued 
over a foreign wire service (AFP)). 
Moreover, to increase administrative control over the 
masses, the 12th Session of the 5th NPC Standing Committee 
decided, in 1980, to r-eintroduce a number of legislative 
enactments passed in the PRC in the 1950s. One of these 
was the December 31, 1954 Statute on Organization of Urban 
Precinct Offices. Under the Statute, local precinct 
offices were created. Through these precinct offices and 
mass volunteer organizations known as urban population com-
mittees (created by the Statute of the Organization of Ur-
ban Committees, adopted Dec. 31, 1954 and reintroduced in 
1980), public security organs keep urban residents under 
strict surveillance through civilian administration depart-
ments which require mandatory registration of identity 
documents and prevent citizens from moving freely in the 
PRC without special permits. See supra note 189. See also 
Yegorov, supra note 168, at 124-25. 
The public security apparatus, therefore, is an amal-
gam of various legal and quasi-legal organizations with 
overlapping functions. Thus, the average Chinese citizen 
is not subject to the arbitrary and ruthless tactics of a 
single agency, such as Soviet citizens are in the Soviet 
Union. But surveillance in the PRC may be more extensive: 
street committees, for example the lowest level 
governmental subdivision--- may monitor the menstrual cy-
cles of young women to ensure compliance with population 
control directives. See F. BUTTERFIELD, CHINA: ALIVE IN 
THE BITTER SEA 325-28(1982). However, joint supervision 
of internal security results in greater control of daily 
routines and poses the possibility that PRC internal 
security forces may become more susceptible of capricious 
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and uncontrolled behavior in the execution of an arms con-
trol agreement. 
194. See Scalapino, supra note 188, at 1053. 
195. The increase in foreign contacts has been more subtle than 
published reports indicate. The Chinese continue tore-
quire Western technological assistance in their drive to 
realize the four modernizations. This has required sales 
negotiations with foreign officials. See. ~· Kux, supra 
note 186, at 107-08; Wallace, Rebuilding China's Army: A 
Job for the U.S.?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 9, 1981) 
reprinted in.U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA, SELECTED ESSAYS AND 
PAPERS 70-71 (Jan. 1982) (published by the National Con-
ference on Asians in America and Asian Americans). 
The PRC Joint Venture Law has also occasioned foreign 
commercial contacts. In addition, the number of diplomatic 
and quasi-diplomatic visitors to the PRC, as well as 
tourism, has increased steadily since 1977. See Kallgren, 
China 1979: The New Long March, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 1, 3-4 
(No.1, Jan. 1979). 
A number of trips by Deng Xiaoping were well-covered 
by the Chinese media. Id., at 3. In addition, groups of 
Chinese journalists have travelled to Europe, Africa and 
the United States. Many wrote of their accounts in the PRC 
press. Combined with television transmissions, these re-
ports provided Chinese citizens with one of their first 
opportunities to view their leaders in the international 
arena and to increase their knowledge of the outside world. 
Id. See also "Formalities Simplified for Foreign 
Tourists," FBIS-CHI-82-205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3; "Youth 
Federation to Increase Foreign Contracts," FBIS-CHI-80-102 
(May 23, 1980), at A6; "More Areas, Cities Opened to 
Tourists," FBIS-CHI-80-090 (May 7, 1980), at L23; "Plans 
Made to Open More Areas to Foreign Tourists," FBIS-CHI-78-
114 (June 13, 1978), at Ell; "AFP: Rules on Foreign Stu-
dents' Travel Replaced," FBIS-cHI-78-020 (Jan. 3, 1978), at 
El6. But see "Regulations on Studying Abroad Approved," 
FBIS-cHI-82-147 (July 30, 1982), at K9 (warning PRC stu-
dents abroad to carefully observe Chinese national security 
laws); Peiping Clamps Down on Studies Abroad, China Post, 
July 28, 1982, at 2; "Renmin Ribao Caut.ions Foreign Jour-
nalists," FBIS-cHI-82-044 (March 5, 1982), at Al; Peking 
Curbs Contacts With Foreign Residents, N.Y. Times, July 15, 
1982, at A9. 
196. See note 187 supra. See also "AFP: PRC Denies Collabora-
tion With CIA, Thailand," FBIS-CHI-82-138 (July 19, 1982), 
at El (denying Vietnamese claim of a PRC-CIA plot to gain 
control of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by 1985). 
197. But see BUTTERFIELD, supra note 193, at 445, who reported 
that People's Daily editors were forced to undergo self-
criticism ( ziwopiping) for printing a plea for artistic 
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freedom from renowned PRC actor Zhao Dan, without first 
seeking clear a nee for the ar tiel e from the CCP. See also 
"Kyodo Sources Say Renmin Ribao Editor Criticized," FIHS-
CHI-81-236 (Dec. 9, 1981), at K8 (Japanese news report on 
alleged editorial error by People's Daily editor). Note 
that in the PRC, there is no constitutional preclusion of 
legal or CCP interference with the press~ 
198. See Chung, From Great Disorder to Great Order: The 
Eleventh Party Congress and the Continuous Revolution. 13 
CHINA REP. 7, 28 (No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1977). See also the 
1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 2, which gives 
the people "the right to administer state affairs." 
199. Id., at 27. The "quadruple weapon" was more often referred 
to as the "four bigs" in Chinese press parlance. The "four 
bigs" first appeared in full in 1957. The press noted that 
the "four bigs" were abused during the Cultural Revolution 
by Lin Piao, the gang of four and their respective cohorts. 
One "big" in particular-- the right to write big-character 
posters -- ~as alleged to have become a vehicle for ground-
less accusations and character assassinations. The posters 
supposedly led to in-fighting among the masses and harmed 
many good people. Such accusations preceded the 1980 Con-
stitutional amendment of Art. 45. See supra note 156 and 
accompanying text. See also "Renmin rti::>ao Cites Reasons 
for Abolishing 'Fou-r-Bigs'," FBIS-CHI-80-194 (Oct. 3, 
1980), at L3; "Deng Xiaoping on Importance of Revising Con-
stitution," FBIS-cHI-80-191 (Sept. 30, 1980), at L3; 
"Guangming Ribao Notes Harm of 'Four Big Rights' ,"FBIS-CHI-
80-080 (April 23, 1980), at Ll4; "Xinhua Surveys People's 
Deputies on 'Four Bigs' Abolition," FBIS-CHI-80-076 (.~pril 
17, 1980), at Rl; "Nanfang Ribao: Abolition of 'Four Bigs' 
Seen Necessary," FBIS-cHI-80-074 (April 15, 1980), at P4; 
"Qinghai Ribao Article Hails Elimination of Four 'Rights'," 
FBIS-cHI-80-066 (April 3, 1980), at Tl. · 
The CCP-sponsored media thrust for elimination of the 
"four bigs" was prompted by a number of problems. First, 
the emphasis of da (great or big) denoted a new style of 
authority-public -relationship in which individuals were 
allowed to publisly criticize authority. Chung, supra note 
198, at 27. This was apparently intolerable to CCP leader-
ship. Second, the intensity, capriciousness and scope of 
the accusations alarmed the authorities. See; ~·· "AFP: 
Beijing Wallposter Hits CCP Leadership," FBIS-cHI-79-066 
(April 4, 1979), at Ll (noting in an Agence France Presse 
(foreign news service) report that wallposters had attacked 
CCP leadership for its repression of certain authors of 
big-character posters). 
Rather than tolerate a burgeoning underground dissi-
dent-human rights movement, the CCP resolved to remedy the 
problem by removing the major outlet for dissident discus-
sion -- big-character posters. 
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200. Chung, supra note 198, at 27. 
201. Id., at 27-28. 
202. Article 45 of the 1978 PRC CONSTITUTION originally read: 
Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, cor-
respondence, the press, assembly, associa-
tion, procession, demonstration and the 
freedom to strike, and have the right to 
speak out freely, air their views fully, 
hold great debates and write big-character 
posters. [emphasis added]. 
The 1980 amendment deleted the previously emphasized 
text. See "NPC Session Presidium Holds Fourth Meeting 9 
Sep: Article 45 Revision," FBIS-CHI-80-177 (Sept. 10, 1980, 
at L30. 
The dispatch with which the Constitution was amended 
albeit through proper legal channels -- indicates the 
significance attached by the CCP to uncontrolled free 
speech activities and the power of Party leadership in 
supervsing the government and legal process. See "Wen Hui 
Bao on Shortcomings of Big-Character Posters," FBIS-CHI-80-
045 (March 5, 1980), at 01. 
203. Control of the press has been further strengthened by the 
promulgation of a State Council "report" banning the "unau-
thorized" compiling and printing of books and publications. 
See "State Council Approves Increasd Publication Controls," 
FBIS-CHI-80-138 (July 16, 1980), at L6. See also Chinese 
are Reminded of Reins on Expression, Bal to:-s~Feb. 17 I 
1980, at A2. 
The press has dictated the extent to which information 
provided by PRC officials would not run afoul of CCP and 
state secret laws. An anonymous PRC legal official in-
formed this author that court proceedings are state secrets 
and should not be discussed until information on them is 
released in the press. See also "24th Session of NPC 
Standing Committee Closes,• FBIS-CHI-82-164 (Aug. 24, 
1982), at Kl (passing resolution on making Xinhua the state 
organ for "unified" release of important news). 
The role of the press in national construction is in-
dicated merely by a perusal of FBIS reports over the last 
eight years. Just after the PRC's admission to the United 
Nations and prior to the promulgation of domestic legal 
codes, the PRC press reported almost exclusively on inter-
national relations topics. With the enactment of the legal 
codes and the emphasis on the four modernizations, an FBIS-
PRC press report is now devoted to national, regional and 
local affairs in addition to interational topics, which are 
decidedly more limited in scope. 
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The press has also been used to infuse Chinese society 
with the proper attitudes toward certain foreign acts. 
Vicious and frequent PRC condemnation of Japanese textbook 
citations to the Japanese invasion of China is an example. 
See, ~·, • Renmin Ribao Criticizes Japan's Revised Text-
books," FBIS-cHI-82-140 (July 21, 1982), at D3. 
204. See, .!L:.S..:.• "Renmin Ribao Discusses Law of Criminal Pro-
cedure," FBIS-cHI-79-168 (Aug. 28, 1979), at L5; 
"Guangming Ribao Comments on Accused's Rights to Defense," 
FBIS-cHI-79-166 (Aug. 24, 1979), at L3; "Gongren Ribao 
Looks at Importance of Joint Ventures," FBIS-CHI-79-153 
(Aug. 7, 1979), at L7; "Renmin Ribao on Counterrevolution-
ary Crimes," FBIS-CHI-79-148 (July 31, 1979), at L6; 
"Guangming Ribao Explains Role of Law in Modernization," 
FBIS-cHI-79-144 (July 25, 1979), at L2; "Jiefangj un Bao 
Discusses Merits of Law on Joint Ventures," FBIS-CHI-79-142 
(July 23, 1979), at Ll7; "Reportage on PRC's New Criminal 
Law: NPC Deputies' Debate," FBIS-CHI-79-131 (July 6, 
1979), at Ll2; "Director Peng Zhen Explains Draft Laws at 
NPC Plenary Session," FBIS-CHI-79-125 (June 27, 1979), at 
L4. See also, "Renmin Ribao Discusses Joint Venture Law," 
FBIS-cHI-82-155 (Aug. 11, 1982) at Kl4; "Renmin Ribao on 
Questions About Lin-Jiang Trial," FBIS-cHI-81-027 (Feb. 10, 
1981), at LlO. ' 
205. See, .!L:.S..:.• "Jurist Fei Xiaotung Comments on Trial," FBIS-
CHI-81-021 (Feb. 2, 1981), at L9; "Lawyers Discuss Dissi-
dents Trial in Beijing," FBIS-cHI-80-241 (Dec. 12, 1980), 
at L7 (justifying dissident Wei Jingsheng's sentence); 
"Renmin Ribao Discusses Criminal Law Provisions: Age of 
Legal Responsibility, Previous Criminal Record," FBIS-CHI-
80-051 (March 13, 1980), at L24; "Renmin Ribao Explains 
Sections of Criminal Law," FBIS-cHI-80-033 (Feb. 15, 1980), 
at Ll5; "Renmin Ribao on Statute of Limitations in Criminal 
Law," FBIS-cHI-80-008 (Jan. 11, 1980), at L7; "Renmin Ribao 
Explains Two Types of Sentences," FBIS-cHI-79-241 (Dec. 13, 
1979), at Ll; "Renmin Ribao Discusses Legal Status of 
Criminals," FBIS-cHI-79-224 (Nov. 19, 1979), at Ll; "Renmin 
. Ribao Discusses Exemption From Prosecution," FBIS-CHI-79-
.220 (Nov. 13, 1979), at Ll2; "Guangming Ribao Discusses 
Counterrevolutionary Offenses," FBIS-cHI-79-165 (Aug. 23, 
1979), at Ll; "Renmin Ribao Discusses Implementation of 
Criminal Laws," FBIS-cHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979), at Ll; 
"Continuation of Explanation of Criminal Procedure Law 
Terms," FBIS-cHI-79-137 (July 16, 1979), at Ll; "Xinhua 
Publishes Explanation of Criminal Procedure Law Terms, • 
FBIS-cHI-79-136 (July 13, 1979), at Ll; "Newspapers Publish 
Columns Explaining Legal Terms," FBIS-cHI-79-134 (July 11, 
1979), at LS; "Xinhua Explains PRC Criminal Law Terms," 
id., at Ll; "Reportage on PRC 1 s New Criminal Law: Legal 
Expert on Technical Points," FBIS-cHI-79-131 (July 6, 
1979), at Ll6; "Reportage on ·pRC 1 s New Criminal Law: Noted 
Jurist 1 s Description,• id., at Ll4; "Text of Peng Zhen 1 s 
Explanation of Seven Draft Laws," FBIS-cHI-79-130 (July 5, 
1979), at L9. See also "Peng Zhen Explains Draft Revised 
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Constitution," FBIS-CHI-82-084 (.l\pr il 30, 
"NPC Official Outlines New Marriage Law," 
(Feb. 11, 1981), at Ll6. 
19 8 2 ) , at Kl; 
FBIS-cHI-81-028 
206. See, ~·, "Guangzhou Announces Punishment on 12 
Criminals," FBIS-cHI-82-071 (April 13, 1982), at P2; 
"Shanghai Publishing House Copy Editor Arrested," FBIS-CHI-
82-070 (April 12, 1982), at 04; "Liaoning Tries Counter-
revolutionary Murders Clique," FBIS-CHI-81-081 (April 21, 
1981), at 54; "Gang of Four Trial Opens in Beijing," FBIS-
CHI-80-226 (Nov. 20, 1980), at Ll; "Gang of Four Trial 
Reveals More Crimes," FBIS-CHI-80-236 (Dec. 5, 1980), at 
Ll; "Shanghai County Public Security Bureau Solves Murder 
Case," FBIS-cHI-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at 01; "Hangzhou 
Judicial Department Tries 'Serious' Criminal Case," FBIS-
CHI-79-223 (Nov. 16, 1979), at 014; "Trial of Fu Yuehau 
Begins in Beijing," FBIS-CHI-79-202 (Oct. 17, 1979), at L5; 
"Political Dissident Sentenced to 15 Years Imprisonment," 
FBIS-cHI-79-201 (Oct. 16, 1979), at Ll (noting the sentence 
imposed in Wei Jingsheng); "Guangdong Municipal Court Pas-
ses Verdict on Nine Hooligan Criminals," FBIS-CHI-79-170 
(Aug. 30, 1979), at P8; "Anhui County CCP Committee Handles 
'Beating-Smashing' Case," FBIS-cHI-79-167 (Aug. 27, 1979), 
at 01; "Jilin: Lishu County Disciplines Law Violators," 
FBIS-CHI-79-164 (Aug. 22, 1979), at Pl. 
207. See,~·, "Commentator Urges Criminals Surrender by 1 May: 
Offenders Surrender," FBIS-CHI-82-058 (March 25, 1982), at 
Kl; "Economic Offanders Surrender Before Deadline," FBIS-
CHI-82-076 (April 20, 1982), at K2; "Xinhua: Many Beijing 
Criminals Surrender to ?olice," FBIS-CHI-80-042 (Feb. 29, 
1980), at R3. Cf. "Guangdong Encourages People to Expose 
Smuggling," FBIS-cHI-80-204 (Dec. 11, 1980), at Pl. 
208. See,~·· "Court Sentences Jiang Qing, Other Defendants," 
FBIS-cHI-81-016 (Jan. 26, 1981), at Ll; "Xinjiang Court 
Sentences Murderer to Death," FBIS-cHI-79-234 (Dec. 4, 
1979), at T3; "Shanghai Court Sentences Swindler," FBIS-
CHI-79-233 (Dec. 3, 1979), at T4 (sentencing a quack doctor 
to two years for removing intrauterine devices from women 
and taking their money); "Harbin District Court Executes 
Murderer," id., at Sl; "Zhejiang Court Sentences Follower 
of Gang ofFour," FBIS-cHI-79-224 (Nov. 19, 1979), at 03 
(sentencing defendant to three years surveillance and three 
years deprivaton of political rights); "Shanghai Lecture on 
Crimes Against Public Safety," FBIS-CHI-79-223 (Nov. 16, 
1979), at 011; "Shanghai Wenhui Bao Urges Punishing 
Criminal Offenders," FBIS-cHI-79-204 (Oct. 19, 1979), at 
02. Cf. "Liaoning: Attacking Counterrevolutionaries 
Urged,"--FBIS-cHI-81-082 (April 29, 1981), at 53. 
209. See, ~·, "National Crime Rate Decreases; More Cases 
Solved," FBIS-cHI-82-171 (Sept. 2, 1982), at K22; "Reduc-
tion in Crime Rate in Beijing Reported," FBIS-CHI-82-152 
(Aug. 6, 1982), at Rl; "Crime Rate Drops in Beijing, Other 
Municipalities," FBIS-CHI-81-157 (Aug. 14, 1981), at Kl; 
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"Procuratorial Organs Handle Over 10,000 Cases in 18 
Months," FBIS-cHI-80-193 (Oct. 2, 1980), at L6; "PRC Rep-
resentative Addresses UN Congress on Crime," FBIS-CHI-80-
173 (Sept. 4, 1980), at Al; "New Weekly Notes Decrease in 
·Urban Crime Rate," FBIS-cHI-80-150 (Aug. 1, 1980), at L6; 
"Wei Guoqing Presides Over 11eeting of NPC Standing Commit-
tee: Briefing by People's Court President," FBIS-CHI-80-
073 (April 14, 1980), at Ll; "Chief Procurator's Report," 
id., <~t L2; "Public Security Minister's Report," id., at 
L3; "Kyodo Cites Jiefang Bao Report on Crime in Shanghai," 
FBIS-cHI-80-070 (April 19, 1980), at 05; "Fifth Jilin Peo-
ple's Congress Concudes: Higher People's Court Report, 
People's Procuratorate Report," FBIS-CHI-80-069 (April 8, 
1980), at 55; "Heilo11gjiang Crime Rate Declines," FBIS-CHI-
80-040 (Feb. 27, 1980), at Sl; "Jiefang Ribao Comments on 
Maintaining Social Order," FBIS-cHI-80-022 (Jan. 3, 1980), 
at 06; "Public Security Ministry Reports Decline in 
Juvenile Crime," FBIS-CHI-79-246 (Dec. 20, 1979), at LlO. 
210. Lucien Pye noted that even though all media forms are vital 
for legitimacy, the process which makes this true operates 
in a way that forces the media to maintain a significant 
gap between rhetoric and reality; in effect, to create an 
imaginary world. See Pye, Communications and Chinese 
Political Culture, iBASIAN SURVEY 221, 244 (No. 3, March 
1978). See also Lonshchakov, The Chinese> Press: ~-Brain­
washing MaCh~ 4 FAR EASTERN AFF. 148. 
One recent e.xa'Tlple of the gap between Chinese rhetr ic 
and reality concerns the existence of terrorist organiza-
tions and narcotics peddlers in the PRC. In a Xinhua 
(Hsinhua) report printed by the Chinese, Xie Bangzhi, PRC 
vice-minister of Justice and head of the Chinese delegation 
of the UN Congress on Crime, noted ir. an address to the 
Congress that terrorist groups and major narcotics peddlers 
were "non-existent" in the PRC. See "PRC Representative 
Addresses UN Congress on Crime," FBIS-CHI-80-173 (Sept. 4, 
1980), at Al. Yet, shortly after this statement appeared, 
an article surfaced in the Chinese press that noted the 
crackdown on drug-traffickers in Guangzhou province. See, 
"Guangzhou Cracks Down on Drug Addicts, Traffickers," FBIS-
CHI-80-182 (Sept. 17, 1980), at Pl. See also "PRC Tightens 
Security on Drugs Into Hong Kong," FBIS-cHI-82-215 (Nov. 5, 
1982), at W6. 
More significant, though, was a Hong Kong-based report 
citing the existence of terrorist organizations in the PRC. 
See "Beijing Reported Investigating 'Terrorist Organiza-
tion'," FBIS-cHI-80-120 (June 19, 1980), at Ul. A second 
report -- this one published by the foreign wire service 
Agence France Presse -- appeared in 1981, and noted the 
PRC's continuing concern with terrorism. See "AFP: 
Liberation Daily on Increase in Terrorism," FBIS-CHI-81-010 
(Jan. 15, 1981), at L7. The Chinese did not directly con-
firm or deny the accuracy of reports on terrorism until the 
recent publicity surrounding a hijacking near Shanghai. 
- 104 -
See "Attempted Hijacking Near Shanghai Foiled," FBIS-CHI-
82-143 (July 26, 1982), at Kl. A second alleged hijack 
attempt was denied by PRC authorities. See "AFP Says Au-
thorities Deny Knowledge of Hijacking,-"--FBIS-CHI-82-147 
(July 30, 1982), at Kl; "AFP Reports Official Spokesman 
Denies Hijacking," FBIS-cHI-82-148 (Aug. 2, 1982), at KlO. 
211. See generally Kallgren, supra note 195, at 16-17. 
212. See,~·· How do Chinese Trade Unions Function?-- An 
Intervie with Ma Chun-ku, a leading member of the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 49 
(Dec. 8, 1978), at 5; Basic Principle of Trade Union Work 
in the New Period, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 44 (Nov. 3, 
1978), at 7. See also, Worker's Congresses, Beijing Re-
view, No. 26 (June 28, 1982), at 5; "Article on Protective 
Role of Trade Unions,• FBIS-cHI-81-198 (Oct. 14, 1981), at 
K24. 
213. See, ~·· Youth Movement: A New Milestone, Peking (Beij-
ing) Review, No. 46 (Nov. 17, 1978), at 5; Glorious Mission 
of the Chinese Youth, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 46 (Nov. 
17, 1978), at 7; "CYL Commentator on Youth's Role in 
Society," FBIS-cH-81-132 (July 10, 1981), at Kl2. 
214. See, ~· "Women's Movement in China: Guiding Concepts 
and New Tasks, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 39 (Sept. 29, 
1978), at 5; Mobilizing Women for the New Long March, 
Peking (Beijing) Review, (Sept. 29, 1978), at 3; "Gongren 
Ribao Views Role, Contributions of Women," FBIS-CHI-82-160 
(Aug. 18, 1982), at KS. 
215. See, KIM, supra note 20, at 52. 
216. See, id., at 49-93. See also 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra 
note T04, Preamble; PYE, supra note 172, at 189-213; Meis-
ner, Marxism and Chinese Values in THE CHINA DIFFERENCE 
101-16 (R. Terrill ed., 1979). But see "Hongqi Article 
Discusses Mao's Merits, Errors,• FBIS-cHI-81-106 (June 3, 
1981), at K8. The nature of this paper precludes a 
detailed analysis of Chinese Communist ideology. 
Examples of Maoist philosophy which have provided fun-
damental guidelines for Chinese actions include, inter 
alia, his articles on military strategy and people's-wat= 
fare. See, ~· "The Atom Bomb is a Paper Tiger," SCMP 
no. 6382 (July 18, 1977), at 9; "Strategically 'Pit One 
Against Ten' and Tactically 'Pit Ten Against One'," SCMP 
no. 5826 (April 17, 1975), at 16; "Study of Mao Tse-tung's 
Military Writings: The Pivotal Strategy Must be Mobile 
Warfare,• id., at 11. Chinese Communist ideological in-
struction emphasizes slogans and catch phrases which are 
useful in providing political instruction to large segments 
of the rural populace which have little schooling. For an 
excellent analysis of these slogans, catch phrases and the 
use of numbers, ~ PYE, supra note 172, at 277-88. ~ 
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also "Renmin Ribao on Two-Line, Two-Frong Struggles," FBIS-
C'iff=82-189 (Sept. 29, 1982), at Kl; "Hongqi Urges Learning 
From Mao's Five Letters," FBIS-cHI-82-171 (Sept. 2, 1982), 
at K26; More Red and Expert Cadres, Beijing Review, No. 22 
·(June 2, 1980), at 3. 
217. See, ~, Wren, Mao's Birthplace is Losing Lure fot 
Tourists, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1982, p. Al2. 
213. KIM, supra note 20, at 55. See generally M. REJAI, MAO 
TSE-TUNG ON REVOLUTION AND WAR 87-88 (1970). 
219. KIM, supra note 20, at 63. 
220. Id. 
221. See On Protracted War (May 1938) in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO 
TSE-TUNG 143 (Vol. II 1965). ~ also REJAI, supra note 
218, at 279; The Concept of People's War, Beijing Review, 
No. 31 (Aug. 2, 1982), at 3; "Hongqi on People's \Var, De-
fense Modernization," FBIS-cHI-82-212; "AFP Notes PRC Posi-
tion on Conflict with Soviets," FBIS-cHI-81-135 (July 15, 
1981), at C2. 
222. See Leng, The Role of Law in the Peool e' s Republic of China 
as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung' s Influence, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/ 
REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., No. 5-1978(17), at 
18. 
223. See id., at 8-11. Under Mao's concept, equality before the 
law for all persons has no place in people's justice. Yet, 
the PRC has, at least for the sake of appearance, called 
for equality before the law for all. See note 169, supra. 
224. As Leng noted, two models of law have coexisted and com-
peted with each other in the PRC -- the jural and the soci-
etal. The former stands for "formal, elaborate and 
codified rules enforced by a centralized and institutional-
ized bureaucracy." The societal model emphasized "socially 
approved norms and values, implemented by pol itcal 
socialization and enforced by social pressures." Leng, 
supra note 222, at 2. Mao's focus was largely on the soci-
etal model. The spate of legal codes which appeared in 
1979-80 indicated a general shift towards a jural model, 
though the societal has not by any means been abandoned. 
225. The mass 1 ine is a fund amen tal party pol icy, expounded by 
Mao, which requires party cadres to integrate with the mas-
ses and to lead the masses in implementing Party. pol icy. 
Id., at 2 n.8. See generally id., at 2-8. 
226. See generally, Munro, The Malleability of Man in Chinese 
Marxism, 48 CHINA Q. 609 (1971). See also Leng, supra note 
222, at 11-18. -- --
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227. The phrase has often been translated as "to seek truth from 
facts." 
228. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 9. 
229. PRC press reports have occasionally assailed the 1 iberal 
attitudes of curious Chinese in their contacts with for-
eigners. Some of the reports have been official Chinese 
releases. See, ~· "Shanghai Radio Urges Propert Atti-
tude Toward Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-80-084 (April 30, 1979), 
at 02 (noting that it is "political ignorance to regard all 
foreign things as good" and that the Chinese people should 
never lose their ability to distinguish between "flagrant 
followers [sic] and poisonous weeds"). "Beijing Radio Ar-
ticle on Foreign Influence," FBIS-CHI-82-194 (Oct. 6, 
19892), at Cl; "Article Cites Corruption Imported From 
West," FBIS-cHI-82-078 (April 22, 1982), at K3. See also 
"Guangming Ribao Discusses Proper Approach to ---p;)reign 
Things," FBIS-CHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at LlO; Ching, Of-
fical's Punishment Gives Chinese A Message: Don't Talk~o 
Foreigners, Asian Wall St. Journal, April 5, 1982, at 10; 
note 195, supra. 
Other reports have been passed on by foreign news ser-
vices. See, ~· "AFP: Restrictions Placed on Chinese 
Contacts with Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-79-105 (May 30, 1979), 
at L2 (aleging that the PRC restricted contact with for-
eigners by stipulating that Chinese citizens could no long-
er visit a foreigner's living quarters or eat with him in 
restaurants without specific permission from heir work 
units). The Chinese press never officially published the 
stipulations, but it never denied the report. A previously 
released Renmin ribao article lends credence to the AFP 
report. In the ReriiiiTn ribao article, Chinese authorities 
called for "energetic sanctions" against those who "sell 
off [state] secrets." 
The article was a reflection of CCP apprehension 
brought on by the recent birth of the Beijing democratic 
movement, some of the members of which were accused of 
selling secrets to foreigners. The publicity surrounding 
the trial of Wei Jingsheng, a Chinese dissident accused of 
selling secrets to the enemy, and the allegations against 
Jiang Qing of giving non-public documents to a foreign 
reporter also preceded the Renmin ribao article. One was 
left with a sense that official concernwas growing within 
the CCP that the PRC was becoming more vulnerable to 
espionage and disruption of its four modernizations plan. 
See generally "Beijing Ribao Stresses Importance of Guard-
ing Secrets," FBIS-cHI-79106 (May 31, 1979), at Ll; "AFP: 
Beijing Radio Urges Protection of State Secrets," FBIS-cHI-
100 (May 22, 1979), at Ll. See also "Renmin Ribao Article 
on Protecting State SecretsTFBIS-cHI-79-072 (April 11, 
1980), at L8; "Beijing Ribao Urges Protecting State As-
sets," FBIS-cHI-82-097 (May 19, 1982), at Kl; "Deng 
Yingchao on Guarding Party Secrets," FBIS-cHI-82-128 (July 
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2, 1982), at Kl; "Army Paper Stresses Vigilance Against 
Espionage," FBIS-cHI-82-141 (July 22 1982), at Kl. 
230. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 9. 
231. For instance, the PRC continues to remain hostile toward 
hegemonism (a term applied more to Soviet 3Cts than Ameri-
can one, though it is frequently used generally with 
respect to "superpower" actions). The Chinese even regard 
the hegemonic acts of third party states to be the direct 
result of superpower instigation. ~ "Newspapers Note 
Importance of Three Tasks for 1980," FBIS-CHI-80-025 (Feb. 
5, 1980), at 11 (Renmin ribao report) and L2 (Jiefang ribao 
commentary); "Renmin Ribao Commentator Urges Unity Against 
'Soviet Aggression';" FBIS-cHI-80-095 (May 14, 1980), at 
Cl; • Israel Invasion of Lebanon, U.s. Role Scored," FBIS-
CHI-82-119 (June 21, 1982), at Il. 
232. See generally TOWNSEND, supra note 64, at 289-337. 
233. That the NPC is a rubber stamp organ of the CCP is not un-
known to the Chinese themselves, who have sarcastically 
remarked that NPC delegates have two roles: to applaud the 
speeches of CCP leaders and to raise their hands to vote 
yes. 
234. NPC deputies serve for a period of· five years, though under 
special circumstances, that term may be extended or short-
ened. 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra not~ 104, Art. 57. 
235. See "Power· of NPC Standing Committee Examined," FBIS-CHI-
82-089 (May 7, 1982), at K9. Standing Committee members 
are permanent members of the NPC. See "Shandong's Bai 
Rubing Receives NPC P~rmanent Members,• FBIS-CHI-81-103 
(May 29, 1981), at 03. 
236. The designation of "statutes" appears to encompass both 
"laws and decrees,• which appear in· both the 1978 and 1982 
PRC CONSTITUTIONS. With an eye toward legal precision, a 
recent Guangming ribao article noted that there is a dis-
tinct hierarchical relationship among laws, decrees, and 
policy decisions although this relationship may now be 
blurred. The ranking of 1) laws; 2) decrees; and 3) 
policies in Article 9 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 
185; to wit, •acts committed should be dealt with 
according to the laws, decrees and policies" was deliber-
ate. Decrees and policies cannot contradict the law (~., 
NPC-enacted statutes) and the law itself cannot contradict 
the Constitution. See "Guangming Ribao Discusses Enforce-
ment of Policies, Laws,• FBIS-cHI-79-221 (Nov. 14, 1979), 
at Ll; 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Arts. 5, 62. 
Legislation and issues concerning it, are delegated in the 
first instance to the Legislative Affairs Commission of the 
NPC Standing Committee. See "Laws Concerning State Struc-
ture to be Revised," FBIS-cHI-82-220 (Nov. 15, 1982), at 
K4. In reality, CCP directives are effectively the supreme 
- 108 -
law of the land, though it would appear that CCP rev1s1ons 
of existing law should, for the sake of appearance, pass 
the NPC or its Standing Committee, the only organs em-
powered to revise the law. See "Peng Zhen Discusses Task 
of Public Security Organs,-"--FBIS-cHI-79-147 (July 30, 
1979), at Ll. See also Chiu, Socialist Legalism, supra 
note 16 8. --- ----
237. Recently promulgated State Council regulations have ad-
dressed an enormous range of activities, including, inter 
alia, obscenity bans, exchange control regulations., theuse 
~police weapons, supervision over explosive materials, 
rewards for invention, product standardization, and changes 
in administrative divisions at or above the county level. 
See, ~· "Pornographic Sound, Video Recordings Banned," 
FBIS-cHI-82-050 (March 15, 1982), at Kl5; "'Full·Text' of 
Regulations on Exchange Control," FBIS-CHI-80-138 (July 16, 
1980), at L4; "State Council Calls for Tight Control of 
Explosives,• FBIS-cHI-80-029 (Feb. 11, 1980), at L4; "State 
Council Revises Invention Reward Regulations," FBIS-CHI-79-
013 (Jan. 18, 1979), at El5; "State Council Issues Stan-
dardization Regulations," FBIS-CHI-79-158 (Aug. 14, 1979), 
at Ll; "State Council Approves New Administrative Divi-
sions," FBIS-cHI-80-039 (Feb. 26, 1980), at Ll. 
238. This constitutional procedure was outlined in the recent 
ratification of the 1980 UN Convention on the prohibition 
or restriction on the use of certain conventional weapons 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscrimi-
nate effects. See "Ling Qing Signs UN Accord on Conven-
tional Weapons,.......-pBIS-cHI-81-179 (Sept. 16, 1981), at Al; 
"Further on NPC Standing Committee Session: Weapons Con-
vention Resolution," FBIS-cHI-82-046 (March 9, 1982), at K8 
[hereafter UN Weapons Convention]. 
The legislative ordering suggested above parallels 
that prescribed ·by the 1978 PRC CONSTITUTION, which was in 
force for both acts. See "PRC Signs UN Convention on Dis-
crimination Against Women,• FBIS-cHI-80-140 (July 18, 
1980), at Al; "Fifth NPC Standing Committee Reportage Con-
tinues: 'UN Convention on Women'," FBIS-CHI-80-191 (Sept. 
30, 1980), at L4. 
239. 'Important NPC-drafted domestic legislation, like the 1982 
PRC CONSTITUTION, is circulated throughout the country in 
draft form prior to promulgation for official reaction to 
provisions and education of the public. See, ~, "Compa-
ny Workers Discuss Draft Constitution,• FBIS-CHI-82-111 
(June 9, 1982), at Kll; "CPPCC Meeting Discusses Draft Con-
stitution," FBIS-cHI-82-116 (June 16, 1982), at K6; "Fur-
ther PRC Draft Constitution Discussions Held," FBIS-CHI-82-
126 (June 30, 1982), at Kl. 
240. In July, 1979, the second session of the fifth NPC promul-
gated four new organic laws - the Organic Law for Local 
Congresses and Governments, the Organic Law for People's 
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Courts, the Organic Law for People's Procuratorates and the 
Electoral Law for the NPC and People' Congresses - desig-
ned, inter alia, to define permissible limits of local 
power.--xi! four laws in translation may be found in "Seven 
PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-CHI-79-
146 (July 27, 1979) PART I: Supp. No. 019. The effective 
date of the laws was January 1, 1980. 
241. An inspectorate would be well advised to peruse the texts 
of the speeches of various speakers at NPC sessions to dis-
cern traces of policy trends and potential conflicts. The 
PRC preoccupation with consensus apparently precludes more 
open disagreement. The floor speeches accompanying the 
adoption of new laws could be used as a gauge for Chinese 
attitudes toward formulation and execution of those laws. 
Cf. note 164 suora. But cf. "Renmin Ribao on Whether 
Speeches Can becrTmes,.......-pBIS-CHI-82-140 (July 21, 1982), 
at K2 (inflammatory speeches may be considered a criminal 
act under Art. 10 of the PRC Crimina! Code). 
242. See, ~· "Pornographic Sound, Video Recordings Banned," 
FBIS-CHI-82-050 (March 15, 1982), at Kl5 (State Council/CCP 
regulations issued); "Hainan Issues Circular on Por-
nographic Goods," FBIS-cHI-82-071 (April 13, 1982), at P3 
(issued by Hainan regional CCP committee); "Yunnan Circular 
.on Pornographic Materials," FBIS-CHI-82-084 (April 30, 
1982), at Q2 (issued by the Yunnan provincial CCP committee 
and provincial people's government). See also "Guangdong 
Issues Government Pornography Notice." FBIS-CHI-82-067 
(April 7, ).982), at P3 (issued by the provincial people's 
council); Guandong Circular on Illegal Foreign Exchange," 
id., at P2 (issued by the provincial people's government 
pursuant to State Council regulations); "Shandong Issues 
Circular on Control of Firearms," FBIS-CHI-81-123 (June 26, 
1981), at 52; "Xizang Issues Circular on Speculation Prof-
iteering," FBIS-CHI-81-072 (Feb. 25, 1981), at Q4. One may 
notice the rather frequent participation of party commit-
tees in the issuance - and drafting - of these circulars. 
Of course, circulars are not the only legislative en-
actments of local governmental organs. See, ~· 
"Guangdong Promulgates New Labor Regulations," FBIS-CHI-82-
048 (March 11, 1982), at Pl; "Beijing Promulgates Market 
Control Regulations," FBIS-cHI-81-018 (Jan. 28, 1981), at 
R2; "Heilongjiang City Bans Unauthorized Firearms," FBIS-
CHI-79-237 (Dec. 7, 1979), at Sl. 
For examples of permissible limits for local conform-
ing legislation, see "Xizang Passes Bills Amending National 
Law," FBIS-cHI-81-210 (Oct. 30, 1981), at Ql; (supplement-
ing the PRC crim.inal procedure code, marriage law, and 
electoral law). Cf. "Renmin Ribao: Ulanhu Writes on 
Regional Autonomy,"FBIS-cHI-81-139 (July 21, 1981), at K3; 
"Environment Discussed at Gansu Congress Session: Adopts 
Protection Measures," FBIS-cHI-81-208 (Oct. 28, 1981), at 
T2; "Sichuan Congress Standing Committee Meeting Held: 
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Resolution on Criminal Celses," FBIS-CHI-81-213 (Nov. 4, 
1981), at Q2. 
243. It is suggested that perceived non-conforming legislation 
or other legislative or judicial obstructions to arms in-
spection operations be brought first to the attention of 
the recently reestablished Ministry of Justice, which coor-
dinates judicial and procuratorial work. See "Justice 
Minister Views Judicial Administration," FBIS-CHI-82-149 
(Aug. 3, 1982), at Kl3. Presumably, initial contact wth 
the Ministry would expedite investigation of the matter. 
244. In American law, for example, invalidity or portions of an 
act or some of its applications will not cause the whole 
act to fall if the valid portions or possible applications 
wich remain are capable of being given legal effect, and if 
the legislature would have intended that which remained to 
stand alone. See, ~· Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 
U.S. 45, 54-56 (1908); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. ll8, 
121 (1919); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 u.s. 286, 289 (1924); 
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Buckley v. Vales, 424 U.S. 
1 (1976). This has given rise to severability clauses. 
See note, 40 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1927). But cf. note 203 
suora and accompanying text. -- --
American courts will invalidate an entire statute only 
where an invalid provision is so dependent on an otherwise 
valid statute as to, by its removal, affect the constitu-
tional features and purposes of the act. See, ~· 
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929). 
245. Limited distribution is partly the result of paper short-
ages in the PRC. See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 193, at 399. 
246. ~. Faxue yanj iu (Studies in law), Minzhu yu fazhi (De-
mocracy and the legal system); Renmin gong an (People's 
public security)(restricted circulation), Renmin jiancha 
(People's procuratorate) (restricted circulation), Renmin 
sif~ (People's judiciary)(restricted circulation) and 
Zhongquo fazhi bao (China legal system daily). See also 
"Chinese Judicial Weekly,• FBIS~HI-80-121 (June 20, 1980), 
at Ll4; "Legal Journal Calls for Abolishing Old Legal Prac-
tice,• FBIS-cHi-80-218 (Nov. 7, 19809), at L2l. 
Several law books have also been published, including 
Guojifa (International law), Falu zhishi wenda (Questions 
and answers on law) and Falu jiben zhishi jianghua (Talks 
on basic knowledge of law). See Chiu, Socialist Legalism, 
supra note 168, at 47 notes 8 and 9. 
247. See Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 146. ~ also Faxue 
cidian (Law Dictionary] (published in Shanghai, PRC, 
1979) (definitions of many legal terms useful to the PRC are 
included therein); note 60 supra. 
-lll 
For earlier collections of PRC statutory material,~ 
Hsia, Sources of PRC Law, supra note 1-68, at 25; CHINESE 
DICTIONARIES (Chinese-Eng 1 ish Translation Assistance Group 
ed. 1982), at 202-05. 
248. The Chinese press reports the sentences handed down to 
criminals, but rarely reports on the judicial proceedings 
or on any judicial deliberations. ~· ~· "Heilongjiang 
Tries Cultural Revolution Criminals," FBIS-CHI-82-183 
(Sept. 21, 1982), at Sl; "Xizang's Lhasa Municipal Court 
Sentences Criminals," FBIS-cHI-81-150 (Aug. 5, 1981), at 
Q3; "Guizhou Intermediate Court Convicts, Executes Mur-
derer," FBIS-cHI-80-159 (Aug. 14, 1980), at Ql; "Hainan 
Court Sentences Perpetrators of Rural Gun Fight," FBIS-CHI-
80-059 (March 25, 1980), at P7. 
Two notable exceptions were the trial of dissident Wei 
Jingsheng and the trial of the gang of four, both of which 
received extensive coverage. See, ~· "Political Dissi-
dent Sentenced to 15 Years' Imprisonment," FBIS-CHI-79-201 
(Oct. 16, 1979), at Ll; "Further Reportage on Trial of Wei 
Jingsheng: 'Xinhua Reporter Is Account, In FBIS-CHI-79-202 
(Oct. 17, 1979), at Ll; -'Public Prosecutor's Statement,' 
id., at L3; 'Renmin Commentator's Article,' id., at L4; 
"Further Report on Renmin Ribao Commentator in Wei Trial," 
FBIS-cHI-79-203 (Oct. 18, 1979), at L2; "Gang of Four Trial 
Reportage Continues," FBIS-cHI-80-230 (Nov. 26, 1980), at 
Ll; 'Jiang Tengjiao Testimony,' id.; Huang Yongshen, Li 
Zuopeng in Docket' id., at L3; 'Xinhua Chinese on Offier's 
Testimony', id., atL5; 'Jiang Qing Interrogated in First 
Tribunal,' id., at L6; "Gang of Four Trial Reportage Con-
tinues From Beijing," FBIS-cHI-80-232 (Dec. 1, 19890), at 
Ll-40; Chiu Certain Legal Aspects of the Recent Peking Tri-
al of the "Gang of Four" and Others, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/ 
REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPT. ASIAN STUD. (No. 3-1981 (40)), 
at 27-38. 
249. Much of this author's information was based on Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service [FBIS] reports, declassified 
translations of Chinese materials put out by a department 
under the aegis of the Central Intelligence Agency, which 
published almost all PRC laws in translation. See, ~· 
"Seven PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-. 
CHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979) PART I: Supp. No. 019; PART II: 
Supp. No. 020; "State Council Approves Regulations on Top 
Quality Products," FBIS-cHI-79-133 (July 10, 1979), at LlO; 
"Text of Law on Environmental Protection," FBIS-cHI-79-182 
(Sept. 18, 1979), at Ll; "State Council Approves Regula-
tions on Foreign Ships," FBIS-cHI-79-188 (Sept. 26, 1979), 
at Ll; "Guangdong Promulgates Regulations on Illegal 
Emigration," FBIS-cHI-80-008 (Jan. 11, 1980), at Pl; "Xin-
hua Publishes Regulations on Guarding State Secrets," FBIS-
CHI-80-073 (April 14, 1980), at L7; "Regualtions on Use of 
Police Weapons, Arms Issued," FBIS-cHI-80-138 (July l6, 
1980), at L4; "Text of Provisional Regula tons on Lawyers,• 
FBIS-cHI-80-180 (Sept. · 15, 1980), at L26; "NPC Standing 
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Committee Issues New Laws: 'Joint Venture's Law Text'," 
FBIS-cHI-80-181 (Sept. 16, 1980), at Ll6; 'Income Tax Law 
Text,' id., at Ll9: "Marriage Law Adopted by Fifth National 
People'sCongress," FBIS-cHI-80-184 (Sept. 19, 1980), at 
L22; "Rules on Carrying Foreign Exchange Published," FBIS-
CHI-81-154 (Aug. 11, 1981), at K4; "Xinhua Publishes Draft 
of Revised Constitution," FBIS-cHI-82-083 (April 29, 1982), 
at Kl. 
250. H. BERMAN AND P. MAGGS, DISARMAMENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET 
LAW 12-13 (1967) [hereafter BER."'lAN AND MAGGS). See also 
ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 39: note 246 
supra. 
Chinese secrecy about PRC legal development is not a 
new concept. Disclosure of information about the judicial 
system was made punishable under the State Secrets Regula-
tions adopted in the early years of the PRC (1951). Hsia, 
Sources of PRC Law, supra note 168, at 27. 
251. ~BERMAN AND MAGGS, supra note 250, at 13. 
252. The Ministry of Justice was established with the approval 
of the NPC Standing Committee on September 13, 1979. ~ 
"Decisions Announced at Fifth NPC Standing Committee Ses-
sion" FBIS-cHI-79-180 (Sept. 14, 1979), at Ll. 
253. See "Justice Minister Views Judicial Administration," FBIS-
CHI-82-149 (Aug. 3, 1982), at Kl3: New Minister of Justice 
Interviewed, Beijing Review, No. 42 (Oct. 19, 1979), at 3-
4. See also "Shaanxi Judicial Official Discusses Legal 
System," FBIS-CHI-81-119 (June 22, 1981), at Tl. 
254. The Ministry of Justice was recetly assigned the following 
tasks: 
1. Guiding and managing the training of judicial per 
sonnel, including directing political and law 
schools to develop legal curriculums: 
2. Publicizing and propagandizing the legal system: 
3. Managing lawyers' work: 
4. Managing notarization work: 
5. Supervi.sing the work of people's mediation 
canmi ttees 1 
6. Organizing participation in international judicial 
activitiies: 
7. Investigating questions of theory and pol icy in 
judicial work and iltudying juvenile delinquency 
and other criminal activities: 
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8. Supervising judicial administrative organs. 
See "Justice Minister Views Judicial Administration," FBIS-
CHI-82-149 (Aug. 3, 1982), at Kl4. Note that these assig-
ned tasks are an expansion of those powers earlier associ-
ated with the Ministry, wit·h the notable exceptions of the 
tasks of compiling codes of laws and publishing law books. 
Compare Ne•..r Minister of Justice Interviewed, Beijing Re-
view, No. 42 (Oct. 19, 1979), at 3-4. 
255. Many of the guidelines for judicial personnel may be formu-
lated by judicial committees, the people's cour-t organ en-
trusted with such tasks as summing up experience in jufi-
cial work, discussing important and complicated cases and 
the application of relevant laws and decrees to them, and 
exchanging views on criminal cases not specifically defined 
in the criminal law. See qenerally "Renmin Ribao· Discusses 
Role of Judicial Committees," FB IS-CHI-80 -03 8 (Feb. 25, 
1980), at Ll7; "Shaanxi Judicial official Discusses Legal 
System," FBIS-cHI-81-119 (June 22, 1981), at Tl; "Justice 
Minister Views Judicial Administration," FBIS-cHI-82-149 
(Aug. 3, 1982), at Kl3. 
256. Article 43 of the 1978 PRC Constitution gave the procuracy 
the power to "ensure observance of the Constitution and the 
law," a power which was deleted from the 1982 Constitution, 
but which nevertheless exists impliedly in the Organic Pro-
curatorate Law. 
Procuratorial powers were apparently not successfully 
forged until the adoption of the 1979 Organic Procuratorate 
Law. As late as March 27, 1979 -- a full year after the 
adoption of the 1978 Constitution, the chief procurator of 
the Supreme People's Procuratorate, Huang Huoqing, was 
still calling for the rebuilding of procuratorial organs 
and the enlistment of a "good revolutionary contingent of 
procuratorial cadres." See "Huang Huoqing Article on Tasks 
of Procuratorial Work," FBIS-cHI-79-060 (March 27, 1979), 
at L7. See also "Zhejiang Chief Procurator in Democracy, 
Legal System:"fBIS-CHI-79-072 (April 12, 1979), at 06; 
"Heilongjiang Ribao Editorial Stresses Procuratorial Work," 
FBIS-cHI-79-071 (April 11, 1979), at 51; Hubei Rees-
tablishes People's Procuratorates,• FBIS-cHI-79-047 (March 
8, 1979), at Hl; "Guizhou Province Reestablishes People's 
Procuratorates," FBIS-CHI-79-043 (March 3, 1979), at J2; 
"Guangzi Reestablishes People's Procuratorates,• id., at 
H3; "Beijing Municipality Restores Procuratorial Organs," 
FBIS-cHI-79-042 (March 2, 1979), at Kl. 
257. See note 151 supra. Cf. "Guizhou Meeting Discusses Tasks 
of Procuratorates," FBIS-cHI-79-054 (March 19, 1979), at 
Ql. 
258. See Yegorov, supra note 168, at 128. Procuratorial duties 
include striking at counterrevolutionaries, punishing other 
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criminals, approving arrests ad suppressing treasonous ac-
tivities. ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAW, supra note 151, Art. 
4. See also "Henan Procuratorate Approves Arrest of Former 
Yiyang Official," FBIS-cHI-79-068 (April 6, 1979), at P2. 
259. Yegorov, supra note 168, at 128. See also "Chief Procura-
tor's Report to NPC Session," FBIS-CHI-81-244 (Dec. 21, 
1981), at K5; "People's Procuratorates Legal Achievements 
Cited," FBIS-CHI-81-014 (Jan. 22, 1981), at L20; "Pro-
curatorates Intensify Economic Crime Inspection," FBIS-CHI-
81-054 (!'larch 20, 1981), at L21; "National Conference of 
Chief Procurators Held," FBIS-CHI-81-205 (Oct. 23, 1981), 
at Kl; "Procuratorates Increase Work on Economic Cases," 
FBIS-cHI-80-170 (Aug. 29, 1980), at L9. 
260. There has been a number of instances of "rehabilitation" 
and retrials in the PRC although the exact role of the pro-
curacy in these processes is not clear. In some instances, 
the PRC rehabilitated (i.e., released and cleared of charg-
es) those who had allegedly been unjustly prosecuted before 
the capture of the Gang of Four. See, ~· "AFP: Govern-
ment Rehabilitates Prominent Dissident Writer," FBIS-CHI-
80-223 (Nov. 17, 1980), at L9 (rehabilitation of Hu Feng, 
who was imprisoned by Mao Zedong as a counterrevolution-
ary); "Nei Monggol Completes Reexamination of Criminal 
Cases," FBIS-CHI-80-230 (Nov. 26, 1980), at Rl; "Renmin 
Ribao on Redressing False, Wrong Cases," FBIS-CHI-81-002 
(Jan. 5, 1981), at Lll. 
These articles reported on the wholesale reexa~ination 
of criminal cases by "judicial departments" and "courts," 
in order to rehabilitate wrongly accused Chinese. In prac-
tice, it appeared that the CCP issued the order for 
rehabilitation and the courts simply adjusted their deci-
sions. In theory, there should have been some official 
procuratorial appeal to the courts to initiate the 
reexamination process, although this was not reported. 
There has also been a smattering of criminal retrials, 
allegedly because of some deficiency in the applicaton of 
the law. See, ~· "Liaoning Higher Court Annuls 
Municipal Court Decision,• FBIS-CHI-80-100 (May 21, 1980), 
at Sl; "Beijing Radio Praises Liaoning Procuratorate Deci-
sion," FBIS-cHI-80-101 (May 22, 1980), at 52. These arti-
cles reported on an assault and robbery of three people. 
The Liaoning Higher Court annulled the municipal intermedi-
ate people's court sentence of two years imposed on the 
defendant for his conviction on the single offense of rob-
bery. The Intermediate Court, on defendant's appeal, re-
versed the District People's Court's five-year sentence (on 
June 5, 1979). In February 1980, the Liaoning Provincial 
People's Procuratorate, pursuant to Art. 17 of the ORGANIC 
PROCURATORATE Law, supra note 151, and Art. 149 of the PRC 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, infra note 276, appealed to the 
Liaoning Provincial HigherPeople' s Court on the ground 
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that the sentence was too lenient. 
ried the case in April 1980, found 
multiple offenses, and sentenced 
imprisonment. 
The higher court ret-
the defendant guilty of 
him to seven years' 
~ also "Liaoning Retries Cultural Revolution 
Criminal," FBIS-cHI-82-168 (Aug. 30, 1982), at 04 (alle.ging 
mass demand for retrial of Jing Oechun, whose five year 
sentence was considered too light for his crimes); "Liao-
ning Resentences 'Archcriminal' to 20 Years," FBIS-CHI-82-
176 (Sept. 10, 1982), at 51 (resentencing Jing Dechun for 
murder, hooliganism, and gr~ft). In Jing's case, PRC legal 
theory would have dictated some form of procuratorial ap-
peal of the original sentence, perhaps based on new 
evidence garnered by procuratorial and public security or-
gans. The articles, however, are not specific n the role~ 
of these organs in the subsequent disposition of the case. 
But see "Supreme People's Court Overrules Shenyang 
Court--necision," FBIS-cHI-80-218 (Nov. 7, 1980), at L32. 
This appears to be the only publicized example of appellate 
remand as a result of too harsh a sentence. The Supreme 
People's Court overruled the Shenyang Intermediate Court's 
pronouncement of death on a charge of embezzlement, stating 
that the defendants were guilty of the lesser crime of 
theft, for which capital punishment should not issue. 
The procuratorial exercise of power in these instances 
indicates the degree of caution with which an arms inspec-
torate must approach this governmental body for requests of 
ruling modifications. Procuratorial power thus becomes a 
double-edged sword and can be used as readily by PRC au-
thorities to obstruct inspection operations as it can by an 
inspectorate to protest administrative and judicial 
interference. 
261. Yegorov, supra note 168, at 128. 
262. Huang Huoqing, chief procurator of the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate in 1979, was alleged to have disclosed at the 
11th meeting of the CCP Central Committee that procurator-
ates were not clear on the limits of their functions and 
power and that members of the CCP Central Committee did not 
have a good grasp of the law. The abruptness 9f the latter 
statement was probably one reason why the report of Hua's 
remarks did not surface in the PRC press, but, rathe,, ap-
peared in the Hong Kong Communist Press. ~ "Ming Pao on 
'Unsound' PRC Procuratorial System," FBIS-cHI-79-146 (July 
2 7, 19 7 9 ) , at Ul. 
263. Article 9 of the ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAW, supra note 151, 
declares: 
People's procuratorates shall exercise their procura-
torial authority independently in accordance with the 
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law and shall not be subject to interference by other 
administrative organs, organizations, or individuals. 
See also Article 133 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, 
supra----note 104. Articles calling for procuratorial in-
dependence include "Hubei Holds Conference of Chief Procu-
rators, Court Presidents," FBIS-cHI-79-179 (Sept. 13, 
1979), at P3; "Ye Jianying Discusses Revisions in Nation's 
Legal System," FBIS-CHI-79-032 (Feb. 14, 1979), at E4. See 
also notes 253-56 supra. Cf. "Renmin Ribao Praises Impar-
tial Procurator," FBIS-CHI-82-055 (March 22, 1982), at Kl9. 
Procuratorial integrity may be further undermined by 
the probability that many procurators are CCP members. 
Article 1 of the CCP Constitution, supra note 157, requires 
CCP members to "carry out Party decisions." Article 4 of 
the ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAW, supra note 151, calls for 
procuratorial independence. It is not difficult to envi-
sion the conflict that might arise when CCP cadres engaged 
in procuratorial work are confronted with Party directives 
which bear on procuratorial functions. Cf. "Tianjin Peo-
ple's Procuratorate Issues Rules for Cadre Conduct," FBIS-
CHI-79-185 (Sept. 21, 1979), at R4 (noting that duties in-
cluded: upholding the principle of equality before the 
law; refusing to accept bribes; guarding state and Party 
secrets; strengthening investigatory work; and, exercising 
procuratorial work independencly). 
264. See note 151, supra. 
265. See note 168, supra. 
266. Compare Ar tiel e 4 of the ORGANIC COURT LA\i, supra. note 151, 
which declares: "The people's courts exercise their judi-
cial authority independently and are only subordinated to 
the law." The Chinese press has also published reports 
calling for judicial independence. See, ~, "Supreme 
People's Court President on Judicial Organs," FBIS-CHI-80-
009 (Jan. 14, 1980), at Lll; "Hubei Holds Conference of 
Chief Procurators, Court Presidents," FBIS-CHI-79-179 
(Sept. 13, 1979), at P3; "Ye Jianying Discusses Revisions 
in Nation's Legal System," FBIS-cHI-79-032 (Feb. 14, 1979), 
at E4; "Heilongjiang Judge Discusses Strengthening of Judi-
cial System," FBIS-cHI-79-028 (Feb. 8, 1979), at L2. See 
also notes 253-56 supra. ---
267. See "Central Press Publishes NPC Regulations on Local Or-
ganizations: 'People's Mediation Committees' ,• FBIS-cHI-
80-017 (Jan. 24, 1980), at L6. See also note 189 supra. 
268. See also "Mediation Organs Reduce Civil Cases in Hunan 
Province," FBIS-cHI-78-156 (Aug. 11, 1978), at H2; "Media-
tors in Beijing Resolve Civil Disputes," FBIS-cHI-81-115 
(June 16, 1981), at R2 •. China's System of Community Media-
tion, Beijing Review, No. 47 (Nov. 23, 1981), at 23; Media-
tiOri resolves 1.4 million civil cases, China Daily, July 
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14, 1982, at 1; Five million mediators help solve civil 
~' China Daily, Aug. 25, 1982, at 1. 
269. Yegorov, supra not 168, at 128. PRC authorities are aware 
that volunteer judges cannot serve the same function as 
legally-trained ones and hence have made efforts to provide 
judicial instruction to large numbers of those involved in 
judicial procedure. ~, ~, "Tianjin Issues Rules of 
Discipline for Court Jurors,• FBIS-CHI-79-165 (Aug. 23, 
1979), at R2; "Beijing People's Courts Train Assessors," 
FBIS-cHI-79-141 (July 20, 1979), at Rl (noting that peo-
ple's assessors were being trained pursuant to Article 9 of 
the Organic Court Law); "Chinese Schools Training More Stu-
dents in Politics, Law," FBIS-CHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at 
Ll8; "Beijing Judicial Assistants," FBIS-CHI-79-051 (March 
14, 1979), at K2 (noting that judicial assistants were 
being assigned to people's communes in Beijing municipality 
to help with civil dispute9 and minor criminal violations); 
"Fuj ian Court Vice-President's Suggestions on Legal Sys-
tem," FBIS-cHI-79-009 (Jan. 12, 1979), at Gl (calling for 
the reestablishment of all judicial organs). 
270. "Two trials' actually means that the defendant is entitled 
to one appeal of right to the next highest court before 
judgment is final. See, ~· "Beijing Municipal Court 
Rejects Wei Jingsheng's Appeal," FBIS-CHI-79-217 (Nov. 7, 
1979), at Ll. 
271. Higher and intermediate people's courts have also set up 
"economic divisions" to handle "economic disputes." See 
"Beijing Wanbao Reports First 'Economic Trial' ,• FBIS-CHI-
80-125 (June 26, 1980), at Ll3 (factory claim for resti tu-
tion and punitive damages for delivery of faulty, obsolete 
machinery from supplier. The court rejected the claim but 
ordered the supplier to make the machinery suitable for its 
intended purpose). See also "More Economic Courts Es-
tablished to Settle Disputes," FBIS-cHI-80-133 (July 9, 
1980), at L6. 
272. See also 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 127. 
273. Since 1979, the Supreme People's Court has had original 
jurisdiction in 4 cases: A) the Gang of Four; B) a case 
involving a 3-star Chinese general; C) -a case involving an 
American air force pilot shot down over Manchuria; D) an 
unpublicized case. This information was imparted to the 
author by an anonymous PRC legal official. 
274. Legal interpretation has since been divided among a nmber 
of organs including the NPC Standing Committee, local 
standing committees, the State Council, the Supreme Peo-
ple's Procuratorate, and the Supreme People's Court. For 
an explanation of the interpretive jurisdiction of each, 
see "NPC Standing Committee Meetng Concludes 10 June: 
ReSolution on Law Interpretation," FBIS-cHI-81-112 (June 
11, 1981), at K3. See~ "Wang Harbin NPC Report on Law 
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Interpretation Cited," FBIS-cHI-81-118 (June 19, 1981), at 
Kl5. 
275. Actually, Article 13 requires Supreme Court approval for 
all death sentences, but legislative fiat has since 
modified this provision. For certain capital offenses, 
Higher People's Court approval is sufficient. This 
modification is designed to expedite punishment and is in 
effect until Dec. 31, 1983. See "NPC Standing Committee 
Meeting Concludes 10 June: Decisions on Death Sentences," 
FBIS-cHI-81-112 (June 11, 1981), at K4. 
276. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, Art. 129. The PRC Criminal 
Procedure Code was passed on July 1, 1979 at the Second 
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and entered 
into force on Jan. 1. 1980. See Gongan fagui huibian, su-
~ note 146, at 34-65. Th Eng ish text may be found in 
"Seven PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-
CHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979) PART II: Supp. No. 020. The 
effective date of the code was January 1, 1980. See also 
"Renmin Ribao Calls for Safeguarding Right of Appeal," 
FBIS-cHI-79-239 (Dec. 11, 1979), at L3. 
277. See, ~· note 260, supra. But see Article 136 of the PRC 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 276, whih stipulates 
that cases in which fact..Jal ambiguities exist are to be 
"returned for retrial to the . • court which originally 
heard the case" (Art. 136(3)). 
278. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 276, Art. 131. 
279. ORGANIC COURT LAW, suora note 151, Art. 29. A special 
court and special procuratorate were set up to try the Gang 
of Four. See "Late Report: Trial Arrangements Approved 
for Gang," FBIS-CHI-80-190 (Sept. 29, 1980), at L24. 
280. Yegorov, supra note 168, at 126. 
281. Pursuant to Article 41, "All cases in the People's Courts 
are heard in pub! ic except those involving special circum-
stances, as prescribed by law. " See also "Taichou 
People's Municipal Court Praises Public Trials;n-FBIS-CHI-
78-220 (Nov. 14, 1978), at E8; "Shanghai Resumes Open Court 
Hearings After 10 Years," FBIS-CHI-78-143 (July 25, 1978), 
at G5. 
282. Yegorov, supra note 168, at 129. 
283. Id. Cf. "Qinghai Ribao Urges Punishment of Policemen Who 
Beat:People," FBIS-cHI-80-188 (Sept. 25, 1980), at Tl. 
284. Both the 1978 and 1982 PRC Constitutions have circumscribed 
the official duties of pub! ic security bodies and passed 
some of their functions to the procuratorate. The 1982 PRC 
Constitution, however, does not detail procuratorial powers 
as specifically as its predecessor, the 1978 Constitution, 
- 119 -
other than noting that the procuratorate is a "state organ 
for supervising the law" (Art. 131). Impliedly, the 1982 
PRC Constitution may therefore have restored some of the 
previous powers of public security organs, although the 
Organic Procuratorate Law is still valid. 
285. Adopted at the sixth session of the Standing Committee of 
the Fifth NPC. The text may be found in "NPC Promulgates 
New Regulations on Arrests, Detentions: Text of Regula-
tions," FBIS-cHI-79-039 (Feb. 26, 1979), at E3 [hereafter 
Arrest Regulations]. 
286. Article 2 of the Arrest Regulations, id., precludes arrest 
"except by the decision of a people'S court or with the 
sanction of a people's procuratorate" (emphasis added). 
Article 4, para. 1, empowers public security organs to make 
arrests "as decided upon by a people's court or sanctioned 
by a people's procuratorate." However, Article 4, para. 2, 
notes that prior to an arrest by a public security organ, 
the "sanction of a people's procurator ate" must be ob-
tained. The language is somewhat ambiguous, inasmuch as 
Article 2 and Article 4, para. 1, use the disjunctive [or] 
to indicate the requirement of the approval of either the 
courts .2.! the procuratorates. Article 4, para. 2, on the 
other hand, appears to require procuratorial approval in 
all cases. 
In practice, it appears as if procuratorial approval 
is always sought before arrest. See "Peng Zhen Discusses 
Task of Public Security Organs," FBIS-CHI-79-147 (July 30, 
1979), at Ll. Strong support for exclusive procuratorial 
approval is implied by Article 47 of the PRC CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE CODE, supra note 276, which grants the people's pro-
curatorate the power "to approve arrest, not to approve 
arrest, or to request a supplementary investigation." 
287. Article 6 of the Arrest Regulations, supra note 285, reads: 
A public security organ may in an emergency detain, 
before it has obtained a warrant, any active criminal 
whose crime justified his arrest or who is suspected 
of having committed a major crime provided he is: 
1) A person who is preparing to commit a crime 
or is discovered immediately after committing 
a crime1 
2) A person who is identified as having commit-
ted a crime by the victim of the crime or by 
an eyewitness 1 
3) A person who is found to be carrying criminal 
evidence on his person or keeping criminal 
evidence at his home1 
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4) A person who is attempting to commit suicide 
or to escape, or who is in flight after 
having committed a crime; 
5) A person who destroys or fabricates evidence, 
or is suspected of being an accomplice in 
such acts; 
6) A person who carries no identification papers 
and is suspected of having committed major 
crimes here and there; 
7) A person who engages in beating, smashing, 
looting or (illegal confiscation ? : il-
legible Chinese-ed. note) or who is 
carrying out sabotage of work, production of 
social order. 
Article 6 is substantively ambiguous. The first paragraph 
permits detention of "any active criminal", while the 
remainder of the provision invites a different reading: 
that anyone who arouses suspicion is vulnerable to deten-
tion. A perusal of PRC press reports from 1978-1980 did 
not turn up any publicized stories of detentions made on 
the basis of aroused suspicion, but an explanation of the 
term "detention" in a 1979 article explaining criminal pro-
cedure terms refers to the possibility of detaining a per-
son "seriously suspected of a crime." See "Xinhua 
Publishes Explanation of Criminal Procedure Law Terms," 
FBIS-cHI-79-136 (July 13, 1979), at L2. 
288. See Article 6 of the Arrest Regulations, suora note 285. 
289. Public security organs detained an American student, teach-
ing in the PRC, for the alleged violation of Chinese secre-
cy laws relating to agriculture. The United States claimed 
that PRC public security organs violated a bilateral con-
sular agreement between the two countries in detaining her. 
See "American Expelled for 'Stealing China's Secrets'," 
FBIS-cHI-82-107 (June 3, 1982), at Bl. 
290. The PRC has no insurance system to cover instances of tort 
liabilty for harm to individuals. Thus, for example, in an 
accident involving two bicyclists in Beijing, a public 
security officer would fill out a report indicating whom he 
believed the tortfeasor to be. On this basis, the tortfea-
sor would be responsible for compensating the other injured 
party for medical bills, lost wages, etc. The tortfeasor 
would have no recourse to any judicial hearing prior to, or 
after this determination. 
In practice, though, compensation is often limited 
because of the indigence of the tortfeasor and his rela-
tives, who may also be required to make restitution. 
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This information was imparted to the author by an 
anonymous PRC legal official. 
291. See Yegorov, supra note 168, at 129. See generallv BUTTER-
FIELD, supra note 193, at 90-91, 334-35. 
292. See Renmin ribao, Oct. 21, 1978, cited in Yegorov, supra 
note 168, at 129. 
293. See also PRC ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAW, supra note 151, 
A r t • """'S(T) • 
294. Detention in the PRC is not limited to formal imprisonment. 
The Chinese employ a vast network of labor reform camps 
populated by thousands of prisoners, many of whom are 
political prisoners and many of whom have been sentenced 
without the benefit of formal legal process. The PRC em-
ploys two resocialization techniques: reeducation through 
labor and rehabilitation (reform) through labor. The lat-
ter requires no judicial proceedings before nor judicial 
review during assignment, which may be up to four years. 
For a startling account of labor camp conditions, see BAO 
RUE-WANG, PRISONER OF MAO (1976). See also Anmesty Inter-
national Report, Political Imprisolmnent in the People's 
Republic of China (1978). Comoare "Peng Chong Visits 
Reeducation-Through-Labor Farm ,• FBIS-CHI-81-192 (Oct. 5, 
1981), at K9; "Zhongguo Xinwen She on Visit to Beijing 
Prison," FBIS-cHI-81-204 (Oct. 22, 1981), at K6; "AFP Cor-
respondents Write on Visit to Beijing Prison," FBIS-CHI-80-
116 (June 13, 1980), at L4. 
Given the informality, inconsistency, and relative 
secrecy of labor reform camp pol icy, its application to 
inspectorate personnel is doubtful. 
295. PRC press articles calling for a strengthened socialist 
legal system abound. See, ~· Wren, China Moves to 
Resurrect A Credible Legai System, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 
1982, at Al; "Political, Legal Work in Modernization 
Urged ,• FBIS-cHI-82-150 (Aug. 4, 1982), at Kl; "Renmin 
Ribao Article on Developing Legal System," FBIS-CHI-81-215 
(Nov. 6, 1981), at K4; "Renmin Ribao on Democracy, Legal 
System," FBIS-cHI-81-202 (Oct. 20, 1981), at K7; "Renmin 
Ribao Carries More Excerpts of 'NPC Deputies' Speeches: 
Opinions on Strengthening Legal Work," FBIS-cHI-80-187 
(Sept. 24, 1980), at Ll4; "Huang Huoqing Addresses Con-
ference on Prosecuting Criminals," FBIS-cHI-80-131 (July 7, 
1980), at Ll3; "Renmin Ribao Discusses Stability, Legal 
System,• FBIS-cHI-80-018 (Jan. 25, 1980), at Ll3; "Hongqi 
Carries Peng Zhen Article on Socialist Legal System," FBIS-
CHI-79-229 (Nov. 27, 1979), at L2; "Guangming Ribao Ex-
plains Role of Law in Modernization,• FBIS-cHI-79-144 (July 
25, 1979), at L2; "Ye Jianying Discusses Revisions in Na-
tion's Legal System,• FBIS-cHI-79-032 (Feb. 14, 1979), at 
E4; n Fuij ian Court Notes Vice-President Is Suggestions on 
Legal System,• FBIS-cHI-79-009 (Jan. 12, 1979), at Gl; 
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"Peking Meeting Discusses Legal System, Democracy,w FBIS-
CHI-78-232 (Dec. 1, 1978), at E8; "Kwangming Daily Calls 
for Strengthening Legal System," FBIS-CHI-78-223 (Nov. 17, 
1978), at E8; "Wang Feng Favors Strengthened Legal System," 
FBIS-cHI-78-250 (Dec. 28, 1978), at M3. 
296. See, ~· Peking Fires Its First Submarine-Launched Mis-
sile, N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982, at Al5; "Further Coverage 
OT2o Sep Satellite Launched," FBIS-cHI-81-184 (Sept. 23, 
1981), at K2; "Wen Wei Po Editorial on Upcoming ICBM Test," 
FBIS-cHI-80-093 (May 12, 1980), at Ul; "Hua Guofeng Meets 
China-Japan Friendship Delegation: Kyodo Cities Hua on 
ICBM," FBIS-cHI-80-096 (May 15, 1980), at D2; wLi Xiannian 
Discusses ICBM Test at Wellington Press Conference," FBIS-
CHI-80-097 (May 16, 1980), at E2; "Xinhua Reports 'Success-
ful' Rocket Launch," FBIS-cHI-80-098 (May 19, 19809), at 
El; "Beijing Press Reports on Successful Missile Test: 
Jiefangjun Bao Commentary," FBIS-cHI-80-103 (May 27, 1980), 
at LB. 
In 1975, the PRC became the third nation to launch a 
reconnaisance satellite. See Leng, Arms Control and Disar-
mament in Chinese Global POlicy [hereafter Leng) in CHINA 
IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 164-86, 164 (Hsiung and Kim ed., 
1980) [hereafter HSIUNG AND KIM]. 
Through March 15, 1978, the PRC had conducted 20 
nuclear tests, the first of which was on Oct. 16, 1964. 
See "Satallite Launches, Nuclear Tests Listed," FBIS-CHI-
79-186 (Sept. 24, 1979), at L12. Leng reported that 25 
nuclear tests had been conducted by Dec. 14, 1978. See 
Leng, supra note 296, at 165. The PRC has also recently 
reported that it possesses nuclear-powered submarines. See 
Journal of Commerce, Sept. 29, 1380, at 9. --
297. After the 1980 ICBM test, a Wen Wei Po editorial reported 
that the ICBM test proved the Chinese could master advanced 
technology· and create a peaceful environment for its four 
modernizations. See "Ta Kung Pao on Launching of PRC 
Satellites," FBIS-cHI-81-189 (Sept. 30, 1981), at W4; "Wen 
Wei Po Editorial on Upcoming ICBM Test," FBIS-cHI-80-093 
(May 11, 1980), at Ul. 
298. See, ~· wHuang Hua Speaks at UN Disarmament Session,w 
FBIS-cHI-82-114 (June 14, 1982), at Al; wyu Peiwen Gives 
PRC Stand on Disarmament Issues,w FBIS-cHI-81-147 (July 31, 
1981), at Al; Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 32 (Aug. 5, 
1966), at 15 cited in Leng, Arms Control, in LENG AND CHIU, 
supra note 1,~5~ China's preoccupaton with the threat 
to peace posed by the Soviet Union's global hegemonism is 
frequently reported in the Chinese press and is often used 
to justify self-defense efforts of the PRC and other Second 
and Third World countries. See, ~· • Renmin Ribao Dis-
cusses U.S., USSR 'Nucleomania' ,• FBIS-cHI-82-195 (Oct. 7, 
1982), at Al; "Commentary Views USSR-U.S. Nuclear Talks,w 
FBIS-cHI-82-071. (April 13, 1982), "Renmin Ribao on Soviet 
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'Threat' to World Peace," FBIS-cHI-82-019 (Jan. 28, 1982), 
at Cl; "Jiefangjun Bao Says USSR Led PRC to Nuclear Arms," 
FBIS-cHI-81-145 (July 29, 1981), at Cl; "Xinhua Commentary 
on Soviet-SRV Plot Against PRC," FBIS-cHI-80-189 (Sept. 26, 
1980), at C3; "PRC Media Warns Against Soviet Worldwide 
Hegemonism ," FBIS-cHI-80-165 (Aug. 22, 1980), at C2; "Wen 
Wei Po Reports on Soviet Threat on Chinese Border," FBIS-
CHI-80-154 (Aug. 7, 1980), at U6; "Xinhua Comments on 
Soviet Military Threat in S.E. Asia," FBIS-CHI-80-151 (Aug. 
4, 1980), at Cl; "Soviet Expansionism Must be Stopped to 
Prevent World War," FBIS-CHI-80-140 (July 18, 1980), at Cl; 
"Hongqi: Soviet Economy Geared for War," FBIS-CHI-80-139 
(July 17, 1980), at Cl; "Renmin Ribao on Soviet 'Peace Of-
fensive' Against Norway," FBIS-cHI-80-064 (April 1, 1980), 
at C2; "Renmin Ribao Quotes Xinhua on Soviet Threat to 
South Asia," FBIS-cHI-80-035 (Feb. 20, 1980), at Cl; "Ren-
min Ribao on Soviet Partial Withdrawal," id., at C2; "Xin-
hua Correspondent on Increasing Soviet Threat," id., at C3. 
299. The most direct exception is the recent PRC accession to 
the UN Weapons Convention, supra note 238. 
The PRC has also acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
for the prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare on Julv 13, 1952. See JOHNSTON liND CHIU, suora 
note 64, at 275: -- ---
The Chinese ambassador to Mexico signed Additioal Pro-
tocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) on Aug. 21, 
1973. On April 23, 1974, the PRC ratified Additional Pro-
tocol II and delivered the instrument of ratification to 
Mexico, the depository for the Treaty, on June 11, 1974. 
See U.N. DOC. A/9718 (Sept. 4, 1974); U.N. DOC. A/9209 
(Oct. 9, 1973), at 2. See also PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, 
supra note 27, at 216. -- ---
The Chinese also signed Additioal Protocol II to the 
Treaty of February 14, 1967 for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons on Aug. 21, 1973. See PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, 
supra note 27, at 214. 
300. On Jan. 21, 1960, the NPC Standing Committee asserted that: 
China has always favored universal disarmament and 
will unhesitatingly commit herself to international 
obligations to which she agrees. However, it must be 
pointed out that any international agreement concern-
ing disarmament, without the formal participation and 
the signature of her delegate, cannot, of course, have 
any binding force on China. Beijing (Peking) Review, 
No. 4 (Jan. 26, 1960), at 14 cited in LENG ArlO CHIU, 
supra note 1, at 248. ---
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301. See Leng, supra note 296, at 166; LENG AND CHIU, supra note 
1, at 249. 
302. The Chinese have characterized the superpower nuclear mo-
nopoly as an attempt to keep "the spear [while not allow-
ing] others to have the shield." See "People's Daily on 
US-USSR Controversy Over Neutron Bomb," FBIS-cHI-78-080 
(April 25, 1978), at Al. See also L. LIU, CHINA AS A 
NUCLEAR POWER IN WORLD POLITICS--r5"-26 ( 1972); LENG AND 
CHIU, supra note 1, at 246-50; KIM, supra note 20, at 172; 
U.N. DOC. A/8536 (Nov. 24, 1971), at 3; "U.S., USSR Nuclear 
Disarmament Roles Discussed," FBIS-CHI-82-188 (Sept. 28, 
1982), at Al (condemning a comprehensive nuclear test ban 
as an effort to help the superpowers consolidate their 
nuclear superiority); "PRC UN Representative Condemns 
Superpowers' Arms Race," FBIS-CHI-78-208 (Oct. 26, 1978), 
at Al (arms control negotiations were a fraud designed to 
maintain the superpower nuclear monopoly); "Huang Hua to 
Attend UN Disarmament Meeting," FBIS-CHI-78-093 (May 12, 
1978), at Al (PRC continued to oppose exclusive possession 
of nuclear weapons by superpowers); "US-USSR Interest in 
Test Ban Talks Revived," FBIS-CHI-77-246 (Dec. 22, 1977), 
at Al (comprehensive test ban treaty precluded other na-
tions from conducting nuclear tests). 
As late as mid-1980, the PRC exhorted Third World 
countries to break the superpower nuclear monopoly. S.:e 
"PRC UN Official Addresses Disarmament Committee ,• FBIS-
CHI-80-095 (May 14, 1980), at A6. 
303. During the late 1950s, the Soviet Union began to modify its 
previous support for total nuclear disarmament in favor of 
1 im i ted nuclear arms control. The Soviets proposed, for 
instance, nuclear free zones in Germany ( 1956) and in the 
Middle East (1958). See Leng, supra note 296, at 166. 
In the context of the developing Sino-Soviet rift, the 
PRC moved away from its support of Soviet arms control pro-
posals and asserted its own position, calling for the "con-
crete, thorough, total, and resolute prohibition and 
destruction" of nuclear weapons. Peking (Beijing) Review, 
No. 31 (Aug. 2, 1963), at 8. See also People of the World, 
United for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Pro-
hibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (printed by the 
Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1963); A. YODER, CHINESE 
POLICIES TOWARD LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 22 (1980); Verba-
tim Record of the 27th Meeting of the First Committee, U.N. 
DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.27, at 13 (Nov. 4, 1980) (statement of Mr. 
Wu Zhen); Verbatim Record of the lOth Meeting of the First 
Committee, U.N. DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.l09, at 26 (Oct. 22, 1980) 
(statement of Mr. ·Lai Yali); Speech by the Chairman of the 
Chinese Delegation at the First Substantive Session of the 
UN Disarmament Commission, PRC Press Release (May 15, 1979) 
(Annex); "Ji Pengfei Reiterates PRC Nuclear Policy,·" FBIS-
CHI-82-091 (May 11, 1982), at A2; "PRC Delegate Addresses 
Geneva Disarmament Conference," FBIS-cHI-80-025 (Feb. 5_, 
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1980), at Al; "PRC Representative Speaks on Disarmament at 
UN Meeting ,• FBIS-cHI-79-210 (Oct. 29, 1979), at Al; "Lai 
Yali Scores Superpowers at Disarmament Session End," FBIS-
CHI-79-113 (June 11, 1979), at AS; "PRC Delegate Speaks on 
Nuclear We a pons in La tin America," FB IS-cHI -7 9-0 85 (May 1, 
1979); at Jl; "PRC Delegate· to UN Addresses Disarmement 
Issue," FBIS-cHI-78-223 (Nov. 17, 1978), at Al; "Chen Chu 
Submits Paper," FBIS-CHI-78-112 (June 9, 1978), at A2; 
"Huang Hua Speech," FBIS-CHI-78-104 .(May 30, 1978), at A3; 
"Chinese Representative Reiterates China's Principal Stand 
on Disarmament at UN First Committee," SCMP no. 6238 
(Dec. 13, 1976), at 39; "Chinese Delegate Exposes Soviet 
'Disarmament' Fraud," SCMP no. 5981 (Nov. 24, 1975), at 29. 
304. The exclusion of any plan to eliminate conventional forces 
was based largely on the Mao Zedong concept of the atom 
bomb as a "paper tiger." In accordance with Mao's teach-
ings, the atom bomb and other nuclear weapons would not 
play the decisive role in war: such weapons were useful 
from a tactical standpoint only and not from a strategic 
one. Rather, the "people's war [was] a hundred and a thou-
sand times stronger than the power of atomic 
weapons." See "The Atom Bomb is a Paper Tiger" SCMP no. 
6382 (July 18, 1977), at 9. See also "Atom Bombs Are Also 
Paper Tigers,• SCMP no. 6367 (June2"4: 1977), at 178; Leng, 
Arms Control, in LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 246-47; 
Powell, Gr~at Powers and Atomic Borobs are 'Paper Tigers', 
23 CHINA Q. 55, 55-63 (July Sept. 1965); Leng, ~ note 
296, at 165. 
Mao considered bombs important for sel £-defense pur-
poses. To a large degree, contemporary Chinese leaders 
have incorporated this philosophy into their justifications 
for modernizing and upgrading their weapons capability so 
as to assure themselves of a peaceful environment for pur-
suit of the four modernizations. However, current PRC 
policy has modified somewhat the earlier military philoso-
phy of Mao. In its drive towards modernization, the PRC 
has recognized the need for parity of manpower, economic 
strength and weapons development. As such, the Chinese 
have begun to mode·rnize their weapons system through such 
actions as the improvement of nuclear delivery systems and 
the purchase of up-to-date conventional weapons from En-
giand, West germany, France, the United States and other 
Western nations. See Godwin, China and the Second World: 
The Search for Defense Technology, 2 CONTEP. CHINA 1, 3-9 
(Fall, 1978); Leng, supra note 296, at 175. See also 
COPPER, supra note 186, at 39 (noting that the PRC does not 
possess abundant quantifies of any of the critical metals 
used in weapons production or high-technology industry). 
Cf. Wren, U.S. to Raise Technological Level of Products the 
Chinese Can Buy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1982, at Al; u.s. and 
China Forging Closer Ties; Critics Fear That Pace is Too 
Swift, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1980, at Al. 
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The importance of military modernization has produced 
some conflict among the upper crust of Chinese leadership 
as to the "pace of [military] modernization and its assign-
ment priority as compared to that of the other three compo-
nents of the modernization drive (agriculture, industry, 
and science and technology)," Leng, supra note 296, at 
175. Michael Kau of Brown University recently remarked 
that competition between military and civilian sectors in 
the PRC for the allocation of resources is probably rather 
keen. M. Kau, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Meeting of the 
American Association for Chinese Studies and the 5th Annual 
Meeting of the Asian American Assumbly for Policy Research 
(Charlottesville, Va., Nov. 15-16 (1980)). 
Just prior to the 1979 war with Vietnam, Chinese pro-
nouncements had deemphasized the importance of military 
modernization vis-a-vis the other three modernizations. 
Leng, supra note 296, at 176. Leng points out rather accu-
rately that the 1979 military encounter with Vietnam "ex-
posed some weaknesses of the PLA in equipment and tech-
niques" and compelled the PRC to channel a larger share of 
its available resources into military modernization. l£. 
Increases in PRC military expenditures take on an even 
greater significance when viewed in light of the concommi-
tant Chi!'lese announcement to slow down economic·· growth, cut 
back on or cancel fore·ign commercial contacts and reevalu-
ate modernization plans. See Report on the t~ork of the 
Government, Beijing Review, No. 27 (July 6, 1979), at 9-20 
(statement of Hua Guofeng at the 2nd Session of the Fifth 
NPC). 
At least one author has surmised that the rehabilita-
tion of Deng X.iaoping and a close political compatriot, 
Defense Minister ~eh, in 1977, Hua Guofeng's rise to power 
after Mao's death, and the arrest of the Gang of four 
(which had been· accused of opposing military modernization) 
implied increased support for modernization programs for 
both conventional and nuclear weapons. See YODER, supra 
note 3 0 3 , at 19 • 
305. Chiao Juan-hua Explains Chinese Government's Principle 
[sic] Stand, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 49 (Dec. 3, 
1971), at 14-16 cited in Leng, supra note 296, at 169. 
306. Leng, supra note 296, at 169. Samuel Kim found that the 
most optimistic note in China's arms control and disarma-
ment policy is the PRC's "firm, positive, and unequivocal 
support for the establishmen~ of nuclear free zones around 
the globe." KIM, supra note 20, at 172. 
307. A Dec. 22, 1974 Renmin ribao editorial, in denouncing the 
1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, modified the PRC's previous 
support for nuclear free zones -- a concept first preferred 
on July 31, 1963. The editorial asserted that "unless pre-
ceded by a 'no-first-use' agreement, the establishment of 
- 127 -
such zones would only bind the 1 hand and foot 1 of non-
nuclear countries while leaving the nuclear powers to con-
tinue production, stockpiling or even the use of nuclear 
weapons." Leng, suora note 296, at 167. 
308. See, ~·· "PRC Reiterates Arms Control Formula at Geneva," 
FBIS-cHI-82-152 (Aug. 6, 1982), at Al; "Text of PRC Pro-
posal at UN Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-127 (July 1, 
1982), at Al; "Huang Hua Speaks at UN Disarmament Session," 
FBIS-cHI-82-114 (June 14, 1982), at Al; "PRC Addresses 
Geneva Committee on Disarmament," FBIS-CHI-82-044 (March 5, 
1982), at Al; "Yu Peiwen Addresses Disarmament. Meeting in 
Geneva," FBIS-cHI-81-150 (Aug. 5, 1981), at Al; "PRC UN 
Official Addresses Disarmement Committee," FBIS-CHI-80-095. 
(May 14, 1980), at A6; "PRC Delegate Addresses Geneva Dis-
armament Conference," FBIS-CHI-80-025 (Feb. 5, 1980), at 
Al; "PRC Representative Speaks on Disarmament at UN Meet-
ing." FBIS-cHI-79-210 (Oct. 29, 1979), at Al; "Lai Yali 
Scores Superpowers at Disarmament Session End, 1 FBIS-CHI-
79-113 (June 11, 1979), at A8; Speech by the Chairman of 
the Chinese Delegation at the First Substantive Ses•ion of 
the UN. Disarmament Commission, PRC Press Release (may 15, 
1979 (Annex), reprinted in Beijing Review, No. 22 (June 1, 
1979), at 17-19. 
For a good review of the development of the PRC 1 s dis-
armament policy,~ Leng, supra note 296, at 165-72. 
309. The PRC voted ~gainst three 1971 draft resolutions calling 
for an end to nuclear testing, a 1972 Soviet resolution 
1 inking the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to 
the non-use of force, a 1974 Soviet resolution calling for 
a ten perce.nt reduction of the military budgets and the 
permanent members of the Security Council, three 1974 
resolutions concerning SALT talks, nuclear test bans and 
nuclear non-proliferation, and a number of 1976-77 resolu-
tions at the Thirty-first and Thirty-second General Assem-
bly Sessions on Arms Control and Disarmament. See Leng, 
supra note 296, at 169 and accompanying notes. --- · 
Moreover, China has argued against UN involvement in 
disarmament matters, not because of the lack of an ap-
propr iate international forum but because of "the lack of . 
will for genuine disarmament on the part of the super-
powers." See U.N. DOC. A/C.l/31/PV.50 (Dec. 2, 1976), at 
6; "Chinese-Representative Reiterates China 1·S Principal 
Stand on Disarmament at UN First Committee," SCMP no. 6238 
(Dec •. 13, 1976), at 39; KIM, supra note 20, at 172. 
The PRC refused to participate in the 35-member Spe-
cial Comittee of the World Disarmament Conference, although 
the Chinese voted for the Committee's establishment. Leng, 
supra note 296, at 171-72. 
310. Leng, supra note 296, at 169. 
- 128 -
311. The PRC frequently justifiea its nuclear tests on the basis 
of maintaining sufficient self-defense capability and 
breaking the superpower nuclear monopoly. See, ~·· 
"Details of China's First Nuclear Test Revealed," FBIS-CHI-
81-148 (Aug. 3, 1981), at W3; "Successful Nuclear Test Con-
ducted 15 March," FBIS-CHI-78-053 (March 17, 1978), at El; 
"China Conducts Another Nuclear Test," SCMP no. 6431 (Sept. 
27, 1977), at 81; "Press Communique: China Successfully 
Conducts New Hydrogen Test,• SCMP no. 65227 (Nov. 26, 
1976), at 203; "China Successfully Conducts Another Under-
ground Nuclear Test," SCMP no. 6208 (Oct. 28, 1976), at 
150; "China Successfully Conducts Another Underground 
Nuclear Test,• SCMP no. 5971 (Nov. 10, 1975), at 14. See 
also note 296 supra. --
312. Articles stressing the danger of a new world war, with par-
ticular emphasis on the Soviet Union as the most dangerous 
source of war, abound in the PRC. See, ~·· "Renmin Ribao 
on Soviet 'Threat' to World Peace," FBIS-cHI-82-019 (Jan. 
28, 1982), at Cl; "Renmin Ribao Looks Toward International 
Situation in 1980s," FBIS-cHI-80-013 (Jan. 18, 1980), at 
A2; "Hongqi Commentator on Detente, Danger of War ,• FBIS-
CHI-79-229 (Nov. 27, 1979), at Al; "Renmin Ribao on In-
creasing Danger of Nuclear war ,• FBIS-cHI-79-140 (July 19, 
1979), at Al; "US-USSR Balance of Terror Theory Viewed as 
Erroneous," FBIS-CHI-78-071 (April 12, 1978), at Al; "Com-
mentary Says World War Can be Delayed But Not Avoided," 
FBIS-CHI-78-057 (March 23, 1978), at Al; "Jenmin Jihpao 
Article: Blindness Through Gains Dooms All Reactionaries," 
SCMP no. 6353 (June 3, 1977), at 181; "Commentary by Hsin-
hua Correspondent: Soviet Social-Imperialism--Most Dan-
gerous Source of War ,• SCMP no. 5820 (March 27, 1975), at 
185. 
Chinese attitudes on war and 
above undoubtedly increase the 
secrecy regulations and make 
difficult. 
civilian defense as noted 
prevalence of internal 
inspectorate work more 
313. See,~·· "U.S., USSR START Talks Recess: No Progress 
Seen,• FBIS-cHI-82-157 (Aug. 13,_1982), at Al; "China Daily 
Looks at U.S. - Soviet Arms Talks ,• FBIS-CHI-82-134 (July 
13, 1982), at Al (reviewing superpower "tactics• at START 
talks); "U.S.-USSR Arms Talks Disputes Termed 'Certain' ,• 
FBIS-cHI-82-128 (July 2, 1982), at Al; "Renmin Ribao Views 
Soviet-u.s. Arms Race, Talks,• FBIS-cHI-82-107 (June 3, 
1982), at Al; "Prospects of USSR-u.s. Disarmament Talks 
'Gloomy' ,• FBIS-cHI-82-104 (May 28, 1982), at Al; "U.S~, 
Soviet Disarmament Proposals Said 'Tricks' ,• FBIS-CHI-82-
095 (May 17, 1982), at Al; •u.s.-soviet Arms Negotiations 
Termed Farce,• FBIS-cHI-82-047 (March 10, 1982), at Al; 
"U.S.-USSR Geneva Talks To Be Fruitless," FBIS-cHI-82-008 
(Jan. 13, 1982), at Al; "Pinning Hopes on U.S.-USSR Talks 
'Dangerous' ,• FBIS-cHI-81-226 (Nov. 24, 1981), at Al; 
•u.s.-soviet Disarmament Talks, Prospects Reviewed," FBIS-
CHI-78-046 (March 8, 1978), at AS. 
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314. The phrase translates as "a wind sweeping through a tower 
heralds a rainstorm." It has appeared in PRC press reports 
in connection with mounting opposition to imperialism, 
colonialism, and hegemony from Third World Countries. It 
has also been less than accurately translated in these re-
ports as "the wind sweeping through the tower heralds a 
rising storm in the mountains." See, ~., "Third World--
Motive Force of History," SCMP no. 5725 (Nov. 4, 1974), at 
52. 
315. This proverb was usually used to indicate that the super-
powers had already passed the apex of their pow.er and were 
no longer capable of controlling the fate of the interna-
tional community. In press reports, it has been translated 
as "flowers fall off, do what one may." .The phrase was 
particularly prevalent in the period from 1974-77. See, 
~·· "An Chih-yuan Addresses UN First Committee," SCMP no. 
5737 (Nov. 20, 1974), at 158; "gen-min Jih-pao Article: 
Flowers Fall Off, Do What One May," SCMP no. 5713 (Oct 10, 
1974), at 229. 
316. This phrase was often employed to describe the task of 
Third World countries in fending off American and Soviet 
competing interests. It has been translated in PRC press 
reports as "letting the tiger in through the back door· 
while repelling the wolf through the front gate," though 
this is technically inaccurate. 
317. See "Second UN Special Disarmament Session Viewed," FBIS-
CHI-82-111 (June 9, 1982), at Al (noting, inter alia, that 
disarmament· cannot be divorced from the international 
situation). 
318. See Leng, supra note 296, at 166-67. See also "Huang Hua 
Speaks at UN Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-114 (June 
14, 1982), at Al; "Huang Hua Speech," FBIS-CHI-78-104 (May 
30, 1978), at A3 (denouncing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
and Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as unacceptable because 
they preserve the nuclear monopoly); "US-USSR Interest in 
Test Ban Talks Revived," FBIS-CHI-77-246 (Dec. 22, 1977), 
at Al. The Chinese also noted that "the British-American-
Soviet tripartite 'partial nuclear test ban treaty'" of 
1963 had not halted the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
nor the improvement in their quality. In addition, the 
Soviet army had grown, superpower warship tonnage had 
doubled and military expenditures had increased. See "Co,m-
mentary by Hsinhua Correspondent: After Signing Tripartite 
Treaty," SCMP no. 6014 (Jan. 14, 1976), at 135. Cf. YODER, 
supra note 303, at 12. 
319. COPPER, supra note 186, at 13. 
320. Id. Such Chinese reasoning has perpetuated the military 
doctrine of a people's war strategy, for even a nuclear 
strike directed at the PRC would not annihilate the Chi-
nese, who would, in turn, be prepared to resist subsequent 
- 130 -
invasion efforts. China's preparation for a nuclear was is 
also illustrated by Mao's philosophy of "dig tunnels deep, 
store grain everywhere," a concept that has prompted a num-
ber of Chinese civil defense efforts. See Middleton, Vast 
Array of Air-Raid Shelters tunnel Underl:hina's Main ~ 
ies, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1976, p. Al, 8, col. 1; Pollack, 
supra note 180, at 25-27. See also Coon, Defense Priori-
ties in Post-Mao Peking, 8 PARAMETERS 13, 17-19 (No. 4, 
1977); Kux, supra note 188, at 107-08. "AFP: Beijing 
Takes Nuclear-;--chemical Warfare Precautions" FBIS-CHI-80-
063 (March 31, 1980), at Ll3 (Beijing authorities launched 
a "mobilization and training campaign" to prepare residents 
for a nuclear or chemical attack); "Peking Municipality 
Building Underground Shelters," FBIS-CHI-78-213 (Nov. 2, 
1978), at K2; "Chairman Mao's Guildeline on War-- Su Yu's 
Article: Great Victory of Chairman 11ao' s Guideline on 
War," SCMP no. 6403 (Aug. 16, 1977), at 59 (China must be 
prepared against war and much dig tunnels deep and store 
grain everywhere); "Foreign Minister Chao Juan-hua Speaks 
of International Situation at. Dinner for James R. 
Schlesinger," SCMP no 6180 (Sept. 16, 1976), at 219 (dig 
tunnels deep, store grain everywhere). 
321. COPPER, supra note 186, at 15. 
322. Leng, suora note 296, at 168. See also "U.S., USSR Nuclear 
Disarmament Roles Discussed," FBIS-CHI-82-188 (Sept. 28, 
1982), at Al; "UN Disarmament Session Ends, Viewed as 
Failure," FBIS-CHI-82-1135 (July 14, 1982), at Al; "China 
Daily Looks at u.s.-soviet Arms Talks," FBIS-CHI-82-134 
(July 13, 1982), at Al; "Renmin Ribao Views Nuclear Disar-
mament Proposals," FBIS-CHI-82-108 (June 7, 1982), at Al; 
"Renmin Ribao Reviews US-Soviet Disarmament Talks," FBIS-
CHI-79-100 (May 22, 1979), at Al; "Commentary Scores Super-
powrs' Obstruction of Disarmament,·" FBIS-CHI-78-123 (June 
26, 1978), at Al; "People's Daily Comments on Arms Race, 
Disarmament," FBIS-cHI-78-108 (June 5, 1978), at A2; "U.S.-
USSR SALT Talks Used to Gain Military Advantages," FBis-
CHI-78-035 (Feb. 21, 1978), at A2; "People's Daily on us.-
Soviet Negotiations," FBIS-CHI-78-007 (Jan. 11, 1978), at 
Al; •u.s.-soviet Troop Talks Labelled 'A Fraud,'" FBIS-CHI-
77-243 (Dec. 19, 1977), at Al; "Peking Raps Fraudulent Arms 
Limitation Talks," FBIS-CHI-77-200 (Oct. 17, 1977), at Al; 
"Commentary by Hsinhua Correspondent: 'Typical Example of 
Saying One Thing and Doing Another,'" SCMP no. 6344 (Dec. 
21, 1976), at 86; "New Soviet Trickery in Vienna Talks," 
SCMP no. 5805 (March 6, 1975), at 154. 
323. Liebe, China and the Global Balance of Power: A Political 
Solution of the Nuclear Predicament, 12 PEACE RESEARCH 7, 7 
(No. 1, Jan. 1980). See also "U.S., Soviet Space Arms Race 
Criticized," FBIS-CHI-82-134 (July 13, 1982), at Al; "Media 
Discuss U.S.-USSR Nuclear Arms Talks," FBIS-CHI-81-228 
(Nov. 27, 1981), at Al; "SALT II Ends: New Phase of Arms 
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Race Begins,• FBIS-cHI-79-109 (June 5, 1979), at All 
•Peking Assesses Status of Current SALT TAlks," FBis-CHI-
78-212 (Nov. 1, 1978), at All "U.S.-USSR SALT Talks Used to 
Gain Military Advantages,• FBIS-cHI-78-035 (Feb. 21, 1978), 
at A21 "People's Daily Article Discusses SALT Issues,• 
FBIS-CHI-77-237 (Dec. 9, 1977), at All "Jenmin Jihpao Arti-
cle: 'Limitation" of Nuclear Weapons or Contention for 
Nuclear Superiority?", SCMP no. 5769 (Jan. 9, 1975), at 
157. 
324. See, ~·· "SALT II Ends: New Phase of Arms Race Begins,• 
FBIS-CHI-79-109 (June 5, 1979), at All "Xinhua Reviews Dra-
ma of SALT Negotiations," FBIS-cHI-79-094 (May 14, 1979), 
at All "Peking Assesses Status of Current SALT TAlks,• 
FBIS-cHI-78-212 (Nov. 1, 1978), at All "USSR Begins Deploy-
ment of New Land-Based ICBM," FBIS-cHI-78-039 (Feb. 27, 
1978), at A41 "U.S.-USSR SALT Talks Used to Gain Military 
Advantages," FBIS-cHI-78-035 (Feb. 21, 1978), at A21 "Jen-
min Jihpao Article: 'Limitation' of Nuclear Weapons;-ci[ 
Contention for Nuclear Superiority?", SCMP no. 5769 (Jan. 
9, 1975), at 157. See also Blechman, Do Negotiated Arms 
Limitations Have a Future?, 50 FOR. AFF. 102, 106-12 (F~ll 
1980). 
325. Pollack, supra note 180, at 22. The unremittingly hostile 
pictures painted by PRC press releases on Soviet intentions 
and behavior are paralleled by press releases depicting the 
United States as a declining power. The shift in thinking 
has required some degree of reorientation of Chinese de-
fense policies and Chinese statements responding to the 
manifold forms of Soviet power. Id., at 22-23. See also 
"Renmin Ribao on Soviet 'Threat' toWorld Peace," FBIS-CHI-
82-019 (Jan. 28, 1982), at Cl1 "UN Delegates Criticize USSR 
Afghan Presence: Ling Oing Address," FBIS-CHI-81-222 
(Nov. 18, 1981), at All "PRC Media Warns Against Soviet 
Worldwide Hegemonism: 'Threat' in Indian Ocean,• FBIS-CHI-
80-165 (Aug. 22, 1980), at C21 "Efforts to Conquer Afghani-
stan,• id., at C31 "Aggression: Czechoslovakia to Afghani-
stan,• id., at C41 "Policy of 'Offensive Detente,'" id., at 
C71 "'Slanders' in Africa, Middle East,• id., at Cl01 "Wen 
Wei Po Reports on Soviet Threat on Chinese Border ,• FBIS-
CHI-80-154 (Aug. 7, 1980), at U61 "Soviet Expansionism Must 
be Stoped to ·Prevent World War," FBIS-cHI-80-140 (July 18, 
1980), at Cl1 "Xinhua Says Vietnamese, Soviets Threaten 
Southeast Asia,• FBIS-cHI-80-097 (May 16, 1980), at Ell 
"Renmin Ribao Quotes Xinhua on Soviet Threat to South 
Asia," FBIS-cHI-80-035 (Feb. 20, 1980), at Cl1 "Xinhua Cor-
respondent on Increasing Soviet Threat,• id., at C3, "Ren-
min Ribao: Soviet Invasion of 'Utmost Gravity,'" FBIS-cHI-
80-001 (J~n. Z, 1980), at C4 (Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan violates UN Charter)l Beijing Radio Discusses War 
Danger, Superpower Contention,• FBIS-cHI-79-245 (Dec. 19, 
1979), at All "PRC UN Delegate Denounces Soviet 
Hegemonism,• FBIS-cHI-79-234 (Dec. 4, 1979), at All "PRC 
Presents Draft Resolution on Hegemonism to UN,• FBIS-cHI-
79-215 (Nov. 5, 1979), at Al (all· states were urged to 
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cease their hegemonic policies and to halt infiltration, 
interference, '.lggression and subversion); "PRC UN Delegate 
Speaks on Social Imperialsm," FBIS-CHI-79-207 (Oct. 24, 
1979), at Al; "Commentary: Dance Atop Volcanoes,• SCMP no. 
6256 (Jan. 11, 1977), '.It 117 (popular Soviet Resentment 
'"ill bury the Soviet military machine); "Commentary by 
Hsinhua Correspondent: New Tsars' Military Exercises,• 
SCMP no. 6129 (July 6, 1976), at 44. See generally, 
Garner, SALT II: China's Advice and Dissent, 19 ASIAN SUR-
VEY 12 2 4 (No • 12 , Dec • 19 7 9 ) • 
326. See Pollack, supra note 180, at 23. See also "Chairman 
Mao's Great Strategic Concept -- About Differentiating the 
Three Worlds," SCMP no. 6416 (Sept. 6, 1977), at 1. 
327. Mathew, China Offers to Monitor SALT Date, Washington Post, 
April 20, 1979, at Al. "PRC Refuses Comment on U.S. Radar 
Stations," FBIS-CHI-81-118 (June 19, 1981), at Kl; "Kyodo: 
U.S. Sets Up Military Base in PRC," FBIS-CHI-82-002 (Jan. 
5,1982), at Bl; "AFP: PRC Refuses Comment on Report of 
U.S. Base," FBIS-CHI-82-003 (Jan. 6, 1982), at Bl. 
328. See "U.S., USSR Nuclear Disarmament Roles Discussed," FBIS-
CHI-82-188 (Sept. 28, 1982), at Al; "Huang Hua Speech," 
FBIS-CHI-78-104 (May 30, 1978), at A3; Leng, supra note 
296, at 178-79; Verbatim Record of the 27th Meeting of the 
UN ~irst Committee, U.N. DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.27, at 13 (Nov. 
5, 1980) (statement of Mr. Wu Zhen). See also, "U.S.-USSR 
Interest in Test Ban Talks Revived," FBIS-CHI-77-246 (Dec. 
22, 1977), at Al. 
329. See "Commentary: At Loggerheads Yet Dreaming the Same,• 
SCMP no. 6321 (April 18, 1977), at 52. 
3 30. See id. See also "Renmin Ribao Views Nuclear Disarmament 
Proposals;r-FBIS-CHI-82-109 (June 7, 1982); at Al; "Commen-
tary Views USSR-U.S. Nuclear Talks,• FBIS-CHI-82-071 (April 
13, 1982), at Al. 
331. See Leng, supra note 296, at 179. 
332. See, ~., "Peking Raps Fraudulent Arms Limitation Talks," 
FBIS-CHI-77-200 (Oct. 17, 1977), at Al; "UN Disarmament 
Session Ends, Viewed as Failure," FBIS-cHI-82-135 (July 14, 
1982), at Al. 
333. See "PRC Delegation Attends UN Disarmament Confe.rence," 
FBIS-cHI-79-178 (Sept. 11, 1979), at A4. 
334. See "Huang Hua Speech," FBIS-cHI-78-104 (May 30, 1978), at 
A3; Verbatim Record of the lOth Meeting of the First Com-
mittee, U.N. DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.lO, at 21 (Oct. 22, 1980) 
(statement of Mr.Lai Yali); "Renmin Ribao Discusses UN Dis-
armament Sessions," FBIS-CHI-82-130 (July 7, 1982), at Al. 
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Leng also cites to a Chinese proverb used to 
illustrate the unfair restrictions of the superpowers 
Zhun zhouquan fanghuo buzhun baix inq d iandenq (The mag is-
trates are allowed to set fires, while the common people 
are forbidden even to light lamps.) Translation by author. 
See speech by Shiao Juan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of 
the PRC at the Plenary Meeting of the 27th Session of the 
UN General Assembly (1972) cited in Leng, supra note 296, 
at 179. 
335. Leng, supra note 296, a.t 179. See also "People's Daily 
Views US-USSR Contention in Space," FBIS-CHI-78-111 (June 
8, 1978), at Al. The Chinese have since attended the UN 
Outer Space Committee Session as an observer so as to 
broaden exchanges with other countries on the peaceful uses 
of outer space. See "PRC Delegate Speaks at UN Outer Space 
Committee Session-;;'FBIS-CHI-80-132 (July 8, 1980), at A2; 
"Delegate to UN Meeting Enunciates Space Policy," FBIS-CHI-
82-156 (Aug. 12, 1982), at Al. 
336. YODER, suora note 303, at 26. See also Arms Sales to Tai-
wan Endanger Sino-American RelafiOns=:-comment on "The New 
York Times" Editorial of November 20, Beijing Review, No. 
49 (Dec. 7, 1981), at 9 (US arms sales to Taiwan infringe 
upon PRC sovereignty); "Criticism of U.S. Interference in 
PRC Affairs," FBIS-CHI-82-135 (July 14, 1982), at Bl3; 
•u.s. Accused of Interference in PRC Affairs," FBIS-CHI-82-
133 (July 12, 1982), at B2; "U.S.-Taiwan Agreement Violates 
U.S.-PRC Agreement," FBIS-CHI-80-195 (Oct. 6, 1980), at Bl 
(agreement giving full diplomatic privileges to Taiwan rep-
resentatives in the United States violates the US-PRC joint 
communique); "Reagan's China Policy Impairs Future US-PRC 
Relations," FBIS-CHI-80-169 (Aug. 28, 1980), at Bl; "U.S. 
Government Approves New Arms Sales to Taiwan," FBIS-CHI-80-
122 (June 23, 1980), at Bl; "Renmin Ribao Hits Reagan's 
Views on Taiwan," FBIS-cHI-80-124 (June 25, 1980), at B2; 
"Renmin Ribao Criticizes Reagan's Statements on Taiwan," 
FBIS-CHI-80-119 (June 18, 1980), at 82. 
337. See, ~., "Chen Chu Speech," FBIS-CHI-78-128 (July 23, 
1978), at A2 (expressing PRC support for small and medium-
sized countries' proposals in the final document of the 
1978 UN Disarmament Conference); "People's Daily Urges 
Third World Participation in Disarmament," FBIS-CHI-78-105 
(May 31, 1978), at A2; "Huang Hua to Attend UN 'Disarma-
ment' Meeting," FBIS-CHI-78-093 (May 12, 1978), at Al (sup-
porting third World efforts to develop nuclear weapons for 
self-defense purposes) 1 "PRC to Attend Special Conference 
on Disarmament," FBIS-cHI-78-044 (March 6, 1978), at Al 
(noting the Chinese decision to participate in the 1978 UN 
Disarmament Conference, though the PRC had shunned earlier 
participation because of superpower control of the 
discussions). 
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The Chinese have also condemned the superpowers for 
their control of the UN Law of the Sea Conference, particu-
larly as it concerned the formation and voting procedure of 
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PART II: LEGAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXISTENCE AND OPERA·-
TION OF AN INSPECTORATE ON PRC SOIL 
Chapter 3. THE STATUS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS ON CHINESE 
TERRITORY 
The presence of inspectorate personnel on Chinese soil will 
present delicate and complex legal and administrative problems 
compounded by the present ambiguous legal posture of the Chinese 
toward the concept of privileges and immunities. Chinese sen-
sitivity to infringements on sovereign rights as well as the 
PRC's somewhat hesitant approach towards foreign contact create 
serious obstacles to the effective operation of inspectorate com-
ponents -- the organization, inspectors, and staff -- in the PRC. 
Under international law, the PRC is empowered to prescribe 
and enforce rules governing the activities of an inspectorate 
while its members are within Chinese territorial jurisdiction.! 
The power to enact laws governing the rights of foreigners is 
implicitly vested in the National People's Congress (the rubber 
stamp legislative organ of the Chinese Communist Party2) under 
the 1982 PRC Constitution, Article 62(3).3 There is at present 
no single unified national legislation on the rights and duties 
of foreign nationals in the PRC and so, resort must be had to 
numerous individual legislative enactments to determine their 
applicability to foreign nationals. 
Applicable rules are found in the Act Regulating the Entry, 
Exit, Transit, Residence, and Travel of Foreign Nationals 
[hereafter Foreign National's Act] as well as in other national, 
provincial and municipal legislation.4 The PRC has also con-
cluded a number of treaties containin~ provisions regulating the 
status of foreign nationals in China. Article 2 of the Foreign 
National's Act provides that "foreign nationals in China shall 
observe the laws and decrees of China." At least in principle, 
therefore, foreign nationals have rights and obligations under 
Chinese law similar to those of Chinese citizens, subject, 
undoubtedly, to exceptions.6 
The absence of these rights would probably have little im-
pact on foreign inspectorate personnel. Other exceptions, 
however, may affect inspectorate operations, particularly where 
they may apply to Chinese nationals associated with the inspec-
tion team. For example, Chinese administrative -- and legal --
impediments t·o marriage between Chinese and foreign nationals may 
have a practical, though indirect, impact on inspection opera-
tions.? Still other exceptions, such as Chinese restrictions on 
photography, travel and the gathering of information may have a 
profound influence ·on the effectiveness of verification 
procedures. a 
At present, the National People's Congress, its Standing 
Committee, and the relevant Party organs are considering the pro-
visions of a comprehensive Civil Code, whose provisions affect 
the rights and obligations of foreign nationals.9 However, the 
degree of protection to be afforded foreign interests in areas 
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such as copyright, inheritance~ and other property and non-
property laws is, as yet, unclear.lO Moreover, the extent to 
which the PRC will provide for specific legislative enactments 
which could circumvent the rights of foreign nationals in 
extraordinary circumstances for purposes of national security is 
at best speculative. 
The impact of the forthcoming PRC Civil Code on foreign 
nationals will depend to some degree upon the element of 
reciprocity. Exemptions or retaliatory restrictions may be im-
posed by the Chinese Communist Party or the National People's 
Congress to coincide with special privileges or limitations 
placed on Chinese nationals in particular countries abroad,ll 
despite the possible discriminatory effects on different groups 
of foreign nationals within the PRC. Exceptions to the general 
rule of equality between foreign nationals and Chinese citizens 
and between groups of foreign nationals are especially justifi-
able where the PRC deems them to be in the interest of state or 
economic security. 
A. Disputes Arising Out of the Activities of An 
Inspectorate 
Some arms inspection experts have already noted the 
potential for deliberate or inadvertent inspectorate violations 
of Chinese domestic law.l2 The potential rights and duties of 
inspectorate members under the PRC Civil Procedure Code are still 
unclear although the recently circulated provisional code indi-
cated that "cases involving foreign nationals and organizations 
or international organizations enjoying judicial immunity" will 
be handled pursuant to PRC laws and the provisions of treaties to 
which the PRC is a party.l3 Cases involving foreigners who have 
not been accorded relevant privileges and immunities are to be 
handled br an intermediate people's court as the court of first 
instance. 4 
The application of the PRC Criminal CodelS to foreign 
nationals also appears to be speculative, despite the fact that 
it was promulgated in 1979. Pursuant to Article 3 of the 
Criminal Code, the criminal law applies to foreigners who commit 
crimes within Chinese territory,l6 unless otherwise specified by 
law .17 
Never the less, the Chinese have inconsistently applied the 
Criminal Code to different foreign nationals. For example, the 
PRC expelled an American teacher in June 1982 for violating PRC 
secrecy laws relating to agriculture,l8 and a Soviet national was 
sentenced to 7 years imprisonment in 1980 for violating PRC 
secrecy laws relating to military intelligence.l9 Although the 
latter violation may appear more egregious, both acts were 
punishable under the counterrevolutionary provisions of the PRC 
Criminal Code (Arts. 90-104) which require a minimum three year 
sentence upon conviction.20 Moreover, the brevity of the reports 
on the two different cases offered no clues as to justifications 
for the variance in applied sanctions.21 Undoubtedly, these 
inconsistencies will cause anxiety for inspectorate members and 
- 143 -
prompt the suggestion of seeking full prosecutorial immunity to 
ensure full and fair inspection operations. 
B. General Procedural Application of the PRC Criminal Law 
to an Inspectorate 
The PRC Criminal Code is primarily concerned with offenses 
committed in Chinese territory by a citizen of the PRC or of a 
third country or by a stateless person. By territory, the PRC 
law refers to territorial land, sea and air, including foreign 
ships navigating on the high seas or docked at PRC ports and 
airplanes flying within PRC air space, or parked at Chinese 
airports.22 
There are also explicit prov1s1ons for offenses committed 
outside Chinese territory by Chinese citizens. For serious of-
fenses considered to jeopardize the state, such as counterrevolu-
tionary acts, betrayal of state secrets, forgery of national 
currency, embezzlement, or bribery, Chinese citizens are punish-
able under the PRC Criminal Code regardless of whether the act is 
considered an offense under the law in the place of commission.23 
Other offenses are punishable under Chinese law when the sentence 
in the PRC would not be less than three years and when the crime 
is also punishable under the place of commission.24 
Chinese judicial organs may. also prosecute a foreign na-
tional when he comes within the terri tor ial j ur isd ic tion of the 
PRC for acts considered an offense punishable by law in the place 
of commission: for acts punishable under Chinese law committed 
against the PRC or a Chinese citizen: or, for an act punishable 
by not less than three years' imprisonment under Chinese law.25 
Article 19 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code provides for 
the jurisdiction of a people's court "in the place where the 
crime is perpetrated," except where it is "more appropriate" to 
try the accused· in the jurisdiction in which he has resided. 
Judging by the present lack of trained judicial personnel in many 
of the PRC's rural areas and by the publicity a criminal trial of 
a foreign national would draw, it is likely that Article 19 would 
be used to justify moving a trial to one of the larger cities, 
such as Beijing. Concepts of venue and forum non conveniens ap-
pear to be foreign to the PRC. ----- ---
Depending on the severity of the offense, the case may be· 
heard in the first instance by a lower people's court,2EI an 
intermediate people's court where the offense has a bearing on 
the entire province,27 a higher people's court,28 or the Supreme 
People's Court where the offense has a bearing on the whole coun-
try.29 An open trial shall be conducted unless state secrets, 
persona) shameful secrets, or juvenile ·delinquency are· in-
volved. 0 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 62 (15) of the 1982 
PRC Constitution, the National People's Congrees is empowered to 
•exercise such other functions and powers" as it deems necessary. 
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In the recent trial of the Gang of Four, the Fifth National 
People's Congress Standing Committee set up a special procurator-
ate and a special court to prosecute and try the ten defendants 
involved.31 Though a number of scholars questioned the legal 
basis for their establishment,32 it remains conceivable that, on 
the basis of the sensitive nature of a prosecution of an inspec-
torate member within the PRC, special organs may be established. 
Such organs, by virtue of their special status and exposure to 
scrutiny by outside parties, could be used by the Chinese both to 
attempt to portray to the outside world total impartiality and 
evenhandedness in dealing with foreign nationals and to convince 
the Chinese masses, by the use of "special" treatment, of the 
seriousness of the offense. 
c. The Criminal Justice System in the PRC and Its Applica-
tion to an Inspectorate 
1. Arrest and Detention 
The recently enacted Arrest and Detention Regulations33 
outline the procedures involved in the arrest and pretrial deten-
tion of a criminal defendant. Under the Regulations, the arrest 
of a criminal is to be carried out by a public security organ34 
after obtaining a warrant35 pursuant to a "decision of a people's 
court or with the sanction of a people's procuratorate•36 within 
the local jurisdiction. Moreover, evidence against any arrested 
criminal is supposed to be submitted to an appropriate people's 
procuratorate within three days, or, in extraordinary circum-
stances, within seven days after the arrest is made.37 
The period of detention pending preliminary investigation 
is dictated by Article 92 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which 
provides for a maximum of two months for an accused. This 
period, however, may be extended by one month on approval of· a 
people's procuratorate at the next higher level. If a case is 
particularly serious and complicated, the Supreme People's Pro-
curatorate shall report the case to the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress for approval of a further extension on 
the detention period in order to complete an investigation.38 
Under a 1954 Act, reconfirmed in 1979,39 the accused is to 
be detained in a detention house, used for confining minor of-
fenders pending adjudication of their cases.40 The detention 
house differs from a jail cell, which is used to hold 
•counterrevolutionary offenders and other important criminal 
offenders whose cases have already been adjudged.•41 
Although these provisions are designed to protect a defen-
dant pending completion of an investigation, the most sensational 
trial in PRC history -- the trial of the Gang of .Four -- violated 
a number of procedural and substantive safeguards embodied in the 
newly enacted criminal codes, leading one to believe that justice 
in the PRC may become very often the slave of political expedien-
cy.42 The potential impact on an inspectorate team is immense, 
since the extremely sensitive nature of inspection operations and 
the potential seriousness of any violations of Chinese criminal 
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laws creates an atmosphere of uncertainty as to both the applica-
tion of criminal 1 aw provisions and the possibility of redress 
for Chinese violations of their own legal codes. 
Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code provides 
that trials in a higher people's court or :.he Supreme People's 
Court as a court of first instance should be conducted by a 
"collegiate tribunal composed of from one to three judges and two 
to four people's assessors," except in simple civil cases or 
minor criminal ones.43 Assessors, too, were curiously absent 
from the Gang of Four trial. Such omissions and commissions by 
the highest legal organs of the PRC suggest problems .for inspec-
tion operations by evincing a willingness on behalf of Chinese 
authorities to circumvent or ignore established legal provisions 
when it is in PRC interests to do so. 
2. Legal Assistance 
Provisions for legal assistance are an essential component 
of an arms control agreement, for one might expect instances in 
which inspectorate personnel will require legal counsel, relating 
to either official or personal affairs. 
There are several alternatives for providing legal assis-
tance, including a legal staff composed of international civil 
servants or an internal international legal staff working in con-
junction with PRC legal advisory offices.44 Provisions for non-
Chinese legal counsel would be desirable from a foreign point of 
view to ensure impartiality on the part of counsel. The Chinese, 
however, have effectively cut off foreign legal practice in the 
PRC, creating problems in representation, devotion to operations, 
and discretion in handling sensitive inspectorate matters. 
The primary impediment to foreign representation in the PRC 
is the statute entitled the "Provisional Regulations on 
Lawyers.•45 Article 8 stipulates that: "Those .citizens who 
cherish the PRC, support the socialist system and have the right 
to elect and be elected are eligible to be lawyers after passing 
an examination " Despite the lack of reference in the 
regulations to what foreign law firms or lawyers may or may not 
do in the PRC, Article 8 appears to preclude foreign representa-
tion. This presumption is supported by recent PRC statements. 
In January 1982, Jiang Datao of the Ministry of Justice noted 
that foreign lawyers "cannot qualify as lawyers and cannot work 
as lawyers in China.•46 In addition, a preliminary outline of 
the draft Civil Code47 and the provisional Civil Procedure Law48 
indicated that no foreign organization or individual may inter-
vene in a civil trial and that all lega~ representation must be 
entrusted to PRC legal advisory office attorneys because pr~vate 
practice is non-existent in the PRC, Thus, the supposedly in-
herent right of representation, pursuant to Article 26 of· the 
Criminal Procedure Code, is more restrictive than it at first 
appears to be. 
A second major stumbling block to legal assistance in the 
PRC is the absence in the Chinese criminal justice system of the 
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"assumption [sic] of innocence" of a criminal defendant.49 This 
is supported by the fact that the Chinese do not perceive the 
defense lawyer as an advocate for the accused. Rather, a defense 
lawyer is an advocate of the "legitimate rights and interests" of 
the accused, which officials in the PRC have noted compels him to 
"base his case on facts, using the law as a guide" and thereby 
protect the rights of the Chinese people as a whole.SO The 
attorney is thereby relegated to a position of acting not to de-
fend the accused on the merits of the claim but rather of serving 
as an advocate for leniency in punishment.Sl The most logical 
conclusion to draw from this is that the interests of the Chinese 
people and the criminal defendant would best be served by a Chi-
nese attorney because a Chinese attorney in all likelihood would 
be more capable of protecting the client within the framework of 
the PRC legal system. 
Several other issues arise in the context of Chinese rep-
resentation. Law schools and legal societies have only recently 
been reestablished.52 Legal research is in its incipiency53 and 
the number of lawyers is pitifully small.54 The lack of trained 
professionals is even reflected in the PRC Criminal Procedure 
Code, which provides for legal representation by lawyers, close 
relatives or guardians of the accused, other citizens, or the 
defendant himself.SS The recent promulgation of the PRC legal 
coces has left little time for the developnent of judicial ex-
perience. Application of statutory provisions is sporadic, the 
concept of stare decisis is unknown,56 and punishment is often 
meted out for oolitical motives rather than on the basis of sound 
legal doctrine·. 57 Moreover, the Chinese legal system continues 
to be beset by problems of judicial and procuratorial. dependence 
on the Chinese Communist Party.58 
Despite the fact that PRC legal advisory offices in many 
areas maintain separate departments to handle foreign legal af-
fairs,59 Chinese legal personnel in these offices are trained 
only to handle cases involving maritime accidents or foreign 
trade disputes. Moreover, many of these cases are eventually 
turned over to arbitration bodies for final resolution and few, 
if any, of these attorneys have been compelled to protect foreign 
interests from the beginning to the end of a dispute. Because 
there is no specific legislative act or administrative practice 
providing for the extension of legal advisory services to non-
juridical persons, a question arises as to whether legal advisory 
offices may offer their services to any form of inspectorate, or 
whether such services would be restricted to those juridical per-
sonalities recognized by Chinese law. 
The most desirable alternative for an arms inspectorate is 
the establishment of a coordinated body of non-Chinese staff 
attorneys who work in conjunction with the relevant departments 
of PRC advisory offices on general retainer. This particular 
legal advisory form possesses a number of advantages over other 
suggested bodies. First, the international composition of the 
legal staff ensures a dispassionate professional commitment to 
the interests of an inspectorate in its conflicts with the Chi-
nese system. Second, it provides personnel familiar with the 
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potentially complicated. machinations of differing legal systems. 
Third, the use of PRC "advisory offices" guarantees the presence 
of Chinese attorneys most familiar with the political and propri-
etary underpinnings of the PRC legal system and avoids any con-
flict with PRC regulations on exclusive Chinese legal representa-
tion in Chinese courts. Fourth, resort to "advisory offices" is 
a flexible concept in that where appropriate, Chinese legal advi-
sors can suggest alternative methods of dispute resolution. This 
avoids the formal rudiments of adversar ial 1 itigation which the 
Chinese have traditionally abhorred. 
Despite its advantages for an arms inspectorate, this com-
posite legal advisory .l>ody will require two acts. First, an 
amendment of PRC law to incorporate a specific provision on for-
eign legal representation in the PRC judicial system would be 
·needed. Second, it would be necessary to obtain the procurement 
of guaranteed assurances of independent legal authority before 
any recruitment of Chinese attorneys takes place. Absent these 
two requirements, the legal staff would be unable to maintain the 
delicate balance of impartiality, commitment to inspection 
operations, and familiarity with the Chinese legal system that 
are crucial to adequate legal assistance. 
D. Vexatious Criminal Statutory Provisions 
According to Ar tiel e 2 of the PRC Criminal Code, the task 
o'f the criminal law is to punish criminals -- particularly coun-
terrevolutionary offenses -- and protect the· public order.oO Ar-
ticle 10 then offers an extremely broad, confusing, and disturb-
ingly vague definition of a criminal offense.61 
Because of the extreme sensitivity of the PRC to the 
principle of the inviolability of state sovereignty, an inspec-
torate team must remain alert to the scrutiny its operations are 
likely to receive from Chinese authorities and to the potential 
for creating explosive political issues through its activities. 
The ambiguity and broad sweep of many of the provisions of 
Chinese laws are often designed to serve a political purpose. 
Inspectorate team members are, therefore, vulnerable to the 
shifting tides of Chinese political expediency and national 
security. 
Though foreign offenses will often be treated pursuant to 
Article 30 of the PRC Criminal Code, which provides for deporta-
tion as· an exclusive penalty, the same provision notes that 
deportation may be a "supplementary penalty.•62 Bence, other 
provisions must be examined for relevance. 
Of significant import to PRC citizens connected with in-
spection procedures and to foreign national~ unprotected by 
diplomatic immunity is the use of the criminal law term 
"counterrevolutionary acts• (fangemingzui). Despite the fact 
that a full chapter, comprising fifteen articles, is devoted to 
counterrevolutionary crimes in the PRC Criminal Code,63 the term 
is defined only nebulously as an act "jeopardizing the People's 
Republic of China by aiming at over throwing the political power 
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of the proletariat or the socialist system.•64 The impact of 
this particular section of the present PRC Criminal Code on the 
operative work of an inspectorate cannot be overestimated. Al-
most any action an inspector may wish to take within the purview 
of his official duties may conceivably violate the provisions on 
counterrevolutionary acts. 
One Chinese authority has defined counterrevolutionary 
crimes to include collusion with a foreign country, splitting the 
country, jeopardizing the motherland and engaging in espionage.65 
This latter term, espionage, is defined somewhat further in Arti-
cle 97 of the PRC Criminal Code, which lists "stealing, spying 
and supplying information to the enemy • supplying arms or 
other military materials to the enemy, [or) joining a secret 
service or espionage organization" as counterrevolutionary ac-
tivities.66 Nowhere in the relevant laws of the PRC, however, 
are espionage and other terms explictly defined. 
Moreover, the Criminal Code's ambiguities extend to other 
statutes. The PRC secrecy statute -- the 1951 Provisional Reg-· 
ulations on Guarding State Secrets67 -- is designed, inter alia, 
to prevent counterrevolutionaries from "gathering intelligence 
[or) selling ..• leaking or losing state secrets.•68 The pro-
vision which lists information that is considered a "state 
secret" is, in essence, an amalgam of military, economic, politi-
cal and social secrets, incorporating everything from military 
logistical information to weather reports. o9 In practice, the 
statute has been used to classify additional matters, including 
the telephone numbers of Beijing residents. 70 Yet, nowhere in 
this statute -- the violation of which is considered a counter-
revolutionary act punishable under the PRC Criminal ·Code -- are 
terms 1 ike "state secrets," "secret information," "spies," 
"counterrevolutionary act" and the like, further explained. In 
addition, the State Secrets Regulations are buttressed by a com-
mon PRC legislative practice known as the "all-encompassing pro-
vision," by virtue of which the law becomes sweeping legislation. 
The catch-all provision of the State Secrets Regulations connotes 
state secrets as "all other state affairs which should be kept 
quiet,•71 thus subsuming almost any matter the Chinese Communist 
Party deems necessary in a particular instance. It is therefore 
quite likely that the present broad scope of these provisions can 
only serve to impede inspection functions. Improper authoriza-
tion for verification activities, insufficient documentation to 
support inspection operations, potential ultra vires verification 
procedures, or blatantly illegal action may well constitute pro-
scribed acts. This may be particularly true of indigenous per-
sonnel who per form inspection functions and who are more 1 ikely 
to be held accountable under Chinese law for indiscretions and 
infractions. 
Several articles of the PRC Criminal Code 1 ist counter-
revolutionary activities for which either a prison sentence or 
death may be imposed.72 Yet, the exact distinction between a 
counterrevolutionary crime and an ordinary one, for which punish-
ment is less severe, is difficult to draw. According to one PRC 
author, the difference depends on "the aim of the perpetrator.•73 
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If that statement holds any legal weight, then all counterrevolu-
tionary crimes appear to be intentional crimes, despite the fact 
that the PRC Crimina! Code does not stipulate that the perpetra-
tor recognize that his acts will harm the PRC~ nor that he fore-
see the harm; nor that he wish (direct intent) or consciously 
permit (indirect intent) the harm to occur. Crimes of negligence 
are, in most instances, omitted from the category of counter-
revolutionary acts, though if the act is egregious, it could be 
prosecuted under this section.74 
Perhaps the most terse distinction between an ordinary 
crime and a counterrevolutionary one is that the latter causes 
the more direct harm to the state. Crimes such as speculation, 
profiteering and theft, though they undermine the socialist 
economic system, are- carried out by criminals for individual 
objectives. Absent counterrevolutionary intent, such activites 
would not constitute counterrevolutionary crimes in most 
instances. 
Another significant legal concept in the PRC Criminal Code 
is one not admitted in Western legal doctrine -- the use of 
analogy ( leisi). 75 By analogy, the Chinese refer to the legal 
justification for treating an act not listed in the law as 
criminal, a concept in direct contravention to the Western legal 
maxim nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without an existing law 
making an act a crime):/6 Although the PRC has cited the use of 
analogy as a necessary stipulation in order to "avoid constantly 
changing the criminal law,•77 it is not difficult to imagine the 
potential for abuse by PRC authorities if and when it became 
necessary to hamper the performance of the duties of an 
inspectorate. 
Counterrevolutionary crime and analogy are not the only 
pitfalls in the Criminal Code confronting inspectorate members. 
Foreign "nationals or aliens not granted diplomatic privileges and 
immunities or granted diplomatic privileges and immunities, but 
engaging in egregious criminal activities, are also vulnerable to 
prosecution under the provisions against violations of public 
security.78 Crimes harmful to public security include arson~ 
breaking dikes~ sabotaging bridges, houses, airfields and naviga-
tion passages; and, causing explosions or using other dangerous 
means to destroy factories and other industrial facilities, 
rivers and water sources, public or private property.79 Sabotag-
ing airlines, shipping lines, railroads and other transportation 
facilities, sabotaging radio stations and other communication 
facilities; and, sabotaging gas, electric, or other flammable 
facilities are also violations of public security.BO Once again, 
though, the main thrust of these provisions dealing with sabotage 
is not clearly defined, leaving ample room for difficult disputes 
over the proper scope of inspection activities and the appl ica-
tion of Chinese criminal law provisions. 
Chinese law is also unique in that criminals are often 
rewarded with reductions or remissions of penalties if they 
surrender voluntarily81 or engage in self-denunciation, a direct 
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application of the PRC pol icy of "leniency to confessors, se-
verity to resisters.•82 Thus, the full thrust of PRC criminal 
code provisions is an effective deterrent to unauthorized or ul-
tra vires activities. Statutory provisions are sweeping and am-
biguous, capable of incorporating most or all of inspectorate 
operations not explicitly exempted from their scope. 
As a result, it is readily apparent that arms inspectorate 
operations would be only marginally effective in policing arms 
control agreements if appropriate inspectorate personnel were not 
granted immunities from, or privileges with respect to, Chinese 
substantive and procedural laws and regulations. 
E. Informal Social Control of Inspectorate Functions 
One additional factor merits consideration with respect to 
potential disputes arising out of inspectorate operations and 
operative PRC control over such activities. Western political 
analysts have often observed that Communist countries often tend 
to suffer from a rampant political paranoia. 83 This phenomenon 
may be expressed in several ways, but perhaps its most appropri-
ate description for the purposes of an inspectorate would be peer 
group jurisdiction.84 Peer groups such as Communist Youth 
Leagues, urban neighorbood committees, people's mediation 
committees, social order committees and the like operate on the 
fringes of administrative and criminal law in the PRC. They are 
often established for broad and nebulous purposes such as 
maintaining social order: enforcing patriotic and law abiding 
education: informing against and conducting surveillance of 
counterrevolutionaries: carrying out propaganda and education on 
policies and laws: and, supervising the masses.85 
These peer groups are often aided in their endeavors by 
common citizens, by the People's Liberation Army (the PRC armed 
forces) and by the public security organs. Though such groups 
would probably offer only minimal prolonged physical interference 
with inspection activities, their danger lies in their nuisance 
value.86 Furthermore, the lack of experience that inspectorate 
foreign nationals can be expected to have with such institutions 
may cause more serious consequences. Strong reactions by inspec-
torate personnel to peer group efforts may result in criminal 
culpability under the rather sweeping provision of the PRC 
Criminal Code, which stipulates that "no one is allowed to dis-
rupt public order by any means whatsoever.•87 
Such groups do not technically exercise formal criminal, 
civil, or administrative jurisdiction. By and large, many of 
these peer groups have no formal enforcement powers and only some 
are legally recognized as surveillance forces within the PRC. 
But, they are encouraged· to oversee daily activities, including 
the registration of building tenants and guests, the mediation of 
intra-familial squabbles, reports on suspicious activities, and 
even the monitoring of the menstrual cycles of young women to 
ensure compliance with population control regulations.88 Provi-
sions in present bilateral and multilateral agreements calling 
for immunity from such jurisdiction (i.e., civil, criminal, or 
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administrative) would therefore be insufficient and irrelevant. 
As such, the recognition of this phenomenon should compel the 
parties to an arms control agreement to revise the provisions on 
jurisdictional immunities to encompass the potential activities 
of these groups. In general, the individuals who comprise an 
inspectorate team, as well as the inspectorate enterprise, would 
be severely hampered in their operations if they were not in some 
way protected from the brunt of Chinese state jurisdiction. It 
is therefore helpful to examine privileges and immunities pro-
vided under Chinese law which may be available to inspectorates 
and inspectorate operations. 
Chapter 4. DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER EXISTING 
CHINESE LAW 
A. General Observations 
The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to in-
spectorate personnel would permit "the free and unhampered exer-
cise of the organization's functions and maintain the dignity of 
the organization and the individuals associated with it."89 In 
accordance with the norms of international relations, the Chinese 
may grant a privilege or immunity from either PRC enforcement 
jurisdiction (such as arrest, detention and prosecution) or pre-
scription jurisdiction (such as the right to demand compliance 
with Chinese laws). In practice, the PRC grants an i~munity from 
enforcement jurisdiction only. 
The Chinese term for immunity -- mianchu -- translates 
literally as "an exemption" and thereby imparts an understanding 
that such immunity connotes an exemption from all aspects of a 
particular law -- i.e., an exemption from PRC enforcement and 
prescription jurisdiction. However, such a term is contrary to 
customary Chinese practice, which recognizes that foreign diplo-
mats and certain international personnel are accorded specific 
diplomatic privileges90 but are not relieved from the obligation 
to respect the laws and regulations of the PRc.91 As such, the 
Chinese are empowered to call for the expulsion of "privileged" 
diplomats who have "act[ed) wildly in defiance of the law."92 
The PRC has noted that criminal violations by foreign representa-
tives are usually handled through diplomatic channels: the PRC 
may ask the sending state to deal with the offenders in accor-
dance with the law [of the sending state]93 or it may declare the 
foreign representative persona non grata and demand his immediate 
recall from the PRc.94 ---
B. Privileges and Immunities Under the Diplomatic 
Convention 
The Chinese, by virtue of their ratification of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations95 [hereafter Diplomatic Con-
vention), have recognized, at least in principle, that persons 
granted full diplomatic privileges and immunities enjoy personal 
inviolability96 and are "immune from the criminal jurisdiction of 
the receiving state."97 A diplomatic agent is not subect to "any 
form of arrest or detention" 98 and "is not obliged to give 
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evidence as a witness.•99 Moreover, the rece~v1ng state is ex-
pected to treat a diplomatic agent "with due respect and . 
[to) take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his per-
son, freedom or dignity.•lOO 
Article 8 of the PRC Criminal Code incorporates the 
customary right to diploma tic privileges and immunities from 
enforcement jurisdiction, providing that criminal liability for 
"foreigners who enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity shall be 
resolved through diplomatic channels.•lOl The wording of Article 
8 appears to be deliberately circumscribed: those accorded spe-
cial treatment are apparently restricted to formal diplomatic 
personnel. Among those protected would be heads of state, ambas-
sadors, ministers, charges d'affaires and armed forces attaches. 
The precise wording of Article 8 is significant, for it 
appears that the privileges and immunities of personnel, other 
than those not subject to Chinese criminal jurisdiction by virtue 
of treaties concluded by the PRC (such as upper level diplomatic 
agents), would not automatically be incorporated into Chinese 
domestic law. Thus, immunities and privileges granted to 
lower-level inspectorate personnel would have to be incorporated 
into Chinese domestic law by direct legislation.l02 Article 11 
of the PRC Crimina! Procedure Code stipulates that no criminal 
prosecution will be sought against those "exempt from criminal 
responsibilities as stipulated by law and decrees.•l03 From this 
provision, it is possible to conclude that there are numerous 
forms of PRC legislation which may be used to grant privileges 
and immunities to those other than recognized diplomatic person-
nel and which would automatically be incorporated into PRC domes-
tic law. The demarcation between those forms of PRC legislative 
acts which do and those which do not automatically incorporate 
privileges and L~munities into Chinese domestic law is not clear, 
particularly in light of the recent conflict involving the u.s.-
PRC Consular Convention and the detention of an ~~erican teacher 
for allegedly violating Chinese secrecy 1 aws relating to 
agriculture .104 
Chinese laws do not broach the subject of whether measures 
involving direct physical restraint of diplomatic personnel are 
permissible in extraordinary circumstances. Although some arti-
cles on diplomatic privileges and immunities which appeared in 
the PRC during the Cultural RevolutionlOS suggested the absolute 
inviolability of the person of diplomatic personne1,l06 both 
concomitant Chinese practice and subsequent international law 
treatises have suggested that restraint is permissible at least 
in circumstances involving self-defense or the prevention of the 
commission of a crime by a diplomatic personage.l07 Because of 
the sensitive nature of material inspectorate agents are likely 
to seek, certain PRC policies must be clarified. Furthermore, in 
light of PRC practices, it would be unwise and unsafe to presume 
automatic incorporation of broad privileges and immunities into 
PRC domestic law. 
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C. Privileges and Immuniites of Consular Officials and 
Personnel of International Organizations 
Persons associated with international and c~nsular organiza-
tions are granted more limited privileges and immunities than 
those granted diplomats. The 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relationsl08 [hereafter Consular Convention], which the PRC 
ratified in August 1979,109 provides, inter alia, that "consular 
officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending 
trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a 
decision by the competent judicial authority."llO Consular per-
sonnel may be called upon to give evidence in the course of judi-
cial or administrative proceedings ,111 but are not obligated to 
testify or to produce evidence on matters pertaining to official 
consular functions.ll2 Moreover, there is immunity from the 
judicial or administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state 
with respect to official acts.ll3 
The Consular Convention is inadequate for purposes of 
granting privileges and immunities to inspectorate agents. 
First, consular personnel under the Consular Convention are still 
susceptible to the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving 
state .114 Moreover, there is .no provision for the absolute in-
violability of consular premises. The effect on inspectorate 
operations would therefore be quite severe. Operations may be 
hampered by potential arrests, detentions, prosecutions, and con-
finements of inspectorate personnel. In addition, the inspection 
team's premises and equipment could be subject to the intrusion 
of the host state, a fact which could lead to interference with 
operations, harrassments of personnel, or tampering with facili-
ties or equipment. 
With respect to international organizations, the PRC's 
recent accession to the ON Convention on the Privileges and Im-
munities of the Specialized AgenciesllS [hereafter UN Convention 
on Privileges], is an unprecedented step in Chinese historical 
and political doctrine towards recognition of international 
organizations as juridical personalities under international law. 
Pursuant to the ON Convention on Privileges, the specialized 
agenciesll6 "shall possess juridical personality" and "shall have 
the capacity (a) to contract, (b) to acquire and dispose of im-
movable and movable property, (and] (c) to institute legal pro-
ceedings.•ll7 The specialized agencies, their property and as-
sets "shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process ex-
cept insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived 
their immunity." 118 
The PRC's accession, however, is not necessarily an indica-
tion of unequivocal Chinese recognition of international organi-
zations as a legitimate subject of international law, nor does it 
signal firm support for participation in multilateral conventions 
for the protection of diplomatic and international personalities. 
First, the PRC has refused to accede to the ON Convention on 
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Privileges as it applied to all international organizations enu-
merated therein.llg Second, the PRC has not ratified any conven-
tion directly granting the United Nations recognized juridical 
status.l20 Third, the PRC has continued to oppose compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and has re-
fused to ratify the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents.l21 Moreover, as a sel £-proclaimed non-aligned 
nation the PRC is not party to any regional convention such as ASEAN1~2 and presumably, therefore, recognizes no special privi-
leges and immunities for such an organization. Because of this, 
it would also be difficult to predict whether Chinese treatment 
of communist international organizations would differ from the 
treatment of non-communist ones. 
Nevertheless, by virtue of PRC accession to the UN Conven-
tion on Privileges, to which the Soviet Union has already ac-
ceded ,123 there now exists a mutually agreeable framework from 
which to conclude subsequent agreements concerning international 
immunities. Moreover, Chinese accession to the UN Convention on 
Privileges is illustrative of a change of heart by the PRC. 
Where once the Chinese had refused to grant specialized interna-
tional (UN) agencies even limited protection because of their 
dependence on the United Nations, itself a non-juridical per-
sonality, they now have offered them a breadth and scope of 
protection similar to those accorded diplomatic agents. 
Within the framework of the UN Convention on Privileges and 
pursuant to the PRC's new approach, no censorship shall, be 
applied to the official communications and correspondences of the 
specialized agencies.l24 Moreover, the archives~ documents and 
premises of these agencies shall be inviolable.! 5 Property of 
the specialized agencies is " immune from search, r equi si tion, 
confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, 
whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative 
action.•lT6 
Aside from the formal, juridical recognition of interna-
tional UN agencies, the PRC has even granted legal status --. 
albeit 1 imited -- to other internationall27 and foreign govern-
ment entities.l28 These limited immunities may be recognized in 
order to protect appropriate personnel in the exercise of their 
official functions. These immunities do not represent clear 
customary rules of international law, but are the result of the 
special status of certain foreign official personnel, who may be 
required to engage in limited activities, including business ven-
tures, educational and cultural exchanges, and political negotia-
tions.l29 
Despite affirmative steps by the PRC to broaden its percep-
tions of legitimate privileges and immunities, wholesale optimism 
regarding future PRC positions on the subject is discouraged. 
Patterns of unequivocal Chinese behavior have only just emerged, 
and past practice has indicated a willingness by the PRC to alter 
its international legal and diplomatic positions, often without 
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apparent cause, particularly when prevailing political winds 
change their course.l30 
Because the status of an inspectorate determines the scope 
of its privileges and immunities, it is crucial that the parties 
to an arms control agreement carefully choose the form of inspec-
torate and endow its members with broad well-defined privileges 
and immunities. Recognition that present practice provides for 
more limited preferential treatment for consular and interna-
tional organizations would seem to mandate a provision for 
specific and comprehensive privileges and immunities for the 
members of inspectorates teams. 
D. Chinese Reactions to Privileges and Immunitiesl31 
According to the Chinese view, "diplomatic privileges are 
the special rights and preferetial treatment, based on the prin-
ciples of equality and reciprocity . . mutually granted by 
countries which have established diplomatic relations with each 
other.•l32 In practice, however, the Chinese have recognized 
limited privileges and immunities for representatives of govern-
ments or entities with which the PRC did not have full diplomatic 
relations.l33 Furthermore, the Chinese have often ignored those 
privileges and immunities rightfully granted to diplomatic rep-
resentatives of foreign states.l34 Since its admission to the 
United Nations, however, the PRC has been much more consistent in 
according and respecting the privileges attached to the conduct 
of diplomatic personnel and in granting them immunity from local 
administrative, civil and criminal processes and sanctions. In 
addition, the PRC has adhered to general international practice 
in allowing these privileges and immunities to remain in effect 
as long as diplomatic departure from this is considered to be 
reasonably connected to official duties.l35 
The modern international practice granting governments both 
the right to declare those who have abused their privileges and 
immunites persona .!12!! grata and the right to deport them creates 
a problem. Subject to potential protest or retaliatory action 
from the sendin% state, this rule is a function of unilateral 
determination.l3 No justification need be given by a government 
for invoking it.l37 In addition, what constitutes abusive con-
duct by a d~lomatic agent is itself open to .unilateral inter-
pretation.l3 The issue of abuse of privileges and immunities 
subsumes questions of fact and questions of law, regarding the 
nature of the conduct, the application of relevent lawa to such 
conduct and the consequences of a finding of abuse.l39 
Uncertainty as to what constitutes abusive conduct in a 
particular country can create potential inhibiting factors for 
effective verification procedures. Recently, for example, the 
PRC expelled a British student for writing the slogan "Long Live 
the Gang of Four" on a classroom blackboard .140 Though interna-
tional practice does not accord to foreign students any official 
privileges and immunities, this incident indicates the potential 
explosive nature of unilateral determination of abuse. As a 
result, if an arms inspectorate is considered an international 
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organization, the prov1s1ons of the arms control agreement should 
specifically identify the requisite international privileges and 
immunities and should provide for a method of dispute settlement 
of alleged abuse cases which does not permit unilateral deter-
minations of abusive conduct. Previous international agreements 
have failed in this respect. Provisions regarding privileges and 
immunities to be accorded appropriate personnel working for par-
ticular international org ani za tions have been so general as to 
vest in member states ultimate interpretive power. The UN 
Charter, for example, obligates member states to grant the Or-
ganization "such privileges and immunities as are necessary for 
the fulfillment of its purposes•l41 and to grant representatives 
of the United Nations "such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in con-
nection with the organization.•l42 Ultimately, the extent of 
privileges and immunities and their proper interpretations rest 
with individual sovereign nations and are thereby susceptible of 
various and sundry legal constructions. 
Although both the Soviets and the Chinese have tradi-
tionally opposed the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice,l43 the Chinese have been much more receptive to 
hegotiationi conciliation, and arbitration as methods of dispute 
settlement. 44 The PRC has, for instance, consistently abided by 
arbitration awards involving its domestic corporations and na-
tionalsl45 despite the fact that it is not a signatory to the 
1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards.l46 
By 'emphasizing the role of the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes through nonadversarial means,l4T the signatories to an arms 
control agreement can avoid disagreeable incidents of unilateral 
declarations of abuse of privileges and immunities and 
interference with the effective operation of verification and 
inspection.l48 
If an arms control inspectorate is composed strictly of 
foreign nationals, presumably from states which are signatories 
to the arms agreement, then inspection operations could probably 
be conducted utilizing the privileges and immunities which pres-
ently comprise the rules of diplomatic intercourse. Foreign in-
spectors could presumably be endowed with the same privileges and 
immunities as high-level embassy personnel, with additional 
privileges being granted by the host PRC .when necessary for 
effective operations. They may also be subjected to similar 
diplomatic procedures such as persona ~ grata declarations for 
claimed abuses. 
Whether or not one considers some of the present methods 
for addressing diplomatic abuses simple to work with in arms 
control agreements because they are the most familiar, there are 
certain pitfalls. Persona ~ grata ,rrocedure is still in-
stituted upon unilateral determination.! 9 Swift deportation of 
undesirable personnel, even if justified, would still be expected 
to interfere with orderly verification and inspection processes~ 
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One possible approach, similar to that contained in Draft 
Annex II of the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,lSO is to post-
pone deportation of persona n2.!l grata until the arrival of an 
appropriate replacement. Undue delays in sending replacement 
personnel may be avoided by providing for reasonable time limits 
for dispatch (persona non grata may be confined to inspectorate 
headquarters in the interim), assuming, of course, that the time 
required for bilateral personal security checks of replacement 
officials can be minimized through mutual agreement. 
E. Conclusion 
Concern for the image of the PRC, particularly in the wake 
of formal diplomatic relations with the United States, has led 
the Chinese to deal leniently with minor transgressions by 
foreignerslSl and extremely harshly with incidents involving 
Chinese attacks on foreign nationals.l52 It is hardly correct, 
however, to assert that the Chinese would be unperturbed by major 
transgressions committed by foreigners. In fact, the PRC can be 
expected to be rather sensitive to such incidents, particularly 
where they may interfere with Chinese national interests. Be-
cause of such sensitivitiy, harsh, radical measures to correct 
any injustices could not be entirely ruled out.l53 One must 
always remember tha the true nature of the PRC 's treatment of 
official foreign personnel is inevitably politically motiva-
ted,l54 international norms of diplomatic privileges and immuni-
ties notwithstanding. 
In a country as vast and tightly controlled as the PRC, it 
becomes fairly simple to regulate events. By maintaining effec-
tive control over the media, for instance, the PRC is capable of 
quelling or inflaming public opinion on certain events.l55 Inci-
dents involving inspectorate members, regardless of the degree of 
pr iv i1 eges and immunities accorded such personages, may have a 
detrimental effect on inspection operations by making them seem 
less acceptable to the Chinese people, with whom inspectorate 
personnel must interact and upon whom inspectorate personnel must 
rely to some degree to discharge their duties. This is true 
particularly if the PRC considers it necessary to publicize such 
an incident, accompanied by the often acerbic ballyhoo of press 
and radio commentaries, editorials, letter write-ins, and 
published public reactions. 
At the same time, Chinese reactions to these incidents will 
have repercussions on Chinese foreign relations. The PRC will at 
some point be required to balance its. own interests against the 
potential impact of international reaction. The choice the PRC 
makes will illustrate its willingness or reluctance to create 
strong affirmative support for arms inspection. 
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Chapter 5. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OPERATIONS IN THE PRC: 
SPECIFIC PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND ARMS 
CONTROL AGREEMENT PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO 
AN INSPECTORATE 
A. Entry Into and Exit From the PRC 
Entry (ruiing) and exit (chujing) continue to be regulated 
by the Foreign National's Act.l56 Pursuant to this act, after a 
foreign national obtains a passport (huzhao)l57 visas (9ian-
zheng) for entry into the PRC are issued abroad by Ch~nese 
diplomatic and consular organs (Art. 4). Within China, visa ap-
plications are handled by appropriate public security bureaus 
(Art. 4). The issuance of visas for those holding official pass-
ports ( gongwu huzhao) are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and, to a lesser extent, appropriate alien affairs offices 
and public security bureaus (Art. 4). In practice, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs is informed of all applications for visas,l58 
thus giving it, for the most part, full discretion in granting or 
refusing permission to enter or leave the PRc.l59 Since such 
decisions are considered administrative affairs, they are not 
subject to judicial review. In extreme circumstances, though, it 
would be conceivable to file a complaint with the procuracy and 
have the Procuratorate, pursuant to Article 176 of the PRC 
Criminal Code, prosecute state functionaries for abusing their 
:Hscretion. 
PRC visa restrictionsl60 are similar to those of the Soviet 
Union: a single visa is not valid for use throughout the entire 
country, but only for destinations specifically authorized in the 
visa (Art. 8). Prior permission must be obtained for travel 
outside the scope of the visa and separate visas are necessary 
for travel to each individual city.l61 
A recent significant development in Chinese visa regula-
tions has been PRC authorization of multiple entry-and-exit 
visas, which permit unlimited entry and exit _at proper check-
points for the limited life (e.g., two years) of the visa.l62 
Procurement of such visas would greatly expedite inspectorate 
operations, where frequent and necessary border crossings by in-
spectorate personnel may be indispensable to such operations. 
Delay in the issuance of a visa is one potential concern 
for inspectorate personnel, though such concern may be alleviated 
by provisions in the arms control agreement for reasonable pro-
cessing periodsl63 and by good faith among the parties. 
To regulate the movement of foreign nationals into and 
through the PRC, the Foreign National's Act provides for check-
points, both at the border (Art. 9) and throughout the country 
(Art. 16). It is at these points that travel documents and prop-
er immunization certificates are inspected and customs procedures 
instituted. Official entry-exit points are scattered throughout 
the PRC, giving an arms inspectorate ad~quate access to the coun-
try. Should circumstances arise, additional passage points could 
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conceivably be authorized by international agreement or domestic 
decree. 
Passage across the Chinese border is also governed by a 
number of other domestic legislative acts. The Act on Frontier 
Defense Inspect~on assigns the protection of PRC border regions 
to People's Liberation Army (PLA) defense forces at frontier 
defense inspection stations.l64 All persons and the means of 
communication and transportation for entering or leaving the 
country, as well as accompanying baggage and goods, must pass 
through specially designated harbor, airport, and national bound-
ary (ground transportation] stations at which frontier defense 
inspection stations are located (Art. 1-3). All flights of for-
eign aircraft, or Chinese aircraft arriving from or leaving for 
foreign destinations must report their flight patterns and man-
ifests and have them approved by the Ministry of ·Foreign 
Affairs.l65 
Any attempt to cross the border into the PRC without ap-
propr iate authorization is punishable under Article 176 of the 
PRC Criminal Code, which provides for imprisonment of up to one 
year, detent-ion, or surveillance for illegal crossings of "the 
national boundary (frontier) in violation of border control reg-
ulations." Furthermore, Article 17 of the PRC Foreign National's 
Act stipulates that violations may be punishable by warnings, 
fines, or expulsion. Violations committad by foreign nationals 
possessing diplomatic immunity are supposed to be handled through 
diplomatic channels. 
Perhaps the most obvious suggestion in alleviating some of 
the restrictions now before arms inspectorate personnel regarding 
their entry into and exit from the PRC is to request an exemption 
from the requirements of the aforementioned acts directly from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This would appear to be the 
simplest and most expeditious method to secure freedom of pas-
sage. An arms control agreement could also stipulate for an 
amendment to the relevant acts to permit freedom of entry and 
departure without special permission. Another balanced solution 
might be some form of domestic legislation designating unneces-
sary Chinese interference with the entry and exit of inspectorate 
team members as a. crime and requiring procuratorial prosecution 
of Chinese officials who obstruct their freedom of passage. 
B. Customs 
Because of the official and extraordinary nature of inspec-
tion operations, it is unlikely that the full range of customs 
regulations would apply to the passage of inspectorate personnel 
and their cargo, equipnent, documents, and personal items across 
the PRC border. Customs regulations are embodied in three Chi-
nese statutes, though they ar_e augmented by additional customs 
orders promulgated by the PRC from time to time. These three 
statutes are the provisionsal regulations governing the entry and 
exit of passengers, crews and baggage of aircraft,l66 rail trans-
port,l67 and sea-going vessels.l68 The regulations also contain 
a number of overlapping provisions dealing with entry into and 
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exit from the PRc.l69 The regulations are fairly uniform in 
tent, permittin~ consistency in inspection for compliance 
customs, health 70 and tariff regulations.l71 Inspection 
cedures are exercised at the stations of first entry 
departure.l72 
con-
with 
pro-
and 
Pursuant to each of the three regulations, the "special 
cases" posed by the entrance or departure of foreign attaches and 
diplomatic agents should be referred to the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs,l73 which handles customs inspection for such 
personnel according to separate rules, regulations and agreements 
and in conformance with international practice. Undoubtedly, 
though, there will be some overlap between these separate rules 
and ordinary customs regulations, particularly as they apply to 
PRC bans on the import or export of Chinese national currency, 
firearms, ammunition, military weapons, lottery or raffle tickets 
and books, journals, photographs, movies, film, files and tapes 
that would be harmful to or cast aspersion on the political or 
cultural relations of the PRc.l74 
Smuggling is the most serious customs violation in the PRC. 
The illegal possession, storage, sale, or transfer of such goods 
as Chinese currency, precious metals and valuable cultural relics 
may result in punishment under Articles 116, 117, 118, and 173 of 
the PRC Criminal Code of up to ten years' imprisonment, fines and 
the confiscation of the property in question. Smuggling is today 
a major business in the PRC and the Chinese are vigilant in en-
forcing customs regulations in order to reduce the amount of con-
traband flowing in and out of the PRc.l75 
Regardless of the means of transportation used to enter 
into or exit from the PRC, it is likely that customs measures 
would defer to the specific inspectorate arrangements, which 
would presumably include extensive privileges and imunities from 
strict inspection measures. 
Official correspondence is often transferred into and out 
of the PRC through the use of the diplomatic pouch, an interna-
tionally recognized means of protecting the inviolability of such 
communications. Chinese practice has heretofore protected the 
diplomatic pouch,l76 but the wording of the Diplomatic Convention 
may permit the pouch to be opened or detained if PRC authorities 
suspect that it may contain items other than "diplomatic docu-
ments or articles intended for official use (Art. 27(4)),177 al-
though such inspection must be in the presence of the diplomatic 
agent (Art. 36). The courier who accompanies the pouch enjoys 
the right of personal inviolability (Art. 27(5)). There appears 
to be no publicized evidence that the Chinese will protect the 
pouch only when the courier is within reasonable proximity to it, 
though courier accompaniment appears to be standard practice. 
Soviet customs officials, on the other hand, have been known to 
open the pouch in instances where the courier is not within rea-
sonable proximity.l78 
Under the Diplomatic Convention, personal baggage of 
diplomatic agents is not subject to customs inspection unless 
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there are "serious grounds for presuming that it contains arti-
cles not covered in paragraph 1 [such as i terns imported or ex-
ported in commercial quantities or items not intended for per-
sonal use] ..• , or articles the import or export of which is 
prohibited by the law or controlled by the quarantine regulations 
of the .receiving state• (Art. 36(2)). Once again, however, the 
Chinese reservation attached to Article 37(2)-(4) of the Diplo-
matic Convention obscures somewhat the applicaton of these privi-
leges to administrative, technical and service personnel attached 
to a foreign embassy. 
Chinese regulations prohibit the sale of imported goods by 
foreigners, 119 so it must be assumed that diploma tic effects 
remain diplomatic property and eventually must be removed from 
the PRC. 
Past and present Chinese practices indicate the need for 
changes in customs regulations and conventions in order to ensure 
the smooth operation of inspection procedures. As a general 
rule, the scope of privileges and immunities will, of course, 
depend on the composition of an arms inspector (adversary or 
international). 
But it appears that current PRC recognition of privileges 
and immunities would be insufficiently broad under either ar-
rangement. The PRC is on record as opposing full juridicial 
recognition of international organizations. The status of per-
sonnel associated with these organizations has not yet been 
broached officially by the Chinese. As for official foreign per-
sonnel, PRC recognition of privileges and immunities is limited, 
at best. In some instances, there has simply been no precedent 
for preferential customs treatment peculiar to an arms inspector-
ate (e.g., operational equipment shipments). In other instances, 
customs privileges currently accorded, for example, secondary 
diplomatic personnel (i.e., technical, administrative, and ser-
vice staff) are inadequate for inspectorate purposes. Technical 
personnel, in particular, would probably be required to perform 
many of the more arduous tasks of controlling the movement of 
equipment, records, and supplies. For the arms inspection ef-
fort, customs delays, tar iff burdens and complicated clearance 
procedures imposed on secondary personnel may interfere with the 
completion of the mission. The relatively small number of 
personnel involved should make a broad grant of privileges and 
immunities to all inspectorate members at least reasonably 
feasible. 
C. Housing, Accommodations and Services 
As is the case in the Soviet Union, most tangible projterty 
in the PRC, aside from small private agricultural plots,l CJ is 
socialistically owned, i.e., belongs to the state or to collec-
tive organizations controlled by the State and· the CCP. For the 
purposes of inspectorate members' accommodations, there appears 
to be no known practice of permitting foreign or international 
personnel access to Chinese socialist housing.l81 Moreover, 
there is a significant urban housing shortage in China which 
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makes any Chinese decision to extend access to housing facilities 
to foreigners a very unlikely proposition. 
Hotel accommodations are also in extremely short supply. 
According to a recent U.S. State Department report, for example, 
even Chinese organizations are unable to secure reservations for 
foreign guests in Beijing's (Peking's) better hotels until one or 
two days before arrival.l82 The impact of increased numbers of 
long-term diplomatic residences and business visitors has forced 
the PRC to often make use of very poor accommodations. 
Under these circumstances, the most sui table ar rang em en t 
for inspectorate accommodations may be to request separately 
built facilities from the Chinese government, with such housing 
leases operating extra legem.l83 In fact, such an arrangement 
has legal precedent. Under present diplomatic and consular prac-
tices, for example, 
1) [a] receiving state shall either facilitate the 
acquisition on its territory, in accordance with 
its laws, by the sending state of premises 
necessary for its mission or assist the latter 
in obtaining accommodation in some other way. 
2) It shall also, where necessary, assist missions 
in obtaining suitable accommodations for their 
members .184 
In addition, arrangements for special accommodations for 
inspectorate personnel has precedent in PRC practice, as well. 
Because of the housing shortage, the Chinese have recently begun 
making separate guest houses available to prominent business del-
egations.l85 Such segregated housing also offers administrative 
advantages to both sides: 
[It] assures conditions more commensurate with 
the outsider's standard of living, and gives the 
[Chinese] state better control over the visi-
tors' activities and contacts with the local 
population.l86 It also enhances the security of 
the visitors' premises. When special premises 
are thus set aside, it is easier to safeguard 
their inviolability (if any). Being segregated, 
the residents are insulated to a certain extent 
from ordinary intercourse with the local popu-
lace and petty officialdom. Finally, [Chinese] 
authorities find it easier to provide the neces-
sary external protection (police, fire) to con-
centrated residential premises.l87 
Most service organizations in the PRC are state enterprises 
directly subordinate to China's State Councn.l88 What this 
means is that foreigners who seek to visit or work in the PRC 
must consult with, and obtain the active cooperation of, Chinese 
state commissions, ministries, offices or special agencies. In 
practice, a single venture in the PRC requires contact with 
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numerous agencies. For example, foreign joint venture partners 
will have contact with their Chinese counterpart, as well as the 
Foreign Investment Commission, the General Administration for 
Industry and Commerce and the Bank of China in order merely to 
initiate venture operations.l89 Inspectorate personnel who seek 
access to restricted areas of the PRC in order to conduct some 
form of inspection procedure -- say, of an industrial facility --
may need to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of National Defense, the Ministry of Public Security and perhaps 
the Ministry directly in charge of the facility to be visited, 
such as the Third Ministry of Machinery. 
An inspectorate may not only be required to deal with these 
types of Chinese state organizations. For some purposes, the PRC 
has established commissions and agencies for dealing specifically 
·with foreign requests: inspectorate members would be obligated to 
deal with these entities. Undoubtedly, inspectorate members 
might wish to voluntarily deal with such specialized agencies or 
commissions where the latter are able to secure better goods or 
services -- such as food or transportation -- than ordinary chan-
nels would permit. 
It is not difficult to envision the potential for inter-
ference with inspection operations if the Chinese choose to 
harass an inspectorate or force the temporary curtailment of 
operations by creating various obstacles to obtaining proper 
food, supplies and services in the PRC. In such instances, it 
would be unlikely that inspectorate personnel could circumvent 
the problem by importing the items. Chinese customs regulations, 
tariff considerations, clearance procedures and time lags could 
all prove prohibitive. Of course, the import of such items will 
probably be necessary at intervals during inspectorate 
operations, but it may be preferable for an inspectorate to limit 
quantities and regulate the intervals between shipments. In very 
many ways, the procurement of housing, goods, supplies and ser-
vices in the PRC is one of the more significant tests of Chinese 
commitment to arms inspection. 
Under these circumstances, it becomes imperative than an 
arms control agreement specifically enumerate the necessary pro-
cedures involved for the procurement of necessary goods, supplies 
and services from the appropriate governmental organs of the PRC. 
In addition, the agreement should stipulate reasonable time 
periods in which the requests should be filled. At the very 
least, the parties involved should commit themselves in general 
terms to facilitating the procurement of such items. 
D. Communications 
Communications will probably qualify as one of the more 
sensitive aspects of arms inspection arrangements in the PRC. An 
arms inspectorate has two choices: it may rely exclusively on 
the Chinese public communications network or it may establish its 
own ·communication system. In each instance, the parties to an 
arms control accord will be required to balance the needs of an 
inspectorate for rapid and confidential communication with what 
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traditionally has been full Chinese state control over the public 
communications network. 
The Chinese Ministry of Communications is the organ mainly 
responsible for the communications network in the PRC, though a 
separate Ministry -- the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
-- has administrative responsibility for mail services.l90 
Communications responsibilities are also shared with a number of. 
specialized agencies, including the Ministry of Radio and Televi-
sion and the Ministry of Electronics Industry, both of which are 
subordinate to the State Council.l91 
There are little hard data at present which indicate the 
difficulties in negotiating with these organs, but undoubtedly 
the ease with which separate communications agreements are con-
cluded will impact on the choice between utilizing Chinese com-
munications or establishing independent facilities. The PRC has 
not made publicly available much direct dc:mestic legislation on 
cc:mmunications, but it is bound to a number of international 
agreements and has promulgated supplementary regulations which 
will affect inspectorate communications. 
Perhaps the most secure form of international communica-
tions which currently exists is the diplomatic pouch. There are, 
however, limits on its confidentiality. As was previously indi-
cated, the pouch -- pursuant to the Diplomatic Convention -- may 
be used to transfer official documents only (Art. 27(4)). Fur-
thermore, there is still the unanswered question of whether the 
PRC will resort to its sovereign right to open the pouch when 
violations are suspected.l92 It should be recognized that the 
potential for interference with the contents of the pouch is 
mitigated somewhat by the provision of the Diplomatic Convention 
permitting "the mission [to] employ all appropriate means, in-
cluding diplomatic couriers and messages in code or cipher" (Art. 
27 ( 1) ) .193 Chinese accession to the Diploma tic Convention and 
recognition of the use of the pouch for diplomatic and consular 
personnel should permit at least a presumption that the PRC would 
be willing to grant to an inspectorate the unhampered use of the 
pouch procedure. 
Though the diplc:matic pouch guarantees, for the most part, 
security and accuracy of communications, emergency situations may 
require more rapid means of communication. Telephone, telex, or 
cable relays ought to be considered in such instances, though 
their present deficiencies in the PRC are less than encouraging 
for inspectorate needs. For example, the quality of telephone 
service in the PRC is not always satisfactory and is often very 
poor with respect to long distance telephone connections.l94 In 
addition, there is at present no form of emergency "hot-line• 
connection between the PRC and the major powers, such as .that 
which exists between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
which the Chinese might employ as a prototype for confidential 
inspectorate telephone service.l95 
Foreigners are permitted to use public telex facilities, 
which exist in Beijing and Guangzhou, but they must punch their 
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own tapes.l96 Moreover, adec:wate two-way Chinese telex com-
munications are non-existent.l97 More promisingly, foreign busi-
ness companies with offices outside hotels in Beijing have been 
allowed to install their own telex lines using foreign equip-
ment.l98 Should an inspectorate be ··granted the same privilege, 
it would undoubtedly facilitate communications, but the telex 
system is currently too restricted to be of major value. 
However, the importance of developing international com-
munications systems is not lost on the Chinese, who are actively 
engaged in the work of the International Telecommunications Union 
and its various organs.l99 The PRC is also party to the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Convention, 200 a provision of which 
calls for the establishment, operation, maintenance and protec-
tion of "channels and installations necessary to carry on the 
rapid and uninterrupted exchange of international .telecommunica-
tions• (Art. 36). The Convention is particularly relevant to the 
establishment ·of an inspectorate under the auspices of the United 
Nations, since Article 29 already grants to UN telecommunications 
operations the rights and obligations of the Convention's provi-
sions. The effectiveness of the Convention as ,a framework for 
the standards and administration of international communications 
systems is significantly enervated by Article 33, which grants to 
each member and associate member "the right to suspend the inter-
national telecommunication service for a indefinite time either 
generally or only for certain relations and/or for certain kinds 
of cqrrespondence ••• • upon notification of other members. 
For purposes of postal communications, reliance on the Con-
stitution of the Universal Postal Union201 would also prove inef-
fective as a standard for conditions of service for inspection 
operations. Though the Constitution calls for "freedom of tran-
situ for postal communications (Art. 1(1)), other provisions en-
sure the inviolability of national sovereignty and the protection 
of each member's vital security interests. Thus, the Consti tu-
tion declares that 0 the provisions of the Acts of the Union do 
not infringe upon the legislaton of any country in anything which 
is not expressly provided for by those Acts" (Art. 24) and 
prohibits the mailing of items "whose import or circulation is 
prohibited in the country of destination" (Art. 2B(l)(d) ). 
The vulnerability of international communications traffic 
to unilateral danestic restrictions creates the potential need 
for independent communications systems. Where speed, accuracy, 
and sec.recy are of utmost importance, perhaps the most judicious 
method is to permit an arms inspectorate to operate its own 
shortwave radio transmitters. Unfortunately, current Chinese law 
prohibits the use of radio transmitters by unlicensed opera-
tors.202 Chinese law also prohibits any foreigner from owning 
private radio transmitters in the PRc.20:l There are also anum-
ber of other unr-elated regulations with peripheral importance to 
inspectorate communications. Two -- the Measures Governing For-
eign Vessels Entering and Leaving Port 204 and the Measures 
Governing Foreign Vessels on Bordering Rivers 205 -- preclude the 
use of, inter alia, wireless transmitters and radio telephones by 
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foteign vessels in inland Chinese waters except in emergency cir-
cumstances.206 More recently, the PRC's National People's Con-
gress (NPC) has promulgated additional regulations on foreign 
ships,207 a chapter of 'which deals specifically with communica-
tions, though its contents have not been made generally 
available. 
Ideally, the inspectorate should either seek some form of 
Chinese legislation exempting it from such restrictions or obtain 
the active cooperation of the appropriate Chinese authorities to 
procure necessary 1 icenses. However, reliance on any form of 
communication system particularly when used across Chinese 
borders -- will not be free from the practical implications of 
modern international relations, which often dictate the need for 
routing surveil! ance of communications to and from its territory 
by a host state. 
The 1982 PRC Constitution and Chinese criminal laws address 
communications interference, although they do not explicitly pro-
scribe or authorize surveillance of correspondence as a general 
operational practice. Rather, relevant legal provisions indicate 
that surveillance procedures are to be conducted in strict con-
formity with the law and only on a showing of cause. Article 40 
of the 1982 PRC Constitution, for example, protects a PRC citi-
zen's freedom and privacy in correspondence, except where public 
security or procuratorial organs may check and censure correspon-
dence "to meet the needs of state security or of investigation 
into criminal offenses." In theory, therefore, interference with 
communications would seem to require some prerequisite showing of 
good or probable cause to initiate surveillance. In practice, 
the language of the Constitution is ambiguous enough -- and due 
process in the PRC vague enough -- to permit periodic and random 
monitoring by public security and procuratorial organs of any 
suspicious communications. 
Article 86 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code authorizes 
the seizure of mail and telegrams "of an accused." Such wording 
implies that seizure of communications is unauthorized in the 
absence of some prior criminal culpability, though, practically 
speaking, the information in the seized documents may occur only 
with the "approval of a public security organ or people's 
procuratorate, at which time the appropriate post and telecom-
munications office(s) are obligated to surrender the items." The 
articles of communication are expected to be held by PRC authori-
ties only if they prove relevant to the case (Art. 87). 
The PRC Criminal Code also punishes any postal or 
munications worker who opens, hides, or destroys letters 
grams without permission by detention or imprisonment 
more than two years (Art. 191). 
tel ecom-
or tele-
for not 
International communications are often subject to inter-
ference for reasons of national security. The means employed are 
significantly more surreptitious than those mentioned in Chinese 
laws and regulations. The preoccupation of the PRC with the pre-
vention of security leaks has led to the promulgation of broadly 
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worded P.rovisional regulations on guarding state and military 
secrets,208 by virtue of which even the more subtle forms of com-
munications interference -- such as the monitoring of telephone 
conversations and the inspection of incoming or outgoing foreign 
mail -- could not be ruled out. Though a Chinese Embassy attache 
recently stated that wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by 
Chinese officials were prohibited in the PRc,209 there appear to 
be no statutory restrictions regulating or forbidding the prac-
tice, aside from broadly-worded Constitutional guarantees of in-
violability of the person (Art. 37), correspondence (Art. 40), 
and home (Art. 39). Where necessary or appropriate for national 
security reasons, however, Chinese communications agencies can be 
expected to utilize surveillance techniques. In extreme instan-
ces, these agencies may even assist inspectorate personnel in 
wiretapping or eavesdropping. 
Notwithstanding international agreement provisions to the 
contrary,210 inspectorate personnel should probably be prepared 
for such practices, though the extent to which they a~e used by 
the PRC may depend greatly on the amount of involvement and par-
ticipation of Chinese officials in inspection operations. To the 
extent procedures are jointly operated or carefully overseen by 
Chinese authorities, there would probably be less reason to moni-
tor or interfere with the transmission of confidential inspector-
ate information, since Chinese nationals would have access to 
much of the information as active inspectorate personnel. 
E. Freedom of Movement of Personnel, 
Supplies in the PRC 
1) General Observations 
Equipment and 
Any study of the PRC's approach to Chinese domestic travel 
by foreign personnel is an empty exercise without at least a 
rudimentary understanding of China's concern for the preservation 
and protection of its sovereignty. Chinese positions vis-a-vis 
freedom of movement in the PRC are at once the product of a 
traditional fear of foreign encroachment and a desire to rein-
state the PRC as a major cultural and economic mecca through more 
open contacts with foreigners. The polarity of such concerns has 
engendered a policy of oversight and supervision in the PRC that 
may be unmatched anywhere else in the world -- with the possible 
exception of the Soviet Union. Though such surveillance may be 
distracting and disconcerting to the foreign visitor, it is un-
doubtedly indispensable to contemporary Chinese economic, cul-
tural, political, and military security. 
There are a number of published laws and regulations 
governing domestic travel by foreign visitors, though more 
importantly, there are also practical and sometimes more subtle 
restrictions which are communicated among cadres only by word of 
mouth or restricted-circulation directives (e.g., among PRC offi-
cials or CCP members). The implementation of an effective in-
spection arrangement requires a Chinese commitment to divulge all 
appropriate regulations and policies, to repeal those _which are 
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most offensive to unhindered operations and to permit unimpeded 
access to inspection points within and beyond Chinese borders. 
Recent Chinese practices regarding freedom of movement by 
foreigners yield ambiguous results with respect to PRC acceptance 
of 1 iberal policies toward domestic travel. 
2) Movement of Personnel 
Chinese contacts with foreign nationals have increased 
dramatically in recent years, as the PRC strives to implement its 
four modernizations program and establish itself as a major force 
in world politics. The influx of foreigners has placed a sig-
nificant strain on the political fabric of the PRC, which must 
straddle the line between a traditional Marxist-Leninist-Maoist 
philosophy that stresses the "poisonous influence" of foreign 
elements2ll and a proclivity for exchanges with foreign nations 
that further contemporary Chinese inter est s. The current ten-
dency of the Chinese to embrace more 1 iberal travel policies 
should not mislead the reader into believing that restrictions on 
foreigners are insignificant or nonexistent. In fact, the PRC 
still maintains rather severe r estr ic tions on the mobility of 
foreigners in China and the pages of the PRC press are frequently 
peppered with articles calling for caution in Chinese dealings 
with foreign visitors.212 
For an arms inspectorate, a reasonable degree of mobility 
in the PRC is essential to inspection operations. Inspectors, 
observers, staff personnel and others associated with verifica-
tion procedures must be free to move about in China to the extent 
necessary to carry out their official functions. Unimpeded move-
ment between inspectorate headquarters and inspection sites as 
well as between headquarters and points abroad should be guaran-
teed. The freedom of movement of essential equipment, records 
and supplies of a inspectorate should likewise be provided for in 
any inspection agreement. 
Chinese restrictions on freedom of travel must be under-
stood on two levels: there are direct impediments on free move-
ment of foreigners, embodied in rules, regulations and accepted 
reciprocal practices;213 and, there are indirect restrictions, 
such as those created by potential dependence on government con-
trolled means of transportation. An adequate inspection arrange-
ment should address both levels. 
At present, certain areas of the PRC are absolutely closed 
to foreigners;214 other areas, such as those containing non-
secret defense facilities and factories, are usually closed to 
foreign visitors, though the Chinese have infrequently granted 
permission to foreign officials to visit such installations.215 
There are also restrictions on travel in • open" (freely acces-
sible) areas. Foreign visitors may journey to open cities but 
find •closed" (restricted) highways and facilities.216 Foreign-
ers on temporary visits to the PRC face even greater restric-
tions, for the China Travel Service -- like In tourist in the 
- 169 -
Soviet Union -- will map out an itinerary which maxlffilzes Chi-
nese-supervised travel to designated areas along assigned routes 
and minimizes uncontrolled free movement. This, of course, is 
not to assert that the PRC authorities are inflexible with regard 
to travel arrangements. Individually-proposed travel plans were 
very recently made possible217 though the itinerary must be ap-
proved by the proper Chinese administrative organs, is subject to 
modification or cancellation on short notice and requires various 
check-in-points to facilitate control. Special permission from 
public security bureaus (gonganju) in the PRC -- which, in in-
stances involving internal travel permits for foreigners, may, in 
turn, be required to obtain the authorization of the Information 
Department of the Foreign Ministry -- is necessary before travel 
to many areas will be permi t'ted. 
Travel restrictions are often embodied in unpublished reg-
ulations. However, the Chinese press has occasionally published 
the more significant governmental pol icy decisions to relax 
travel restrictions,218 probably as an indication to the Chinese 
and foreign public of the PRC commitment to political liberali-
zation. 
One significant facet of travel in the PRC is the present 
requirement of assigning all aspects of the trip of a foreign 
visitor to various host organizations, a fairly common bureau-
cratic oversight and surveillance technique in Communist 
countries. The initial host organization may be the China Travel 
Service, Chinese universities, Chinese business organizations, 
the Foreign Trade Ministry, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
However, in many instances, there are additional organizations 
which must be contacted or informed of travel arrangements. For 
example, r estr ic ted industrial installations may be opened to 
foreign military and political personnel on rare occasions, pro-
vided approval is first obtained from the Foreign Ministry, the 
Ministry of National Defense, public security bureaus and often 
the Ministry directly supervising the facility (e.g., the Second 
Ministry of Machine Building). 219 Such overlapping and var ie-
gated control channels can create delay, tedium, and the necessi-
ty for learning the procedures and idiosyncracies of different 
organizations and for developing working relationships with 
different groups of people.220 Though not necessarily peculiar 
nor unusual, the sheer number of enterprises which may be re-
quired to participate in any given foreign venture would tend to 
work to the disadvantage of an inspectorate, to which prompt in-
spection operations may be essential. 
Currently, most travel arrangements are initiated either 
through requests to the Information Department of the Foreign 
Ministry (official personnel) or to the China Travel Service (for 
tourists and other foreign visitors). The China Travel Service 
js by no means the insidious organization that Intourist (of the 
Soviet Union) has been known to be, though, understandably, the 
participation of the Agency in handling domestic travel arrange-
ments for an inspectorate may cut both ways. Any preferences 
granted the China Travel Agency in booking flight and room reser-
vations may facilitate inspectorate movement throughout the PRC. 
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Conversely, the Agency can impede travel through its monopoliza-
tion of travel procedures; it may book bogus plan reservations or 
allege full seating, for example, in order to ensure that inspec-
torate members are not able to travel on a particular flight.221 
These observations dictate the need for either careful negotia-
tion of travel arrangements by conventional means or for special 
transportation services for inspection members. 
Outside of particular modes of travel for foreign visitors 
in the PRC, there is one important Chinese law which governs the 
movement of foreign persons in China -- the Foreign National's 
Act.222 The Act is designed with PRC national security in mind 
and is indicative of the form of strict control over foreigners 
which is accomplished by significant and constant contact between 
foreign visitors and public security bureaus (gonganju). 
Pursuant to the Foreign National's Act, foreigners are re-
quired to obtain special permission to travel when they seek to 
travel outside the jurisdiction of the major administrative unit 
they reside in (Art. 14).223 The traveller is expected to follow 
the routes, use the means of communication, reside in the places 
and ride the means of transportation noted in the travel docu-
ments (Art. 15). Residence and travel of foreign nationals in 
"important national defense and military localities and restric-
ted areas" (emphasis added) is prohibited (Art. 6). Public 
security bureaus are empowered to check on foreign nationals with 
regard to their observance of the provisions of the Act, and 
foreign nationals are expected to comply with such checks (Art. 
16).224 
Presumably, if a travel route must be changed for reasons 
of accident or illness, a foreign visitor would be obligated to 
notify and receive the approval of a local public security bu-
reau. Moreover, when an alien travels alone to designated cities 
or towns, one may assume that he would not be entitl'ed to stop 
off in any cities or towns en route without advance permission 
from a local public security bureau and a proper or justifiable 
reason for the stay.225 
Permission to reside in the PRC is governed by Chapter III 
of the Foreign National's Act. In effect, the provisions of this 
chapter extend control over the movement of foreign nationals to 
various other official and quasi-official organs including 
schools, enterprises, hotels and private residents22~ who accom-
modate them (Arts. 3, 11). All foreign nationals must apply for 
residence registration and be registered in the place in which 
they reside (Arts. 10, 11). Changes of residence require the 
certification of appropriate documents by competent Chinese or-
gans (Art. 13). Moreover, foreign nationals residing in the PRC 
are obligated to "proceed to public security organs within a 
specified period of time" to present documents for examination 
(Art. 12). 
The Act is not specific as to permissible durations for 
temporary residence of foreign nationals, though its predecessor 
stipulated for stays ranging from six months to five years.227 
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There is also no provision in the Act as to the appropriate 
method for addressing situations where travel documents are lost, 
damaged, or destroyed during the period of travel. Presumably, a 
foreign national would be required to report his problem to a 
local publ.ic security bureau for replacement. In the Provisional 
Rules that were subsequently abrogated by the Foreign National's 
Act, a foreign national, after losing his travel documents, was 
required to place an ad in a local newspaper "delaring that the 
documents were null and void" ( shengming zuofei). 228 Under the 
Foreign National's Act, however, this deed is no longer required. 
Foreigners are required to obey Chinese laws and decrees 
(Art. 2). Infractions are addressed by Article 17, which grants 
to public security organs the power to enforce administrative and 
criminal sanctions against violators.229 Though Article 17 does 
not enumerate prohibited actions beyond those violations of the 
Foreign National's Act, it would seem that the possession of 
fraudulent (zaqi), forged (weizao), materially altered (yuequan) 
or unauthorized ( wuquan) documents 1 the possession of i terns pro-
hibited by law (such as contraband or weapons);230 or, the viola-
tion of other laws and decrees of the PRC would also fall within 
the purview of Article 17. These violations may also fall within 
the ambit of Article 5, which gives organs handling applications 
for entry, exit, transit, residence and travel of foreign nation-
als apparent carte blanche "authority to cancel or declare null 
and void" travel documents (including visas) for whatever reason. 
The Foreign National's Act is indicative of the tight supervision 
over foreign travel in the PRC, the potential pitfalls that beset 
an inspectorate by broad and ambiguous language and the need for 
appropriate privileges and immunities to permit less restricted 
personal mobility by inspectorate members. Moreover, the move-
ment of inspectorate personnel is inextricably intertwined with 
the problems of, and regulations governing, access to state-owned 
and inspectorate-owned means of transportation. 
3) Means of Transportation in the PRC and the Movement 
of Personnel and Supplies 
a) Chinese Transportation 
State-controlled means of transportation are currently 
the major mode of access to points in the PRC. Private means of 
transportation, with the exception of bicycles, are virtually 
non-existent in the PRC and there are currently no private means 
of transportation for hire.231 As such, any form of inspectorate 
travel arrangements calling for the chartering of trasnportation 
will require the active participation of numerous Chinese state 
agencies. Once more, the monopolization of services by the state 
lends itself to potential abuse and infringement of inspection 
operations. 
It is not altogether clear what administrative agencies 
oversee Chinese transportation services. There is, for example, 
a separate ministry for railways in the PRC, though there are no 
ministerial-level agencies responsible for maritime transport or 
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civil aviation. Though a special agency exists for civil avia-
tion -- the Civil Aviation Administration -- the Vessel232 and 
Aircraft233 Regulations of the PRC call for the participation of 
Maritime and Aviation Administrative Bureaus in entry-exit in-
spection procedures. It is not certain which existing agencies 
handle these duties, nor whether such agencies are in any way 
similar to, or have replaced, the older ones. The presumption of 
probable overlapping functions among transportation agencies, 
particularly with respect to travel service for foreigners, cre-
ates confusion, delay and the potential for such problems as: 
last-minute flight cancellations; the exclusion of certain types 
of material or equipment from carriage by rail or boat; damage or 
loss of equipment caused by negligent or intentionally malicious 
handling; and, the possibility of unauthorized inspections of 
inspectorate documents or equipment en route by Chinese 
personnel. 
b) Inspectorate-Supplied Transportation 
Just how permissive Chinese authorities are with regard to 
the alternative of allowing foreign visitors to import and use 
their own private means of transportation is not known. Auto-
mobiles, arguably the most essential form of inspectorate trans-
portation next to air transport, are a notable exception. 234 
Chinese legal practice does permit diplomatic envoys, attaches 
and other official personnel to own and operate private auto-
mobiles in the PRC, though arrangements are controlled by the PRC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and handled through diplomatic chan-
nels. Though this practice provides at least a starting point 
for alternative transportation services, it is obviously not en-
tirely free from Chinese control. 
According to Chinese officials, there are no privileges and 
immunities accorded diplomatic personnel with respect to driving 
regulations.235 All foreigners desiring to drive automobiles in 
the PRC are required to pass a written test and a road test in 
order to obtain a Chinese driver's license. Arrangement fo.r the 
testing procedures are made through the Traffic Safety Division 
of the local Public Security Bureau (gonganju) in the PRc.236 
The Chinese do not currently have motor vehicle insurance 
regulations in effect. 237 According to Chinese officials, at 
least part of the reason for this lies in the paucity of foreign 
automobiles in the PRC. 238 Accordingly, expenses incurred as a 
result of accidents are not handled through 1 iabil ity or com-
prehensive insurance coverage; rather, they are dealt with 
through diplomatic and administrative channels. Thus, costs are 
borne, in some cases, by the sending state and, in other cases, 
by private or public organizations with which a foreign national 
involved in an accident is employed.239 
Chinese Embassy officials in the United States have stated 
that all drivers in the PRC must abide by traffic regulations,240 
though the 1957 Public Security Regulations241 currently applic-
able permit the waiver of penalties for violations in instances 
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where the offender was "definitely ignorant of the regula-
tions.•242 Although the PRC is not a party to the 1949 Conven-
tion on Road Traffic,243 indications are that major Chinese traf-
fic regulations do conform to Convention provisions.244 There is 
also a number of secondary traffic rules which occasionally find 
their way into current Chinese publications.245 Some of these, 
in fact, could be used to the detriment of inspection opera-
tions.246 Indisputably, inspectorate members should be provided 
with copies of relevant regulations and amendments to avoid 
potential interference with Chinese laws and the inspectorate's 
mission. 
Though conformity with Chinese traffic regulations appears 
to be the rule for all foreigners in the PRC, Chinese enforcement 
procedures may be weakened by PRC adherence to international 
diplomatic conventions, which recognize full immunity from 
criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of Chinese or-
gans.247 Moreover, specific provisions in these conventions 
obligate the receiving state to ensure freedom of movement and 
travel, 248 though they are often couched in terms which permit 
unilateral alterations of regulations and policy in the interests 
of national security.249 
The severity of Chinese treatment of foreigners involved in 
serious traffic accidents will depend probably on both the nature 
of the accident and the status of the foreigner involved. The 
PRC Criminal Code does not directly address the issue of the 
liability of an operator of a motor vehicle involved in a serious 
accident, but the Code does provide for punishment for man-
slaughter (Art. 133) and for unintentional bodily injury (Art. 
125). Even in the absence of local regulations, Chinese accep-
tance of the use of analogy (Art. 79) would arguably permit 
serious auto accidents to be brought within the purview of such 
Criminal Code provisions. Although it appears that Chinese 
ratification of international conventions on privileges and 
immunities would probably insulate most inspectorate personnel 
from criminal liability in traffic accident cases, adequate 
privileges and immunities covering all inspectorate personnel 
(including staff and service personnel, who would be likely can-
didates for criminal prosecution by virtue of Chinese reserva-
tions to international diplomatic conventions) should be ob-
tained. Additionally, there is little information available on 
the right of local Chinese public security bureaus to impound 
vehicles involved in traffic accidents. One might envision the 
degree of interference which local police might impose on inspec-
torate agents involved in minor accidents causing only slight 
property damage if impoundment was standard procedure in all or 
many accident cases. It is imperative therefore, that certain 
privileges and immunities from Chinese jurisdiction also be ex-
tended to motor vehicles used by inspectorate members. 
The most convenient long-distance mode of travel for in-
spectorate purposes would be by air. International law recog-
nizes the principle of the exclusive sovereignty of a state over 
the airspace above its territory.250 In conformity with this 
principle, the Chinese announced in 1958 that •no foreign ves-
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sels for military use and no foreign aircraft may enter China's 
territorial sea and the airspace above it without [PRC] permis-
sion • . • • "2 51 
On the basis of this sovereign jurisdiction, the PRC State 
Council promulgated on the Flight Rules Governing Foreign Civil 
Aircraft252 in 1964. Though these rules, like those of the 
Chicago Convention, are applicable to civil aircraft and may not 
cover, therefore, certain non-civilian inspectorate aircraft, 
they are nevertheless useful as a gauge of Chinese attitudes 
toward, and tolerance of, foreign aircraft over and in PRC 
territory. The flight rules were made public by the Civil Avia-
tion Administration of China.253 According to the rules, foreign 
civil aircraft can enter or leave China or fly within China only 
in accordance with bilateral or multilateral agreements to which 
the PRC is a party, or with the permission of the Chinese govern-
ment obtained through diplomatic channels. Foreign civil air-
craft are required to obey the orders of the air traffic control 
departments designated by the Civil Aviation Administration and 
abide by the flight regulations. 
Foreign civil aircraft, its crew members and its passengers 
must abide by the laws of the PRC while in China and must adhere 
to the decrees and regulations for entrance, departure and tran-
sit through China. 
Chinese PLA air defense planes on duty !'!lay order foreign 
civil aircraft to land at designated airfields if they violate 
the rules governing flight within China. Such aircraft may con-
tinue their flights only with the permission of the PRC Civil 
Aviation Administration. 
These regulations generally reflect much of what was em-
bodied in the Convention on International Civil Aviation254 
[hereafter Chicago Convention], to which· the PRC acceded on 
February 20, 1946.255 
The Chinese have closely adhered to Chicago Convention 
provisions256 both in subsequent bilateral air navigation agree-
ments257 and in unilateral declarations regarding specified re-
stricted and non-restricted areas for overlights in Chinese 
territory.258 However, the PRC has objected to unregulated fifth 
freedom traffic as envisioned in the Chicago Convention, though 
its objection apparently parallels those of many other states.259 
The Chinese have also recently expressed condemnation of 
aircraft hij ackings and other aerial crimes. The PRC acceded to 
both the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed 
on Board Aircraft260 and the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.261 Hijacking is also a punishable 
offense under the PRC Criminal Code (Art. 100). 262 
In short, the viability of inspectorate aircraft as a means 
of transportation within the PRC depends greatly upon Chinese 
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cooperation. The PRC adamantly rejects any notion that inter-
national law advocates unrestricted innocent passage along un-
specified air corridors within domestic airspace. The amount of 
Chinese territory open to foreign overflights is probably rather 
small, as is the number of airfields and air corridors available. 
Chinese concessions in these areas are expected to be rather 
circumscribed. 
The significance of familiarity with all available Chinese 
laws and regulations regarding air flight cannot be overesti-
mated. Any agreement on the use of inspectorate aircraft will 
require full Chinese cooperation in disclosing the composite of 
PRC air law as it presently exists. As a first step, the PRC 
should be compelled to exchange "all basic laws and regulations 
covering foreign air trasportation, navigation and operation of 
aircraft, air traffic rules, immigration, customs, landing per-
mits, passports, currency, quarantine, aircraft registration, 
aircraft airworthiness, communications 1 icensing, airmen 
personnel 1 icensing, accident investigation, and airport noise 
regulations."263 Some authors have also suggested that inter-
fe-rence between inspectorate air travel and domestic air services 
might be minimized by the establishment and operation independent 
inspectorate facilities and installations, the use of long-range 
aircraft and the requirement of prior notification of intended 
travel plans. 264 
The seasonal and temporal disadvantages of using vessels as 
a means of transportation for inspectorate personnel probably 
outweigh any advantages. Nevertheless, the use of ships may be 
contemplated for transporting oversized equipment or for offshore 
monitoring. Therefore, some familiarity with Chinese regulations 
concerning access to and activities in ports and internal water-
ways is necessary. 
For purposes of exercising territorial jurisdiction, the 
PRC claims as its internal waters: 1) harbor areas; 2) inland 
gulfs or bays inside a closing line not exceeding 24 nautical 
miles; 3) straits and other waters which have historically belong 
to the PRCJ265 and, 4) a territorial sea extending twelve nauti-
cal miles • ..:66 
Chinese r egul at ions on maritime traffic are embodied in 
three sets of PRC rules, the 1964 Rules Regulating Passage of 
Foreign Nonmilitary Vessels Through the Qiongzhou Strait267 
[hereafter Qiongzhou Strait Regulations], the 1957 Measures 
Governing Foreign Vessels Entering and Leaving Port268 [hereafter 
Port Regulations], and the 1966 Measures Governing Foreign Ves-
sels on Bordering Rivers269 [hereafter River Regulations]. 
These three regulations are bou~d by a common thread --
the preservation of Chinese security. 70 For example, passage 
through the Qiongzhou Strait is 1 imited to daytime hours only 
(Art. 6). Under the Port Regulations, only certain ports desig-
nated bt the Ministry of Communications are open to foreign ves-
sels.27 Foreign ships may not enter or leave a port on a river 
bordering the PRC and other countries or on a Chinese river 
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The captain of a vessel is required to fill out inbound and 
outbound reports -- including information on passengers and car7o 
-- for inspection by local port administration authorities.2 3 
Foreign vessels in Chinese ports must also submit to customs pro-
cedures and all ships must observe health and quarantine regula-
tions.274 Crews and passengers are subject to both personal and 
luggage inspection pursuant to the Provisional Regulations Con-
cerning Inspection of Incoming and Outgoing Vessels, Passengers, 
Crew and Baggage.275 Pilotage is compulsorr; for entry into and 
departure from a port on a bordering river.2 6 Failure to comply 
wth the orders of a Chinese pilot is a violation of harbor reg-
ulations and in one instance, • resulted in detention followed by 
an order requiring the offending vessel to leave the port immedi-
ately, and in a ban on the Master from returning.•277 
Maritime accidents occurring in PRC waters and ports must 
be expeditiously reported.278 The use of wireless trans:nitters, 
radar, rocket signals and other similar equipment is forbidden 
except in emergency circumstances.279 Under the Port 
Regulations, weapons and ammunition must be sealed and stored 
(Art. 7(1)). 
Under the River Regulations, weapons and ammunition "should 
be delivered to the Port Affairs Supervision Office for custody" 
(Art. 8(1)). Passengers and crews of foreign vessels are strict-
ly prohibited from taking photographs or making sketches or draw-
ings, or otherwise engaging in conduct violating the laws and 
decrees of the PRc.280 The departure of vessels may be temporar-
ily delayed or prohibited for a multiplicity of violations, in-
cluding, inter alia, violations of PRC laws,281 violations of 
technical and tariff regulations282 and unseaworthiness.283 Pre-
vious strict prohibitions against shoreleave for foreign seamen 
have yielded to more 1 iberal regulations. 284 Though 1 ittle is 
actually known about Chinese jurisdiction over criminal and civil 
disputes involving foreigners in port areas, it is most likely 
that Chinese authorities would assert jurisdiction on the basis 
of territorial sovereignty.285 
The preceding rules and regulations indicate that, at 
present, access to PRC ports and inland waterways and general 
mobility of foreign vessels in the PRC are extremely limited. An 
inspectorate should be apprised on the probability that Chinese 
concessions regarding jurisdiction over port areas and inland 
water routes may well be minimal because of their vital impor-
tance to PRC military and economic security. Nevertheless, 
inspectorate operations will undoubtedly require some utilization 
of water routes and harbors. Tt is suggested that the 
inspectorate members employ their own means of transport and 
resort to PRC vessels only for secondary support functions. 
Ideally, the Chinese should be requested to provide limited 
privileges and immunitie.s for both crews and vessels. 
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c) Transportation of Inanimate Cargo 
The conveyance of inanimate movable cargo within the PRC is 
an issue requiring a careful enumeration of specific privileges 
and immunities. By virtue of its accession to th'e Diplomatic 
Convention, the Consular Convention and the UN Convention on 
Privileges, the PRC is on record as advocating a fairly broad 
immunity for movable property of diplomatic and consular agents 
and for representatives of international organizations. However, 
the provisions of the relevant instruments differ in scope. For 
example, both the Diplomatic and Consular Conventions provide for 
the inviolability of archives, documents and official correspon-
dence.286 The Diplomatic Convention also immunizes the personal 
-baggage of a diplomatic agent, provided there are no serious 
grounds for assuming it contains articles not covered by permis-
sible exemptions.2B7 The UN Convention on Privileges288 provides 
for a more unqualified immunity -- albeit one that may provoke 
more technical legal and semantic arguments. Section 13 (a) ac-
cords to representatives of members • immunity from .•. seizure 
[not inspection) of their personal baggage." At the same time, 
Section 13(f) accords to representatives the same immunities with 
respect to personal baggage as are accorded to diplomatic 
agents289 to wit, immunity from inspection (in ordinary 
circumstances) . 
Where some provisions are given strict legal effect, two 
problems arise. First, the relevant provisions would appear to 
immunize certain forms of inspectorate cargo, without immunizing 
the means by which it is transported. Thus, it would be permis-
sible to search the means of transportation carrying such items 
although not the cargo-- and may result in considerable delay 
in transporting equipment and documents.290 
Second, where cargo is immunized, the relevant convention 
provisions refer to official archives, documents and correspon-
dence. Additional problems are created when "the cargo contains 
things that are not subsumed by [these) categories.•291 
The problem is sufficiently acute with respect to inanimate 
cargo transported by inspectorate means of transportation; it is, 
however, compounded when cargo is shipped via Chinese transporta-
tion. Under these circumstances, and absent additional privi-
leges and immunities, inspectorate cargo may be no different from 
ordinary Chinese cargo. As such, it is susceptible of seizure 
under the PRC Criminal Procedure Code, which authorizes Chinese 
investigators to conduct examinations and searches in order to 
collect criminal evidence and to seize objects and documents 
which may be used to prove the accused guilty or not guilty.292 
To ensure the inviolability of inanimate, movable cargo 
used for inspection purposes, the parties to an arms control 
agreement must distinguish among and identify items or articles 
intended to be transported as part of verification procedures and 
extend to them requisite privileges and immunities. Within a 
framework currently existing in international diplomatic 
relations, certain inspectorate items could be transported by 
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diplomatic pouch. 293 However, in its current recognized form, 
the pouch is not a viable means of transporting most inspectorate 
cargo. 294 Undoubtedly, arrangements should be made to protect 
all inspectorate cargo and transportation with adequate immuni-
ties and to broaden the base of acceptable pouch items to include 
environmental sampling for laboratory analysis at facilities out-
side the PRc.295 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This is a recognized principle of sovereignty. See "Rerun in 
Ribao Discusses Laws Applicable to Foreigners," Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service on China [hereafter cited as 
FBIS-cHI] No. 027, 1980 [hereafter cited by year and number 
e.g., 80-027] (Feb. 7, 1980), at L21. According to the 
article, "without prejudice to their privileges and immuni-
ties, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privi-
leges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of 
the receiving state. They also have a duty not to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of the state." The obligation 
of foreign nationals to obey the laws and regulations of 
the PRC while within its jurisdiction is also noted in Art. 
32 of the 1982 PRC Constitution, [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
xianfa] which states: "The People's Republic of China pro-
tects the lawful rights and interest of foreigners within 
Chinese territory, and while on Chinese territory foreign-
ers must abide by the law of the People's Republic of Chi-
na.• See •Text of New PRC Constitution Pubished," FBIS-
CHI-82-235 (Dec. 7, 1982), at Kl [hereafter cited as PRC 
CONSTITUTION]. 
2. Chinese. on the mainland have sarcastically remarked that 
NPC representatives have two roles: to applaud the 
speeches of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and to 
raise their hands to vote yes. F. BUTTERFIELD, CHINA: 
ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA 421 (198.2). 
3. PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 1. Article 62(3) grants to the 
National People's Congress (NPC) the power to "enact and 
amend basic statutes ...• " 
4. Act Regulating the Entry, Exit, Transit, Residence, and 
Travel of Foreign Nationals (in Chinese: Waiguoren rujing 
chujing guojing juliu luxing guanli tiaoli [hereafter cited 
as Foreign National's Act]. The Act was passed by the Na-
tional People's Congress' Standing Committee at its !14th 
meeting, March 13, 1964 and was promulgated by the Premier 
of the State Council on April 13, 1964. Jenmin jihpao [in 
Pinyin: Renmin ribao] [hereafter cited as JMJP] April 20, 
1964, p. 2. For a translation of the text, see J. COHEN 
AND H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
DOCUMENTARY STUDY 510-13 (2 Vols. 1974) [hereafter cited as 
COHEN AND CHIU]. 
This is the basic statute still regulating the move-
ment of foreigners. 
5. Other laws may be found in COHEN AND CHIU, id., at chaps. 
15-18, oassim, and in a recent collection of public securi-
ty laws promulgated from 1950-79 by the PRC and published 
in Chinese. See Gongan fagui huibian, 1950-79 [Collection 
of Public Security Laws], printed by the Commission on the 
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Study of Policy and Law, Department of Public Security, 
Be ij ing, 19 80. 
Applicable laws include customs regulations, health 
and immunization regulations, border security regulations, 
civil aircraft regulations, and the like. 
6. See text accompanying notes 18-21, infra. 
7. Recently, a Chinese woman was given a two-year sentence of 
reeducation through labor for living with a French diplomat 
prior to marriage, despite the fact that both had already 
obtained official PRC permission to marry. The French 
diplomat was asked to leave by the Chinese government. See 
French Press China to Free Envoy's Lover, Balto. Sun, Nov. 
11, 1981, at A3. (Marriage to foreigners is not explicitly 
forbidden in the PRC's new marriage law). See also "Mar-
riage Law Adopted by Fifth Na tiona! People's Congress," 
FBIS-CHI-80-184 (Sept. 19, 1980), at L22. But mixed mar-
riages have been frowned upon. See COHEN AND CHIU, supra 
note 4, at 662-67. 
Other incidents involving foreigners and Chinese na-
tionals in unauthorized contact have helped to chill inti-
mate relationships in the PRC. See, ~· Zhonggong yan 
zhuofang sudian jianu ming bubai zhiyuan (Communists claim 
"hotel incident"; Canadian woman declares her innocence) 
World Journal, Sept. 10, 1982, at 1. (In this case, public 
security officials detained a female Canadian citizen of 
Chinese'extraction who was a guest of an American news cor-
respondent in his hotel room. For not reporting the meet-
ing in advance, he was fined 140 renminbi (appx. $90 at 
that time). See also "AFP: Chinese Girl Forced From 
Diplomats Car ,;;--FBIS-CHI-82-201 (Oct. 18, 1982), at Kl3 
(young Chinese girl forced from French diplomat's car by 
"scores" of unidentified Chinese). 
8. The PRC prohibits 16 mm. photography as a result of an un-
flattering documentary of China made by an Italian movie 
director. This information was supplied to the author by a 
State Department official. 
Restrictions on gathering information are the most 
significant obstacles to inspectorate operations. See Pro-
visional Regulations on Keeping State Secrets (Baoshou 
guojia jimi zhanxing tiaoli], in Gongan fagui huibian, su-
~ note 5, at 472-76 (hereafter cited as State Secrets 
Regulations], passed June 1, 1951 by the National People's 
Congress Standing Committee at its 87th meeting and promul-
gated on June 8, 1951. A translation of the text may be 
found in "Xinhua Publishes Regulations on Guarding State 
Secrets,• FBIS-cHI-80-073 (April 14, 1980), at L7. The Act 
lists broad categories of information, including weather 
reports and telephone numbers, which fall within the ambit 
of State Secrets (Id., Art. 2). This law is designed to 
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prevent unauthorized leaks in the PRC, a country where in-
formation is parceled out like fine tea, to few people and 
in small quantities. 
9. ~· ~· "Beijing Paper Cites Peng Zhen on Civil Law," 
FBIS-cHI-81-119 (June 22, 1981), at Kll. 
10. Fox Butterfield reported that PRC publishing services 
publish foreign materials without compensating their au-
thors, in violation of inter nation copyright conventions, 
which the PRC has chosen not to ratify. See BUTTERFIELD, 
supra note 2, at 390. ---
11. For an example of the use of reciprocity concerning exemp-
tions from customs duties, see Art. 10 of the Consular 
Agreement Between the Union OfSoviet Socialist Republics 
and the People's Republic of China (June 23, 1959) cited in 
G. RHODE AND R. WHITLOCK, TREATIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA, 1949-1978: AN ANNOTATED COMPILATION (1980). 
Note also PRC retaliatory actions, such as the Chinese 
request of the SRV (Vietnam) to close down the latter's 
three consulate-generals in Canton, Kunming, and Nanning 
provinces after the SRV, in effect, had prevented the PRC 
from setting up a Chinese consulate-general in Ho Chi Minh 
City. See "Sino-Vietnamese Relations Continue to Deterio-
rate: Appointment of Consul-General Canceled." FBIS-CHI-
78-120 (June 21, 1978), at AlO. 
12. It is within the realm of reasonable foreseeability 
that persons performing arms inspection functions [in 
the PRC] would occasionally commit or be accused of 
committing violations of laws for the protection of • 
• [Chinese] public order. This would be so even if 
certain kinds of normally culpable conduct were deemed 
privileged in the interest of arms inspection activi-
ties • The relatively small number of indi-
viduals involved, combined with their probable charac-
ter traits, would be bound to keep down the count of 
such incidents, but their total absence could not be 
guaranteed. Leaving aside spectacular instances of 
violence and vice, there would still remain countless 
opportunities for breaching rules of conduct by reason 
of ignorance, inattention, misunderstanding, or other 
common human failings. 
z. ZILE, R. SHARLET AND J. LOVE, THE SOVIET LEGAL 
SYSTEM AND ARMS INSPECTION: A CASE STUDY IN POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION 197 (1972) [hereafter cited as ZILE, 
SHARLET AND LOVE] • 
13. See "NPC Standing Committee Session Ends in Beijing: Civil 
P"[[cedure Law,• FBIS-CHI-82-045 (March 8, 1982), at K6. 
Presumably, organizations and international organizations 
would include diplomatic missions, consular delegations, 
and certain of the UN Specialized Agencies, all by virtue 
of PRC ratification of international conventions, whose 
- 182 -
provisions envelop such organizations. See notes 95, 108 
and 115, infra. 
An inspectorate could reasonably appear in one of two 
forms: adversary (composed of members of certain other 
parties to an ACD agreement) or international (composed of 
members of disinterested countries, perhaps under (UN aus-
pices). The PRC is on record as supporting an internation-
al verification body, though this may not be akin to sup-
port for an international on-site inspection team. 
Although an inspectorate is not entitled to privileges 
and immunities as a matter of law, at least within the am-
bit of convention provisions acceded to by the PRC, it ap-
pears that the Chinese suggestion of an international 
verification organization may have been prompted by PRC 
recognition of the probability--and more palatable belief--
that personnel of an international organization would be 
less likely to cause serious national security concerns. 
This is particularly true when one investigates frequent 
PRC press reports "that condemn at least one other nuclear 
power, the Soviet Union (a probable member of an adversary 
inspectorate), for the constant, oppressive, and dangerous 
clandestine activities of the KGB in third countries. See, 
.!L:.9..:.• "Renmin Ribao Looks at KGB Activities in u.s., FBIS-
CHI-81-234 (Dec. 7, 1981), at Bl. See also note 89, infra. 
14. See "NPC Standing Committee Session Ends in Beijing, Civil 
Procedure Law," FBIS-CHI-82-045 (March 8, 1982) K6, at K7. 
15. The PRC CRIMINAL CODE was passed on July 1, 1979 at the 
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and 
was promulgated on Jan. 1, 1980. See Gongan fagui huibian, 
supra note 5, at 4-33. For the English text of the PRC 
CRIMINAL CODE, see "Seven PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC 
Second Session,......--pBIS-cHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979) PART I: 
Supp. no. 019 [hereafter cited as Supp. no. 019] at 33-62. 
16. Article 12 of the PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE is also ap-
plicable to foreigners who commit crimes in the PRC. This 
effectively grants foreign nationals the full spectrum of 
procedural rights due them when criminal prosecution is 
initiated. The PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE was passed on 
July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National 
People's Congress and entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980. 
See Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 34-65. For the 
English text of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, see "Seven PRC 
Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session, FBIS-cHI-79-146 
(July 27, 1979) PART II: Supp. no. 020 [hereafter cited as 
Supp. no. 020], at 1-31. 
17. The phrase "unless otherwise specified by law" applies to 
foreigners who enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities 
and will be addressed more fully in text infra at Chapter 
4. --
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18. See "American Expelled for 'Stealing China's Secrets,• 
FBIS-CHI-82-107 (June 3, 1982), at Bl; Weisskopf, China 
Holds American as Suspect in Spy Case, Washington Post, 
June 2, 1982, p. Al. 
19. See •soviet Spy 'Imprisoned', Chinese Natipnal Sentenced to 
Death," FBIS-CHI-80-141 (July 21, 1980), at Cl. 
20. Sentences range from 3 years for less serious cases to the 
death sentence for more serious offenses. 
21. Lisa Wichser, the American teacher, was treated leniently 
by the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, and ex-
pelled for violating Chinese secrecy laws--presumably, the 
1951 Provisional Regulations on Keeping State Secrets, su-
~ note 8-~which is punishable as counterrevoluntionary 
activity under the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Arts. 
90-104. 
The Soviet spy, Nikolay Petrovich Zhang, was sentenced 
under Article 3 (which makes the PRC CRI!HNAL CODE ap-
plicable to foreigners) and Article 97, para. 3 (supporting 
the enemy by joining an "espionage organization• ). 
Though the explanation for the differences in the 
laws' application was most probably politically motivated, 
it is important to note that there is a legal basis for 
Wichsler' s dissimilar treatment. Article 30 of the PRC 
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, states: 
Deportation may be applied as an exclusive or supple-
mentary penalty to a foreigner who has committed an 
offense. [emphasis added] 
22. See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 321. 
23. See "Reportage on PRC's New Criminal Law: Legal Expert on 
Technical Points, "FBIS-cHI-79-131 (July 6, 1979), at Ll6. 
24. See id. See also PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Article 
~-
25. PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 5. 
26. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 14. 
27. 1£., Art. 15. 
28. Id., Art. 16. 
29. 1£., Art. 17. 
30. See Ar tiel e 7 of the PRC ORGANIC LAW FOR PEOPLE'S COURTS, 
passed on July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth 
National People's Congress and entered into force on Jan. 
1, 1980, in Gongan fagui huibian, suPra note 5, at 449-57. 
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For the English text, ~ Supp. no. 19, supra note 15, at 
20-27. 
31. See "Fifth NPC Standing Committee Reportage Continues: 
'Special Court, Procuratorate Members'," FBIS-CHI-80-191 
(Sept. 30, 1980), at 15. 
32. For example, Prof. Hungdah Chiu attacked the legal grounds 
for the establishment of the special organs on the basis of 
the fact that Articles 20 and 31 cited below provide for 
the establishment of permanent (standing) divisions and not 
mere ad hoc creations. He also pointed out the legal de-
fectsin"the composition of the special procuratorate and 
special court. See Chiu, Certain Legal Aspects of the Re-
cent Peking Trials of the "Gang of Four" and Others, OC-
CASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., 
No. 3-1981 (40), at 27-38 [hereafter cited as "Gang of Four 
Trial"]. See also The ORGANIC LAW FOR PEOPLE'S PROCURATOR-
ATES, passed on July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the 
Fifth National People's Congress and entered into force on 
Jan. 1, 1980, in Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 
458-64. The English text may be found in Supp. no. 019, 
supra note 47, at 27-33. Article 20 of this law states: 
"The Supreme People's Procuratorate shall extablish 
criminal, disciplinary, prison and economic procuratorial 
divisions. It may also, according to its need, establish 
other organs.• 
Article 31 of the PRC ORGANIC LAW FOR PEOPLE'S COURTS, 
supra note 30, states: "The Supreme People's Court shall 
establish a criminal court, a civil court and an economic 
court, and may also set up other courts as needed." PRC 
jurist Zhang Youyu defended the establishment of the spe-
cial court on the basis of the latter provision. See Jian-
pan Wu and Tao Ouyang, "On Problems of the Application of 
Law Concerning the Trails in the Counterrevolutionary Cases 
of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing ,• Faxue Yanj iu (Legal Studies), 
No. 6, p. 3 (1980). 
33. See "NPC Promulgates New Regulations on Arrest, Deten-
tions," FBIS-cBI-79-039 (Feb. 26, 1979), at E2 [hereafter 
cited as Arrest and Detention Regulations]. Prior to the 
enactment of these regulations, detention was frequently 
arbitrary. For example, the PRC detained two Americans who 
had inadvertently strayed into PRC territorial waters in 
their yacht for almost 10 months -- Feb. 16 - Dec. 6, 1969. 
No charges were ever filed against the Americans in that 
period. ~B. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 188 (1979). 
34. See Arrest and Detention Regulations, id., Art. 4. 
35. Id., Art. 5. There are no indications in these regulations 
that the issuance of warrants in the PRC depends on such 
Western concepts' as probable cause. It appears sufficient 
that the warrant is requested by official personnel. 
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36. ..!.!! • , Art. 2 • 
37. ..!.!! • , 1\.r t. 8 . 
38. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 92, para. 
2. 
39. The 1354 Act of the PRC for Reform Through Labor was recon-
firmed by the NPC Standing on Nov. 29, 1979. See "12th 
Meeting of NPC Standing Committee Ends: ApprovalOf Reg-
ulations," FBIS-cHI-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at L3. On the 
same day, Nov. 29, 1979, the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress issued its Decision on the Ques-
tion of the Validity of Laws and Decrees Enacted Since the 
Founding of the PRC, cited in Gongan faaui huibian, supra 
note 5, at 447-48. For the English text, ~ "12 Meeting 
of NPC Standing Committee Ends: Adopts Resolution on Past 
Laws," FBIS-CHI-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at L3. This deci'"' 
sion reconfirmed the validity of certain PRC laws and reg-
ulations enacted in the early 1950s and suspended during 
the Cultural Revolution of the 1 ate 1960s. See also "Ren-
min Ribao Editorial Hails Validity of Past Laws," FBIS-CHI-
79-233 (Dec. 3, 1979), at L4. 
40. See the 1954 Act of the PRC for Reform Through Labor, id., 
Art. B. This Act is used as the basis for removing un-
desirables from the mainstream of Chinese society much like 
Soviet psychiatric institutions are used against dissidents 
in the USSR. See also P. SHORT, THE DRAGON AND THE BEAR 
114-16 (1982). - --
41. Id. The jail cell is designed to isolate serious criminal 
offenders from minor offenders. 
42. See "Gang of Four Trial," supra note 32, at 27-38. See 
~ text accompanying notes 18-21 supra and notes 130 and 
154 infra. 
43. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 105, para. 
2. See also Ar tiel es 9 and 10 of the PRC ORGANIC LAW FOR 
PEOPLE'S COURTS, supra note 30. 
People's assessors are unlike jurors as we know them in 
the United States. But see "Shanghai Districts Elect, 
Train People's Court--:JUries," FBIS-cHI-80-154 (Aug. 7, 
1980) (This article was probably mistranslated, incorrectly 
substituting "juries" for "assessors." There are no juries 
in the PRC.) First, the assessors are usually intimately 
familiar with the facts of the defendant's case before tri-
al. Most often, they are chosen from the defendant's dan-
wei or workplace and have an unfavorable predisposiTIO'ii 
toward the defendant's action. This is in keeping with the 
Chinese principles of isolation and confrontation: sin-
gling out the accused, confronting him with his acts, and 
securing his confessions and repentance, usually in the 
form of sel f-er i tic ism. Assessors serve only in the court 
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of first instance. At the appellate level there are three 
judges and no assessors. 
Second, there are no legal devices such as voir dire 
with its attendant rights of dismissal for cause or peremp 
tory challenges as Western legal systems know them. Asses-
sors, once appointed (ostensibly, they are to be elected by 
the people, although they are often selected by local offi-
cials) are expected to serve; no lawyer will challenge 
their presence neither with cause nor without. See, ~, 
"Hunan's Use of Peale's Assessors Proves Effective," FBIS-
CHI-80-205 (Oct. 21, 1980), at L7 (Hunan assessors "chosen" 
for 3-4 year terms and may be removed at any time for in-
competence or negligence.) Cf. "Jiefangjun Bao on System 
of Assessors for Military Courts," FBIS-cHI-80-197 (Oct. 8, 
1980), at L8. 
44. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 215. 
45. Adopted at the Aug. 26, 1980 session of the Standing com-
mittee of the National People's Congress, in Zhongguo baike 
nianj ian 1981 (China encyclopeadic yearbook 1981), Beijing 
1982, at 190-91. For a translation of the text, see "Text 
of Provisional Regulations on Lawyers," FBIS-CHI-80-169 
(Aug. 28, 1980), at L6. See also "Renmin Ribao, Discusses 
Regulations for Lawyers" FBIS-cHI-82-Gll (Jan. 18, 1982), 
at Kl6. 
46. See Peking Restricts Foreign Legal Firms, Dealing Setback 
to Some U.S. Lawyers, Asian Wall St. Journal, Jan. 1, 1982, 
p. 6. There are American firms in the PRC, including Baker 
& McKenzie, with offices in Beijing hotels, but their work 
is confined largely to trade negotiations and issues. None 
of the US attorneys, however, is licensed to practice law 
in the PRC. 
There are no provisions in the Provisionl Regulations 
on Lawyers for foreign representation of foreign nationals, 
including foreign official personnel. 
47. See "Regulations on Civil Law Procedures Outlined," FBIS-
CHI-79-017 (Jan. 24, 1979), at El2. 
48. See "NPC Standing Committee Session Ends in Beijing: Civil 
Procedure Law," FBIS-cHI-82-045 (March 8, 1982), at K6. 
See also "Jurist Discusses New Civil Procedure Law," FBIS-
CHI-82-046 (March 9, 1982), at KlO; Yanling, China's Law of 
Civil Procedure, Beijing Review, No. 33 (Aug. 16, 1982), at 
20. 
49. See "Wang Harbin on Legal Question on Trial," FBIS-CHI-80-
241 (Dec. 12, 1980) at LS; "Gang of Four Trials Opens in 
Beijing; Indictment Read: 'Jurist Interviewed on Trial'," 
FBIS-cHI-80-226 (Nov. 20, 1980), at L2. This is not to say 
that the • presumption of innocence" has been completely 
ignored. Prior to the promulgation of the PRC CRIIHNAL 
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CODE, a Renmin Ribao article called for the "assumption of 
innocence" to be included in the CODE. "Renmin Ribao Arti-
cle Discusses Judicial Procedure," FBIS-CHI-79-046 (March 
7, 1979), at E7. 
50. See "Renmin Ribao Explains Role of Defense Lawyer," FBIS-
CHI-80-242 (Dec. 15, 1980), at Ll7. See also "Commentary 
on Correct Understanding of Defense Lawyei""S""Role," FBIS-
CHI-80-187 (Sept. 24, 1980), at Ll4; "Vice Justice Minister 
Interviewed on Regulations on Lawyers," FBIS-cHI-80-178 
(Sept. 11, 1980), at L27; "Renmin Ribao on Questions About 
Lin-Jiang Trial," FBIS-CHI-81-027 (Feb. 10, 1981), at LlO; 
The Role of Chinese Lawyers, Beijing Review, No. 46 (Nov. 
17, 1980), at 24; China's Lawyers, Beijing Review, No. 23 
(June 7, 1982), at 14. 
51. The attorney in the PRC is a state functionary who rep-
resents a particular client only on the advice and consent 
of.the Chinese Communist Party. The attorney is not expec-
ted to defend his client's interests too zealously, and his 
main function is merely to present to the court mitigating 
circumstances of his client's guilt. No attorney in the 
PRC fights for the innocence of his client, and, within at 
least a tacit understanding between the Chinese Communist 
Party and PRC lawyers, no defendant is ever really inno-
cent. This information was provided to the author on Dec. 
6, 1982, by a PRC attorney currently enrolled in a US 
educational institution. 
For an overview of the Chinese code of "leniency to 
those who confess, severity for those who resist," see 
"Leniency For Those Who Confess Crimes Advocated," FBIS-
CHI-82-066 (April 6, 1982), at K4; "Renmin Ribao on 
Criminal Law Leniency, Severity," FBIS-CHI-81-234 (Dec. 7, 
1981), at K24 (noting that the "leniency, severity" code 
dates back as far as 1940 and was part of Mao Zedong's 1952 
directive on the Struggle Against the "Three Evils" and the 
"Five Evils.") 
52. During the entire period of the Cultural Revolution, from 
1966-1975 legal codes, lawyers, judicial officers, legal 
practice, and all formal legal institutions ceased to ex-
ist. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, a rebirth of 
law as an institution of the PRC began. See, ~·· 
"Chengdu Law School," FBIS-cHI-066 (April 7, 1981), at Q2; 
"International Law Society Founded, Officers Elected,• 
FBIS-cHI-80-026 (Feb 6, 1980), at L2; "Tianjin Municipality 
Establishes Law Society ,• FBIS-cHI-79-145 (July 26, 1979), 
at Rl; "Northwest Political Law College," FBIS-cHI-79-165 
(Aug. 23, 1979), at T3; "Tianjin Law School," FBIS-cHI-79-
143 (July 24, 1979), at R3. 
·53. See ~-, "PRC Adopts 8-Year Plan for Study of Law". FBIS-
CHI-79-065 (April 3, 1979), at L8; "International Law 
Research to be Strengthened" FBIS-cHI-80-025 (Feb 5, 1980), 
at LlO; "Shaanxi Criminal Law Studies" FBIS-cHI-79-196 
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(Oct. 9, 1979), at R2; "Guangming Ribao Reports New Pro-
grams in Legal Education" FBIS-cHI-80-080 (April 23, 1980), 
at L3. 
54. See ~, "Vice Minister Wang Notes Shortage of Lawyers," 
FBIS-cHI-80-212 (Oct. 30, 1980), at L3. See also "Legal 
Consultants Office Set Up in Beijing," FBIS-cHI-82-072 
(April 14, 1982), at Kl7; "Judicial Bureaus Set Up Through-
out Beijing," FBIS-cHI-81-075 (April 20, 1981), at Rl;. 
"Justice Ministry Announces Plans to Train More Lawyers," 
FBIS-cHI-80-101 (May 22, 1980), at Ll5; "Beijing Lawyers 
Prepare for Codes Taking Effect in January," FBIS-CHI-79-
173 (Sept. 5, 1979), at L5. 
55. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 26. 
56. The PRC socialist legal system is organized as a civil law 
system. Stare decisis, a principle of the common law, is 
unlikely to prevail in a country having the civil law as 
the basis of its jurisprudence. 
57. See, ~, text accompanying notes 18 and 19, supra. 
58. See,~, "People's Daily Publishes Articles on Legal Sys-
tem," FBIS-cHI-79-006 (Jan. 9, 1979), at Ell; "H~ilongj iang 
Judge Discusses Strengthening of Judicial System," FBIS-
CHI-79-028 (Feb. 8, 1979), at L2; "Ye Jianying Discusses 
Revisions in Nation's Legal System," FBIS-CHI-79-032 (Feb. 
14, 1979), at E4; "Supreme Court President Discusses Legal 
System Reforms," FBIS-CHI-80-168 (Aug. 27, 1980), at L7; 
"Renmin Ribao Carries More Excerpts of NPC Deputies' 
Speeches: 'Opinions on Strengthening Legal Work'," FBIS-
CHI-80-187 (Sept. 24, 1980), at Ll4; "Progress Being Made 
in Rebuilding Legal System," FBIS-CHI-80-126 (Nov. 5, 
1980), at L4; "Beijing Ribao Decries Interference in Legal 
Cases," FBIS-cHI-81-021 (Feb. 2, 1981), at LB. See also 
Chiu, Structural Changes in the Organization and operatiOn 
of China's Criminal Justice System, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/ 
REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., No. l-1981 ( 38) 1 
at 7-9; Chiu, Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in 
Post-Mao Communist China, 17 ISSUES & STUD. 45, 53-55 (No. 
11, Nov. 1981); SHORT, supra note 40, at 389. 
59. See ~·· "Beijing Lawyers' Association Formed; To Provide 
Legal Advice,• FBIS-cHI-79-096 (May 16, 1979), at R2; "Har-
bin Reopens Legal Advice Office,• FBIS-CHI-80-013 (Jan. 18, 
1980), at S2; "Yunnan Legal Advice Offices,• FBIS-cHI-80-
082 (April 25, 1980), at Q2; "Qinghai Legal Offices,• FBIS-
CHI-80-069 (April 8, 1980), at T2; "Nei Monggol Judicial 
Bureau,• FBIS-cHI-80-093 (May 12, 1980), at R4; "Work of 
Legal Advisory Offices Reviewed ,• FBIS-cHI-82-004 (Jan. 7, 
1982), at K8; "Legal Consultants Office Set Up in Beijing,• 
FBIS-cHI-82-072 (April 14, 1982), at Kl7. 
60. See PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 2. According 
to Aritcle 2, the task of the criminal law is to: 
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Struggle against counterrevoluntionary crimes and acts 
of criminal offenses •.• protect the personal rights, 
democratic rights, and other rights of citizens, main-
tian public order and order in production, work teach-
ing, scientific research and the life of masses 
61. Article 10 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, defines 
a criminal offense as 
Any action which endangers state sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity, jeopardizes the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, sabotages socialist revolution and 
socialist construction, disrupts public order, en-
croaches upon the property of the whole people, the 
collective or legitimate privat.e property, infringes 
upon the personal rights, democratic rights and other 
rights of citizens or any other act which endangers 
society and is punishable according to law is an of-
fence. However, if the offense is obviously a minor 
one and if its harm is negligible, it should not be 
considered a crime. 
62. Inspectorate personnel will more than 1 ikely be accorded a 
certain range of privileges and immunities in operating 
within PRC territory. Violations of domestic law by im-
munized foreign nationals is customarily handled by oersona 
non grata proceedings (i.e. expulsion). See text accom 
panying note 94, infra. But, expulsion is likely to be 
viewed as a supplementary penalty in instances where viola-
tions are egregious (eg: Stealing military secrets during 
inspectorate operations). In such an event, the act is so 
ultra vires that it might not protect an otherwise im-
munized foreign official from criminal prosecution. Cf. PRC 
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 30; note 21, supra.-
63. See PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, PART 2: CHAPTER I, 
Arts. 90-104. 
64. Translation by author from Faxue Cidian (Law Dictionary) 
(published in Shanghi, PRC, 1980), p. 118. 
65. "Renmin Ribao Article on Counterrevolutionary Crimes,• 
FBIS-cHI-79-148 (July 31, 1979), at L6. See also "Guang-
ming Ribao Discusses Counterrevolutionary Offe""ii'SeS,• FBIS-
CHI-79-165 (Aug. 23, 1979), at Ll; "Renmin Ribao Defines 
Counterrevolutionary Words, Deeds," FBIS-cHI -80-0 4 7 (March 
7, 1980), at L6. Cf. "Correction to Supplement on Laws 
Adopted at 5th NPC 2nd Session,• FBIS-cHI-79-165 (Aug. 23, 
1979), at Ll7. 
66. PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 97(1) - (3)._ 
67. ~ note 8, supra. 
68. State Secrets Regulations, supra note 8, Art. 1. 
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6 9. Id • , Ar t. 2. 
70. This information was imparted to the author by Profssor Jan 
Prybyla, Pennsylvania State University, at the recent 24th 
Annual Conference of the American Association for Chinese 
Studies, held in Baltimore, MD., November 6-7,1982. 
71. State Secrets Regulations, suora note 8, Art. 2, para. 17. 
See also P. SHORT, supra note 40, at 362. 
72. See PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 91-97, 100-103. 
Note that a recent NPC Standing Committee decision suspend-
ed the death sentence review procedure of the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court for certain criminal offenses (all capital 
crimes except embezzlement and counter revel ution) until 
1983. See "NPC Standing Committee Concfudes 10 June: 
Decisionson Death Sentences," FBIS-cHI-81-112 (June 11, 
1981), at K4. 
73. "Renmin Ribao Article on Counterrevolutionary Crimes," 
FBIS-cHI-79-148 (July 31, 1949), at L6. See also "Shanghai 
Lecture on Crimes Against Public SafetyTFBIS-cHI-79-233 
(Nov. 16, 1979), at 011 (intentional acts of saboteurs 
should be severely punished while negligent acts endanger-
ing public safety should be dealt with according to "legal 
action", which is, presumably, less severe); Faxue Cidian, 
suora note 64, at 118; Lecture V: Suppress All Counter-
revolutionary Criminals; Advance the Consolidation of the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 13 CHINESE LAI'I' & GOV'T. 
38, 41 (No. 2, Summer 1980). 
74. See, ~, "Further Reportage on Bohai No. 2 Accdent,• 
FBIS-cHI-80-173 (Sept. 4, 1980), at L21 (noting that 4 men 
who were accused of dereliction of duty in relation to the 
Bohai No. 2 oil rig accident that killed 72 Chinese 
received prison sentences ranging from one to four years). 
75. See PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 79, which 
States: 
Those who commit offenses not explicitly defined in 
specific articles of the criminal law may be convicted 
and sentenced according to the most approximate article 
in the criminal law. However, permission must be ob-
tained from the Supreme People's Court. 
76. Arguably, Western creative statutory interpretation often 
fills the analogy role. See ~, United States v. Mandel, 
591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 961 
( 1980) (noting the ever expanding use of the mail fraud 
statute to cover activities previously considered to be 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of state regulation). 
77. See "Renmin Ribao Explains Section of Criminal Law," FBIS-
ffi-80-033 (Feb. 15, 1980), at Ll5. 
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78. See PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15,. PART 2, CHAPTER II, 
Arts. 105-115. 
79. Id. 
80. ~ee generally Lecture VI: Struggle Against Crimes of Harm-
lng Public Security: Safeguard the Security of the Peo-
ple's Lives and Property, 13 CHINESE LAW & GOV'T. 46, 47 
(No. 2, Summer 1980). 
81. PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 63. 
82. See note 51, supra. ~ &.22 "Jeifang Ribao Comments on 
Maintaining Social Order ,• FBIS-cHI-80-002 (Jan. 3, 1980), 
at 06. For examples of cases where criminals were exempted 
from punishment or·given lighter sentences because of self-
denunciations (admissions of guilt), ~ "Henan Sentences 
Man for 'Appealing' Wei Jingsheng Case,• FBIS-CHI-79-246 
(Dec. 20, 1979), at 041 "Beijing Press Highlights Execution 
of Convicted Murderer ,• FBIS-cHI-80-059 (march 25, 1980), 
83. 
at L8. · 
~ generally R. BERNSTEIN, FROM THE 
(1982)1 BUTTERF!ELD, supra note 21 J. 
IN CHINA 289-337 (1980)1 ZILE, SHARLET 
121 H. ROS ITZ KE, THE KGB : THE EYES OF 
CENTER OF THE EARTH 
TOWNSEND, POLITICS 
AND LOVE, supra note 
RUSSIA (1981). 
84. Cf. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 198. 
85. An excellent example of such committees and their respec-
tive purposes is offered by the 1980 reintroduction of four 
sets of regulations, previously enacted in 1952. The Or-
ganic Regulations of the Urban Neighborhood Committee, the 
Organic Regulations of the Subdistrict Office, The Tem-
porary Organic. Regulations of the People's Mediation Com-
mittee and the Temporary Regulations of the Social Order 
and Security Committees were repromulgated by the NPC. See 
"Central Press Publishes NPC. Regulations on Local Organiza-
tions,• FBIS-cHI-80-017 (Jan. 24, 1980), at L2-9. Cf. 
"Renmin Ribao Notes Effectiveness of Criminal Surveil-
lance,". FBIS-cHI-80-005 (Jan. 8, 1980), at Ll7.16 
Surveillance by the masses may be a throwback to the 
Shan Yang era (circa 350 B.C.), where failure to denounce 
an offender was punishable by death. See D. BLOODWORTH, 
THE CHINESE LOOKING GLASS 36 (1980 ed.). 
86. ~ ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 198. One can 
envision the potential for such groups to utilize obscure 
regulations to harass an inspectorate; For example, a new 
Beijing (Peking) sanitation regulation calls for fines to 
be imposed on those who spit on, urinate in, or litter the 
streets of Beijing. See "Peking Municipality Issues New 
Sanitation Regulatons,n-pBis-cHI-78-242 (Dec. 15, 1978), at 
K21 "Beijing Vice Mayor Urges Stricter Sanitation Laws ,• 
FBIS-cHI-81-152 (Aug. 7, 1981), at Rl. See ~ "1957 
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Public Security Regulations Published." FBIS-cHI-80-039 
(Feb. 26, 1980), at LB-15. 
87. PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 158. 
88. See ~' Butterfield, How the Chinese Pol ice Themselves, 
N.Y. Times, April 18, 1982, at 32 (Magazine). 
89. ZILE, SHA~ET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 79. The PRC has 
questioned the dignity of Soviet Embassy personnel on more 
than one occasion, claiming that they serve as agents of 
the KGB. See ~· •soviet Activities in Singapore De-
nounced," FBIS-cHI-82-040 (March 1, 1982), at Cl1 "In-
donesian Expulsion of Soviet Diplomat Viewed." id.J "Renmin 
Ribao Looks at KGB Activities in U.S. ,• FBIS-cHI-81-234 
(Dec. 7, 1981), at Bl. "KGB-Agency of Fascist Repression, 
Spying, Subversion,• SCMP no. 5969, Nov. 6, 1975, at 2311 
"Jen-min Jih-pao Article: Dirty, Ugly Espionage Activities 
of Soviet Revisionists," SCMP no. 5580 (March 26, 1974), at 
65. 
90. See ~' "Further Commentary on Netherlands Sub Sale: 
'Ranking of Envoys Explained', "FBIS-cHI-81-013 (Jan. 21, 
1981), at G4 (noting that diplomatic envoys "diplomatic 
privileges" and not "diplomatic privileges and immuni-
ties"). But see "Renmin Ribao Discusses Laws Applicable to 
ForeignerS";'" FBIS-cHI-80-027 (Feb 7, 1980), at L21 (ad-
dressing the effect of the criminal law on those who enjoy 
"diplomatic privileges and immunity")! Article 8 of the PRC 
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, also addresses those with 
diplomatic privileges and immunities. 
The apparent ambiguity is probably more the result of 
the imprecision in press reporting than the pronouncement 
of differing Chinese legal standards. Cf. "PRC Protests 
KGB Attempt to Force PRC Diplomat to Defect," FBIS-cHI-80-
170 (Aug. 29, 1980), at Cl (PRC note protesting KGB at-
tempts to incite Chinese diplomatic defection in violation 
of international laws and norms on relations between 
countries). 
The nature of the difference between privilege and im-
munity can also be gleaned from an examination of Chinese 
domestic news reports. A recent Jiangsu circular, for ex-
ample, decried the use of • special privileges" by Party 
(CCP) members in housing construction projects. See 
"Jiangsu Circular Forbids Special Privileges,• FBIS-cHI-80-
246 (Dec. 19, 1980), at 04. The suggestion is that the 
term "privilege" connotes special treatment over and above 
the usual treatl\lent, but does not refer to special treat-
ment outside the usual, a phrase best described by an ex-
emption, or, in English translation, an immunity [mian-
chu). For instance, certain Chinese officials :nay beeie= 
pected to travel fairly freely within the PRC. Where such 
officials receive better accommodations en route, they are 
receiving privileges. However, an average PRC citizen, who 
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is not permitted to travel freely, would require an exemp-
tion to travel to a restricted area. 
Chinese recognition of diplomatic privileges and im-
munities may extend back as far as the Boxer Rebellion in 
1900. The Chinese commander-in-chief in Peking sent a 
telegram to the viceroys of South China, stating. "When 
two countries are at war, it has been customary since an-
tiquity not to injure the envoys. ."BLOODWORTH, supra 
note 8 5 , at 2 6 • 
91. See "Renmin Ribao Discusses Laws Applicable to Foreigners," 
FBIS-cHI-80-027 (Feb 7, 1980), at L21. According to the 
. article, "without prejudice to their privileges and immuni-
ties, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privi-
leges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of 
the receiving state. They also have a duty not to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of that state.• See also Ar-
ticle 41 of the Diplomatic Convention, infra note 9s:--
92. See "Renmin Ribao Discusses Laws Applicable to Foreigners," 
FBIS-cHI-80-027 (Feb 7, 1980), at L21. 
93. Parties to an inspection arrangement must address the issue 
of the waiver of immunity by a sending state, which is in-
corporated in the Diplomatic Convention infra note 95, the 
Consular Convention, infra note 108 and""tiieUN Convention 
on Privileges, infra note 115. By virtue of such an inter-
national practice, a grant of extensive, jurisdictional 
immunities to foreign inspectorate personnel would not 
necessarily immunize these agents from legal process, since 
absent immunity granted to them by the sending state for 
acts performed within the scope of official duties, the 
host state might couple expulsion of personnel for trans-
gressions in the host country with a formal request for 
prosecution by the sending state. 
In practice, requests of this nature are rarely made or 
honored, because of the inability of· the requesting state 
to enforce its request in the sending state. 
94. Article 41 of the Diplomatic Convention, infra note 95. 
See also "AFP: PRC Expels Dutch Newspaper Correspondent," 
FBIS-cHI-81-096 (May 19, 1981), at G2 (for activities • in-
compatible with the status of a correspondent"). See 
generally, COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 929-1108. ---
95. Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 
23 U.S.T< 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 
[hereafter cited as Diplomatic Convention] The PRC 
deposited its accession on Nov. 26, 1975 with reservations 
concerning "the provisions about nuncios and the represen-
tative of the Holy see in Arts. 14 and 16 and on the provi-
sions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Art. 37" (regarding the 
privileges and immunities of service, technical and ad-
ministrative personnel). See H. CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE 
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96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, A CALENDAR OF EVENTS 1966-1980, 
217 (1981) [hereafter cited as PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80). 
See also S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER 
425-26(1979). 
Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Art. 29. 
12_., Art. 31 ( l). 
12_.' Art. 29. 
Id., Art. 31(2). 
12_.' Art. 29. 
101. See also Fu Chu, "Diplomatic Privileges," Shih-chieh chih-
shih no. 21: 32 (Nov. 10, 1965) cited in COHEN AND CHIU, 
supra note 4, at 949; PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra 
note 16, Art. 12; Keng and Chuan, Practice Regarding 
Diploma tic and Consular Privileges and Immunities, in LAW 
IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-94 (Keng and Chiu ed., 
1972) [hereafter cited as LENG AND CHIU). 
102. There is 1 ittle available information on automatic incor-
poration of PRC-ratified treaties into PRC municipal law. 
For example, in the most recent compilation of PRC domestic 
laws and regulations, no treaties are included. See Gongan 
fagui huibian, supra note 5. 
However, the recently circulated PRC Provisional Civil 
Procedure Law contains provisions noting that, in the ab-
sence of strict language to the contrary, any conflict 
between international treaties and conventions (to which 
the PRC is a party) and the Law of Civil Procedure, will be 
resolved in favor of those international treaties and con-
ventions, except where specific contractual clauses desig-
nate that PRC law will apply. ~ Yanling, supra note 48, 
at 22. 
103. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 11, para. 
6. 
104. See note 18 supra. The US Embassy protested alleged Chi-
nese disregard for the US-PRC Consular Convention for 
detaining Ms. Wichser, the American graduate student teach-
ing in Beijing. Embassy officials claimed they had not 
been notified of the arrest in timely fashion and had been 
unable to visit her during 4 days of detention despite pro-
visions of the bilateral consular convention permitting 
speedy access to imprisoned Americans. See also Weisskopf, 
China Reported Set to Expel American Held 1n Spy Case, 
Washington Post, June 3, 1982, p. Al. Note that prior to 
the promulgation of Chinese detention regulations and the 
ratification of the Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, 
the PRC was often arbitrary in its treatment of foreigners 
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who violated ·chinese Law. In two separate instances in 
1969, for example, the PRC detained American yachtsmen who 
had inadvertently strayed into Chinese territorial waters. 
Two of them were detained without formal charges for almost 
10 months (from Feb. 16, 1969 to Dec. 6, 1979). See KIS-
SINGER, supra note 33, at 180,188. ---
105. ~, ~, Fu Chu, "Diplomate Privileges," Shih-chieh chih-
shih, no. 21:32 (Nov. 10, 1965) cited in COHEN AND CHIU, 
supra note 4, at 949. ~ generally, id:; at 933-55. 
106. See Diplomatic Convention, supL! note 95, Art. 29. 
107. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTE.RNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 791-92 
(Vol. I: Peace, H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed, 1955). Oppen-
heim suggested that diplomatic agents may be restrained 
upon the commission of acts which disturb the internal or-
der of the state. Id., at 791. Cf., Chunq-hua jen-min 
kunq-ho kuo min-fa chi-pen wen-t'i (Fundamental problems of 
the civil law of the PRC7 Peking, 1958) p. 41 cited in 
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 1001. "Diplomatic immuni-
ty is a matter of comity in international relations. It 
does not affect the uniformity and independence of [the 
PRC'S] legal sovereignty .... Id. See also "Jenmin Jihpao Ar-
ticle: Dirty, Ugly Espionage Activities of Soviet 
Revisionists,• SCMP no.5580 (March 26, 1974), at G5 (Chi-
nese arrests of Soviet KGB agents are in conformance with 
"generally accepted norms of international law"). 
108. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 
U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereafter 
cited as Consular Convention]. The PRC deposited its ac-
cession on July 2, 1979. See PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra 
note 95, at 218. 
109. ~ PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 95, at 218. 
110. Consular Convention, supra note 108, Art. 41. Grave crime 
is not further defined in the Convention, but would prob-
ably include all capital offenses in the state where the 
act was conmitted. 
111. Id., Art. 44(1). 
112. Id., Art. 44(3) 
113. M·, Art. 43. 
114. M·• Art. 41. 
115. UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Spe-
cialized Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 521, 33 U.N. 
T.S. 261 [hereafter cited as UN Convention on Privileges]. 
PRC accession was deposited on Sept. 11, 1979. See PRC 
AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 95, at 218. · ---
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The PRC's accession was with respect to the UN Food and 
Argricul tural Organization (second revised text of annex 
II), the International Civil Aviation Organization (annex 
III), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (annex IV), the tiorld Health Organization (third re-
vised text of annex VII), the Universal Postal Union (annex 
VIII), the International Telecommunications Union (annex 
IX) and the International Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion (revised text of annex XII). See Statement of Treaties 
and International Agreements Registered on Filed and Re-
corded with the Secretarariat During the Month of September 
1979, at 510 no. 521, U.N. DOC. ST/LEG/SER.A/391 (1981). 
The PRC did not accede to the UN Convention on Privi-
leges with respect to the International Labor Organization, 
the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and other UN agencies in the 
accordance with Articles 57 and 63 of the UN charter. The 
PRC has also not acceded to the Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities 9f the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 
21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, nor has 
it apparently acquiesced to Section 32 of the UN Convention 
on Privileges, which permits Int~rnational Court of Justice 
jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Convention. 
Within the UN Convention on Privileges, two distinct 
classes of international persons are recognized: represen-
tatives of members and officials. Representatives of mem-
bers of specialized agencies, in the course of their offi-
cial function, enjoy the following privileges and 
immunities: 
a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from 
seizure of their personal baggage, and in respect 
of words spoken or writ ten and all acts done by 
them in their official capacity, immunity from le-
gal process of every kind; 
b) Inviolability for all papers and documents; 
c) The right to use codes and to receive papers or 
correspondence by courier or in sealed bags; 
d) Exemption in respect of themselves and their 
spouses from immigration restrictions, aliens' reg-
istration or national service obligations in the 
State in which they are visiting or through which 
they are passing in the exercise of their 
functions; 
e) The same facilities in respect of currency or ex-
change restrictions as are accorded to representa-
tives of foreign Governments on temporary official 
missions; 
fl The same immunities and facilities in respect of 
their personal baggage as are accorded to members 
of comparable rank of diplomatic missions (Article 
V, Section 13). 
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Under Section 19, officials of the specialized 
agencies shall: 
a) Be immune from legal process in respect of works 
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in 
their official capacity; 
b) Enjoy the same exemptions from taxation in respect 
of the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the 
specialized agencies and on the same conditions as 
are enjoyed by officials of the United Nations; 
c) Be immune, together with their spouses and rela-
tives dependent on them, from immigration restric-
tion and alien registration; 
d) Be accorded the same privileges in respect of ex-
change facilities as are accorded to officials of 
comparable rank of diplomatic missions; 
e) Be given, together with their spouses and relatives 
dependent on them, the same repatriation facilities 
in time of international crises as officials of 
comparable rank of diplomatic missions; 
f) Have the right to import free of duty their furni-
ture and effects at the time of first taking up 
their post in the country in question. 
116. The specialized agencies are basically international or-
ganizations operating under UN auspices and created for the 
purpose of corrdinating activities connected with interna-
tion trade, communication, and human welfare. The special-
ized agencies covered by the UN Convention on Privileges, 
supra note 115, are enumerated therein. 
117. UN Convention on Privileges, supra note 115, Art. II, Sec. 
3. 
118. Id • , Art. II I, Sec. 5. 
119. ~ note 115, supra. 
120. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations and UN Personnel, supra note 115. 
121. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents, done Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8532. 
122. ASEAN is the acronym for the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, composed of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines. It is a regional organization designed to 
foster economic and secrui ty relations among members and 
between ASEAN and the United States and Japan. See 
generally Sours, ASEAN and U.S. Foreign Policy, in ASIA AND 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 173-90 (Hsiung and Chai ed. 1982) 
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123. The USSR deposited its accession on Jan. 10, 1966. See 
Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the Secretary 
General Performs Depositary Functions, Lists of Signatures, 
Ratifications, Accessions, etc., (as of Dec. 31, 1979), 
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/13, at 46. 
124. UN Convention on Privileges, supra note 115, Sec. 12. 
125. _!E.., Sees. 5 and 6. 
126. _!E.., Sec. 5. 
127. To facilitate the purchase and delivery of foreign high 
technology equipment, for example, the PRC has recently 
recognized and accepted the safeguard clause for an export 
license issued by the Coordinating Committee for Export 
Controls (COCOM). COCOM is a Paris-based, fifteen nation 
organization comprised of Western nations which trade with 
Communist countries. The clause, known as Form 629, al-
legedly permits periodic COCOM on-site inspection of in-
stallations in the PRC to verify that the commodities sup-
plied are being used for the purpose for which they were 
intended (i.e., civilian, non-military use). See China 
Recognizes Form 629: Permits Monitoring of :SoensitTVe 
Equipmnt, 6 CHINA BUS. REV. 55 (No. 4, July-Aug. 1979). 
But see Miller, U.S. is Holding up Peking Atom Talks, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 19, 1982, p. All. 
COCOM inspector privileges would seem to be implied by 
the nature of the agreement, which requires the Chinese to 
admit COCOM agents into limited-access areas to monitor the 
use of purchased equipment. 
128. Recent reports have cited the existence and operation of a 
joint US-PRC electronic intelligence gathering station in 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Reg ion in western China, to 
monitor Soviet missile and suspected electromagnetic pulse 
testing. See, e.g., U.S., China jointly run spy station, 
Balto. Sun, June 18, 1981, p. Al, col. 1; "PRC Refuses Com-
ment on U.S. Radar Station, "FBIS-cHI-81-118 (June 19, 
1981), at Kl. See also "Kyodo: U.S. Sets Up Military Base 
in PRC, "FBIS-cHI-82-002 (Jan. 5, 1982), at Bl (issued by 
Japanese wire service); "AFP: PRC Refuses Comment on Re-
port of U.S. Base," FBIS-cHI-82-003 (Jan 6, 1982), at Bl. 
According to the report, CIA agents occasionally visit the 
facility. Presumably, they are accorded limited privi-
leges, such as customs exemptions, and are permitted into 
an obviously restricted area. 
129. Foreign government officials performing official acts in a 
third country have been extended certain diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities in the 1969 United Nations Convention 
on Special Missions. U.N. DOC. A/7375, Annex I, Dec. 11, 
1968. The Chinese have not ratified this Convention, but 
some of its provisions would be useful in formulating 
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requisite privileges and immunities for an arms inspector-
ate. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 89-92. 
Another potential source for the formulation of arms 
inspectorate privileges and immunities is 'the Draft Annex 
II on the Privileges and Immunities of the Control Or-
ganization Under the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
Discussion of the latter is omitted from this paper because 
of consistently vehement Chinese objections to the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, but an excellent treatment of the Annex 
and its relationship to inspectorate privileges and im-
munitie as they apply to the Soviet Union may be found in 
id., at 108-10. 
13 0. See, .!l....:.!l..:.• PRC d isr eg ard of the US-PRC Consular Convention 
in detaining Lisa Wichser, supra note 104. Note that this 
incident, the first major one involving a US national since 
US-PRC normalization in 1979, occurred at a time where us-
PRe relations had cooled significantly as a result of 
American insistance on the U.S. right to continue arms 
sales to Taiwan, in what the PRC considered a violation of 
PRC sovereignty. See, e.g., "Xinhua Hits Helms Over Arms 
Sales to Taiwan," FBIS-CHI-82-021 (Feb. 1, 1982), at Bl; 
"Sino-U.S. Ties Based on Respect for Sovereignty," FBIS-
CHI-82-024 (Feb. 4, 1982), at Bl. 
131. See oenerally, ZILE,· SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 
ll3-19. 
132. Chung-yang cheng-fa kan-pu hsueh-hsiao hsing-fa chiao-yen-
shih, Chung-hua jen-min Kung-ho-kuo hsing-fa tsun-tse 
Chiang-i (Lectures on the general principles of criminal 
law of the PRC; Peking, 1957), pp. 40-42 reprinted in COHEN 
AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 1000-1001. 
133. The PRC, for instance, has permitted the PLO to maintain an 
office in Beijing (Peking). This information was supplied 
to the author by Prof. Hungdah Chiu of the University of 
Maryland School of Law and by the Chinese Embassy in 
Washington, D.C. 
134. See generally COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 931-1042. 
The PRC has, in fact, protested some of the same acts it 
had performed when such acts were performed by others. See 
.!l....:.!l..:.• "Chinese Government Strongly Protects Against Soviet 
Authorities Fascist Atrocities of Kidnapping Chinese Diplo-
mat and Brutal Treatment of China's Internaitonal Train," 
SCMP no. 5545 (Feb. 4, 1974), at 35 (protesting the kidnap-
ping and unlawful questioning of Kuan Heng-kuang, who was 
returning to the PRC after completing a tour of the Chinese 
Embassy in the Soviet Union. 
135. See generally COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 1016-42. 
See also" PRC Protests U.S. Inspection of Diplomats' Bag,• 
FBIS-cHI-82-095 (May 17, 1982), at Bl. 
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136. See PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 30. 
13 7. See, ~· note 154, infra. 
138. See, ~· text accompanying note 110, supra. 
139. See, ~· note 21, supra. 
140. See Ying xuesheng kaige wanxiao zhonggong yaoba ta guzhuo 
[English student makes jokes: China wants to deport him], 
Lianhe bao (United Daily News) [AP Report] July 7, 1981, 
p. 2. 
Actually, the British student was accused of writing 
two slogans. Both slogans siren bang wansui [Long Live the 
Gang of Four] and Weidade shehui zhuyizhe Jiang Qing wansui 
[Long Live the Great Socialist Jiang Qing]--were not 
specifically branded as counterrevolutionary by Chinese 
authorities, but the PRC immediately informed the British 
Embassy that the youth was to be deported. 
141. U.N. CHARTER, 59 STAT. 1031, 3 BEVANS 1153 (1945), ART. 105 
( 1) • 
142. Id., Art. 105(2). A U.S. District Court recently held that 
international practice did not grant t::> foreign nationals 
employed by the United Nations the same degree of immunity 
as foreign diplomats. Thus, the seizure of illegally ob-
tained national secrui ty information from a foreign 
minister did not violate his right to diplomatic immunity. 
United States v. Enger, 442 F.Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978). 
143. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 117; S. KIM, ~ 
~ note 95, at 418. 
144. See Ellis and Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement 
in the Peoples Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 155, 
161-64 (No. 2, 1981). 
145. Where the arbitral awards are fair and do not violate Chi-
nese laws and policies, PRC enterprises will usually ex-
ecute them. Where they refuse to execute the award, the 
party requesting enforcement may petition the relevant PRC 
goverrunent department or the China Council for the Promo-
tion of International Trade (CCPIT) or appeal to the Chi-
nese courts to enforce the award. Ten Tsien-Hsin [sic] and 
Lin Shao-Shan, •People' s Republic of China," 3 YEARBOOK -
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 160 (1978). 
146. [1958] 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 
(done June 10, 1958). 
147. Despite the fact that the PRC does not belong to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has not ratified 
the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA, 
the latter document may also serve as a useful referent for 
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the formulation of an acceptable agreement concerning the 
scope of the immunities to be enjoyed by an arms 
inspectorate. 
The IAEA Agreement, for example, provides for mutual 
consultation between a protesting state and the Agency when 
an abuse of privileges and immunities is alleged (Art. 26). 
If such an abuse has in fact occurred, the State party may 
withhold from the Agency the benefits of the privileges or 
immunities so abused, provided it does not interfere with 
the principal functions of the Agency (Art. 30). See ZILE, 
SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 104-07. --
148. The PRC has even indicated its willingness to use third 
country arbitration sites and to apply the law of the locus 
of arbitration. See Ellis and Shea, supra note 144, at 
169. -
149. See text accompanying notes 136-39 supra. 
150. Under Draft Annex II of the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, after consultation and in the event of continued 
disagreement on whether an abuse has occurred, the com-
plaining Party may request a replacement (Art. 7 (B) (3)), 
though the departure of the first member must not take 
place until the arrival of the replacement. See generally 
ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 108-110, 117-19. 
151. Chinese tolerance of proprietary violations is limited. In 
a case recently reported to this author by an ABC news cor-
respondent, an American businessman was expelled from the 
PRC for engaging in sexual relations with a Chinese pros-
titute. Prostitution is illegal under Article 5(8) of the 
1957 Public Security Regulations, repromulgated in 1980. 
See "1957 Public Security Regulations Published," FBIS-CHI-
80-039 (Feb. 26, 1980), at L8-15. Punishment of nationals 
under that provision was set at: 1) detention under 10 
days1 2) a fine of not more than 20 yuan (approx. $8 at 
that time) 1 or 3) a warning. See also "Porngraphic Sound, 
Video Recordings Banned," FBIS-CHI-82-050 (march 15, 1982), 
at Kl5. 
Moreover, the PRC has published incidents between for-
eign nationals in China such as the recent clash between 
African and Arab students attending the Chinese Medical 
College. One African student allegedly was killed. Though 
Shenyang public security and judicial departments were put 
in charge of investigating the incident, the two relevant 
embassies were informed and, presumably, the matter was 
further handled through d ipi om a tic channels although this 
latter point was not subsequently confirmed by FBIS re-
ports. See "Shenyang Investigates Fatal Brawl Among For-
eign Students," FBIS-cHI-80-117 (June 16, 1980), at A2. 
See~ "Education Ministry Statement," id. 
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152. See, ~· "Chinese 
Counterrevolutionary 
1966), at 1-3 cited 
995-99. --
Court Pronounces Death Sentence on 
Criminal," SCMP no. 3720 (June 17, 
in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 
153. See note 19 supra (Chinese national, who had defected to 
the USSR and returned to the PRC for clandestine activi-
ties, executed by firing squad.) 
154. A case in point is the recent AFP report of the expulsion 
of a Dutch newspaper correspondent for "activities incom-
patible with the status of a correspondent," official par-
lance for what are often subversive or clandestine ac-
tiviies. "AFP: PRC Expels Dutch Newspaper Correspondent,• 
FBIS-CHI-81-096 (May 19, 1981), at G2. Ironically enough, 
the PRC press, which usually reports on such cases as an 
indication of the effectiveness of Chinese counter intel-
ligence operations, did not publicize the case (AFP is 
Agence France Press, a foreign news service operating in 
East Asia). The AFP report carne on the heels of the PRC's 
extreme disapproval with the Netherland's sale of Dutch 
submarines to Taiwan. The irnpl ic a tion, of course is that 
the journalist was removed partly as a retaliatory measure 
for the Netherland• s act. See also note 21 supra and ac-
companying text. The treatment of Ms. Wichset; may have 
been indirectly linked to the growing resentment of the PRC 
towards U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a topic that often found 
its way into the PRC press during 1982, prior to the is-
sual'lce of the second US-PRC Joint Communique in August 
1982. 
155. A barrage of PRC press reports on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 
and Chinese claims of regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong 
when the Treaty of Nanjing· lapses in 1997 attest to the 
number of articles and the vitriolic language employed in 
order to gain mass support for PRC policies. 
See, ~· "Ta Kung Pao Hits Shultz Statement on Taiwan,• 
FBIS-cHI-82-136 (July 15, 1982), at Wl; "U.S. Taiwan Lobby, 
Kuomintang 'Conspiracy' Hit," FBIS-cHI-82-138 (July 19, 
1982), at Bl; "Conservatives' Aim to Create 'Two Chinas' 
Scored," FBIS-CHI-82-185 (Sept. 23, 1982), at Wl; "PRC's 
Sovereignty Over Hong Kong Reviewed," FBIS-CHI-82-183 
(Sept. 21, 1982), at Wl; "Wen Wei Po Comments on Sino-
British Talks," FBIS-82-187 (Sept. 27, 1982), at W3. 
156. See note 4, supra. 
157. Inspectorate personnel of an international inspectorate 
team may be issued a UN laissez passer or a comparable cer-
tificate noting their official business. See ZILE, SHARLET 
AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 123-24. 
158. This information was provided to the author by a cultural 
attache of the Chinese Mission in New York on June 29, 
1981. 
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159. Observers reported that the Chinese government had eased 
its policy on granting visas for Chinese nationals to 
travel abroad. See "Difficulties in Obtaining Exit Visas 
From PRC Noted,"""""'FBIS-CHI-78-132 (July 25, 1978), at El7. 
Since 1978, however, the PRC has not, in practice, been as 
lenient as reported. One reason may be Chinese concern for 
defection.. See Bernstein, Peking is Troubled by Rise in 
Defections to West, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1982, at A22. See 
also "Regulations on Studying Abroad Approved," FBIS-cHI-
82-14 7 (July 30, 1982), at K9. 
Exit and reentry permits are aughorized for foreigners 
by the Foreign Ministry and the Public Security bureau in-
volved. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 94. 
The purpose of requiring permits is simple: it allows 
for identificaton, numbering, and control of foreigners. 
160. The Chinese governmnt has waived on occasion, the visa re-
quirement for citizens of neighboring countries. See 
"Agreement on Mutual Exemption of Visa Reached Between 
Governments [sic] of PRC and Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of South Vietnam," SCMP no. 5530 (Jan. 9, 1974), 
at 107. But ~ "Late Report: New PRC-SRV Border Regula-
tions Stipulated," FBIS-CHI-78-134 (July 12, 1978), at A24. 
161. The PRC apparently waived certain visa restrictions in cer-
tin instances. Soviet TASS commentator Yakovlev was given 
permission to visit "any place" (presumably within the 
bounds of Chinese na tiona! security r estr ic tions) on his 
one month visa. "PRC Grants Visa to TASS Commentator 
Yakovlev," FBIS-cHI-79-169 (Aug. 29, 1979), at C3. See also 
"Formalities Simplified for Foreign Tourists, "FBIS-cHI-82-
205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3 (foreigners travelling to any 
of 29 municipalities need not obtain a travel certificate 
or advance notification). Cf. "PRC Will Now Receive Indi-
vidual Tourists," FBIS-cHI-82-199 (Oct. ].4, 1982), at K9 
(noting Chinese willingness to accept individual tourists 
as well as groups). 
162. See Crew Members of Aircraft and Vessels, United States 
Pe'Ople's Republic of China Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 9965 
(Jan 7, 1981). The visas are provided on a reciprocal 
basis. 
163. Zile, Sharlet and Love suggested the osibility of including 
an exhortatory provision in the arms control agreement pat-
terned after Section 30 of the Agreement on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the IAEA, which calls for dealing with 
visa applications "as speedily as possible." ZILE, SHARLET 
AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 125. 
164. An illustration of these border regulations was found in a 
recent Chinese publication. These particular regulations 
were set up for Yunnan province and designated, inter alia, 
that prior permission must be obtained before outsiders 
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could enter Yunnan (Art. ) 1 that passes must be carried at 
all times (Art. 4)1 that all cars and people entering the 
province must submit to inspection (Art. 9)1 and that smug-
gling was prohibited (Art 8). See Yunnan jiaqiang bianjing 
guanl i (Yunnan strengthens border management) reor in ted in 
Zhonggong wenti ziliao (Reference Materials on Chinese Is-
sues), No. 125 (March 8, 1982), at 11-13. See also "Xizang 
Issues Rules on Entry from Other ProvinceS";" FBIS-CHI-81-
218 (Nov. 12, 1981), at Ql. 
For examples of PLA activities in defending PRC 
sovereignty, see "Heilongjiang Border Defense Foils 'Abnor-
mal' Soviet Activities," FBIS-cHI-78-025 (Feb. 6, 1978), at 
Ll1 "Inner Mongolia Border Defense Unit Discovers 'Enemy' 
Vehical," id., at Kl1 "Kirin Border Guard Captures Suspect-
ed Saboteur;" id., at Ll. PRC provinces have also recently 
set up their ·own border defense pol ice forces to protect 
public security and Chinese sovereignty. See, ~·· 
"Guangdong Establishes Armed Border Defense Police Force," 
FBIS-cHI-80-211 (Oct. 29, 1980), at Pl1 "Zhejiang Sets Up 
Armed Police Units for Border Defense," FBIS-CHI-80-249 
(Dec. 24, 1980), at 081 "Guangxi, Yunnan Militiamen Help 
Defend Border," FBIS-CHI-82-209 (Oct. 28, 1982), at 56. 
165. Information was provided to the author in an interview with 
a PRC official at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., 
June 26, 1981. Note also that the PRC does not issue 
coundtrip tickets for transportation within the county. 
Return reservations must be made or reconfimed at each 
departure point. See Frustrations of Expatriate Life in 
Peking, Asian Wall St. Journal, Jan. 18, 1982, at 11. 
166. Jinchukou feiii jiyuan luke xinglijiancha zhanxing tongze 
[Provisional Regulations Concerning Inspection of Incoming 
and Outgoing Aircraft Passengers, Crew and Baggage] (May 
24, 1951) [hereafter AIRCRAFT REGULATIONS] reprinted in 
Gongan faqui huibian, supra note 5, at 277. Translation by 
author. 
167. Jinchukou lieche cheyuan luke xinglijiancha zhanxing tongze 
[Provional Regulations Concerning Inspection of Incoming 
and Outgoing Trains, Passengers, Crew and Baggage] (May 24, 
1951) [hereafter RAILWAY REGULATIONS] reprinted in Gongan 
fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 280. Translation by 
author. 
168. Jinchukou chuanbo chuan uan luke xin li"iancha zhanxin 
tongze Provisional Regulations Concerning Inspection of 
Incoming and Outgoing Vessers, Passengers, Crew and Bag-
gage] (Jan. 27, 1950) [hereafter VESSEL REGULATIONS] re-
printed in Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 282. See 
also infra note 194. Translation by author. 
169. For example, the VESSEL REGULATIONS, id., stipulate that 
foreign sailors must have a valid visa before entry into 
the PRC will be permitted (Art. 8). 
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170. See generally Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quoj ing weisheng 
j ianyi tiaol i (Chinese Border Regulations Regarding Health 
and Immunization) (March 6, 1951) Art. 2(3) reprinted in 
Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 297; RAILWAY REGULA-
TIONS, supra note 167, Art. 2(2); VESSEL REGULATIONS, supra 
note 16 8, Art. 2 ( 4 ) • 
The Aircraft Regulations, presumably the most 
applicable statute based on the 1 ikel ihood of the use of 
aircraft as a means of transportation, also stipulate that 
inspection is conducted only once at the port of entry and 
the port of departure, "unless special circumstances exist" 
[emphasis added], Art. 3. Special circumstances are not 
further defined. 
171. See, ~' "Increase in Chinese Customs Duties Reported," 
FBIS-cHI-82-169 (Aug. 30, 1982), at W5. (noting increases 
of from 25-67 percent on popular consumer items). 
172. Such procedures technically apply to foreigners and their 
means of transportation. Nevertheless, domestic airline 
flights may be required to undergo inspection procedures in 
at least two instances: 1) where the flight destination 
includes areas where smuggling is rampant; and, 2) in spe-
cial cases. AIRCRAFT REGULATIONS, supra note 166, Art. 
9(1), 9(2). The "special cases" exception is one of the 
more appropriate examples of the type of sweeping contex-
tual legal definitions that can play havoc with inspection 
operations. The entire nature of inspection operations is 
"special" and leads to an interesting supposition: since 
this "special case" escape clause applies to flights which 
would otherwise be exempt from inspection, query its analo-
gous use by the Chinese to circumvent customs and inspec-
tion exemptions and irnmun i ties usually accorded d ipl om a tic 
agents and their goods? 
173. See AIRCRAFT REGULATIONS, supra note 166, Art. 6; RAILWAY 
REGULATIONS, supra note 167, Art. 5; VESSEL REGULATIONS, 
supra note 168, Art. 7. 
174. See generally, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS WITH 
CHINA 31 (Nov. 1980) [hereafter DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA]. 
175. Smuggling receives extensive press coverage in the PRC, 
more than any other economic crime except embezzlement. 
See, ~' "Guangdong CCP Committee Inveighs Against Smug-
gling," FBIS-cHI-80-233 (Dec. 2, 1980), at Pl; "Smuggling 
Activities Will Not be Tolerated," FBIS-cHI-81-168 (Aug. 
31, 1981), at K6; "Renmin Ribao Reports on Shenzhen Smug-
gling Case," FBIS-cHI-82-049 (March 12, 1982), at Kl. 
To help combat smuggling activity and "safeguard he 
socialist economic order," the PRC recently promulgated 
"Customs Measures to Reward Those Who Assist in the Inves-
tigation of Smuggling" in order to help expose major smug-
gling operations. Rewards include material incentives, 
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such as bonuses and prizes. See "Ta Kung Pao Publishes PRC 
Customs Measures," FBIS-CHI-79-214 (Nov. 2, 1979), at U4. 
176. This statement was confirmed by Mr. Jeffrey Buczacki, China 
Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C. in an in-
terview on June 26, 1981. 
177. Debate still continues among membes of the International 
Law Commission (ILC) as to whether to provide for the abso-
lute inviolability of the diplomatic pouch in a protocol to 
the Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95. See Status of 
the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag Not Accompa-
nied by the Diplomatic Courier, Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 170, 
179-80 (Vol. II, Part 2, 1979). 
178. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 131. These 
authors cited an example of a train ride. Ordinarily, a 
courier who rides a train in which the pouch travels in a 
separate baggage car would be considered within "reasonable 
proximity" to the pouch. However, if the courier were to 
ride in a car which became decoupled from the baggage car, 
such "reasonable proximity" vanishes and customs officials 
may dispense with any courtesies and open the pouch. 
179. A recent 1981 article stated that a Hong Kong businessman 
was fined 12000 yuan (approx. $7000 at that time) for 
buying cars from foreign embassies and trying to sell them 
in Beijing (Peking), in violation of a rule prohibiting 
foreigners from selling imported goods. See "Businessman's 
Illegal Activities," FBIS-CHI-81-009 (Jan. 14, 1981), at 
E2. 
180. See, ~· "Privately Run Industry Seen as Indispensable," 
FBIS-CHI-82-186 (Sept. 24, 1982), at K3; "Remmin Ribao Com-
mentator on Expanding Private Plots,• FBIS-CHI-81-122 (June 
25, 1981), at Kl. 
181. See oenerally Frustrations of Expatriate Life in Peking, 
Asian Wall St. Journal, Jan. 18, 1982, at 11. Cf. "Disci-
pline Commission on Illegal Housebuilding," FBIS-CHI-81-193 
(Oct 6, 1981), at KG (calling for halt to illegal building 
of private homes by cadres). 
182. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 174, at 32. 
183. The same suggestion was offered by other authors with 
respect to inspection operations in the Soviet Union. ZILE, 
SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 184-85. Unquestion-
ably, tight state control practiced by the Soviet and Chi-
nese governments and similar concern for administrative 
problems in handling foreigners account for the similarity 
in suggestions regarding inspection operations in both 
countries. 
184. See Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Art. 11; Consular 
Convention, supra note 108, Art. 30. 
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185. ~DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 174, at 32. 
186. The Chinese desire to isolate foreigners from proloned con-
tact with Chinese citizens .was shown in a recent AFP report 
from China which stated that PRC authorities had restricted 
Chinese contacts with foreigners by stipulating, ~
alia, that Chinese could no longer visit a foreigner's 
living quarters or eat with him in restaurants without 
specific permission from their work units. Ostensibly, at 
least, the restrictions were declared for the purpose o·f 
"block[ing] up the canal of security leaks" to foreigners 
in the PRC. See "AFP: Restrictions Placed on Chinese Con-
tacts with Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-79-105 (May 30, 1979), at 
L2. See also "Shandong Meeting Discuss [sic] Foreign Stu-
dents," FBIS-cHI-81-238 (Dec. 11, 1981), at K9 (admonishing 
Chinese to be friendly but circumspect); "Fujian Bans Gifts 
in Dealing With Foreign Firms," FBIS-cHI-82-033 (Feb. 18, 
1982), at 02 (banning Chinese from accepting foreign gifts, 
which ironically and probably unintentionally, makes the 
PRC one of the few Asian countries enforcing provisions 
similar to those of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
Pub. L. No. 95-213, Sections 102, 103, 104, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified at 15 u.s.c. Sections 78a, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff 
(Supp. I 1977)). See generally "State Council Announces 
·Decision on Tourism," FBIS-cHI-Bl-202 (Oct. 20, 1981), a.t 
K9 (calling on Chinese to display to tourists the super'ior-
ity of the socialist system). 
187. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 184. 
188. See Agencies Directly subordinate to China's State Council, 
7 CHINA BUS. REV. 9 (No. 5, Sept.-oct. 1980). 
189. See Articles 3 and 8 of the PRC Law on Joint Ventures Using 
Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted July 1, 1979, at 
the Second Session of the Fifth People's Congress, ~ 
printed in Supp. no. 020, supra note 16, at 31. 
190. Telecommunications services remain somewhat limited in 
1 ight of the fact t~at 1981 reports indicate that the PRC 
operates only 3 standard internatonal communications ground 
stations. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BACKGROUND NOTES - CHINA 
16 (June 198Ti. However, the PRC allegedly announced that 
it will launch its first communications satellite in 1983 
or 1984. See "AFP Reports Space Program Outlined at Con-
ference," FBIS-cHI-82-153 (Aug. 9, 1982), at K4. As a 
·result of the developnent of Chinese satelite communica-
tions, the PRC has also taken a stronger stand on the issue 
of geostationary orbit. See "Delegate to UN Meeting En-
uniciates Space Policy," FBIS-cHI-82-156 (Aug. 12, 1982), 
at Al. 
191. The Ministry of Radio and Telvision was established to re-
place the Central Broadcasting Administration. The Minis-
try of Electronics Industry was established as the organ 
which merged the Fourth Ministry of Machine Building, the 
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National Bureau of Radio arid Television Industry, and the 
State Administration of Computer Industry. See "NPC Ap-
proves Government Appointments, Restructure," FBIS-CHI-82-
086 (May 4, 1982), at Kl. 
192. See notes 176-78, supra. But see "PRC Protests U.S. In-
spection of Diplomats' Bag ,• FBIS-cHI-82-095 (May 17, 
1982), at Bl. Cf. "AFP Reports Restriction of Embassy Pro-
paganda," FBIS-cHI-82-168 (Aug. 30, 1982), at K5 (reporting 
on PRC restrictions on the dissemination of writings harm-
ful to China's internal affairs). 
193. See also Consular Convention, supra note 108, Art. 35(1). 
194. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 174, at 34. 
195. The absence of a US-PRC hotline, arguably the only poten-
tial hot line that might exist between the PRC and another 
major power, was confirmed by a State Department source in 
a phone interview on June 25, 1981. 
196. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 174, at 34. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. See China's Participation in International Orqanizations, 6 
CHINA BUS. REV. 28, 30 (No. 3, May-June 1979). 
200. PRC accession with a reservation was deposited on November 
16, 1972. PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 95, at 213. 
For the Convention, see 18 U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S. No. 6257 
(1967). -
201. Acceptance by the PRC was made on December 5, 1950. See D. 
JOHNSTON AND H. CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 1949-1967: A CALENDAR 5 (1968). The PRC also 
deposited its acceptance of the 1969 Additional Protocol to 
the Universal Postal Convention on February 7, 1973. See 
PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 95, at 213. ---
202. See Zhongyanq renmin zhengfu gonqanbu bugao [Bulletin of 
the Central People's Government's Division of Public Safe-
ty] (March 12, 1950) reprinted in Gonqan fagui huibian, 
supra note 5, at 258. Translation by author. See also 
"Beijing Wanbao: Private Radio Station Dismantled," FBIS-
CHI-81-115 (June 16, 1981), at K4. Private radio transmit-
ters were banned ostensibly because of their potential for 
interfering with PRC sovereighty and because of their pro-
paganda value. For example, a Sept. 16, 1969 London Eve-
ning News article reported the existense of a clandestine 
ant -Mao radio station operating the the PRC. See KIS-
SINGER, supra note 33, at 185 (1979). ---
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203. See Regulations Governing the Use of Private Radio Trans-
mitters, supra note 202, Art. 1. Article 1 also stipulates 
that violators will be severely punished. Article 2 called 
for the dismantling of any previously owned foreign trans-
mitters within 7 days of the promulgation of the rule. 
Since the rule was promulgated in 1950, no foreign trans-
mitters have been permitted in the PRC and it is likely 
that Article 2 is currently obsolete. 
204. Promulgated by the Ministry of Communications of the PRC, 
March 14, 1957. Reprinted in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note· 4, 
at 559-61. In Chinese the Regulations are known as Zhong-
hua renmin gongheguo dui waiguoj i chuanbo j inchu gangkou 
guanl i ban fa and may be found in Gong an fagui huibian, ~ 
~note 5, at 287 [hereafter PORT REGULATIONS]. Transla-
tion by author. 
205. Promulgated by the Ministry of Communications on April 19, 
1966. Reprinted· in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 567-70 
(in Chinese: Guojing heliu waiguoji chuanbo guanli banfa, 
cited in Gongah fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 293 
[hereafter RIVER REGULATIONS]. Translation by author. 
206. _See PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 7(2). ~also 
RIVER REGULATIONS, supra note 205, Art. 8(2). 
207. "State Council Approves Regulation on Foreign Ships,• FBIS-
CHI-79-188 (Sept. 26, 1979), at Ll. 
208. See ~· "Military Commission Issues Documents on Secur i-
ty,• FBIS-cHI-78-099 (May 22, 1978), at El; "Xinhua 
Publishes Regulations on Guarding State Secrets," FBIS-CHI-
80-073 (April 14, 1980), at L7; note 8 supra. 
209. The inter'view was conducted by the author on June 26, 1981. 
210. Both the Diplomatic Convention (Art. 27), supra note 95, 
and the Consular Convention (Art. 35), supra note 108, pro-
vide for the inviolability of official correspondence. 
211. See, ~· "Shanghai Radio Urges Proper Attitude Toward 
Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-79-084 (Apr i1 28, 1979), at 02. See 
also "Beijing Radio Article on Foreign Influence," FBIS-
CHI-82-194 (Oct. 6, 1982), at Kll; "Yangcheng Wanbao Dis-
cusses Foreign Influences,• FBIS-cHI-82-037 (Feb. 24, 
1982), at K5; "Guangming Ribao Discusses Proper Approach to 
. Foreign Things," FBIS-cHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at LlO. 
212. See id. See also •Article Cites Corruption Imported From 
West;" FBIS-cHI-82-078 (Apri'l 22, 1982), at K3; "Dazhang 
Ribao on Pursuit of Foreign Things,• FBIS-CHI-82-072 (April 
14, 1982), at 03; "Fujian Bans Gifts in Dealing With For-
eign Firms,• FBIS-cHI-82-033 (Feb. 18, 1982), at 02; "Ban 
Yue Tan·on Dealings With Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-81-237 (Dec. 
10, 1981), at Kl6; (Oct. 20, 1981), at K9; "Shandong ·Meet-
ing Discuss [sic] Foreign Students,• FBIS-cHI-81-115 (June 
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16, 1981), at W4; "AFP: Restrictions Placed on Chinese 
Contact With Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-79-105 (may 30, 1979), 
at L2. See generally BUTTERFIELD, supra note 2; BERNSTEIN, 
supra note 83. 
213. One accepted practice is the r estr ic tion placed on the 
freedom of movement of foreign attaches in Beijing 
(Peking). According to one PRC official at the Chinese 
Embassy in Washington, D.C. (interview conducted on June 
26, 1981), there are no hard and fast limits on travel, but 
foreign attaches are generally accorded the right of free 
movement in a circumscribed area of up to 70 km. from the 
embassies. However, the maximum limit depends on what 
areas are encompassed. For ex·ample, within Beijing, un-
restricted travel may extend 70 km. north-eastward but only 
15 kms. southward. But ~ BERNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 94 
(noting a 15 mile radius around the whole of Beijing beyond 
which foreigners could not go). Restricted crreas are lo-
cated south of Beijing. 
The 70 km. northeastward limit, which is significantly 
greater than 40 km. restriction generally imposed by the 
Soviet Union on Foreign diplomats, exists because that part 
of the Great Wall is located rather far from Beijing and is 
open to foreigners without special permission. 
214. See, ~· "Xisha Quandao Designed Restricted Military 
Zone," FBIS-cHI-62-225 (Nov. 22, 1982), at WS (noting that 
the Paracel Islands and 12-mile territorial waters sur-
rounding them were declared a military zone [no civilian 
access)); "USSR-PRC Rift Said to Hold Apart Two Mongol ias," 
FBIS-cHI-82-212 (Nov. 2, 1982) at C2 (reporting, inter 
alia, that the lao-mile border area between Inner and Outer 
Mongolia is a military zone). Article 6 of the FOREIGN 
NATIONAL'S ACT, supra note 4, states that residence and 
travel of foreign nationals in important defense and mili-
tary localities and in restricted areas shall be 
prohibited. 
215. This information was provided to the author by Mr. Jerry 
Buczacki of the U.S. State Department, China Divison, in a 
telephone interview on June 26, 1981. 
216. For an excellent overview of life in the PRC for a foreign-
er, see D. BONAVIA, THE CHINESE (1980) ; BERNSTEIN, supra 
note 83; J. FRASER, THE CHINESE: PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE 
(1980). 
217. See e.g., "PRC Will Now Receive Individual Tourists," FBIS-
CHI-82-199 (Oct. 14, 1982), at K9; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
CHINA-BACKGROUND NOTES 18 (June 1981). See also "Formali-
ties Simplified For Foreign Tourists," FBIS-CHI-82-205 
(Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3. Prior to these articles, visas 
were usually granted only to groups. 
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218. Anytime a foreigner wishes to leave from and return to the 
PRC, he must first apply to the Foreign Ministry, then to 
the Public Security Bureau, for an exit permit and a reen-
try permit. ~ BERNSTEIN, supra note 83, at ~4. See id. 
~ also "Dazu Grottoes in Sichuan Opened to Visitors," 
FBIS-cHI-81-111 (June 10, 1981), at Q2. "Plans Made to 
Open More Areas to Foreign Tourists,• FBIS-CHI-78-114 (June 
13, 1978), at Ell; "AFP: Rules on Foreign Students' Travel 
Relaxed,• FBIS-cHI-78-0.20 (Jan. 30, 1978), at El6. Cf., 
Foreign Scholars and Students in China, Beijing Review,_No. 
11 (March 17, 1980), at 9. But see "Regulations on Study-
ing Abroad Approved," FBIS-c"'iff=8H47 (July 30, 1982), at 
K9; "State Council Announces Dec is ion on Tour ism," FBIS-
CHI-81-202 (Oct. 21, 1981), at K9; "Fuj ian Ribao on Abuses 
in Securing Exit Permits,• FBIS-cHI-82-039 (Feb. 26, 1982), 
at 03 (announcing a Fuij ian Prohibition on CCP members· 
securing exit permits for their families through guanxi, or 
•pull"). The types of exit permits concerned were not ex-
plained, although they are presumably for internal transit 
only. · 
219. This information was supplied to the author by an official 
at the U.S. State Department in a phone interview on June 
25, 1981. The Second Ministry of Machine 13uilding was in 
charge of nuclear development in the PRC. It is now the 
Ministry of Nuclear Industr~. See "NPC Approves Government 
Appointments, Restructure,• FB:iS=C:HI-82-086 (May 4, 1982), 
at Kl. 
Machine Building Ministries are common Soviet and Chi-
nese euphemisms for high-technology and weapons facilities. 
For example, Zhang Jun, former Minister of the Seventh 
Ministry of Machine Building, was made the Minister of 
Space Industry in the 1982 ministerial reorganization that 
abolished the Seventh Ministry. Presumably, the former 
Seventh Ministry was engaged in high-technology work. See 
•NPC Approves Government Appointments, Restructure," FB!S= 
CHI-82-086 (May 4, 1982), at Kl. 
220. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 138. 
221. Chinese ticket offices frequently maitain that reservations 
are booked on a particular airline flight or train, when in 
reality there are vacancies. This is to ensure the 
availability of seats for important organization or offi-
cials who might book last minute reservations. Apparently, 
these offices would rather risk the loss of ticket revenue 
than run the risk of unavailability of seats. See Frustra-
tion of Expatriate Life in Peking, The Asian warr-st. Jour-
nal, Jan. 18, 1982, p.ll. 
Travel in the PRC is not an uncomplicated process. An 
inspectorate faces numberous obstacles, in addition to bo-
gus plane reservations cited above: round trip bookings 
are apparently non-existent (reconfirmation must be made at 
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each destination) and airline flights are frequently can-
celled or disallowed because of weather conditions. Id. 
222. ~ note 4, supra. This Act replaced the August 10, 1954 
Provisional Rules Governing Travel of Foreigners 
(Waiguoqiaomin luxinq zhanxinq banfa), reprinted in Gonqan 
faqui huibian, supra note 5, at 265. The latter rules were 
considerably more restrictive and specific than the ones 
that superseded them. Chinese authorities may have sought 
more sweeping statutory leeway to address the problems and 
concerns generated by the presence of foreign nationals in 
the PRC1 hence, the revised rules. Translation of relevant 
provisions were made by the author. 
223. A perfect example of legislating by administrative fiat 
recently occured in the PRC. On Oct. 22, 1982, the Minis-
try of Public Security announced that foreign travellers 
may now travel to any of 29 designated municip~lities with-
out a travel certificate or advance notificaton. The For-
eign National's Act has not been amended to reflect these 
changes. See "Formalities Simplified for Foreign 
Tourists," FBIS-CHI-82-205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3. 
224. Such checks are probably 1 imited to document and baggage 
checks, though the language could be used to justify more 
intrusive checks. 
225. Authorization for deviations in travel plans is required by 
Article 15. A proper or justifiable reason presumably sub-
sumes reasons of accident or illness. However, just what 
type of reason would constitute a proper justification ~or 
a public security organ, in the absence of specific inci-
dents, would be mere conjecture. 
226. To this author, it appears as if the force of the Foreign 
National's Act on private residents has been virtually 
eliminated by subsequent PRC pronouncements. In 1979, for 
example, foreign press services reported that Chinese con-
tacts with foreigners were being closely monitore by work 
units and public security organs, or, in some instances, 
were being altogether prohibited. See notes 211 and 212 
supra. 
In the Soviet Union, it is well-known that prolonged or 
unauthorized contact with foreigners may result in ad-
ministrative, political, or criminal sanctions, though 
whether such punitive actions exist under PRC jurisdiction 
is not as widely known. These circulated reports, supra 
notes 211 and 212, however, have indicated that Chinese 
responses paralleled Soviet ones. 
227. See the August 10, 1954 Provisional Rules Governing Travel 
of Foreigners, supra note 222, Art. 6. 
228. Id., Art. 8. 
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229. Article 17 states: 
Local public security organs shall, according to the 
gravity of the matters involved, give foreign nationals 
who violate the provisions of this act punishment in 
the form of warning, find, detention, orders to leave 
the country within a time limit, expulsion, and so 
forth or they shall pursue these violations for 
criminal responsibility "according to law" [~ 
falu]. 
Cases of violation of the prov1s1ons of this act 
involving foreign nationals who enjoy diplomatic immunity 
shall be handled through diplomatic channels. (emphasis 
added). 
230. Pursuant to the Regulations Coverning the Use o.f Weapons 
and Arms by the People's Pol ice, only authorized public 
security officials are permitted to carry and use weapons 
in the PRC. See "Regulations on Use of Police Weapons, 
Arms Issued," FBfs-cHI-80-138 (July 16, 1980), at L4. See 
also "Shanxi Issues Rules on Use of Pol ice Equipmen"'t";"" 
'FBIS-cHI-81-035 (Feb. 23, 1981), at R5; "Renmin Ribao Com-
ments on Firearms Control," FBIS-cHI-81-099 (May 22, 1981), 
at K21; "Guangzhou issues Notice on Personal Weapons," 
FBIS-CHI-81-ll2 (June ll, 1981), at Pl. The 1957 Public 
Security Regulations, Article 9, provide for detention of 
less than 5 days, a fine of under 10 yuan or a warning to 
those possessing or using guns and ammunition for "sports 
or athletic purposes" without govern:nent permission. See 
"1957 Public Security Regulations Published." FBIS-CHI-80-
039 (Feb. 26, 19i:IO), at L8-15. 
231. This information was provided to the author by a cutural 
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., on June 
28, 1981. Cf. "Official Cited on Transportation Shortcom-
ings." FBIS-cHI-82-205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl6. 
232. See note 168 supra, Art. 7. 
233. See note 166 supra, Art. 2(1). 
234. Recently, the Chinese eased foreign national travel retric-
tions. See "Formalities Simplified for Foreign Tourists," 
FBIS-cHI-82-205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3. Within this arti-
cle, it was also reported that "foreign travellers may use 
their own cars only on the highway between Beijing and 
Tianjin.• Id., at Kl4. It is not clear from this article 
which cl a sST es] of foreign traveller [ s] may have his own 
car in the PRC, although it is known that certain 
diploma tic personnel may do so. But cf. "Be ij ing Circular 
Bans Misuse of State Vehicles.• -FBIS-cHI-145 (July 
29,1981), at Rl. 
235. This information was provided to the author by a culural 
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington o.c., on June 
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26, 1981. Note that this conflicts with standard interna-
tional practice regarding diplomatic envoys. The host 
country will usually issue a domestic 1 icense upon presen-
tation of a valid license from the receiving state. 
Article 13 of the 1957 Public Security Regulations 
calls for "detention of less than 10 days, a fine of under 
20 yuan, or a warning" to be issued to "anyone" who, inter 
alia, drives a defective motor vehicle, speeds, violates 
traffic signs, or drives a motor vehicle without a valid 
driver's license. See "1957 Public Security Regulations 
Published," FBIS-cHI-80-039 (Feb. 26, 1980), at L8. 
Note that many foreigners, because of the abundance of 
bicycles and bicycle accidents and the lack of insurance 
law or defined principles of tort liability, prefer to use 
PRC-supplied transportation. 
236. This information was supplied to the author by a cultural 
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington D. C., on June 
26, 1981. 
237. Id. Note that the Chinese have set Up a special agency, 
the People's Insurance Company of China, to help handle 
insurance arrangements pursuant to, inter alia, joint ven-
ture contracts. The establishment of this agency perhaps 
portends the eventual promulgation of automobile insurance 
regulations. 
238. See note 236, supra. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. See "1957 Public Security Regulations Published," FBIS-CHI-
80-039 (Feb 26, 1980), at L8-15. 
242. Id., Art. 20. 
243. (Sept. 19, 1949]. 3 U. S.T. 3008, T. I.A.S. No. 2487, 125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
244. In 1955, the PRC promulgated numerous decrees on regula-
tions governing urban traffic. See TAO-TAI HSIA, GUIDE TO 
SELECTED LEGAL SOURCES OF MAINLAND CHINA 143-44, 224 
(1967). 
245. See, !!..:..S.·, • Restrictions on Motor Vehicle Noise Issued. • 
FBIS-cHI-79-135 (July 12, 1979), at Ll6. See also note 241 
supra, Art. 13. 
246. For example, the noise regulations cited id., designate 
certain areas where horns may not be blown and generally 
limit the maximum amount of horn noise which may emanate 
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from a vehicle. Violations are punishable, though punish-
ment is usually meted out in the form of a fine. Inspec-
torate members are vulnerable to repeated harassment for 
violations of such restrictions. 
247. See Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Arts. 29-31; Con-
sular Convention, supra note 108, Arts. 41-43; UN Conven-
tion on Privileges, supra note 115, Sees. 4, 13, 19. 
248. Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Art. 26; Consular 
Convention, supra note 108, Art. 34. 
249. For example, Article 26 of the Diplomatic Convention, supra 
note 95, stipulates that freedom of movement shall be 
guaranteed to diplomatic personnel "subject to the laws and 
regulations [of the receiving state) concerning zones, en-
try into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of 
national security." The Consular Convention, supra note 
108, at Article 34 uses identical language. 
250. See the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, TIAS No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 
(Dec. 7, 1944) (Art. 1). The 1919 Paris International Con-
vention for Air Navigation, Art. 1, expresses a similar 
principle. See J. GREENFIELD, CHINA AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, AIR, AND ENVIRONMENT 188 (1979) 
251. PRC Declaration Regarding Territorial Waters, September 4, 
1958 cited in 8 Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-Kuo Fa-kuei Hui-
pien [Collection of Laws and Regulations of the PRC), at 
112-13. See also GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 188. 
Chinese writer Hsu Tun-chang has remarked: 
In view of the present highly developed air traf-
fic, it is impermissible for any country to carry 
out within its territory or in areas under its ef-
fective jurisdiction any activities that encroach 
on the erritorial air of other countries or are 
detrimental to their aviation or international 
security. See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 
593. 
252. See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 596-97. The PRC re-
cently supplemented these regulations with its decision to 
implement security checks at airports in order to safeguard 
aircraft and passengers." Airport Security Checks to be 
Effective 1 April," FBIS-CHI-81-061 (March 31, 1981), at 
L20. See also "Further Reports on Guangdong Plane Crash: 
Safety~easures Strengthened (announcing new, but un-
published, safety regulations after a crash that killed 104 
people. The crash occured under mysterious circumstances, 
with rumors that a would-be hijacker blew up the aircraft. 
Th~ safety regulations, therefore, may have included 
tighter security checks). 
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253. The Civil Aviation Administration of China is actually 
known by the title the General Administration of Civil 
Aviation [GACA], which answers to the State Council and has 
functions similar to those of the FAA and CAB in the United 
States. It also performs special aviation tasks connected 
with commercial aviation. See Young, The Dragon and the 
Eagle -- A Study of u.S. China Relations in Civil Air 
Transport, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN COMTEMP. 
"ASIAN STUD., No. 3-1979(24), at 58 n.l41. 
After the recent reorganization of the State Council, 
the GACA did not appear as a separate department under the 
executive organ and may have been partly subsumed by the 
Ministry of Aviation Industry, although this is not entire-
ly clear. Cf., American and 20 Others Die in Chinese Air 
Crash, N. Y: Times, Dec. 26, 1982, at 13 (Around the 
world). 
254. GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 191. KIM, supra note 95, at 
383-84. 
255. KIM, supra note 95, at 385. Chinese ratification did not 
include any reservations. Others authors observed that 
With minor exceptions, then, PRC practice does not 
diverge from Chic ago Convention pr inc ipl es. In many ways 
the PRC duplicates generally accepted international rules 
in its bilatera,l agreements. The deviations are not un-
usual See King and Rossevelt, Civil Aviation 
Agreements of the People's Republic of China, 14 HAR-
VARD INTL. L. J. 316, 322 (1973). 
256. The Chicago Convention, supra note 250, stipulates, inter 
alia, that 
Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the 
other contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in 
international air services, shall have the right, sub-
ject to the observance of the terms of the convention, 
to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its 
territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes 
without the necessity of obtaining prior permission, 
and subject to the right of the State flown over to 
require landing. Each contracting State nevertheless 
reserves the right, for reasons of safety of flight, to 
require aircraft desiring to proceed over regions which 
are inaccessible or without adequate air navigation 
facilities to follow prescribed routes, or to obtain 
special permission for such flights. (Art. 5) 
The strength of this right of non-scheduled flight is ener-
vated by subsequent provisions. The Chicago Convention, 
Article 9, also provides that: 
a) Each contracting State may, for reasons of military 
necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit 
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uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying 
over certain areas of its territory, provided that 
no distinction in this respect is made between the 
aircraft of the State whose territory is involved, 
engaged in international scheduled airline ser-
vices, and the aircraft of the other contracting 
States 1 ikewise involved. Such prohibited areas 
shall be of reasonable extent and location so as 
not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation. 
b) Each contracting State, reserves also the right, in 
exceptional circumstances or during a period of 
emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and 
with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or 
prohibit flying over the whole or any part of its 
territory, on condition that such restriction or 
prohibition shall be applicable without distinction 
of nationality to aircraft of all other states. 
c) Each contracting State, under such regulations as 
it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering 
the areas contemplated in subparagraphs (a) or (b) 
above to effect a landing as soon as practicable 
thereafter at some designated airport within its 
territory. 
Article 20 requires states to ensure that 311 aircraft have 
proper identification markings. Article 29 obliges states 
to ensure that proper documentation-- including radio and 
crew 1 icenses passenger and cargo manifests -- be carried 
on board. Article 16 explicitly grants the receiving state 
the right to search foreign aircraft upon landing and 
departure. 
257. King and Roosevelt, supra note 255, at 319-22, 322-38. See 
also COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 597-603; GREENFIELD, 
supra note 250, at 190-93. 
258. See, ~· "AFP: PRC Declares Hainan 'Danger Zone' for 
Planes,• FBIS-cHI-79-162 (Aug. 20, 1979), at Ll3 (PRC 
notification was communicated to foreign embassies without 
explanation. Speculation as to the reason for the restric-
tion ranged from Chinese mil itray exercises to satellite 
recovery); "PRC to Allow Foreign Airlines to Use New Air 
Route,• FBIS-cHI-79-140 (July 19, 1979), at L1 (The PRC 
opened an air route over Guangzhou, Kunming and Lincang and 
designated Guangzhou airport as an emergency landing site 
for foreign airlines); "AFP: PRC Easing Restrictions on 
the Hong Kong-Bangkok Air Route,• FBIS-cHI-80-107 (June 2, 
1980), at El. (As of May 15, 1980, the PRC eased an "air-
space· ban" it had imposed on a Hong Kong-Bangkok air 
corridor.) 
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259. King and Roosevelt, supra note 255, at 322. The third, 
fourth and fifth freedoms are known as "commercial free-
doms." They deal with the transportation of passengers and 
freight. The fifth freedom -- unrestricted carriage of 
passengers and freight from one foreign country to another 
-- is particulary offensive to Chinese sovereignty claims. 
See King and Roosevelt, supra note 255, at 320. The PRC 
also has not complied with the Chicago Convention on the 
publication of civil aviation statistics (Art. 67). GREEN-
FIELD, supra note 250, at 193. 
260. 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, done 
Sept. 14, 1963, entered into force Dec. 14, 1969. The PRC 
deposited its accession onNov. 14, 1978. See generally 
"PRC Accedes to International Civil Aviation Conventions," 
FBIS-cHI-80-201 (Oct. 15, 1980), at A2. 
261. 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, done Dec. 16, 1970 ~ 
tered into force Oct. 14, 1971. The PRC deposited its ac-
cession on Oct. 14, 1980. See PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, su-
~ note 95, at 221. See generally "PRC Accedes to Interi1'a=" 
tional Civil Aviation Conventions," FBIS-CHI-80-201 (Oct. 
15, 1980), at A2. 
262. Articles 100 and 103 (dealth penalty for heinolls counter-
revolutionary crimes) were involved in the recent publi-
cized hijacking attempt in Shanghai. See "AFP Reports 11 
Oct. Failed Hijack Attempt," FBIS-CHI-82-197 (Oct. 12, 
1982), at K8. 
263. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 158 (discussing 
previous US-USSR proposals on exchanges of information on 
civil aviation). 
264. H. BERMAN AND P. MAGGS, DISARMAMENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET 
LAW 29 (1967). 
265. For an example of this pervasive theme in Chinese jurisdic-
tion over territorial waters and surrounding land areas, 
see, ~· China's Indisputable Sovereignty Over Xisha and 
Nansha Islands, Beijing Review, No. 6 (Feb. 11, 1980), at 
4. 
266. See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 482-89, 474-78. ~ 
also Cheng, The Law of the Sea in LENG AND CHIU, supra note 
101 at 79-114; "Xisha Quandao Designated Restricted Mili-
tary Zone," FBIS-cHI-82-225 (Nov. 22, 1982), at W5. 
267. The rules were promulgated by the State Council on June 28, 
1964. An English translation is found in COHEN AND CHIU, 
supra note 4, at 535-38 [hereafter QIONGZHOU STRAIT REGULA-
TIONS] ~aiguoji fei junyung chuanbo tongquo Qionqzhou 
haixia guanli quize, reprinted in Gongan faqui huibian, 
supra note 5, at 290. 
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268. See PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204. The recent promulga-
tion by the PRC State Council of regulations governing for-
eign ships includes, inter alia, chapters on entering and 
leaving a port, navigation, carriage of dangerous goods and 
punishment for violations. See "State Council Approves 
Regulation on Foreign Ships,"~BIS-cHI-79-188 (Sept. 26, 
1979), at Ll. However, specific prov1s1ons were not 
published, nor was any statement rade to the effect that 
previous port regulations were thereby abrogated. It is 
presumed, therefore, that the Port Regulations are still 
valid. 
269. See RIVER REGULATIONS, supra note 205, at 25. 
270. See GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 25. 
271. Among those ports open to foreign vessels are Shanghai, 
Canton, Chankiang, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Chinquangtao and 
Dairen. Id., at 24. More recently, with the increase in 
PRC foreign trade relations, the Chinese have opened addi-
tional ports to foreign vessels, including ports along the 
Yangtse and the port of Sw.atow. See, ~· "Eight Chiang 
Jiang Ports Opened to Foreign Trade," FBIS-CHI-80-077 
(April 21, 1980), at L2; · "Wuhu Port Opens to Foreign 
Trade," FBIS-CHI-80-091 (May 8, 1980), at A2; "PRC Port of 
Swatow to be Designated International Zone," FBIS-CHI-79-
164 (Aug. 22, 1979), ~t AS. 
272. RIVER REGULATIONS, supra note 205, Art. 4. 
273. Id., Art. 5; PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 8. 
Cf., QIONGZHOU STR~IT REGULATIONS, supra note 267, Art. 4. 
274. PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 4,6. 
275. Id., Art. 6. See also VESSEL REGULATIONS, supra note 168. 
276. GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 25 citing the S.S. Zagorsk 
Incident. See also COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 571-72. 
278. This is the wording of Article 13 of the RIVER REGULATIONS, 
supra note 205. THE PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, 
however, are somewhat more definitive. "Maritime problems" 
along the Chinese cease must be reported within 48 hours. 
"Problems" occurring in port must be immediately reported 
(Art. 12). 
279. QIONGZHOU STRAIT REGULATIONS, supra note 267, Art. 10; PORT 
REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 7 ( 2); RIVER REGULATIONS, 
supra note 205, Art. 8(2). Apparently, the PRC also recog-
nized the common international practice of granting • safe 
harbor" to vessels in distress. See "China Protests Viet-
namese Slander of Ship's Encroachment," FBIS-CHI-78-178 
(Sept. 13, 1978), at Al2 (PRC Embassy protested the forc-
ible confiscation· of the possessions of PRC fishing boats 
which had docked at SRV ports during a typhoon.) 
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280. QIONGZHOU STRAIT REGULATIONS, supra note 267, Art. 11: PORT 
REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 10: RIVER REGULATIONS, 
supra note 205, Art. 11. 
281. QIONGZHOU STRAIT REGULATIONS, supra note 267, Art. 12. 
282. Id.: PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 13: RIVER REG-
ULATIONS, supra note 205, Art. 14. 
283. PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 13(1): RIVER REGULA-
TIONS, supra note 205, Art. 14(1). 
284. GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 25, reported that the 1957 
Port Regulations precluded seamen from coming ashore, ex-
cept where necessary and only with prior permission. The 
recent US-PRC Agreement ·on Visas for Crew Members of Air-
craft and Vessels, entered into force January 7, 1981, 
T.I.A.S. No. 9965, indicatesthe change in the Chinese 
position. The latter agreement granted, gratis, to crew 
members of airlines and vessels two-year multiple en try-
and-exit visas (on a reciprocal basis). 
285. See GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 26-30: COHEN AND CHIU, 
supra note 4, at 528-87. 
286. Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Arts. 24, 27(2): Con-
sular Convention, supra note 108, Arts. 33, 35(2). 
287. Article 36(2) reads: 
The personal baggage of a diplomatic agent shall be 
exempt from inspection, unless there are serious grounds 
for presuming that it contains articles not covered by the 
exemptions mentioned in paragraph 1 [articles for official 
or personal use of diplomatic agents or dependents], or 
articles the import or export of which is prohibited by the 
law or controlled by the quarantine regulations of the 
receiving stats •••• 
288. See note 115, supra. 
289. Pursuant to Section 13 (f), representatives of members are 
accorded the "same immunities and facilities in respect of 
their personal baggage as are accorded to members of com-
parable rank of diplomatic missions. Section 21 is 
narrower in scope, stating that only 
the executive head of eac;h specialized agency, includ-
ing any official acting on his behalf during his ab-
sence from duty, shall be accorded in respect of him-
self, his spouse and minor children, the privileges and 
immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to 
diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international 
law. 
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Note also that, pursuant to the Annexes acceced to by the 
PRC, experts of the various specialized agencies (as opposed to 
representatives of members or officials) are also accorded simi-
lar privileges and immunities. But cf. Section 23 which reads: 
Each specialized agency shall cooperate at all times 
with the appropriate authorities of member States to 
facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure 
the observance of pol ice regulations and prevent the 
occurrance of any abuses in connection with the privi-
leges, immunities and fac i1 ities mentioned in this 
Article. 
290. But see Section 5 ·of the ON Convention on Privileges, supra 
notell5, which· stipulates that 
The property and assets of the specialized agencies, 
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be im-
mune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropria-
tion and any other form of interference, whether by 
executive, administrative, judicial or legislative ac-
tion. (emphasis added). 
Where the inspectorate is an international 
organization, it would appear that both the inanimate cargo 
and the means of transporting it--assuring inspectorate 
ownership (note the issues arising out of • ownership")-
would be immunized. 
291. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 151. 
292. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Arts. 79, 84. 
See also •Airport Security Checks to be Effective 1 April," 
FBIS-cHI-81-061 (March 31, 1981), at L20 (weapons, explo-
sives, radioactive materials and poisonous chemicals are 
prohibited on board aircraft and those endangering public 
safety will be turned over to local public security bu-
reaus): •auangzhou Issues Notice. on Personal Weapons," 
FBIS-cHI-81-112 (June 11, 1981), at Pl (public security 
organs will sieze personal lethal weapons). 
293. See notes 177 and 178, supra. 
294. Within the conventions cited, inviolability of the pouch 
extends only to •diplomatic documents or articles intended 
for official use,• which circumscribes its applicability to 
inspectorate cargo. See Diplomatic Convention, supra note 
95, Art. 27(4): ConsUlar Convention, supra note 108, Art. 
35(4). The Consular Convention's provision for in-
violability is not applicable, however, when there is 
•serious reason to believe the bag contains something other 
than the correspondence, documents or articles referred to 
• (Art. 35(3)). .£!.· Diplomatic Convention, Art. 
27 ( 4). 
295. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 152. 
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PART III: LEGAL PROBLEMS DIRECTLY CONFRONTING AN ARMS IN-
SPECTORATE DURING THE COURSE OF VERIFICATION 
PROCEDURES 
Chapter 6. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION 
A. Gathering Information in Light of Chinese Secrecy Laws 
From a practical standpoint, Chinese secrecy laws and reg-
ulations probably cover almost all items in the PRC which may be 
subject to inspection. Circumvention of these rules will be a 
formidable task for inspectorate personnel and one on which the 
effectiveness of verification procedures may rest. Chinese 
secrecy laws are pervasive~ their coverage includes party docu-
ments, military information and hardware, and state secrets. 
Moreover, secrecy laws are generally unavailable in specific 
detail, making a thorough examination of their effect on the col-
lection of information in the PRC rather difficult. Neverthe-
less, some regulations provide a reference point for determining 
the extent to which revision of Chinese secrecy laws is necessary 
or the scope of privileges and immunities that inspectorate mem-
bers would require in order to avoid conflict with the relevant 
laws. 
In essence, Chinese secrecy laws are embodied in a single 
document -- the 1951 Provisional Regulations on Guarding State 
Secrets [hereafter State Secrets Regulations], which was 
republished in 1980.1 The Regulations emcompass broad categories 
of information and are designed to "prevent domestic and foreign 
spies, counterrevolutionaries and saboteurs from gathering intel-
ligence, stealing and selling state secrets and [to] prevent all 
kinds of personnel from leaking or losing state secrets" (Art. 
1). Article 2 provides a long list of what are referred to as 
st~te secrets (guojia jimi), though, in actuality, the listing is 
an amalgam of military, foreign diplomacy, economic and public 
security secrets. The listing is not further· classified for pur-
poses of handling~ that is, there is no official comment on 
whether secret information falls into different security rankings 
-- such as "top secret,• "classified," "for official use,• and 
the like -- which would presumably be used to characterize the 
nature of the information as well as to· determine the proper 
sanction to be imposed for disclosing information of different 
classifications.2 The Chinese employ the term guojia jimi (state 
secrets) to denote various forms of classified government infor-
mation. Classification levels do exist, however, although it 
appears that they are not publicly acknowledged.3 
According to Article 2, the following are classified as 
state secrets: 
(1) All national defense and military plans and construc-
tion measures~ 
(2) Secret information on the authorized strength, des-
tination, actual strength, equipment, stationing, 
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movement and deployment of all armed forces units and 
on logistics, ordnance, construction and so forth1 
(3) Foreign affairs secrets1 
(4) Public security secrets1 
(5) State financial ·plan, state budget estimate, budget 
and final accounts and other financial secrets. 
(6) State banking, trade and customs' plans and banking, 
tr.ade and customs' affairs secrets 1 
(7) Secret information about railways, transport, postal 
and telecommunications se·rvices; 
(8) Secret information on the country's various economic 
construction plans and undertakings1 
(9) Secret information on natural resource surveying, 
geological prospecting, meteorological observation 
and reporting, geographical surveying and mapping and 
so forth1 
(10) Scientific inventions and discoveries, cultural, 
educational, public health and medical secrets1 
(11) Secret information on legislative, judicial, procura-
torial and control affairs1 
(12) Secret information on nationalities and Overseas Chi-
nese affairs1 
(13) Internal and personnel secrets1 
(14) Files, cipher codes, official seals and all docu-
ments, telegrams, letters, data, statistics, figures, 
charts, books and periodicals concerning state 
secrets; 
(15) All organs, establishments, warehouses, places and so 
forth that have something to do with state secrets1 
(16) All state affairs which have not yet been decided 
upon or which have been decided upon but have not yet 
been made public1 and 
(17) All other state affairs which ·should be kept secret. 
Documents pertaining to "any important meeting• may not be dupli-
cated or kept in personal files without specific approval (Art. 
8). Individuals are not permitted to take notes during meetings, 
nor reveal what happened during them to outsiders,· including fam-
ily members. 4 Moreover, the publicizing of conferences is en-
trusted to those who have received special training in keeping 
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secrets, and such reports are to· be strictly controlled. 5 Media 
services may not publicize or broadcast information touching on 
state secrets (Art. 11). 
Though this list is hardly a circumscribed one, it has been 
augmented by separate military regulations6 and ad hoc miscel-
laneous restr ictions7 which may prevent the publication of such 
items as industrial statistical evidenceS or prevent access to 
advanced technological inventions. 9 Foreigners are also effec-
tively denied occasional access to non-classified material 
published in the PRc.lO A noteworthy example is the paucity of 
Chinese legal materials that are systematically mailed abroad for 
foreign reference. 
The PRC also engages in various forms of disinformation: 
economic statistics are often exaggerated and published reports 
of criminal cases depict only the successes of public security 
agencies in apprehending criminals or preventing criminal activi-
ty.ll Undoubtedly, these statistics also serve domestic politi-
cal needs and ideological purposes. 
The secrecy syndrome is pervasive in Chinese society, as 
shown by the existence of separate contemporaneous regulations 
governin~ the preservation and dissemination of Communist Party 
secrets. 2 However, as some authors have indicated, "because of 
the peculiar ties between the state and the Party, the two 
theoretially distinct systems of secrecy may be treated as one 
[under Party control) for many practical purposes.•l3 
There is not much publicized information outside China 
about the administration of secrecy laws in the PRC, although 
almost all PRC government employees and many ordinary Chinese 
know of the existence of operative Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
organs which deal with internal security. Apparently, there are 
two CCP organs: the Confidential Communication Bureau ( j iyao-
i!:!.>and the General Office ( bangongting) which cooperate to ad-
minister state secrets and their affairs. The former is mainly 
responsible for the dissemination, control, and retrieval of 
state secrets materials, while the latter possesses decision-
making and administration responsibility.l4 
There are also few data on the nature of any system of 
security clearance for Chinese with access to classified informa-
tion, although access to secret information depends, at least in 
part, on government rank, profession, and loyalty.l5 
Despite the lack of any apparent, authorized power to en-
force Chinese secrecy laws, public security organs (gonganju) 
maintain special operational sections in change of observation, 
surveillance and counter-espionage activity.l6 
Actually, an elaborate secret police system in the PRC is 
superfluous. There are several organizations which most 1 ikely 
participate in intelligence activities, such as military, com-
munications and intelligence depi'rtments within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of 
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Public Security and the Ministry of National Defense. PLA forces 
actively direct and control border frontier security. Moreover, 
the Chinese have worked wonders with mass organizations: by vir-
tue of such regulations as the Provisional Regulations Governing 
the Organization of Public Security Committeesl7 special mass 
organizations, such as residents' committees ( jumin weiyuanhui) 
and the militia, have been established to assist public security 
organs in. "preventing traitors, spies, thieves and arsonists and 
in eliminating counter-revolutionaries in order to safeguard 
state and public security.•lB They are expected to "keep watch 
on, inform against ••. report on •.• arrest and turn in~l9 
counterrevolutionaries and criminals. All such intelligence and 
quasi-intelligence organizations eventually answer to Party 
leadership. 
Faced with numerous ~ntelligence-gathering groups with 
overlapping functions, arms inspectorate personnel should prob-
ably be prepared for a significant degree of surveillance during 
the course of their official operations and in their personal 
lives. The extent to which the various committees, agencies and 
organizations participate in monitoring inspectorate activities 
will likely depend on how much sensitive information will be made 
available to inspectorate personnel and how strong the Chines.e 
commitment to effective arms inspection pol icy is. The Soviet 
Union· provides an interesting example of potential conflict 
between foreigners and intelligence organizations. Presumably, 
official inspectorate functions, like official foreign diplomatic 
functions in the Soviet Union, are monitored by official Soviet 
military, communications and KGB representatives, often using 
sophisticated equipment. Additionally, the KGB engages in more 
subtle forms of intelligence-gathering operations, including the 
use of Soviet "plants" who are directed to monitor the more per-
sonal social activities of diplomatic agents, often entrapping 
them into compromising situations which the Soviet eventually use 
to discredit the agent and possibly the organization or country 
he represents.20 
The potentially analogous response of Chinese intelligence 
organizations toward inspectorate personnel should not be antici-
pated. ·First, Chinese technology may not yet permit the kind of 
close electronic surveillance of foreign operations usually as-
sociated with the KGB and the CIA. Second, PRC intelligence 
operations do not appear to be vested in a single agency with 
overall control of security activities. The number of Chinese 
intelligence agencies involved in inspectorate operations will be 
based on temporal factors and perceptions of intrusiveness: in-
spectorate per·sonnel can expect to be monitored more closely 
during the incipiency of arms inspection verification procedures 
and at time when the scope of operations extends to the more 
clandestine features of Chinese military and economic life. 
Nevertheless, absent a pervasive paranoia of foreign-
intelligence operations in the PRC, it is unlikely that the PRC 
would mobilize the full array of surveillance mechanisms to moni-
tor inspectorate personnel. Public security committees, for ex-
ample, are mainly comprised of ordinary Chinese citizens who 
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would probably not have access to inspectorate installations and 
inspection sites. The Chinese authorities themselves would prob-
ably wish to limit the involvement of domestic security agents in 
order to permit the expeditious and ,centralized handling of in-
telligence information on inspectorate personnel and to avoid 
overlapping and continual surveillance that could make the entire 
range of inspectorate operations dysfunctional. 
The value of civilian security forces, if any, to the PRC 
exists in their potential use to frustrate the aims of inspection 
operations or to hinder verification procedures -- goals the Chi-
nese are unlikely to strive for if they are truly committed to an 
arms control arrangement. 
Chinese secrecy legislation is very much the product of PRC 
concern for the preservation and protection of its sovereignty. 
Chinese protectiveness is conveyed in the PRC Criminal Code, 
which provides for very broadly defined acts of counterrevolu-
tion, the category of Chinese criminal activity wich subsumes 
crimes against the state. Pursuant to article 97: 
Those committing espionage or supporting the 
enemy in the following manner will be sen-
tenced to impr isonrnent of no less than 10 
'years or life imprisonment; in less serious 
cases, they will be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not less than 5 and not more 
than 10 years: 
1. Stealing, spying and supplying infor-
mation to the enemy; 
2. Supplying arms or other military 
materials to the enemy; and 
3. Joining a secret service or espionage 
organization or receiving orders from 
the enemy. 
This antiespionage provision is supplemented by Article 91: 
Offenders colluding with foreign countries and conspir-
ing to jeopardize the sovereignty, territorial integri-
ty and security of the motherland will be sentenced to 
life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not 
less than 10 years. 
Terms such as "espionage" and "colluding with foreign 
countries" are never adequately defined elsewhere in the PRC 
Criminal Code. Consequently, they are subject to the unilaterial 
determination fo the PRC, a fact hardly advantageous to inspecto-
ate operations. Nevertheless, there are factors which tend to 
mitigate the severity and applicability of these provisions on 
inspection activities. 
First, Article 91 addresses offenders who collude with for-
eign countries: this provision would cover an adversary arms 
inspectorate but may not be applicable to an arms inspectorate 
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with the status of an international organization. Since the PRC 
has gone on record as recognizing that ~various kinds of interna-
tional organizations ••• are a form of international coopera-
tion,~21 an international inspectorate organization would not, by 
definition, be considered to be a foreign country or an affiliate 
of a foreign country. 22 In fact, Chinese participation in such 
an international body would arguably preclude any consideration 
that the inspectorate is even a foreign entity. 
The second part of Article 91 may be argued away somewhat 
more subtly. Conceivably, conspiring to threaten the motherland 
may be regarded as a crime regardless of the status of the in-
spectorate. But, reading the second clause in pari materia with 
the first and according legal force to the conjunctive "and,•23 
it would appear that the offender is guilty of a crime against 
the state only to the extent· he both colludes with a foreign 
country and conspires to jeopardize the PRC. In effect, this 
confines the applicability of Article 91 to agents of foreign 
states and renders the provision nugatory when the arms control 
arrangement calls for the collection of information on behalf of 
a n0n-governmental international inspectorate. 
The provisions of Article 97 are also somewhat narrowly 
formulated, for they are addressed to the transfer of certain 
types of information to the enemy ( diren). By signing an arms 
control agreement, the· Chinese do riOt necessarily relinquish 
their right to perceive other parties to the agreement as enemies 
in the ideological sense of the word, but it is hardly 1 ikel y 
that the PRC would perceive the official acts of, inspectors --
pursuant to an agreement voluntarily executed by the Chinese 
government -- to be clandestine covers for parasitic deeds of 
espionage, designed to transfer damaging information to enemy 
forces.24 
Article 97 also creates criminal responsibility for "steal-
ing" and "spying." However, information collected and trans-
ferred by inspectorate agents as part of their official opera-
tions would be disclosed by the PRC pursuant to self-executing 
danestic legislation. As such, it would be ludicrous to associ-
ate official inspectorate acts with the more reprehensible no-
tions of • stealing" and "spying." "An inspector doing what is 
permitted (and in fact required) under one portion of [Chinese] 
law could hardly be convicted for spying under another portion of 
the same law."25 
Of course, the provisions of article 91 and 97 would be 
applicable to the collection and transfer of information outside 
the scope of the agreement. For this reason, inspectors would be 
well-advised to keep abreast, where possible, of operative Chi-
nese domestic legislation regarding secret information. If, for 
example, one assumes that later domestic legislation would over-
rule prior treaty law, the"n the potential for a scenario in which 
inspectors are accused of collecting and transferring information 
previously declassified but subsequently classified by a Chinese 
legislative act increases dramatically. · 
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In order to suggest a sound approach to handling the col-
lection and transfer of information by an inspectorate in ·1 ight 
of Chinese secrecy and espionage laws, the more practical aspects 
of Chinese protectiveness must be considered. It is unlikely 
that the PRC could be compelled to amend presently existing 
secrecy laws and regulations to exclude official inspectorate 
acts and it is unrealistic to assume that the PRC would refuse to 
introduce subsequent domestic legislation taking certain types of 
information out of the reach of inspectors. Rather, the best 
approach is to address the problem in light of existing 
circumstances. 
Because it is essential to grant inspectorate personnel 
sufficient protection from Chinese criminal jurisdiction in the 
collection and transfer of information, the most appropriate 
vehicle for accomplishing this would be to grant to an inspector-
ate a "privilege to gather in specified ways particular kinds of 
information (traditionally, security information) essential to 
the inspection mission • . coupled with a full immunity from 
arrest and criminal process.n26 This approach avoids the poten-
tial problems of a mere grant of full immunity from criminal pro-
cess which insulates an inspector from liability for criminal 
conduct but does not provide him with a privilege to engage in 
any course of marginally criminal conduct. Though this last 
statement may ostensibly appear to be a semantic splitting of 
hairs, its significance is not lost in the course of delicate 
negotiations with the PRC on sensitive topics such as sovereignty 
and espionage. Essentially, a grant of immunity from liability 
for criminal conduct would protect an inspector in the event he 
violated criminal rules; it is in no way intended. to grant him 
license routinely to engage in a course of conduct in direct con-
travention of applicable criminal statutes. In this manner, the 
grant of immunity would not preclude the PRC from taking preven-
tive measures to impede, if not to halt, inspectorate operations 
concerned with the collection of sensitive information where they 
are considered to skirt the border of counterrevolutionary ac-
tivity. However, the grant of a privilege to engage in 1 imited 
acts of information collection is an ·admission by the PRC that 
certain activities fall outside the scope of criminal statutes 
and are thereby permissible. 
Naturally, the Chinese would be expected to maintain as 
much control over the collection of information as possible and 
to prevent inspectorate intrusions into areas of more sensitive, 
classified materials. Therefore, the PRC can be expected to 
spell out the requisite privileges and immunities 1n careful 
detail and to narrowly define permissible inspection procedures 
in order to keep the collection and transfer of information 
limited to appropriate declassified material and to prevent 
verification techniques from falling within the ambit of culpable 
counterrevolutionary (espionage) activity. 
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B) Observation by Direct Access, Photography and 
Sampling Restrictions 
Certain areas and faciliites in the PRC are off limits to 
foreigners.27 Access to other installations is often restricted 
and requires the direct permission of Chinese governmental organs 
and a complement of official Chinese escorts before foreigners 
will be permitted to visit these locations. There do not exist 
in the PRC any general regulations covering access to restricted 
areas. Rather, general guidelines are conveyed directly to for-
eign states through diplomatic channels, indirectly through press 
releases of policy directives,2B or peripherally through provi-
sions governing the entrance, exit and domestic travel restric-
tions of foreigners. 
In their study of the Soviet Union, Zile, Sharlet and Love 
published the more significant rules concerning frontier security 
areas and the effect on inspectorate operations of, inter alia, 
Soviet KGB background investigations of foreign visitors prior to 
entry into these restricted areas.29 An examination of analogous 
regulations in the PRC yields .less definitive conclusions on the 
handling of foreign access to and through frontier security 
areas. First, although border belts exist in the PRC, Chinese 
officials have acknowledged _that there are inconsistencies in 
width among those belts, some of which are the result of ongoing 
disagreements with India (in southwestern China) and with the 
Soviet Union (in northeast China).30 There is currently no uni-
form specified width for restricted border belt areas, although 
inspectorate personnel are advised that they do exist and that 
traffic into and out of these areas is strictly regulated. 
Available Chinese codified regulations do not indicate the exis-
tence of any restricted frontier areas which are absolutely inac-
cessible to foreigners, but they do exist, particularly in the 
heavily industrialized northeast region borderng the Soviet 
Union,31 which is likely to have many restricted installations. 
Essentially, foreign access through frontier security areas 
is re_qulated by the 1965 Act on the Frontier Defense Inspec-
tion,3"2 which, in its most general terms, requires personnel to 
pass through frontier defense inspection stations, many of which 
are manned by PLA trooops.33 The administration of this Act is 
based largely on the Chinese passport/visa system, which permits 
travel in and out of the PRC only with valid, stamped passports. 
However, there is no indication in the Act whether different sec-
tors may adopt different security measures, nor is there any 
reference to specific penalties for violations of frontier 
restrictions beyond a general provision calling for handling 
violators "according to law" in light of the "actual circumstanc-
es of the matters involved."34 There is no provision which 
would, in effect, prevent Chinese frontier inspection agents from 
engaging in the type of time-consuming, disruptive security 
checks on individual foreigners entering or leaving the PRC. 35 
For this reason alone, a specific grant of immunity from this 
form of administrative jurisdiction for inspectors is essential 
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in order to expedite inspection operations and prevent the pos-
sibility of splitting the inspectorate team at the border areas. 
Once inside the PRC, access to spec i fie installations and 
facilities becomes an entirely different matter. There are no 
specific published rules in the PRC which directly address this 
issue. Chinese practice, however, provides some indication of 
what procedures are presently implemented. The question of ac-
cess to a particular Chinese facility may be a secondary issue. 
The first priority may be for inspectors to obtain the proper 
documents to visit the general locus of the installation. That 
is, certain cities, towns, and other areas are restricted; for-
eigners wishing to visit them are required to obtain the permis-
sion of appropriate (provincial) public security org_ans pursuant 
to the Foreign National's Act discussed earlier. 36 Access to 
installations within these areas would be handled separately and, 
in many instances, by other departments. 
Direct access into otherwise classified security facilities 
may be obtained only with the permission of the Chinese govern-
ment. According to State Department sources, the most likely 
installations requiring special permission are defense facil i-
ties, factories, economic installations, scientific and research 
institutes, government department and educational institutions.37 
The procedure for obtaining special permission is initiated 
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, permission is 
often not received '.mless the visit has also been approved by 
other cninistr ies and agencies. The number of depart:."'llents in-
volved and the problems of securing permission vary depending on 
the nature of the visit. An inspection of a classified in-
dustrial facility, for example, would require the permission of 
-- at the very least -- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of National Defense and the machine building ministry 
directly in charge of the installation.38 
Effective inspection operations require a more streamlined 
procedure. From the standpoint of the PRC, the present procedure 
of hierarchical approval would invariably preclude surprise in-
spection operations, though this is mitigated somewhat by the 
likelihood that large-scale Chinese facilities "could not be hid-
den, nor could their activities be transformed on short 
notice.•39 The first step in ~ecuring an alternative procedure 
requires cooperation among inspectorate personnel, Chinese 
governmental organs, and those directly in charge of the instal-
lations in question. A reasonable suggestion might begin with a 
careful examination of the facilities to be inspected and the 
most feasible domestic routes to travel in order to reach them. 
Prior arrangements can be made between the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and any other appropriate ministries and agencies and 
local public security organs to expedite travel to the facility. 
Permission to enter the facility might issue from the State Coun-
cil, which, as the organ responsible for supervising PRC minis-
tries, would thereby circumvent the present process of multiple 
approval. In order to protect Chinese interests in classified 
security areas, permission to enter could perhaps "provide for 
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conditional access to 'reasonable times' or with 'prior notifica-
tion' •••• n40 The key to a workable arrangement with respect 
to inspectorate access to restricted PRC installations is to 
forestall procedures which appear to the Chinese to be overly 
disruptive, for at such times the Chinese can be expected to 
muster a full array of legally justifiable bureaucratic impedi-
ments to interfere with or prevent proper inspection procedures. 
Chinese restr icti.ons regarding photography are somewhat 
less severe than those of the Soviet Union, but, at least in 
principle, they extend to both aerial and ground photography. 
With respect to aerial photography, the PRC Flight Rules Govern-
ing Foreign Civil Aircraft41 do not directly address the issue of 
overflight photography at all. However, the rules do stipulate 
that passengers and crews must abide by Chinese laws, decrees and 
regulations. Though there are apparently no specific legal pro-
hibitions against aerial photography, the PRC Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs does communicate photography restrictions to foreign 
governments.42 However, enforcement apparently varies, depending 
on the nature of the flight and the air corridor used. For exam-
ple, Chinese officials at the PRC Embassy in Washington, D.C. 
asserted that panoramic photographs of industrial cities are pro-
hibited.43 Yet, a State Department official reported that he had 
photographed Chinese territory from an airplane in flight over 
Beijing (Peking).44 For national security reasons, it may be 
assumed that overflight photographs of military installations, 
fuel storage facilities, harbors, rail road and highway bridges, 
large industrial enterprises, electric power stations, radio sta-
tions and telephone exchange complexes are forbidden. However, 
it is unlikely that inspectorate personnel would be faced with 
many of the practices engaged in by the Soviet Union to inhibit 
observation, such as seating foreigners in windowless sections of 
airplanes, rerouting the airplane or conducting rough landings 
and takeoffs. 45 
Though the PRC has decried superpower contention in outer 
space, 46 the Chinese have heretofore refrained from significant 
participation in treaties and resolutions governing the law of 
outer space. This is not to say that the PRC has not proffered a 
position on the rules concerning activities in outer space. In 
fact, Chinese writer Liu Tse-yung has stated: 
Although cosmic space does not belong to 
the sovereignty of any State, international 
law does not allow the breach of interna-
tional peace, the infringement of the 
sovereignty of other States or the 
threatening of the security of other States 
from any direction ( including space of any 
altitude). Cosmic space can only be used 
for peaceful and scientific purposes; 
otherwise regardless of whether or not a 
State has prescribed the altitude of its 
airspace, it has the right to take all 
necessary measures for self defense against 
any threat •.•• 47 
- 232 -
The PRC has recently participated in discussions of the UN 
Outer Space Committee48 and has expresed its commitment to the 
utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes,49 but it has 
not actively supported the principles of Resolution 196250 or the 
Outer Space Treaty.Sl Moreover, despite rabid Chinese denuncia-
tions of the Soviet handling of the Cosmos 954 crash in Canada,52 
the PRC has also repudiated any obligations under the 1972 Con-
vention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects. 53 
At the heart of the Chinese position on the use of outer 
space is the issue of whether the PRC considers the activities of 
intelligence-gathering satellites to be legally justifiable. 
The Chinese do have a number of their own satellites in 
orbit and others on the way,54 but their lauchings and purposes 
are enveloped in secrecy. The PRC has neither denounced nor sup-
ported the use of satellites for the collection of intelligence 
information over the territory of foreign nations, though it 
would be advisable that an inspectorate not accept Chinese si-
lence as the equivalent of acquiescence in such a principle. 
Presumably, the most recent official Chinese statement, calling 
for cooperation in the "peaceful utilization" of outer space, 
would preclude PRC approval of the intelligence-gathering opera-
tions of the satellites of individual nations. The PRC is likely 
to perceive such operations as unilateral efforts to obtain mili-
tary advantages. However, whether the Chinese would support the 
collection of intelligence by inspectorate satellites -- particu-
larly where the inspectorate was established as an international 
organization-- or whether the PRC would sanction satellites use 
for the collection of intelligence data by an adversary inspec-
torate -- when the purpose was to promote peace through com-
pliance with a arms control agreement -- is simply a matter of 
speculation. An inspectorate, therefore, is well-advised to for-
mulate narrow inspection procedures and to require strict non-
interference by Chinese authorities in aerial photography for 
inspection purposes. 
Ground photography in the PRC is a somewhat different mat-
ter though photographic restrictions are often erratically enfor-
ced. Ostensibly, ground photography restrictions are embodied in 
provisions of statutes controlling the movement of foreigners in 
the PRC. The Oiongzhou Strait Re~ulations,SS the Port Regula-
tions56 and the River RegulationsS all contain provisions pro-
hibiting photographing or sketching while in restricted areas.58 
It might be contended that the severity of these provisions has 
been emasculated by time and by changes in Chinese attitudes to-
ward forei~ners. The recently reissued 1957 Public Security Reg-
ulations,S however, seem to breathe new life into domestic 
photography restrictions. Article 7 of the Regulations calls for 
detention of less than 3 days, a fine of under 6 yuan, or a warn-
ing to be meted out to anyone "taking pictures, surveying and 
drawing maps in areas where picture-taking, surveying and map-
drawing are prohibited •..• • Presumably, negatives or sketches 
of restricted areas or installations will be confiscated, though 
there are no explicit provisions to this effect. Additionally, 
- 233 -
the PRC has recently denied foreigners the freedom to use 16mm. 
cameras without special permission from the Ministry of Fore1gn 
Affairs, or, if for commercial purposes, from the China Film 
Corporation. GO 
Since in spec tor ate photographic operations will pr ed om i-
nantly cover military installations and equipment, and since 
military installations and equipment are 1 ikely to be among the 
items prohibited from being photographed, it would be advisable 
for an inspectorate to obtain a special privilege granting it the 
right to take ground photographs of structures and articles 
within the scope of official inspection functions. It may also 
be feasible that the photographic privilege extend only to cer-
tain relevant inanimate objects. The latter suggestion provides 
the Chinese with two advantages. First, it promotes justifiable 
Chinese protectiveness of the identity of key military, scien-
tific and technical personnel. Second, by eliminating any pe-
ripheral landscape photography, the PRC is able to preserve the 
concealed locations of its more secret installations (such as 
those hidden in the mountainous regions of the northeast). 
In addition to photographic restrictions, an inspectorate 
should be aware of the potential for problems surrounding the 
procurement of samples of natural resources or raw materials. 
The issue is essentially a legal one, since in effect, acquisi-
tion of samples would constitute a taking cognizable under prop-
erty law principles. The issue is made a good deal simpler in 
the PRC where most relevant property, including military, nuclear 
and research facilities, is state-owned. 
There are precedents for state ~takings" in Chinese law. 
Under the 1982 PRC Constitution,Gl the state can, when in the 
public interest, "take over land for its use in accordance with 
the law" (Art. 10). Other statutes embellish on state authorized 
"takings." For example, the PRC Environmental Protection Law62 
implicitly provides for the taking and sampling of food products 
to ensure that sanitary standards are met. The 1979 Standardiza-
tion Regulations63 provide, inter alia, for the "checking and 
accepting of raw and other mater 1al s and i terns produced by 
cooperating units [and) examination of semifinished and finished 
products" (Art. 20) and for "quality supervision" through 
"scheduled or unscheduled product quality inspections~ (Art. 27). 
Moreover, the PRC has recently publicized the existence of a 
draft food hygiene law64 and quarantine regulations,65 the provi-
sions of which would presumably permit authorized government in-
spectors to examine and/or withdraw inferior or infected 
products. 
Thus, it is simply a question of coupling a state-granted 
privilege of access to such areas with a right to obtain samples 
of property under state control. This latter privilege should 
probably be combined with an immunity from administrative, 
economic, or even criminal liability that may result pursuant to 
provisions of the 1979 PRC Environmental Protection Law66 and the 
1979 Forestry Act. 67 The Environmental Protection Law encom-
passes, inter alia, the air, water, land, mineral resources, 
234 -
forests, grasslands, wild plants and animals, acquatic life, and 
scenic spots (Art. 3). Each of these resources is to be pro-
tected from damage and rationally utilized (Art. 2; Arts. 10-15). 
Relatively minor violations of these provisions may result 
in administrative penalties as well as an obligation to compen-
sate the state fo:: losses (Art. 32, par a. 1) • Serious viola-
tions, including pollution or ecological damage, which cause per-
sonal injury, death or heavy resources loss, may result in ad-
ministrative, economic or even criminal culpability (Art. 32, 
para. 2).68 Moreover, Article 9 stipulates hat the Environmental 
Protection Law, as well as other environmental regulations, apply 
to "[a]ll foreign nationals and foreign aircraft, vessels, vehi-
cles, materials and living beings entering or transiting the ter-
ritorial land, waters and airspaces of China. . " 
The Forestry Act is, in effect, a more circumscribed en-
vironmental protection law, intended, inter alia, to protect 
"damage to forest trees, roads, rivers or engineering facilities 
which serve forestry .••. " (Art. 2l(a)). Restitution for los-
ses or fines (Art. 39) are among the penal ties for such viola-
tions as "entering forest areas without authorization to procure 
lumber .•. " (Art. 39(5)) or "illegally taking lumber or fall-
ing trees . " (Art. 39 ( 6)). Serious violations may create 
criminal responsibility (Art. 40).69 
Unquestionably, f ai lure to obtain an immunity from such 
provisions would permit administrative or possibly physical 
interference with inspectorate personnel and operations. In 
negotiating for such an immunity, the parties to an arms control 
agreement must consider the historical protectiveness of the PRC 
over its natural resources. 70 It is unlikely that the Chinese 
will part easily with a full grant of immunity, particularly 
where major environmental consequences may result. However, 
since sampling and testing procedures should not greatly inter-
fere with the ecological balance or environmental resources, per-
haps the only requirement would be recognition of, and sensitivi-
ty to, Chinese concern for natural resource protection. In light 
of this, a sensible approach may be to offer the PRC a quid 12.£.9. 
~· In return for such immunity, the arms control agreement may 
formally stipulate procedures for, and amounts of, compensation?! 
for ecological damage caused by sampling or testing or it may 
even provide for restitution simply on the basis of the "taking" 
principle without regard for any possible damage to the 
environment. 
Chapter 7. THE INTERROGATION OF ~FFICIAL AND PRIVATE CHINESE 
CITIZENS AND THE PROCUREMENT OF EVIDENCE 
A) The Interrogation of Chinese Officials 
There do not appear to be any authoritative regulations 
restricting contacts between Chinese officials and foreign 
citizens, 72 though, from a practical standpoint, such contacts 
are inevitably linked to official functions and are usually ini-
tiated and executed only through circumscribed and carefully 
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supervised channels. In effect, these channels operate at almost 
every level of Chinese life. By virtue of pervasive state con-
trol, everything from social enterprises to high-level governmen-
tal organs are considered to be "official" state institutions. 
The effect of this is twofold. First, it creates a large number 
of "official" personnel, whose dealings with foreigners will thus 
be conducted through formal channels. Second, the omnipresence 
of official positions at every level of Chinese life reduces the 
potential for personal, unsupervised contact. ~lthough this con-
struction of officialdom is no doubt advantageous to the protec-
tion of PRC interests, the obstacles thereby created for foreign 
interrogation procedures are considerable. 
The need to interrogate Chinese officials to collect rele-
vant data for inspection operations depends on the comprehensive-
ness of the arms control agreement. It is 1 ikely, however, that 
any inspection operation will generate the requirement of col-
lecting information from oral statements and evidence provided by 
Chinese authorities. In this respect, inspectorate agents can 
encounter two interrelated sets of problems. The first involves 
the issue of what may be termed "authoritative voice." Certain 
officials either refuse to speak on behalf of the Chinese govern-
ment or are not empowered to do so. In fact, the bureaucratic 
chain of command in the PRC .is itself a obstructive force to in-
spectorate operations. Bureaucratism in the PRC, in fact, fauses 
shocking amounts of waste. National politics and national 
security are, of course, sensitive and serious matters, and it is 
a recognized principle in both domestic and international rela-
tions that only certain persons speak with a sufficiently au-
thoritative voice to communicate official government positions on 
various issues. Nevertheless, inspectorate personnel should 
realize that this principle applies strongly to the PRC. As 
such, formal interrogations of many PRC officials would be time-
consuming and potentially futile since the Chinese government 
would not itself be bound by their statements and since these 
officials may not in fact be competent to answer such inquiries. 
The second problem is more formidable. Simply stated, Chi-
nese secrecy laws are so broad and so pervasive that they con-
stitute the single most obstructive legal hindrance to effective 
inspection operations. In effect, they bar Chinese officials 
from divulging many types of information, violations of which are 
usually punishable as counterrevolutionary crimes73__ crimes 
similar to treasonable activities in other countries. The secre-
cy laws do not convey the full array of disciplinary and criminal 
penalties available to enforce those laws. However equivocal 
these provisions are by their textual ambiguities, they unmistak-
ably punish improper conduct by state officials with respect to 
state secrets. The magnitude of this issue cannot be ignored. 
The 1982 PRC Constitution, for example, refers to the obligation 
to protect state secrets no less than four times. 74 Article 186 
of the PRC Criminal Code declares that 
In grave cases, any state functionary who 
developed important state secrets in 
violation of state security regulations 
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will be sentenced to detention or impr is-
onment for not more than 7 years or sub-
jected to deprivation of political rights. 
In contrast with such provisions directly applicable to 
those who divulge state secrets, there are also more oblique 
clauses -- oblique in the sense that they do not directly punish 
the communication of secrets. Rather, they are designed to deter 
verbal cooperation with those not privy to the same information. 
For example, Article 131 of the PRC CRiminal Code protects "the 
citizen's personal and democratic rights and other rights against 
unlawful infringement." Article 146 punishes a state functionary 
who "abuses his power." Article 145 punishes anyone who 
"seriously insults another person by force or other means .... " 
Somewhat more peripherally, Article 138 states that " [ i) t is 
strictly forbidden to bring false charges against the cadres and 
masses by any means whatsoever.•75 
In addition to criminal provisions, the military76 and Par-
ty regulations77 enforce a system of disciplinary penalties rang-
ing from demotion and dismissal to criminal punishment for 
serious violations in communicating national secrets. 
The purpose of these laws and regulations is not only to 
promot~ Chinese protectiveness of its sovereignty and national 
security but also to foster a sense of individual circumspection 
in communicating official information in personal encounters with 
foreign personages. Although this will not make renegotiating 
for broad inspectorate interrogatory powers any simpler, it at 
least indicates the nature and historical roots of Chinese atti-
tudes toward secrecy. Foreign negotiators may thereby gain 
greater sensitivity to Chinese thought and action. Such sen-
sitivity, in turn, may stretch a long way in securing PRC 
concessions. 
In their chapter on the interrogation of Soviet officials 
by an arms inspectorate, Harold Berman and Peter Maggs78 examined 
the scope of the questions that soviet officials were permitted 
to answer. Their analysis extended to the Soviet procedure for 
letters rogatory, a recognized international practice which calls 
for specific answers to questions posed by other countries. 79 
Soviet procedure included the right not to respond to questions 
that might "infringe upon the 'safety or security' of the 
USSR.•BO Similar limitations were found in the Soviet Civil Pro-
cedure Code, which stipulated that Soviet courts should execute 
commissions of foreign judicial agencies except, inter alia, 
where they threatened the security or contradicted ----rti"e 
sovereignty of the Soviet Union.Bl 
Significantly, there are no explicit equivalent Chinese 
procedures or provisions. In fact, the only available recent 
information on the impact of foreign judicial decisions on Chi-
nese entities is found in Chinese commercial trade practices. It 
has been reported that, although the PRC is not a member of 
international conventions for the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards, Chinese corporations will observe foreign arbitral awards 
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"so long as they are fair and. not in violation of Chinese laws 
and policies." 82 
As Zile, Sharlet and Love had indicated with respect to the 
Soviet Union, domestic organs enjoy broad interrogatory powers, 
within the limits of their competence, designed to facilitate 
internal interests. 83 A number of Chinese agencies are accorded 
such interrogatory powers. For instance, under the 1982 PRC Con-
stitution, special committees of inquiry appointed by the Nation-
al People's Congress ( NPC) and its Standing Commit tee -- commit-
tees likely to be established to address extraordinary inspector-
ate issues -- have the power to secure the information necessary 
for their investigations from "all organs of state, public or-
ganizations and citizens ..•. •84 Under the PRC Criminal Pro-
cedure Code,85 "each and every unit and individual has the duty 
to surrender as required by a people's procuratorate or public 
security organ, material and documentary evidence which may prove 
the accused to be guilty or not guilty" (Art. 80). Article 86 of 
the same Code requires a witness to "produce evidence and give 
testimony.n86 
In fact, a basic tenet of the Chinese criminal justice sys-
tem -- leniency toward confessors and severity to those who re-
sist87 -- presupposes the right of procuratorial organs to· secure 
information tending to prove the guilt of an accused. 
These broad powers have been extended to cover various 
forms of interrogation of foreign entities by Chinese depart-
ments. Under the Joint Venture Income Tax Law,88 for exa'llple, 
t:~x authorities "have the right to investigate the financial af-
fairs, account books and tax situations of any joint venture. 
The joint vent~re must make reports according to the facts and 
provide all relevant infor:nation and shall not conceal the facts 
or refuse to cooperate" (Art. 12). Implicitly, such interroga-
tory powers are granted to the PRC's Labor f1anagement Department 
which~ pursuant to the Joint Venture regulations on Labor Manage-
ment,i:l9 has the power to "supervise and inspect" the implementa-
tion of labor protection and safety regulations in joint venture 
operations (Art. 13).90 
To protect and preserve the objectives for which an inspec-
tion arrangement is implemented, an arms inspectorate would un-
doubtedly require Chinese officials to reveal needed information. 
To circumvent PRC secrecy laws and potential criminal liability 
for cooperative Chinese officials, an inspection arrangement 
ought to stipulate for 1) declassification of certain types of 
information or of all documents contained in a given zone, or 2) 
adequate personal immunity from disciplinary and criminal penal-
ties for Chinese officials divulging information for inspection 
purposes.91 Though either alternative would be effective, it 
would be less probable that the PRC would relinquish its control 
over its own government agents through a grant of immunity, 
since, despite the loyalty of its personnel, this choice may be 
perceived as a license to engage in counterrevolutionary activi-
ty. The declassification alternative, on the other hand, permits 
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greater Chinese control over the· type of information that may be 
divulged and who may divulge it. 
B) The Interrogation of Chinese Civilians 
Traditional orientation in the PRC has emphasized and en-
couraged official, organized contacts between PRC representatives 
and foreigners. Chinese authorities, until very recently, have 
mistrusted thoroughly foreign influences on the rudiments of Chi-
nese society. The pages of the Chinese press have been the forum 
for articles calling on the Chinese to preserve their "national 
dignity and prestige", to avoid "worshipping foreign things" and 
to distinguish between • flagrant [sic) followers and poisonous 
weeds."92 Complete freedom in dealing with foreigners is simply 
not an aspect of private life in the PRC, and it appears that, 
despite increased contacts with foreign countries, Chinese au-
thorities do not seek actively to expunge the pervasive suspicion 
of foreigners or to erase the sense of secrecy which they have so 
carefully instilled in the Chinese people. 
In light of this, it is hardly unusual that so great a seg-
ment of the PRC pouplation is precluded from substantial contact 
with foreign individuals and so much international communication 
is conducted through formal channels. In the absence of any com-
pelling reason for particular extraordinary instances of inter-
rogation of private individuals, it is unlikely that an ar~s in-
spectorate need request specific procedures for ~ollecting infor-
mation from private Chinese citizens. As Zile, Sharlet and Love 
have so succinctly stated with respect to the Soviet Union, 
which, by virtue of similar forms of state control, is equally 
applicable to the PRC: 
The power to interrogate private individuals 
should not be necessary • . , nor should it be 
requested. It should not be necessary because, 
in the absence of relevant private enterprise, 
the role of the private individual as a source 
of firsthand information is negligible. It 
should not be sought because it implies a mis-
trust between the individual . citizen and 
his class state and would, ther·efore, be in-
tolerable in the [Chinese] system.93 
Private citizens communicating information to foreigners flirt 
with criminal liability under the.articles pertaining to counter-
revolutionary activity in the PRC Criminal Code. Though there is 
no statistical evidence on how often this aspect of law is ap-
plied to private individuals, one recent celebrated case indi-
cates the severity with which private acts of counterrevolution 
are treated. In 1979, political dissident Wei Jingsheng was sen-
tenced to fifteen years imprisonment and deprived of his politi-
cal rights for an additional three years for having "betrayed the 
country by supplying a foreigner with military intelligence,•94 
including "the names of commanders of the Chinese units engaged 
in the action [in the Chinese self-defense counterattack against 
Vietnam in 1979], the number of troops, the developments of the 
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battle and the number of casualties.95 Both the sentence imposed 
on Wei and the publicity surrounding the trial96 may well have 
been deliberately desiged to deter similar future activities.97 
In addition to counterrevolutionaray provisions, Chinese 
citizens are also subject to more oblique laws which reduce con-
tacts with foreigners, such as those punishing violations of 
monetary and foreign exchange regulations. 98 In the context of 
these provisions and Chinese practice, it seems unreasonable to 
assume that private individuals would be willing to cooperate, or 
that they would be permitted to freely associate, with inspector-
ate personnel.· In view of Chinese procedures for handling for-
eign communications through official channels, however, private 
contacts would be of marginal utility to inspectors. 
C) Legal Procedure Surrounding Interrogation 
Since the decision to interrogate Chinese officials or pri-
vate citizens, no matter how minimal such interrogation is, would 
profoundly affect the system of secrecy in the PRC and the notion 
of the exclusiveness of Chinese legal procedure, an arms control 
arrangement must adequately describe the place and manner of 
interrogating Chinese respondents. 
interrogation procedures can be either informal or formal. 
The former is probably more desirable, both from the standpoint 
of minimal offensiveness to the autonomy of the Chinese judiciary 
and in reducing the number of present legal obstacles to the for-
mation of a separate and distinct inspectorate interrogatory 
body. However, informal interrogation has two distinct disad-
vantages. First, informality breeds indifference. For inspec-
torate operations, which will often be of limited duration in any 
particular country, dispatch in the collection of information is 
crucial. The lack of coercive legal tactics-- such as contempt 
proceedings -- ·creates a risk that Chinese non-cooperation will 
not result in serious consequences and may reduce interrogation 
to a painstakingly futile and dilatory exercise. Second, effec-
tive informal interrogation procedures wuld require the complete 
cooperation of Chinese respondents, an assumption which, in light 
of secrecy laws and counterrevolutionary provisions of the PRC 
Criminal Code, is probably unrealistic, if not, in fact, 
incorrect. 
Formal interrogation procedures face equally formidable 
obstacles. First, there is a question of the status of the in-
spectorate entity and its concomitant interrogatory powers. The 
PRC 's latest disarmament proposal supports some form of interna-
tional body that would monitor verification.99 Some authors con-
tend that an international inspectorate with interrogatory powers 
would be less objectionable than an adversary one.lOO Though 
this may be quite logical and somewhat self-evident, the larger 
question is whether the Chinese would support any abdication of 
sovereign power in favor of· an autonomous interrogatory body .. 
From a practical standpoint, the question is almost rhetorical. 
The most salient feature of the Chinese international position is 
the concept of sovereignty and equality.lOl Almost any activity 
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of an inspectorate may impinge bpon this sacred principle, and 
undoubtedly any delegation of basic governmental powers (e.g., 
judicial or ~uasi-judicial powers) would add to the 
offensiveness.lO 
Although the 1982 PRC Constitution authorizes the es-
tablishment of special committees of inquiry at the behest of the 
National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, there are 
numerous legal impediments to the establishment of a separate 
inspectorate interrogatory body with judicial or quasi-judicial 
powers, though they are ostensibly not as extensive as those in 
the Soviet Union.l1l3 By virtue of Article 104 of the 1982 PRC 
Constitution, the Supreme People's Court, local people's courts, 
military courts and other special people's courts exercise judi-
cial authority, though the provision is couched in terms less 
direct than those of the 1978 Constitution.l04 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Organic law of the People's 
Courtsl05 [hereafter Organic Court Law) special courts include: 
military courts, railway transport courts, water transport 
courts, forestry courts and other special courts" (emphasis add-
ed). In essence, therefore, assuming the non-objectionable na-
ture of a separate inspectorate judicial body, the legal frame-
work for establishing ~ parte inspectorate courts already ex-
ists. Thus, the need for either amendments to present Chinese 
law or the addition of lex specialis is eliminated.l06 
A number of laws would conflict with the establishment of a 
properly-structured special inspectorate court and would thereby 
require amendment or abrogation. First, Article 3 of the Organic 
Court Law provides that the functions of people's courts are, 
inter alia, "to safeguard proletarian dictatorship, the socialist 
legal system and socialist order • . to guarantee the smooth 
progress of the socialist revolution and socialist construction 
[and to) devote all their activities to educating the 
citizens in loyalty to their socialist motherland •••• "107 A 
special inspectorate court would not properly execute its obliga-
tions if it was to serve only the socialist interests of the PRC1 
the provision must therefore be amended or made non-applicable to 
inspectorate operations. Article 33 of the same law limits those 
eligible to be judges to "citizens,• a rule which is obviously 
inconsistent with the establishment of a separate, independent 
and special non-Chinese inspectorate court. 
The 1982 PRC Constitution also provides that "[a)ll cases 
handled by the people's courts, except for those involving spe-
cial circumstances as specified by law, shall be heard in public 
(Art. 125). Article 7 of the Organic Court Law elaborates on 
this constitutional provision: "All cases in the people's courts 
are to be heard in public exce9t those involving slate secrets, 
personal shameful secrets and juvenile delinquents." 08 
Technically, inspectorate interrogation procedures may 
operate outside these provisions. The Chinese term for "case• 
(e.g., criminal case) as it is used in the Organic Court Law and 
the 1982 PRC Constitution is anli, a term with a rather precise 
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circumscribed definition; to wit, "a legal case [or) a crime."l09 
Whether the term would apply to the quasi-legal interrogatory 
procedure of an inspectorate, initiated for the purpose of 
soliciting information and not necessarily for determining the 
circumstances surrounding a crime, is unclear. 
Moreover, even where the "public trial" guarantee would 
seem to be applicable, the PRC government has administered ·it 
somewhat erratically under its criminal law.llO This may indi-
cate that the guarantee is not yet so entrenched in the Chinese 
legal system that it is consistently employed, even where stcite 
or personal, shameful secrets are not involved. In light of its 
erratic application under the PRC Criminal Code and the use of 
the more sweeping term "special circumstances" under the 1982 PRC 
Constitution -- which could easily encompass inspectorate pro-
cedure -- the "public trial" language would probably not even 
need to be amended in order to permit closed sessions for all 
inspectorate interrogation hearings.lll 
There is also a potential obstacles posed by Article 6 of 
the Organic Court Law which states: 
Citizens of all nationalities have the 
right to use their own spoken and written 
languages in court proceedings. The peo-
ple's courts should provide interpreter 
services to the parties concerned who do 
not understand the local spoken and writ-
ten languages. In places where people of 
a national minority reside or people of 
many nationalities live together, the peo-
ple's courts should issue written judg-
ments, public announcements and other 
documents in local written languages.ll2 
In one sense, the potential problems posited by this provision 
can be argued away rather easily. First, its application 1s 
strictly reserved for people's courts; a special arms inspector-
ate court would not possess the same status. In addition, the 
likelihood that the Chinese government would assign to inspection 
operations local officials who are fluent only in obscure in-
digenous dialects would be negligible unless the PRC was seeking 
to display its displeasure with, or disapproval of, in~pectorate 
activities. As such, the necessity for providing interpreters 
would seem to be diminished. 
In another sense, the provision is sufficiently broad so as 
to create potential practical problems for the collection of in-
spectorate information. The time, effort and security precau-
tions involved in providing for and using interpreters and 
guaranteeing accurate instantaneous translationll3 would seem 
prohibitive. With this in mind, a statutory amenpment to Article 
6, exempting from its ambit all inspection proceedings, would be 
required. 
- 242 -
The Chinese legal system operates mainly as a collegiate 
system. Restated, judicial process in the PRC involves the par-
ticipation, "in initial trials, [of) a collegiate bench of judges 
and assessors who are representatives of the masses ... •114 A 
colleriate court is usually composed of one judge and two asses-
sors. 15 From the standpoint of confidentiality and security, 
the participation of local citizens or numerus quasi-judicial 
personnel in a judicial panel is obiously undesirable. Though 
the suggestion to eliminate assessors is probably appropriate, 
the proper mechanisim for doing so, in light of the ambiguity of 
PRC law, is uncertain. 
The language of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code calls for 
the application of the collegiate system in "[t)rials at basic-
level and intermediate people's courts of first instance, except 
for cases of private prosecution and other minor criminal cases 
which may be handled by a single judge. " (Art. 105). To 
extend further the ambiguities, the PRC Organic Court Law calls 
for the use of the collegiate system "except in simple civil 
cases, minor criminal cases and cases otherwise specified by law" 
(Art. 16). If either the Crimina! Procedure Code or Organic 
Court Law was used, the most feasible suggestion would be to seek 
a statutory amendment to exclude assessors from inspectorate pro-
ceedings. However, it is possible that any change in the use of 
the collegiate system may require a more cumbersome and signifi-
cant procedure: a statutory amendment.ll6 ro further confound 
the issue, though, the recent Gang of Four trial was conducted 
without assessors. Chinese jurist Zhang Youyu justified this 
deviation on the grounds that the establishment of a special 
court permitted the use of special procedures.ll7 If such jus-
tification is cited by negotiators for an arms control agreement 
and validated by Chinese authorities, then the mechanism for ex-
cluding assessors from an inspectorate judiciary already exists 
and no domestic legal procedure would be required to sanction it. 
As in the relevant Soviet codes and u.s. Constitution,ll8 
Chinese legal provisions guarantee the right to counsel to "an 
accused." The 1982 PRC Constitution asserts, "Tne accused has 
the right to defense" (Art. 125). Article 8 of the Organic Court 
Law stipulates: 
The accused has the right to defense. 
Besides defending himself,the accused ·has 
the right to delegate a lawyer to defend 
him. He can also be defended by a citizen 
recommended by a people's organization or 
the unit where the accused works, with the 
approval of the people's court. He can 
also be defended by a close relative or 
guardian.. If necessary, the people's 
court can appoint a defender for the 
accused.ll9 
There are a number of issues posed by these provisions. 
First, the right to counsel applies only to "the accused"; in the 
case of interrogatory hearings a witness is not necessarily an 
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naccused.n All parties concerned would likely desire legal rep--
resentation. A statutory amendment granting witnesses the right 
to counsel is suggested. Moreover, the parties may wish to ad-
dress at this time the issue of legal representation in the PRC, 
which, pursuant to the Provisional Regulations on La~ers, may 
presently be reserved exclusively ·to Chinese counse1.12 
Second, both the Organic Court Law (Art. 8) and the PRC 
Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 26) permit persons outside the 
practicing legal profession, such as guardians, relatives and 
colleagues, to represent an accused in the PRC. 
Lawyers in the PRC are expected to safeguard the legitimate 
rights and interests of a client, pursuant to the equivalent of a 
code of professional responsibility.l21 Though there is no lan-
guage that explicitly creates an attorney-client privilege in the 
Provisional Regulations on Lawyers, the protection of the legiti-
mate rights of a client may be presumed to imply one. The real 
problem, however, lies outside such an inference. Whether or not 
an attorney-client privilege may be read into the lawyer's enu-
merated obligations, non-legal representation is definitely not 
governed by any code of professional conduct. As some authors 
have already stated: 
the presence of a lay representative 
might unfavorably affect the confidential 
nature of the proceedings before the arms 
control court (should confidential handling 
pe desired).l22 
Since the right· to defense is constitutionally guaranteed, 
a wholesale .elimination of legal representation before an arms 
inspectorate court would appear to be a more difficult concession 
to extract from the Chinese than a statutory amendment limiting 
representation to legal, and not lay, counsel in inspectorate 
proceedings.l23 
The actual course of interrogation proceedings under Chi-
nese law presents its own set of problems. Though Chinese law 
prohibits the acts of torture, threat, or other illegal means to 
procure information, 124 the PRC Criminal Procedure Code stipu-
lates that n [ a]ll those who have knowledge of a case shall have 
the obligation to be witnessesn (Art. 37). This obligation of 
compulsory appearance seems to be ignored in some instances. Re-
cent Chinese press reports have decried the practice of refusing 
to °Come and give evidencea at the Gang of Four trials, asserting 
that it was the nduty of everyone .•• to show a responsible 
attitude towards the country and give evidence.nl25 
There are also a number of other prov1s1ons in Chinese 
criminal law which imply the right of appropriate legal organs to 
summon persons to be interrogated or to provide evidence as wit-
nesses. For example, the PRC Criminal Procedure Code divides 
evidence into six categories, one of which is designated 0 Witness 
testimony• (Art. 31( 2)). Furthermore, under Article 32, a Judges, 
procurators and investigators shall, in accordance with the legal 
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process, collect various kinds of evidence to furnish proof as to 
whether or not the accused is guilty. " There is even a 
separate section in the PRC Crimina! Procedure Code devoted to 
the inquiry of witnesses,126 one provision of which states: 
"When an inquiry of a witness is conducted, he shall be notified 
that he must produce evidence and give testimony strictly accord-
ing to the facts and that he shall be legally responsible if he 
commits perjury or withholds criminal evidence" (Art. 68). 
Neither constitutional nor statutory provisions explicitly 
recognizes any privileged situations with respect to the produc-
tion of evidence or oral testimony, with the exception of those 
who are mentally or physically impaired.l27 
Chinese law does not recognize the privilege against self-
incrimination. According to Article 64 of the PRC Criminal Pro-
cedure Code, 
When an inquiry of the accused is conducted 
by an investigator, the investigator shall 
first ask the accused whether or not he is 
guilty of a crime, allow him to state the 
circumstances of his crime or to plead not 
guilty, and then ask him other questions. 
The accused shall answer the investigator's 
questions strictly according to the facts, 
but he has the right to refuse to answer 
questions irrelevant to the case (emphasis 
added). 
The value of the right to refuse to answer irrelevant ques-
tions is dubious: one wonders who has the final determination 
during interrogation as to what questions are relevant and as to 
when an accused is exercising his prerogative of silence or sim-
ply refusing to cooperate. In any event, it is not the equiva-
lent of a privilege against self-incrimination. 
The recent Gang of Four trial offered further evidence that 
the privilege is foreign to Chinese law. According to a 
published Renmin ribao report,128 the PRC "law of criminal pro-
cedure does not mention the defendant's right to remain si-
lent.•l29 Yet, in one specific instance -- that of Zhang Chun-
quao during the Gang of Four trial -- the lack of insistence by 
the Special Court that the defendant answer questions was deemed 
"right and proper. A defendant's silence, on the one hand, indi-
cates that he gives up his right to defense. On the other hand, 
it shows that he refused to admit the charges brought against 
him.•l30 The Renmin ribao report then noted that the defendant's 
silence, in 1 ight of the plethora of damning evidence, • did not 
intefere with the regular progress of the tria1.•131 
In the unlikely instance that PRC prosecutors need to 
secure oral evidence from a Chinese defendant during trial in 
order to obtain a conviction, the report leaves unanswered the 
question of what consequences would flow from the defendant's 
silence. 
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The PRC Criminal Procedure Code may also be read to sanc-
tion the use of polygraph tests and truth serums. According to 
Article 78, 
An investigative test, when necessary and 
with the approval of the publ ic security 
bureau director, may be conducted in order 
to find out the truth of a case. In con-
ducting an investigative test it is forbid-
den to take any action which may cause 
danger, subject' anyone's personality to 
humiliation or harm -public morals. 
However, there have been no reported cases of the administration 
of such tests and no Chinese authorities contacted by the author 
would confirm their use. 
The absence of a civil code leaves uncertain the existence, 
or P.Xtent of civil contempt powers in the PRC, but there are 
three criminal provisions punishing false testimony and the con-
cealment of evidence. Article 148 of the PRC Criminal Code 
states: 
Any witness, appraiser, recorder or inter-
preter who intentionally makes false iden-
tification, appraisal, recording or inter-
pretation on major links of a case in the 
course of investigation and trial to frame 
another per son or conceal evidence will be 
sentenced to detention or imprisonment for 
not more than 12 years. In grave cases, the 
offender will be sentenced to imprisonment 
for not less than 2 years and not more than 
7 •. 
Article 162 provides, inter alia, that 
Anyone who gives shelter to or gives false 
testimony to harbor counterrevolutionaries 
will be sentenced to imprisonment for not 
more than 3 years, detention or surveil-
lance. In grave cases, the offender will 
be sentenced to imprisonment for not less 
than 3 years and not more than 10. 
Anyone who gives shelter to or gives false 
testimony to harbor other criminals will be 
sentenced to irnpr isonment for not more than 
2 years, detention or surveillance. In 
grave cases, the offender will be sentenced 
to imprisonment for not less than 2 years 
and not more than 7. • · 
Article 115 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code stipulates, inter 
alia: 
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When questioning a witness, the judicial 
personnel and the public prosecutor should 
instruct the witness to give truthful tes-
timony and explain that if he intentional-
ly gives false evidence or withholds 
evidence he is legally liable. • 132 
Together, these three provisions provide an effective 
mechanism for a Chinese court's ability to obtain truthful state-
ments from those who testify at trial. Unfortunately, their ef-
fectiveness is only as good as their relevance. A slight varia-
tion of the justification that Zhang Youyu made with respect to 
the absence of assessors at the Gang of Four trial; to wit, a 
special court may adopt special proceduresl33 -- could be used by 
the Chinese to deny the use of criminal sanctions by a special 
inspectorate court against interrogated Chinese officials. More-
over, an inspectorate court set up outside the purview of Chinese 
laws may be, absent special provisions to the contrary, equally 
helpless to apply Chinese criminal sanctions-for false testimony. 
Finally, even in the event that an inspectorate court were gran-
ted the power to pronounce appropriate sanctions for false tes-
timony, one must also consider the proper enforcement organ. 
Without the creation of a separate inspectorate procuracy -- and 
here one must once again consider conflict with PRC constitution-
al provisionsl34__ enforcement would be entrusted to Chinese 
procuratorial organs. Independent inspectorate authority would 
thereby be denied. In essence, the effectiveness of the inter-
rogataory and enforcement organs, absent absolute independence, 
will depend on the degree of Chinese willingness to cooperate 
with inspectorate personnel. 
The protection of cooperative Chinese citizens in the form 
of a grant of immunity from prosecution would seem to be offen-
sive to the Chinese system. Coercive apparatus in the PRC is so 
pervasivel35 __ extending from the informal administrative sanc-
tions meted out by people's mediation committees to the formal 
criminal sanctions imposed by public security and procuratorate 
organs -- that the entire concept of immunity as it is known in 
Western domestic criminal systems is alien to the Chinese. Demo-
tions, dismissals, labor reduction, imprisonment and execution, 
as well as the more voluntary forms of social control, including 
self-criticism and denunciation, extend the influence of rule 
enforcement in the PRC to cover all form of deviant behavior. As 
such, the equivalent of a full exemption from liability in return 
for information would likely be unacceptable to the Chinese. 
Moreover, one must keep in mind that most of the Chinese citizens 
who have contact with an inspectorate will have connection to the 
CCP apparatus. Therefore, the promise of immunity from criminal 
sanctions, for example, would not preclude the imposition of sep-
arately enforced Party sanctions. The possibility of securing a 
sufficiently broad grant of immunity for cooperative Chinese 
which would cover legal and extralegal punitive or deterrent mea-
sures would appear close to impossible without a fundamental 
change in Chinese philosophy. 
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A second, perhaps less offensive, form of protection for 
cooperative Chinese, is to permit informers to emigrate fr'om 
their country.l36 The Chinese position on emigration, however, 
reflects a reluctance to freely extend such privileges to Chinese 
nationals. As Chinese authorities explained to the author,l37 
the PRC is fairly receptive to extending visa permits for tem-
porary travel privileges to Chinese nationals with relatives in 
foreign countries. Applications for exit are filed with local 
public security organs.l38 The waiting period for approval or 
rejection of the application for passports and visas -- the 
necessary documents for exit from the PRC -- may range up to one 
year. In addition, visitation rights are restricted in time. 
Permanent emigration, however, seemingly has not met with 
wide approval in the PRC. In fact, if one accepts as fact the 
above rules applicable to the visitation of foreign relatives, it 
would appear that emigration per se is not routinely recognized, 
a policy that may be responsible for a number of recent sensitive 
and publicized defections of Chinese personages to the West.l39 
Chinese press reports occasionally publish articles on illegal 
emigration,l40 which may imply the possibility of legal emigraton 
procedures, but provincial regulations on the subject of illegal 
emigration are so significantly harshl41 as to raise the spectre 
of Chinese governmental disapproval of the entire notion. Though 
the author could not obtain hard evidence as to Chinese permis-
siveness in extending travel privileges to governmental personnel 
with access to sensitive or classified information, it is rea-
sonable to assume that such privileges would be granted only 
under extraordinary circumstances and would undoubtedly require a 
promise to return. In fact, it is quite conceivable that a 
refusal to return to the PRC would constitute an act of counter-
revolution within the ambit of the PRC Criminal Code. Article 94 
provides, inter alia, that "[t)hose defecting and turning traitor 
1.rill be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 3 
and not more than 10 years.n Though this provision does not 
necessarily equate a deliberate refusal to return to the PRC with 
"defecting and turning traitor," the latter phrase is nonetheless 
susceptible of subjective interpretation. Moreover, it at least 
impliedly evinces a reluctance on the part of the PRC to permit 
freedom of travel abroad. Since no right to travel abroad exists 
and since Chinese practice frowns on permanent emigration, the 
chances of securing a permit for an informer to leave the PRC are 
probably minimal. 
In summation, the establishment and existence ·of a separate 
interrogating arm of an inspectorate is encumbered with numerous 
legal obstacles. In 1 ight of these obstacles, complete autonomy 
seems unlikely. Rather, the parties to an arms control arrange-
ment should be prepared for a number of compromises. First, the 
most significant legal impediments to independence apply to the 
establishment by PRC judicial authorities of a special inspector-
ate court. Therefore, the creation of this form of an inspector-
ate interrogating body should receive low priority, and the 
parties may wish to negotiate some form of informal judicial or-
gan which operates flexibly within the framework of Chinese law. 
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Second, a separate, independently structured interrogation 
organ established outside Chinese law will probably be considered 
too offensive to Chinese concepts of sovereignty to be permitted. 
As such, the parties may utilize Chinese interrogation organs, 
but ought to obtain broad interrogatory powers and possible 
privileges for interrogating personnel in order to ensure effec-
tive cooperation for inspection operations. 
The most realistic alternative envisions limited inspector-
ate autonomy and the significant cooperation of Chinese authori-
ties. The creation of some form of hybrid interrogating organ 
should incorporate a number of principles such as the elimination 
of assessors and the rejection of legal representation exclusive-
ly by Chinese counsel, which tend to deny strict Chinese control 
over interrogation procedure. At the same time, the arrangement 
will undoubtedly fail without active Chinese participation, par-
ticularly with respect to judicial decision-making and procurato-
rial enforcement of sanctions. The most likely approach, there-
fore, will be to require the promulgation of new laws and the 
amendment of existing ones. 
D) Production and Procurement of Documents and Property 
The most rational suggestion is this area of arms inspec-
torate functions is probably to permit inspectors to order docu-
ments and real evidence to be t:.~rned over to the inspectorate 
interrogating organ in connection with interrogation pro-
cedures,l42 particularly in the case of the appearance of wit-
nesses. This method appears to be the least offensive to the 
PRC. It lacks a number of problems which might arise through the 
use of other means of securing documents or evidence, such as 
personal body searches or the direction examination of files and 
materials pursuant to inspection of physical premises. 
Zile, Sharlet and Love suggested that, under Soviet law, 
inspectors could conduct a bodily search of individuals for 
evidence on their persons, though such searches would probably be 
unnecessary.l43 Chinese law also admits this possibility. Al-
though the 1982 PRC Constitution guarantees unequivocal in-
violability of the "freedom of person" of Chinese citizens (Art. 
27), the PRC Criminal Code prohibits only unlawful searches of a 
person (Art. 144). Lawful searches are, at least in part, de-
fined in the PRC Criminal Procedure Code: 
Investigators may search the person of an 
accused and the body, belongings and 
residence of a per son who may be hiding a 
criminal or criminal evidence as well as 
other relevant locations, in order to col-
lect criminal evidence and track down the 
criminal (Art. 79) .144 
The powers enumerated by this provision are too 1 imited to 
be readily transferred to inspectors. First, it is applicable 
only to •an accused• or a person who hides a criminal or criminal 
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evidence. Information collected for routine inspection opera-
tions will rarely be furnished by "an accused," nor is such in-
formation likely to fall within the ambit of criminal evidence. 
Second, by virtue of a subsequent PRC Criminal Procedure Code 
provision, the right of personal search is accorded only to "in-
vestigators" from Chinese legal organs (Art. 62). 
Article 10 of the 1979 Arrest and Detention Regulationsl45 
is at least as explicit as the search provision of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. Under Article 10, 
At the time of arrest or detention, in 
looking for criminal evidence, the public 
security organ may carry out a search of 
the criminal's body, his property, his 
residence or other places concerned. If 
it suspects any other person of hiding the 
criminal or concealing criminal evidence, 
it may also carry out a search of his 
body, property, residence or other places 
concerned. Except for in emergencies, the 
public security organ should present a 
search warrant in case of such a search. 
In case of a search, a neighbor or any 
·other witness and the person to be 
searched or members of his family should 
be present. After the search, a record 
should be made of the results of the 
search and of any criminal evidence 
seized. 
Again, it is apparent that the search is to be conducted 
only by the appropriate PRC public security organ and only of a 
"criminal." 
When these provisions are read in conjunction with the pro-
visions of the 1982 PRC Constitution stipulating that the 
citizens' "freedom of person" (Art. 37) and sanctity of the home 
(Art. 39) are inviolable,l46 it would seem that the PRC has re-
fused, at least on paper, to recognize carte blanche search 
powers.l47 Body searches in the PRC would appear to be confined 
to narrowly-defined instances involving criminal activity and are 
relegated only to Chinese legal organs. In practice, of course, 
the letter of the law has often been ignored by Chinese authori-
ties: nevertheless, a request for personal search powers for in-
spectors is likely to be perceived as overly intrusive and hence 
unacceptable. In fact, Chinese authorities would be likely to 
invoke Article 3 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code, which reads: 
The public security organ is in charge of 
investigation, provisional apprehension 
and inquiry in cases involving criminal 
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offenses. The people's procuratorate ap-
proves arrests and procuratorial proceed-
ings (including investigation) and in-
stitutes prosecution. The people's court 
is responsible for trying cases. No other 
government O!:gan, institution, organiza-
tion or oer son has the right to exercise 
such powers (emphasis added).l48 
A third alternative -- direct examination of files and 
other rna ter ial s during the inspection of physical premises under 
broad rights of accessl49 __ is so thoroughly reprehensible to 
Chinese secrecy laws as to be totally unacceptable. 
Ordering the production of evidence in connection with 
interrogation procedures and the examination of witnesses lacks 
the more nefarious qualities of personal body searches and avoids 
the potential infringement of secrecy laws. It is a right which 
would be granted in connection with a set of interrogatory powers 
that, assuming Chinese participation in the interrogating organ, 
are shared by PRC personnel. Moreover, and perhaps most impoc-
tantly, there are pervasive precedents in the present Chinese 
legal system for demanding the production of relevant documents 
to facilitate investigation. Many of these precedents have al-
ready been discussed in connection with the existing interroga-
tory powers of various Chinese legal organs. For example, under 
the PRC Criminal Procedure Code, "[e] ach and every unit and indi-
vidual has the duty to surrender . material and documentary 
evidence which may prove the accused to be guilty or not guilty" 
(Art. 80). Although such material is not sent directly to the 
court, it is surrendered to a people's procuratorate or public 
security organ which, in turn, submits it to a judicial body. 
Criminal subpoena powers are broad, ex tending to objects, doc u-
ments, mails and telegrams relevant to a particular case.l50 
They have also extended to other areas of Chinese law, such as 
tax regulationsl51 and quality standard rules. These ample sub-
poena powers of Chinese governmental agencies concerned with the 
administration of law may serve as an excellent model on which to 
pattern inspectorate interrogatory powers. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. See Provisional Regulations on Keeping State Secrets 
[Baoshou guojia jimi zhanxing tiaoli), in Gongan fagui hui-
pian 1950-79 ([Collection of Public Security Laws) [Depart-
ment of Public Security, Beijing, 1980) ), at 472-76, passed 
June 1, 1951 by the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress at its 87th meeting and promulgated on June 
8, 1951 [hereafter State Secrets Regulations]. For an En-
glish translation of the text, see "Xinhua Publishes Reg-
ulations on Guarding State Secrets," Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service on China [hereafter FBIS-cHI) No. 073-
1980 [hereafter cited by year and number, e.g., 80-073) 
April 14, 1980, at L7. Many laws promulgated in the early 
1950s have subsequently been revalidated. See Gongan fagui 
huibian at 447-48 citing the NPC Standing Committee Deci-
sion on the question of the validity of laws and decrees 
enacted since the founding of the PRC, passed on Nov. 29, 
1979. 
2. For an explanation of the dual level classification system 
as it applies to the Soviet Union, see z. ZILE, R. SHARLET 
AND J. LOVE, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYTEM AND ARMS INSPECTION: A 
CASE STUDY IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 221-22 (1972) 
[hereafter ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE). For an explanation of 
the document classification scheme in the PRC, see K. 
LIEBERTHAL, CENTRAL DOCUMENTS AND POLITBURO POLITICS IN 
CHINA (1978). 
3. It is possible that the PRC intended to avoid mention of 
any classification scheme in order not to create a public 
impression that the consequences of some secrets were not 
nearly as severe as those of others. This would have had 
the effect of promoting generally consistent public ap-
prehension of Chinese-enforced legal sanctions· at a time 
when PRC state and Party officials sought to offset some-
what the mass fascination with foreign goods and the influx 
of foreign visitors. 
See also "State Council Revises Invention Reward Reg-
ulatiOii'S,;;----psiS-cHI-79-013 (Jan. 18, 1979), at El5. The 
Regulations called for State Scientific Commission approval 
of "classified inventions" before the particulars are sup-
plied to foreigners. However, no distinct security clas-
sifications were posited. 
On the other hand, Fox Butterfield discovered that CCP 
Central Committee documents are numbered and labeled with 
one of 3 security level classifications: secret, institu-
tional secret, or absolutely secret. See F. BUTTERFIELD, 
CHINA: ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA 382 (1982). 
4. See State Secrets Regulations, supra note 1, Art. 8. See 
also China News Analysis, No. 1182 (Jun 6, 1980), at 2.~ 
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Guangyi, a correspondent for Zhongguo Caimao Sao (China 
Finance and Trade News) was recently convicted of divulging 
to foreigners the time, place and agenda of the Sixth Ple-
nary session of the 11th Party Central Committee, in viola-
tion of the 1951 State Secrets Regulations and the PRC 
Criminal Code, Art. 186. See Crime of Betraying State 
Secrets, Beijing Review, No. 20 (May 17, 1982) at 3; "Li 
Guangyi Loses Appeal in 'State Secrets' Leak," FBIS-CHI-82-
060 (March 29, 1982), at Kl. 
5. See China News Anaylsis, No. 1182 (June 6, 1980), at 2. 
6. See, ~, "Provisional Regulations on Military Offenses," 
FBIS-cHI-81-113 (June 12, 1981), at Kl, ~· Art. 4; "Ex-
planation of Regulations," id., at K4; "Anhui Military 
Court on New Military Law,-.- FBIS-CHI-81-133 (July 13, 
1981), at 01; "Military Commission Issues Documents on 
Security,• FBIS-CHI-78-099 (May 22, 1978), at El. (This 
was a report of some of the rules contained in the Regula-
tion on PLA Safeguarding of State and Military Secrets, 
published by the Military Commission of the CCP Central 
Committee. The Military Regulations included a long list 
of vague and nebulous rules, such as "Never ask questions 
about secrets you shouldn't know," which are enough to in-
still mortal fear into PLA soldiers and thereby limit for-
eign access to military information.) See also "Army Paper 
Stresses Vigilance Against Espionage," FBIS-CHI-82-141 
(July 22, 1982), at Kl. 
7. See generally "Text of New PRC Constitution Published," 
FBIS-CHI-82-235 (Dec. 7, 1982), at Kl, ~· Art. 53 
("Citizens of the [PRC) must .•. keep state secrets") and 
Art. 54 (citizens must "safeguard the security .•• of the 
motherland" [note the significance of incorporating two 
similar articles in the Constitution); "Regulations on 
Studying Abroad Approved," FBIS-CHI-82-147 (July 30, 1982), 
at K9; "State Council Publishes Personnel Regulations," 
FBIS-CHI-82-132 (July 9, 1982), at Kl, ~· para. 10 (State 
Council personnel must "strictly guard state secrets 
. . . . " ) 
8. For example, though the PRC is a party to the 1944 Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S 295, it has not yet published 
any civil aviation statistics as mandated by Article 67 of 
the Conventio.n. J. GREENFIELD, CHINA AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, AIR AND ENVIRONMENT 193 (1979). 
9. A recent Renmin ribao editorial called for the creation of 
a patent system which would permit the PRC to "refuse 
requests from foreigners to see [Chinese) advanced tech-
nological inventions on the grounds that they are patented 
[and thereby protected by) international practice." See 
"Renmin Ribao Calls for Creation of Patent System" FBIS-
CHI-80-133 (July 9, 1980), at Lll. See also China's Draft 
Patent Law, 8 CHINA BUS. REV. 39 (No.-r, May-June 19Sl). 
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10. Fox Butterfield discovered four layers of internal bulle-
tins, designated neibu, which have restricted circulaton in 
the PRC: 1) Reference News, which reprints articles from 
foreign press agents on international and domestic events; 
2) Reference Material, which is a more detailed account of 
foreign news articles and is available to Party members and 
cadres through their danwei, or work unit; 3) neican or 
"internal reference" reports, which are circulated only to 
officials above grade 12 on the 24-grade Party-rank scale; 
and 4) Cable News, which is a bulletin of major PRC and 
international events for the eyes of CCP Central Committee 
personages and military commanders only. See BUTTERFIELD, 
supra note 3, at 389-92. According to Philip Short, at the 
very highest level there are secret bulletins of domestic 
political intelligence, published by an elite department of 
the People's Daily (Renmin ribao) for Politburo members 
only. SeeP. SHORT, THE DRAGON AND THE BEAR 139 (1982). 
11. The exhaustive examination done by this author of Chinese 
press reports on domestic law enforcement activity did not 
reveal a single instance in which the media reported on the 
failure of public security agencies or judicial bureas to 
prosecute criminal perpetrators. But cf. "Nei Monggol 
Cracks Armed Criminal Case," FBIS-CHI-82-103 (May 27, 
1982), at Rl (one of three gang leaders in crime spree 
still at large). 
12. The Regulations on PLA Safeguarding of State and Military 
Secrets, supra note 6, called on Party Committees to es-
tablish and implement their own security commissions. This 
is not unusual in 1 ight of the fact that many books and 
documents are published only for upper-echelon Party 
leaders. See China News Analysis, No. ll82 (June 6 180), 
at 2. Seeaiso "Deng Yingchao on Guarding Party Secrets," 
FBIS-CHI-82-128 (July 2, 1982), at Kl. "Yunnan Rally 
Reveals Case of Stolen Party, State Secrets," FBIS-CHI-78-
094 (May 15, 1978), at J3. The articles implied the exis-
tence of separate Party sanctions for violations of Party 
secrecy. In addition to the potential for criminal sanc-
tions, violators in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are 
often dismissed from their posts. See "Criminal Vice 
Minister Yang Yibang Punished ,• FBIS-CHI-82-145 (July 28, 
1982), at K4. Cf. "Radio Delineates Between Gang's Party, 
State Crimes," FBIS-CHI-80-227 (Nov. 21, 1980), at Ll. 
Chinese press reports have stated that the abolition 
of the "Sida" (Four Bigs of the 1978 PRC Constitution) was 
due, inter-alia, to their tendency to permit communication 
of Party and state secrets. See Important Resolutions of 
N.P.C. Standing Committee, Beijing Review, No. 17 (April 
28, 1980), at 3. 
13. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 229. 
The application of Chinese secrecy legislation is 
often as capricious as its provisions are ambiguous, the 
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result of the interplay of concepts of sovereignty and the 
political current of the time. See note 73 infra. A few 
examples will illustrate. --- -----
In 1980, a Soviet national was imprisoned for 7 years 
for violating the PRC 1951 State Secrets Regulations - this 
at a time when PRC-USSR relations were almost non-existent. 
See "Soviet Spy 'Imprisoned,' Chinese National Sentenced to 
Death," FBIS-CHI-80-141 (July 21, 1980), at Cl. Moreover, 
Chinese nationals have been punished for colluding with the 
Soviets. See, ~· "PRC Vice Foreign Minister's Daughter 
Said Arrested," FBIS-cHI-82-087 (May 5, 1982), at VI (Tai-
wan report of the arrest of the daughter of Vice Foreign 
Minister HoYing, for spying for the KGB). 
As US-PRC relations deteriorated in late 1981 and ear-
ly 1982 over the issue of the u.s. arms sales to Taiwan -
before the August 1982 US-PRC communique was issued - the 
Chinese used the 1951 State Secrets Regulations to expel an 
American teacher for obtaining agricultural secrets .and to 
detain a Hong Kong newspaper editor suspected of "selling 
information to the Americans." See "American Expelled for 
'Stealing China's Secrets'," FBIS-cHI-82-107 (June 3, 
1982), at Bl; "Hsin Wan Pao Editor 'Detained' in Beijing," 
FBIS-cHI-82-14 7 (July 30, 1982), at W2; "Cheng Ming on PRC 
Detention of Hong Kong Editor," FBIS-CHI-82-194 (Oct. 6, 
1982), at W5; "Detention of Hong Kong Citizen by PRC Con-
firmed ,• FBIS-CHI-82-217 (Nov. 9, 1982), at W2 (the editor, 
Pai Zhen, was eventually sentenced to twelve years impris-
onment for leaking secrets. See Woodruff, China Deals 
Harshly with Unauthorized News Leaks, Balto. Sun, Jan. 7, 
1983, at Al. 
An earlier PRC state secrecy law - the 1951 Act for 
the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries (obsoleted by the 
1979 PRC Criminal Code) was invoked in 1979 in punishing 
Wei Jingsheng as part of a PRC crackdown on dissidents. 
See,~· "Renmin Ribao Report on Beijing Trial of Wei 
Jingsheng ," FBIS-cHI-79-207 (Oct. 24, 1979), at Ll; "Bei-
jing Municipal Court Rejects Wei Jingsheng's Appeal," FBIS-
CHI-79-217 (Nov. 7, 1979), at Ll. See ~ notes 93-96 
infra. 
Vigilance against secrecy leaks are occasionally used 
as grounds for the detention of Chinese citizens who main-
tain frequent or close contact with foreigners. See, ~, 
"Police Arrest Chinese Fiance of Italian Lecturer,• FBIS-
CHI-81-229 (Nov. 30, 1981), at G2; "AFP: Chinese Girl 
'Forced' from Diplomat's Car," FBIS-cHI-82-201 (Oct. 18, 
1982), at Kl3. 
14. The information on these CCP organs, as well as their exis-
tence, was imparted to the author by a former, high-level 
PRC government employee in December 1982, whose wish to 
remain anonymous will be respected. 
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15. Rank in Party or goverrunent organs is the most important 
factor in access to classified information. It also sym-
bolizes those cadres' positions in a privileged society. 
All secret materials are clearly identified to the extent 
to which they can be disseminated (~., level of county 
and regiment, prefecture and division, province and army, 
and so forth) . 
In terms of profession, access to classified informa-
tion is usually 1 im i ted to professionals whose work relates 
to it. 
Access to highly sensitive information (~., intel-
ligence and counter-intelligence) requires special back-
ground investigations to ensure loyalty to the CCP and to 
the state. Clearance will depend on numerous factors, in-
cluding an appropriate personal and behavioral record, a 
good family history, and satisfactory marital and social 
relationships. 
See note 14, id., for obtainment of this information. 
~ generally R. BERNSTEIN, FROM THE CENTER OF THE EARTH 19 
(1982). 
16. The CCP's Central Investigation Department, under the Party· 
Central Committee, is supposedly in charge of covert for-
eign-intelligence operations. The Public Security Minis-
try, allegedly divided into 13 bureaus, is the agency in 
charge of domestic traffic cops, plainclothes officers, and 
agents monitoring foreign activities in the PRC. See BUT-
TERFIELD, supra note 3, at 334-35. The Ministry also-main-
tains a crack PLA contingent, which serves as a "secret 
service" force to guard PRC leaders. In this respect (as a 
secret service force), it replaces the old 8341 unit, ear-
lier considered to be the military detachment in charge of 
protecting Chinese leaders. ~ generally, R. DEACON, THE 
CHINESE SECRET SERVICE (1974). 
Public security organs have been known to employ 1 iu-
mang, or toughs, to exercise surveillance of the general 
populace and enforce limited physical sanctions when neces-
sary. See J. FRASER, THE CHINESE: PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE 
318-33 (1980). Most of these incidents, though, were con-
ducted by so-called rebel factions ( zaofanpai) during the 
Cultural Revolution. These incidents are rare today and 
such conduct is not an offshoot of official goverrunent 
policy. See note 14 supra. 
17. Adopted by the PRC Goverrunent Administration Council on 
June 27, 1952 and reintroduced by the NPC in 1980 as part 
of a set of four regulations repromulgated in order to es-
tablish a pre-Cultural Revolution surveillance network. 
The regulations also include the reintroduction of People's 
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Mediation Committees, Subdistrict Offices and Urban Neigh-
borhood Committees. Texts of these regulations are re-
printed in "Central Press Publishes NPC Regulations on Lo-
cal Organizations," FBIS-cHI-80-017 (Jan. 24, 1980), at L2. 
18. See the "Temporary Organic Regulations of the Social Order 
and Security Committee" in id., Art. I. 
19. Id., Art. VI. See also Zhongqonq yan zhuofang sudian jianu 
ming bubai zhiyuan (Communists claim "hotel incident"; 
Canadian woman declares her innocence.) World Journal, 
Sept. 10, 1982, p. 1. In this case, public security offi-
cials detained a female Canadian citizen of Chinese extrac-
tion who was a guest of an American news correspondent in 
his hotel room. For not following PRC regulations by not 
reporting her visit, he was fined 140 renminbi (=$90 at 
that time). 
These committees operate on the fringes of the law 
and, technically, need not respect provisions of PRC laws 
regarding search and seizure, surveillance, and conceiv-
ably, detention. The committees are considered representa-
tives of the masses and not the police. Surveillance may 
be so comprehensive that street committees, the lowest 
level governmental subdivision, may monitor the menstrual 
cycles of young women to ensure compliance with population 
control directives of the PRC. For an account of certain 
street committee activities, ~BUTTERFIELD, supra note 3, 
at 325-28. 
20. An excellent account of KGB operations vis-a-vis foreign 
diplomatic agents is found in J. BARRON, THE KGB ( 1974). 
See also "KGB-Agency of Fascist Repression, Spying, Subver-
sion," Survey of China's Mainland Press [hereafter SCMP], 
no. 5969 (Nov. 6, 1975), at 231; "Renmin Ribao Calls for 
Vigilance Against KGB," FBIS-cHI-82-032 (Feb. 17, 1982), at 
Cl. 
21. This was a statement made by PRC writer K'ung Meng in 1960 
in an article criticizing bourgeoise concepts of interna-
tional law, cited in Chiu, The United Nations, reprinted in 
LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND SE-
LECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (Leng and Chiu, 
ed., 1972) [hereafter LENG AND CHIU]. Query the argument 
that international organizations, though not indigenous to 
one nation, are still alien or foreign organizations to the 
PRC? 
22. Under a strictly literal interpretation of international 
law and in accord with international practice, an interna-
tional organization should not be regarded as a foreign 
entity in the country in which it operates, especially 
where that country is a member of that organization. 
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all outside personnel and outside interests not under di-
rect PRC control to be foreign entities. This is the 
result of the long-term unbridgeable chasm between the PRC 
and the outside world, as perceived under the ideology of 
the isolated Chinese totalitarian system. The PRC con-
tinues to conduct its political relationships pursuant to 
the phrase nei wai you bie (literally: "the inside and the 
outside are different.") 
2 3. Notice the obvious distinction between Ar tiel e 91 in its 
present .form and an Article 91 which· might be amended to 
read, "Offenders colluding with foreign countries or other-
wise •••• " (emphasis added). 
24. This argument may misgauge the force behind PRC concern for 
preventing intrusions of foreign agents and protecting Chi-
nese mainland sovereignty. For example, Taiwan -- the ob-
ject of PRC efforts at reunification but certainly not an 
enemy of the mainland in the literal sense is oc-
casionally rebuked for its acts of espionage against the 
PRC. See, ~· "Xinhua Scores Activities of Taiwan Secret 
Service," FBIS-cHI-82-094 (May 14, 1982), at "Kuomintang 
Secret Agents Arrested in Changsha," FBIS-cHI-81-047 (March 
11, 1981), at K2; "KMT 'Special Agent'· Arrested in 
Guangzhou~· FBIS-CHI-81-115 (June 16, 1981), at U1; "Yunnan 
Court Sentences Three 'KMT Spies, ... FBIS-CHI-81-163 (Aug. 
24, 1981), at 02; "Xinhua Scores Activities of Taiwan 
Secret Service," FBIS-CHI-82-094 (May 14, 1982), at Ul. 
25. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 235. 
26 . .!.£., at 237. 
27. See, ~, "Xisha Quandao Designated Restricted Military 
Zone," FBIS-cHI-82-225 (Nov. 22, 1982), at W5 (noting that 
no civil ian access was permitted to Paracel Islands and 
their 12-mile terr itoria1 waters); "USSR-PRC Rift Said to 
Hold Apart Two Mongol ias," FBIS-cHI-82-212 (Nov. 2, 1982), 
at ·C2 (noting that a 100-mile border area between Inner and 
Outer Mongolia is a restricted military zone). 
28. See, ~, "Plans Made to Open More Areas to Foreign 
Tourists," FBIS-cHI-78-114 (June 13, 1978), at Ell; "For-
malities Simplified For Foreign Tourists,• FBIS-Cffi-82-205 
(Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3. 
29. See ZILE, ·SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 241-44. 
30. This information was provided to the author by a cultural 
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., on June 
26, 1981. See also "Soviet Leadership Reneged on 1969 Bor-
der Agreement,"~IS-cHI-78-069 (April 10, ·1978), at A6; 
"NCNA Refutes Soviet Claims to Disputed Territory," FBIS-
CHI-78-099 (May 22, 1978), at AS; "Soviet Violations of ·PRC 
Border Reported," FBIS-cHI-79-168 (Aug. 28, 1979), at Cl. 
- 258 -
31. See note 27 supra. 
32. Promulgated by the State Council on April 30, 1965. The 
Act has been translated and reprinted in J. COHEN AND H. 
CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY 
STUDY 516-18 (2 Vols. 1974) [hereafter COHEN AND CHIU). 
33. See, ~· "Kirin Border Guard Captures Suspected Sabo-
teur," FBIS-CHI-78-025 (Feb. 6, 1978), at Ll; "South China 
Morning Post Says China Tightening Border Security," FBIS-
CHI-79-124 (June 26, 1979), at Ll4; "Hsin Wan Pao Reports 
on China Border Security," FBIS-cHI-79-124 (June 26, 1979), 
at Ul. 
34. See the 1965 Act on the Frontier Defense Inspection, supra 
note 32, Art. 11. 
35. In fact, these security checks may be irnpl icitly warranted 
by Article 10 of the 1965 Act on the Frontier Defense In-
spection, supra note 32, which requires that all those in 
charge of "means of communication" such as "vessels, air-
planes, trains [and) automobiles" which pass into or out of 
the PRC "carrying persons seeking to cross the national 
boundary secretly or goods endangering the security of Chi-
na" to report immediately to frontier inspection stations 
and "await disposition." 
36. For an English translation of the text, see COHEN AND CHIU, 
supra note 32, at 510-13. See generally Gongan fagui hui-
pian, supra note 1. 
37. This information was provided to the author by anonymous 
sources at the U.S. State Department, June 25, 1981. 
38. This information was provided to the author by Mr. Jeffrey 
Buczacki, China Division, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. in an interview on June 26, 1981. 
39. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 253. 
40. 1.2.· 
41. The Rules are reprinted in English Translation in COHEN AND 
CHIU, supra note 32, at 596-7. 
42. This information was provided to the author by a military 
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D. C., June 
25, 1981. 
43. This information was provided to the author by a cultural 
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D. C., July 
28, 1981. 
44. This information was provided to the author by a U.S. State 
Department official, July 28, 1981. 
- 259 -
45. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 249-50. 
46. See, ~, "Renmin Ribao on U.s., Soviet Military Satel-
lites," FBIS-cHI-82-158 (Aug. 16, 1982), at Al; "People's 
Daily Views US-USSR Contention in Space," FBIS-CHI-78-111 
(June 8, 1978), at Al; "Jen-mir'l Jih-pao Article: Competi-
tion in Space, Hardship on Earth," SCMP no. 5906 (July 31, 
1975), at 139. 
47. Liu Tse-yung, "The Question of the Legal Status of Cosmic 
Space," Kuo-chi wen-'ti yen-chiu (Studies in International 
Problems) no •. 8: 45-57 (1959) cited in GREENFIELD, supra 
note 8, at 195. ~ also COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 32, at 
499-501. 
48. See "PRC Delegate Speaks at UN Space Committee Session," 
FBIS-CHI-80-132 (July 8, 1980), at A2 (the PRC attended as 
an observer); "PRC to Join UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space," FBIS-cHI-80-214 (Nov. 3, 1980), at Al; "Zhao 
Ziyang Sends Greetings to UN Space Conference," FBIS-CHI-
82-154 (Aug. 10, 1982), at A2; "Delegate to UN Meeting 
Enunciates Space Policy," FBIS-CHI-82-156 (Aug. 12, 1982), 
at Al. 
49. See id. 
50. 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 13, 
1963). 
51. The official title of the document is the "Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing- the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies of January 27, 1967, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. See generally 
Chiu, The Law of Outer Space, in LENG AND CHIU, supra note 
21, at 115-21. 
52. See •soviet Satellite Crashes in Canada,• FBIS-CHI-78-017 
(Jan. 25, 1978), at Al3; "Ta Kung Pao Comments on Crash of 
Soviet Satellite,• FBIS-cHI-78-024 (Feb. 3, 1978), at Nl. 
53. March 29, 1972, [1973] 24 U.S.T. 2389, T. I.A.S. No. 7762. 
See GREENFIELD, supra note 8, at 195. 
54. See, ~· Doyle, Reentering Space Objects: Facts and 
Fiction, 6 J. OF SPACE LAW 107, 108 (Nov. 2, 1978); "AFP 
Reports Space Program Outlined at Conference," FBIS-CHI-82-
153 (Aug. 9, 1982), at K4 (noting that PRC had already sent 
11 "scientific and technological testing satellites" into 
orbit and would launch its first communications satellite 
in 1983 or 1984. 
55. These regulations were promulgated on June 28, 1964 
[hereafter Chiungehow Strait Regulations]. See COHEN AND 
CHIU, supra note 32, at 535-38. See also Gongan fagui 
huibian, supra note 1, at 290 for the Chinese text. 
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56. The full title of the regulations is the Measures Governing 
Foreign Vessels Entering and Leaving Port, promulgated on 
March 14, 1957 [hereafter Port Regulations], reprinted in 
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 32, at 559-61. See also Gongan 
fagui huibian, supra note 1, at 287 for the Chinese text. 
57. The full title of the regulations is the Measures Governing 
Foreign Vessels on Bordering Rivers, promulgated on April 
19, 1966 [hereafter River Regulations], reprinted in COHEN 
AND CHIU, supra note 32, at 567-70. See also Gongan fagui 
huibian, supra note 1, at 293 for the Chinese text. 
58. Article 11 of the Qiongzhou Strait Regulations, supra note 
55, reads: 
When passing through the Qiongzhou Strait, foreign 
nonmilitary vessels are not allowed to take pictures, 
to make surveys, or to engage in conduct that violates 
the laws and decrees of the PRC. 
Article 10 of the Port Regulations, supra note 56, reads: 
Passengers and crew of a foreign vessel shall not be 
allowed to engage in photographing or sketching in 
port. 
Article 11 of the River Regulations, supra note 57, reads, 
inter alia: 
A foreign vessel entering port on a bordering river or 
a river reaching a foreign country, together with its 
crew and passengers on board, is forbidden to do the 
following: 
(1) Photographing and sketching ... 
59. See "1957 Security Regulations Published," FBIS-cHI-80-039 
(Feb. 26, 1980), at LS-15. 
60. Officials at both the U.S. State Department and the Chinese 
Embassy in Washington, D. C., confirmed this restriction. 
It apparently stemmed from the recent use by a foreigner of 
16 mm. photography to film an unflattering movie of the 
PRC. 
61. For the text of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, see "Text of New 
PRC Constitution Published," FBIS-cHI-82-235 (Dec. 7, 
1982), at Kl-28. The Constitution was promulgabed on Dec. 
4, 1982. See also 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, id., Art. 10; 
"Discipline Commission on Illegal Housebuilding,• FBIS-CHI-
81-193 (Oct. 6, 1981), at KG (calling for halt to illegal 
building of private homes by cadres) "Guangxi Notice Pro-
hibits Unlawful Acquisition of Land," FBIS-cHI-80-060 
(March 26, 1980), at Pl (calling for "serious treatment" of 
those who violate state policy on land acquisition and pur-
chase land for unauthorized use, such as the construction 
of private residences); "Hainan Daily Cites Case of Corrupt 
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Truck Drivers," FBIS-CHI-78-098 (May 19, 1978), at H7 
(publicizing acts which cause serious damage to property in 
the PRC), But see Article 82 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, 
infra note 6~which recognizes certain legitimate forms of 
private property such as income, savings and other means of 
livelihood as well as private· plots, livestock and trees 
near the house. Accord 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 
61, Art. 13. 
In addition, the PRC has recently been much more 
liberal in permitting private operation (i.e., sanziyibao) 
of agricultural activities. See Prybyla, Readjustment and 
Reform in the Chinese Economy, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS 
SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., No. 2-1981(39), at 25-27. 
See also "Renmin Ribao Commentator on Expanding Private 
Plot~FBIS-CHI-81-122 (June 25, 1981), at Kl; "Private 
Run Industry Seen as Indispensable," FBIS-CHI-82-186 (Sept. 
24, 1982), at K3. 
62. See "Text of Law on Environmental Protection," FBIS-CHI-79-
182 (Sept. 18, 1979), at Ll. Article 25 states: "Pollu-
tion of foods in the course of production, processing, 
packing, transporting, storing and selling should be 
strictly prevented. Examination should be strengthened 
and those foods that do not meet the sanitary standards of 
the state should be strictly prohibited from being sold, 
exported and imported." 
63. See "State Council Issues Standardization Regulations," 
FBIS-CHI-79-158 (Aug. 14, 1979), at Ll. 
64. See "Further on· NPC Standing Committee Meeting: 'Hygiene 
Law Discussed'," FBIS-CHI-82-220 (Nov. 15, 1982), at K3. 
See also "Wang Wei Explains New Food Hygiene Law," FBIS-
CHI-82-227 (Nov. 24, 1982), at K2. 
65. See "Export-Import Quarantine Regulations Issued," FBIS-
CHI-82-122 (June 24, 1982), at K5. 
66. See "Text of Law on Environmental Protection," FBIS-CHI-79-
182 (Sept. 18, 1979), at Ll. See also "Provisional Norms 
on Sea Pollution Issued," FBIS-CHI-80-050 (March 12, 1980), 
at L6 n PLA Issues Environmental Protect ion Regulations I" 
FBIS-CHI-82-079 (April 23, 1982), at K8. Cf., "Tough 
Environmental Laws Urged at Taiyuan Meeting," FBIS-CHI-80-
050 (March 12, 1980), at L5; "Article Urges Formulation of 
Energy Law,• FBIS-CHI-82-097 (May 19, 1982), at Kll. China 
Draws tire Over Environment, Balto. Sun, Oct. 4, 1982, at 
A8. 
67. See "Text of New Forestry Act Recently Adopted by NPC," 
FBIS-CHI-79-043 (March 2, 1979), at El. Cf., "Anhui Offi-
cial Arrested for Violating Forestry Law,n-FBIS-CHI-80-246 
(Dec. 19, 1980), at 03. 
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68. The PRC CRI!UNAL CODE was passed on July 1, 1979 at the 
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and 
entered into force on January 1, 1980. See Gongan fagui 
huibian, supra note 1, at 4-33. For the English text of 
the Code, see "Seven PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second 
Session," FBIS-cHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979) PART I: Supp. 
No. 019 [hereafter Supp. No. 019)), at 33-62. Article 129 
of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE provides in pertinent part that 
" [ t) hose guilty of the serious viol at ion of the 
resources protection law • . • will be sentenced to fixed 
term imprisonment of not more than 2 years, detention or 
fines." Article 129 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE connects a 
number of violations (i.e., violation of the resources pro-
tection law; violation of the acquatic product law; and, 
using forbidden tools to catch acquatic products) with the 
conjunctive "and." It is not clear whether the accused 
must therefore violate all the elements of the provision or 
whether violation of a single element (i.e., the resources 
protection law) is sufficient for criminal responsibility. 
Cf., Articles 5, 8, 15 of the 1957 Public Security Regula-
tions, supra note 59, punishing, inter alia "soiling scenic 
sports (sic) [or) historical sites ..• or wilfully damag-
ing flowers, grass and trees in parks and along streets." 
See also "State Council Decision on Environmental Protec-
tion;"FBIS-cHI-81-049 (March 13, 1981), at L2; 1982 PRC 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, Arts. 9, 12, and 26. 
69. Article 128 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, id., provides in per-
tinent part that "[t)hose guilty of the serious violation 
of the forest protection law . will be sentenced to 
fixed term imprisonment of not more than 3 years or deten-
tion and can concurrently or exclusively be sentenced [sic) 
fines." Cf. Articles 5, 8, 15 of the 1957 Public Security 
Regulations, note 59, supra. 
70. Ar tiel es in the Chinese press on PRC sovereignty over its 
natural resources abound. The PRC has been particularly 
vehement in this respect at the United Nations in recent 
negotiations for a new law of the sea regime. See ~' 
"Delegates Address Sea Law Treaty Conference: "Han Xu: 
PRC to Sign Treaty,• FBIS-cHI-82-238 (Dec. 10, 1982), at 
A3; "Issues at UN Law of Sea Conference Viewed," FBIS-cHI-
82-050 (March 15, 1982), at Al; "PRC Representative Speaks 
at Law of Sea Conference," FBIS-cHI-80-173 (Sept. 4, 1980), 
at A2; "Foreign Ministry Warns USSR, SRV Against Oil Pros-
pecting [in South China Sea)," FBIS-CHI-80-141 (July 21, 
1980), at El; "UN Sea Conference on New Law Continues 
'Heated Debate' ,• FBIS-cP.I-78-079 (April 24, 1978), at A2; 
"PRC Representative Addresses UN ESCAP Conference," FBIS-
CHI-78-048 (March 10, 1978), at AlO. 
71. PRC recognition of a sovereign right to compensation for 
damages was explicitly stated in 1982 in a Chinese demand 
for compensation for cargo lost when a u.s. submarine sank 
a Japanese freighter in the East China Sea in April 1981. 
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See "China Daily on Suit Against U.S. Over Cargo," FBIS-
CHI-82-104 (May 28, 1982), at Bl. 
Prior to this, Chinese recognition of a sovereign 
right to compensation for damages was i:npl ied in a Xinhua 
commentary on the Soviet MIG which landed in Japan. See 
"Hsinhua Correspondent: Who Should Pay Compensation?" SCMP 
no. 6333 (May 5, 1977), at 219. 
Compensation is also required under the PRC CRIMINAL 
CODE, supra note 68. Article 31 states: "Apart from sanc-
tions according to law, an offender guilty of an offense 
resulting in financial losses to a victim should also be 
sentenced to make reparations [peichang] in the light of 
the condition." See also Art. 41 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITU-
TION, supra note61;--wilich asserts that "[c]itizens who 
have suffered losses through infringement of their civic 
rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to 
compensation. . . . • 
72. There are, however, pubicized directives admonishing Chi-
nese citizens to appropriately conduct themselves in their 
relations with foreigners. One recent government/CCP cam-
paign stressed the slogan "five stresses and four 
beauties," requiring Chinese to "be warm and friendly 
.civilized and courteous and be neither supercilious 
nor obseqious." See, ~· "Ban Yue Tan on Dealings with 
Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-81-238 (Dec. 11, 1981), at K9. See 
also "Yangcheng Wanbao Discusses Foreign Influences," FBIS-
CHI-82-037 (Feb. 23, 1982), at K5. See also note 92, 
infra. -- ---
73. Article 13 of the 1951 State Secrets Regulations, supra 
note 1, provides: 
Any person who behaves in one of the following ways 
shall be found guilty of being a counterrevolutionary and 
shall be punished according [to] the regulations for the 
punishment of cou.nterrevolutionar ies: 1) Any person who 
sells state secrets to enemies at home and abroad; 2) any 
person who deliberately divulges state secrets to enemies 
at home and abroad; and, 3) any person who sells state 
secrets to domestic and foreign profiteers. 
A good example of the capriciousness of 'state secrecy 
laws in the PRC was provided by a secret directive issued 
by the CCP, making it a criminal offense to trace Mao 
Zedong's writings back to their original versions. As such 
Mao's writings could be revised, without mass knowledge of 
the changes, to reflect "each new twist of the political 
line." See SHORT, supra note 10, at 149. 
74. See Articles 28, 53, 54, and 76. Note also that the 1982 
PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, included prov1S1ons in-
sulating deputies of the National People's Congress (NPC) 
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from legal accountability for comments made at NPC meet-
ings. See Arts. 74 and 75. Though this might appear 
ostensibly as a form of immunity from prosecution for 
acts performed reasonably within the scope of official 
functions, no NPC deputy or other state functionary is 
authorized to reveal any form of classified information. 
Under all circumstances divulging unpublicized information, 
even where the act appears to conform with NPC legislative 
enactments, would be tantamount to violating state secrecy 
laws and punishable as ultra vires activity. Cf. "Renmin 
Ribao on Whether Speeches Can Be Crimes," FBIS-cHI-82-140 
(July 21, 1982), at K2; note 7, supra. 
75. For an example of PRC treatment of those who levy false 
charges, ~· ~· Self-Correction by the Party, Beijing 
Review, No. 16 (April 21, 1980), at 5; "Kansu Prefecture 
Announces Arrest of 'Archcriminal' ," FBIS-CHI-78-176 (Sept. 
11, 1978), at M2. A recent article noted that those who 
falsely accuse others of being enemy agents are 1 iable to 
life imprisonment. See "Legislator Comments on Penalties 
in Gang Trial," FBIS-CHI-81-013 (Jan. 21, 1981), at L3. 
76. See note 6 supra. 
77. See note 12 supra. See also Guiding Principles for Inner 
Party Political Life, Beijing Review, No. 13 ( i1arch 31, 
1980), at 3. Note also that Chinese press reports stated 
that the abolition of the "Sida" (Four Bigs of the 1978 PRC 
Constitution) was due, inter alia, to their tendency to 
permit communication of Party and state secrets. See Im-
portant Resolutions of N.P.C. Standing Committee, Beijing 
Review, No. 17 (April 28, 1980), at 3. 
78. H. BE~~AN AND P. MAGGS, DISARM~~ENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET 
LAW 35-7 (1967) [hereafter BERMAN AND MAGGS]. 
79. Id., at 36. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Ellis and Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement in 
the People's Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L. J. 155, 
159 n.22 (Nov. 2, 1981). 
83. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 288. 
84. Actually, the language is written in the converse, stating 
that "all organs of state, public organizations and 
citizens concerned are obliged to supply the necessary in-
formation to those committees of inquiry when they conduct 
investigations." See 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, 
Art. 71. See also Art. 73. 
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85. The PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE was passed on July 1, 1979 
at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Con-
gress and entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980. See Gongan 
fagui huibian, supra note 1, at 34-65. For the English 
text of the PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, see "Seven PRC 
Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-CHI-79-146 
(July 27, 1979) PART II: Supp. No. 020 [hereafter Supp. 
No. 020]. 
86. For an overview of PRC laws applicable for noncooperation, 
see "Article Discusses Concealing Criminal Behavior," FBIS-
CHI-82-054 (March 19, 1982), at K8. 
Cf. Article 73 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 6I, which requires ·officials of the State Council and 
its subordinate organs to "answer the questions [of NPC and 
NPC Standing Committee deputies] in a responsible manner." 
87. See "Leniency for Those Who Confess Crimes Advocated," 
FBIS-CHI-82-066 (April 6, 1982), at K4; "Renmin Ribao on 
Criminal Law Leniency, Severity," FBIS-CHI-81-234 (Dec. 7, 
1981) at K24. Chiu, Structural Changes in the Organization 
and Operation of China's Criminal Justice System, oc-
CASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., 
No. 1-1981(38), at 4 and 18 n.30. See also "Renmin Ribao 
Urges Leniency Toward Cadres Who Made tiiTStakes in Past ,• 
FBIS-CHI-79-056 (March 21, 1979), at Ll5; "Shanghai Case of 
Shielding Murderer Handled According to Law," FBIS-CHI-79-
155 (Aug. 9, 1979), at 02; "Jiefang Ribao Comments on Main-
taining Social Order," FBIS-cHI-80-002 (Jan. 3, 1980), at 
06. 
88. See The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China 
Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Invest-
ment, Beijing Review, No. 40 (Oct. 6, 1980), a 18. 
89. See Regulations on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using 
Chinese and Foreign Investment, 7 CHINA BUS. REV. 43 (No. 
6, Nov.-Dec. 1980). 
90. Supervision and inspection would also appear to apply to 
the implementation of the PRC Quarantine Regulations, supra 
note 65, and the PRC Food Hygiene Law, supra note 64, the 
drafts of which are currently being revised for formal 
enactment. 
91. See BERMAN AND MAGGS, supra note 78, at 36; ZILE, SHARLET 
AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 285. 
92. See "Shanghai Radio Urges Proper Attitudes Toward Foreign-
ers," FBIS-cHI-79-084 (April 30, 1979), at 02. See ~ 
note 72, supra; "Guangming Ribao Discusses Proper Approach 
to Foreign Things," FBIS-CHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at LlO; 
"AFP: Restrictions Placed on Chinese Contacts with For-
eigners," FBIS-CHI-79-105 (May 30, 1979), at L2; "State 
Council Publishes Decision of Gifts," FBIS-cHI-80-225 (Nov. 
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19, 1980), at Ll (noting that, according to a State Council 
decision, no Chinese are allowed to accept gifts in dealing 
with foreign nationals and organizations without the ap-
proval of appropriate authorities). 
93. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 289. 
94. See "Political Dissident Sentenced to 15 Years 
ment," FBIS-CHI-79-201 (Oct. 16, 1979), at Ll. 
note 13, supra. 
Imprison-
See also 
95. "Remmin Ribao Report on Beijing Trial of Wei Jingsheng," 
FBIS-cHI-79-207 (Oct. 24, 1979), at Ll. Wei was actually 
convicted of a number of crimes. In addition to supplying 
information to a foreigner, Wei was convicted of carrying 
out revolutionary propaganda and agitation and damaging the 
vital interests of the state and the people. Id. Though 
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cused -- in this case Ma Tianshui, who was suffering from 
"psychosis," as diagnosed by a judicial medical exa~iner at 
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143. Id., at 299-300. 
144. See also Article 75 of the PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 
supra note 85, which states: 
An inspection may be conducted of the person of the 
injured party or the accused in order to ascertain his fea-
tures, injury or physiological condition. 
If the accused refused to be inspected, investigators 
may subject him to a compulsory inspection when deemed 
necessary. 
An inspection of the person of a woman shall be con-
ducted by female personnel or a medical doctor. 
- 273 -
g. note 84, supra. Note also that under the recently 
implemented provisional civil procedure code, courts must 
base their findings in civil cases on facts and are re-
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tions," FBIS-CHI-79-039 (Feb. 26, 1979), at E2. 
146. See also Article 131 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 
68, whiCh provides, inter alia, that "the law protects the 
citizens' personal and democratic rights and other rights 
against unlawful infringement by any person or 
organization.• 
147. The Chinese press has occasionally publicized egregious 
violations of search laws and has stressed the respect that 
ought to be exhibited toward personal premises. See ~· 
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CHI-80-161 (Aug. 18, 1980), at P2; "Zhejiang Illega'l House 
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Conclusion 
Chinese perceptions of international law issues, including 
the recognition of international organizations and individuals, 
have varied with broadly-defined domestic goals. For example, 
the PRC's previous hard-line position on refusing to recognize 
international organizations as juridical personalities has yield-
ed to a more flexible posture, most recently illustrated by Chi-
nese accession to the UN Convention on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the Specialized Agencies, participation in the UN Disar-
mament Committee, ratification of the UN Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons with a statement noting among the Conven-
tion's inadequacies the absence of adequate verification mea-
sures,! and recommendation of nuclear disarmament verifiable by 
an international inspectorate body.2 Nevertheless, these PRC 
acts cannot be wantonly paraded before the international communi-
ty as a weathervane of future PRC commitment to the operation of 
any ACD agency on PRC territory. 
Chinese positions are palpably inconsistent, frequently am-
biguous, and legally duplicitous. The PRC, for example, may have 
ratified the UN Specialized Agency Convention, but it has not 
ratified the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, which grants juridical status to the United 
Nations and would appear to be the logical precursor to recogni-
tion of UN agencies. The Chinese have also refused to accept the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 
Despite its participation in the UN Disarmament Committee and its 
recent ratification of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, the PRC has not exhibited any tangible interest in 
cooperating in multilateral disarmament talks: rather, its posi-
tion is noticeably noncommittal pending primary disarmament mea-
sures first implemented by the superpowers. Moreover, the sug-
gestion that disarmament on a multilateral scale is a function of 
bilateral initiation gives the Chinese the justification they 
require to increase their military expenditures and develop newer 
and more sophisticated weapons systems in the interim. It has 
also served as the rationale for PRC recalcitrance in refusing to 
ratify existing ACD treaties such as the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even the PRC 's 
laudable 1982 disarmament proposal, including provisions for 
verification by an international inspectorate under UN authority, 
is sufficiently nebulous to permit the Chinese the luxury of op-
posing verification measures unilaterally deemed overly intrusive 
or otherwise found unsatisfactory. 
In short, PRC perceptions of international law, inter-
national organizations and individuals, and ACD verification mea-
sures have always been formed and followed within the context of 
the Chinese commitment to the inviolable nature of state 
sovereignty. Arguably, the idea of arms control and arms inspec-
tion runs counter to such a concept. Chinese reluctance might 
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reasonably be manifested at the negotiating table, PRC represen-
tatives claiming that the constraints of arms control and intru-
siveness of arms inspection constitute an undue interference into 
the sovereign affairs of the PRC. Undoubtedly, Chinese recep-
tiveness to an arms control agreement and concomitant inspection 
provisions will remain a function of PRC perceptions of the 
international law principles of sovereignty and noninterference 
in the internal affairs of a state, and, perhaps, the degree to 
which other parties to the agreement reconcile arms control ar-
rangements with their own views of such principles. 
International l:aw principles aside, there are fundamental 
Chinese domestic concerns which would influence the execution of 
arms control provisions within the PRC or determine the willing-
ness of other nuclear powers to secure Chinese cooperation in 
their implementation. Systematic re:froductions of legislative 
and judicial pronouncements are few. To some extent, this is 
the result of the relative infancy of operation of Chinese legal 
codes: to a larger degree, the lack of information is part and 
parcel to the Chinese tradition of mistrust of foreign elements 
and the tendency to envelop the operational aspect of formal Chi-
nese government in secrecy. Chinese xenophobia is an extremely 
sensitive concern, particularly where potential verification pro-
cedures envision the creation of a non-Chinese inspectorate body. 
The PRC has been extremely assiduous in insulating Chinese 
society from foreign influence. Despite apparent attempts to 
reconcile its mistrust of foreigners with its constitutionally-
expressed goal of achieving the four modernizations by the onset 
of the twenty-first century, the PRC has set in motion formally-
sanctioned procedures for foreign contact, some of which inhibit, 
rather than promote, bilateral association. The relative eu-
phoria enveloping the exposure of Chinese and American society to 
each other following normalization of relations in 1979 has been 
tempered by the rather loose interpretation of Chinese secrecy 
laws to activities engaged in between Chinese nationals and 
Americans. Party, military, state and seemingly innocuous forms 
of information are subject to PRC secrecy laws, and the Chinese 
have simply broadened or narrowed their application to reflect 
shifts in political relations. Thus an arms inspectorate might 
be faced with significant obstructive PRC practices that result 
from the vagaries and caprices of what constitutes secret infor-
mation. Undoubtedly, effective inspection operations would re-
quire either drastic revisions in the drafting of, or exemptions 
from, existing secrecy laws in the PRC. 
Secrecy laws are not, of course, the only legal impendiments 
to effective inspectorate operations in the PRC. Relevant provi-
sions of the PRC Constitution, Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure 
Code, Arrest and Detention Regulations, Entry, Exit and Transit 
regulations, and local decrees and regulations are worded suffi-
ciently ambiguously as to create uncertainty as to their applica-
tion at any given time. The result is an unequivocal conclusion 
that an inspectorate can operate in the PRC only insofar as revi-
sions in, or exemptions from, numerous Chinese laws are 
extensive. 
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The decision to accept and implement verification procedures 
rests mainly with the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP has such 
pervasive influence over each and every aspect of Chinese 1 ife 
that it remains unquestionably the single, most dominant force in 
creating an environment which facilitates or inhibits arms in-
spection. Where arms inspection procedures were considered 
tolerable within the PRC system, Party support as policy-maker 
and pol icy-executor would likely ensure full compliance with an 
arms inspection pol icy. The gover mnen tal system, despite its 
ostensible role in the pol icy-making and pol icy-execution pro-
cesses as laid down in the recent legal codes, appears to exert 
only a marginal influence. Party control of governmental units 
and basic-level societal units (through public supervisory or-
ganizations such as people's mediation committees) would seem to 
preclude the possibility of official opposition to a CCP-
supported arms inspection policy, though the exact strength and 
independent function of intra-Party factions cannot be gauged 
with sufficient certainty to determine their role in inspection 
operations. 
Despite the CCP's dissemination of the 1979-80 legal codes 
to the Chinese masses and the Party's emphasis on socialist 
legality, the entire legislative and administrative machinery 
rem a ins subordinate to the CCP at every 1 evel. The Party'!; mo-
nopoly on the pol icy-making and pol icy-execution processes per-
mits CCP-initiated directives to be immediately implement-:d by 
governmental authorities. Moreover, such enactments are 1 ikely 
to be binding on all cadres and individuals, regardless of their 
advice and consent. Though such a centralized process can readi-
ly facilitate the operation of an inspectorate in the PRC, Party 
control can cut both ways. It can be used just as readily as an 
obstructive factor in inspection operations, the more so because 
the CCP leadership has at its disposal all the necessary means to 
influence civic attitudes towards the inspection process. By 
publicizing or propagandizing an arms inspection policy through 
the communications media, mass organizations and mass campaigns, 
the Party has the power to highlight incidents of intrusiveness 
and to otherwise create an at:nosphere of significant adverse 
publicity for inspection operations. 
Despite the apparent power of legal and quasi-legal organs 
in the PRC, the CCP can expect no serious threat to its control. 
First, the procuracy and the judiciary are composed of CCP cad-
res, whose task is, first and foremost, to strengthen Party 
leadership over the masses. Second, the judiciary in the PRC 
does not exercise the power of judicial review as it is known in 
.the West. Any challenge to the validity of implementing legisla-
tion is expected to issue from the procuracy, though there has 
yet to appear an instance in which the procuracy has challenged 
any Party-initiated decrees on constitutional or other legal 
grounds. CCP-initiated implementing legislation in support of an 
arms inspection policy is therefore unlikely to be opposed by PRC 
legal organs, in spite of constant calls in the media for the 
exercise of independent legal authority. 
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Undoubtedly, there is the opportunity for a more positive 
association among the Party, Chinese legal organs and an inspec-
torate. Where the CCP supports an arms inspection policy, a full 
array of legal and quasi-legal organizations can help to facil i-
tate compliance. The procuracy might utilize its extensive in-
vestigative powers to expedite the procurement of inspectorate 
information and to ensure cooperation from local authorities. 
The more informal dispute resolution procedures, such as media-
tion and arbitration, might s~rve to create an environment con-
ducive to effective, expeditious and harmonious dispute resolu-
tion. The courts -- in the event it became necessary to resort 
to them -- could be used as a forum for the construction of broad 
legal principles that facilitate inspection operations. In most 
instances, however, an inspectorate should recognize the PRC 
aversion to formal judicial procdure and the 1 ikel ihood that re-
sort to the judiciary may itself indicate Chinese unhappiness 
with inspection activities. 
Quasi-public and mass organizations can be used to indoctri-
nate the Chinese masses with positive attitudes toward inspection 
functions. Moreover, the Party can facilitate the molding of 
such attitudes by tailoring Chinese Communist ideological con-
structs to meet the goals of effective inspection operations. 
Assuming the conclusion of an arms control agreement, there 
are numerous legal and administrative safeguards that an inspec-
.torate would require in order to carry out its operations in the 
PRC. First, verification procedures must be made operative 
within PRC territory. Though the Chinese appear to be particu-
larly attentive to their treaty obligations because of their be-
lief that treaties are the most unequivocal expression of state 
consent, verification arrangements would probably require 
specific incorporation into Chinese municipal law. To this end, 
the most effective means of facilitating inspection operations 
would probably be to incorporate the carefully-outlined powers of 
an inspectorate in a statute promulgated by the NPC and its 
Standing Committee. Since lower-level legislatures exercise 
mostly subordinate, rather than concurrent, powers, the enactment 
of a statute at the NPC level would bind provincial and lower-
level law-making bodies and facilitate inspection operations. 
Obviously, PRC enabling legislation is, by itself, insuffi-
cient for effective verification operations. The Chinese must be 
required to provide an inspectorate with a continuous flow of 
information on national and local laws. Moreover, an inspector-
ate is well-advised to engage in political monitoring -- through 
the examination of media pronouncements -- in order to observe 
potential changes in the internal functioning of CCP leadership 
that may impact on inspectorate legislation and operations. 
Most importantly, effective, unimpeded inspection operations 
will require a relatively broad grant of privileges and immuni-
ties from Chinese substantive and procedural jurisdiction. 
Privileges and immunities would be required regardless of whether 
the form of the inspectorate were adversar ial or international in 
character. Arguably, the Chinese appear most willing to part 
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with sovereign jurisdiction where the inspectorate is interna-
tional in character. An adversary inspectorate would, inter 
alia, require the Chinese to undertake a significant resocializa-
tion process, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union, 
which has been accused consistently of using diplomatic privi-
leges as a cover for covert ac tiv i ties. The par tic ipa tion of 
Chinese nationals on the inspectorate team, despite the obvious 
advantages it offers the PRC in keeping inspection operations 
supervision to some extent • in-house," suffers from the poten-
tially more severe repercussions which might accompany the ultra 
vires conduct of Chinese personnel, including the possible con-
flict between a grant of privileges and immunities and the im-
position of severe criminal penal ties for counterrevolutionary 
activity. 
In many instances, an international inspectorate -- particu-
larly in the event its members were from Third World nations --
would not suffer from the same infirmities. First, the PRC con-
siders itself ideologically, socially, and economically com-
patible with many Third World countries. Second, Chinese au-
thorities rarely ascribe to Third World nations the more ob-
noxious features of the superpowers, such as blatant acts of 
espionage or competitive escalation of the arms race. There 
would simply be less distrust of Third World members' intentions 
than those of, say, the Soviet Union. Finally, the PRC is al-
ready on record as supporting an international body to "carry out 
effective verification", a choice of words that, despite their 
potential, offer nothing more than support for the collection of 
data by an international body. Nevertheless, despite its dis-
similarity to support. for on-site verification by an internation-
al inspectorate, the PRC's proposal is still a step in the direc-
tion of mutual, observable compliance with ACD measures. 
An inspectorate, in addition to a grant of broad privileges 
and immunities, would also require certain exemptions from Chi-
nese restrictions, particularly as they apply to the freedom of 
movement of personnel, equipment and supplies in the PRC. Ob-
viously, the novelty and untested procedures of inspectorate 
operations will create a significant degree of suspicion, and it 
seems almost tautological to assert that the more specific and 
narrowly-focused the requisite privileges, immunities and exemp-
tions, the greater the likelihood of their acceptance by the Chi-
nese. Inspectorate operations should be limited to the collec-
tion of relevant data and the examination of appropriate facili-
ties and should result in only marginal contact with the everyday 
aspects of Chinese life, thus reducing any latent fear of the 
effects of any perceived, pernicious, outside influence on Chi-
nese society. 
For the most part, the insulation of Chinese society from 
inspectorate operations should make it desirable for the inspec-
torate to operate its own means of communication and transporta-
tion and to secure separate accommodations and personal services. 
Not only would this limit any foreign influence on the masses and 
more readily permit Chinese monitoring of inspection activities, 
but it would also protect the inspectorate from the potential 
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harassment of mass organizations, street committees and the like 
and facilitate operations, since all inspectorate functions .would 
proceed through special channels. 
Because of the Chinese penchant for secrecy and control, the 
consolidation of the supervision of inspectorate operations in 
the PRC in a newly-created special Chinese agency (or agencies) 
or commission would seem to be a realistic and plausible consid-
eration. The establishment of such entities within the PRC 
should pose no legal obstacles to the Chinese, assuming, of 
course, Chinese Communist Party approval for its creation. The 
PRC has, for example, set up a Legislative Affairs Commission 
under the NPC Standing Committee4 to draft and revise legislation 
and~ Discipline Inspection Committee under the Chinese Communist 
Par ty5 to investigate and discipline CCP cad res for legal and 
ethical violations. A commission combining these types of func-
tions (i.e., legislative, investigative and prosecutorial) would 
be an excellent prototype for an ACD supervisory body.A special 
PRC organ to oversee inspectorate operations and handle inspec-
torate requests would, as is perhaps true of most totalitarian 
regimes, reduce bureaucratic red tape, provide a single forum 
from which and through which to channel complaints, ensure in-
sulation of the masses from inspectorate activities, guarantee 
compliance with PRC national security, minimize the number of 
personnel involved in verification, and legitimize inspectorate 
operations by introducing government involvement in the entire 
process. To these ends, the CCP could .simply create a new minis-
try or agency to oversee inspectorate operations and report di-
rectly to the Party's Central Committee or it could put a high-
level Party official directly in charge of the ministry or agen-
cy. In either case, the CCP would be 1 ikel y to assume more or 
less direct control of inspectorate operations. 
At the heart of the entire process of on-site inspection in 
the PRC is not only Chinese willingness to participate in ACD 
measures but perceptions within the international community that 
PRC participation is relevant. Evidence of the former continues 
to accumulate. Despite apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies, 
there are promising indications offerred by the mere fact that 
the Chinese have taken affirmative steps to provide their own ACD 
proposals. In both 1979 and 1982, PRC formal pronouncements on 
disarmament have indicated growing Chinese concern for stemming 
the arms race, and its 1982 proposal calling for effective 
verification by an international body is as progressive a disar-
mament measure as has been offerred in any international forum by 
any nuclear power. Chinese participation in the UN Disarmament 
Commission, the resurgence of international law study in the PRC, 
Chinese military potency, weapons modernization programs, and the 
recent promulgation of numerous major legal codes are cumulative 
evidence of the Chinese calculus of cooperation and interdepen-
dence underlying effective implementation of ACD measures. 
The reaction of the international community to these PRC 
actions has, however, been mixed. The current absence of sophis-
ticated nuclear weapons delivery systems, the general language of 
PRC disarmament proposals, and th.e tendency of the Chinese to go 
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long on rhetoric and short on hard-nosed negotiation have thus 
far resulted in an essentially bilateral !US-USSRl quality to ACD 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the growing nuclear weapons freeze 
movement, the initiation of bilateral USSR-PRC normalization 
talks,6 US-PRC normalization, and US-PRC negotiations on a 
nuclear accord? suggest formally unacknowledged but nevertheless 
systematic attempts to incorporate Chinese behavior as a signifi-
cant variable in foreign policy strategies in general and in ACD 
proposals in particular.B There may be many controversial and as 
yet unanswerable questions concerning PRC involvement in ACD is-
sues, but its importance and relevance to those ought not be 
among them. 
The degree to which the PRC would be willing to fulfill its 
obligations under the requirements of ACD verification procedures 
will depend greatly on the careful preparation of the agreement, 
the reciprocal obligations of its provisions, and the negotiation 
of all terms by highly qualified and tactful personnel who can 
demonstrate the significant competence and serious intentions of 
all parties. 
In the final analysis, arms control, disarmament, and 
verification are issues that are important not merely in theory 
and not only to the United States and the Soviet Union. Because 
of the messianic urge of each to deliver the earth from the 
threat of nuclear war posed by the other, American and Soviet 
negotiators lose sight of the whole. And the danger of ignoring 
the more general implications is not that ACD and verification 
will become insignificant, but that they will thereby become 
irrelevant. 
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